Is this a good argument? (RE: Subjectivism)

[Surlethe]

The point of my probability argument, in case it wasn't clear, is that we actually define reality by the consensus of observers. If an individual's perception of reality does not conform with the objective measurements an overwhelming majority agree on, then we agree that person is delusional. In other words, we conclude delusion with respect to our observations, rather than vice versa.

[Darth Wong]

The probability that a six-sided die will roll a number N is 1/6.

That is how we model probability, and it isn't "probability itself."

Completely irrelevant. Newland's argument was that the probability of anything happening is tiny, which is simple idiocy. If the actual probability of a six-sided die rolling the same number twice in 6 trials was "ridiculously tiny", then we'd never see it happen.

Perhaps more to the point, it confuses "before the fact" and "after the fact" probability. It's like the argument that any given hand in poker is just as unlikely as a royal flush. This is technically true, yet that is not what people mean when they say that a royal flush is extremely unlikely while other hands are less so. If you must get one specific outcome, then the probability of that outcome must be weighed against all other possible outcomes. But if you can happily select from 50 similar outcomes, then you examine the probability of that set of outcomes as a whole, not any individual outcome within that set.

It's the kind of argument people make about probability when they don't really understand probability. Needless to say, I've seen it countless times before because of my extensive dealings with creationists.

[SWPIGWANG]

Darth Wong wrote:
Perhaps more to the point, it confuses "before the fact" and "after the fact" probability.

uhhh....What does "before the fact" and "after the fact" mean? I think this has something to do with denying a certain reality is possible because it is improbable "before the fact." This is an error because the sum of the all probability is one, despite the low chances of each individual event, or something?

I understand what sets of outcomes are and how they are calculated (for example, given a 1/6 chance/side fair die, the chance of it being even is 1/6*3) but I still don't get what the term before and after the fact means means.

I could try saying that the probability of continous events to be zero since the probability of any discrete event in the set is zero...... (runs before the horrible curbstomp via the 3vil created by sir issac newton...grrrrr)

Surlethe wrote: The point of my probability argument, in case it wasn't clear, is that we actually define reality by the consensus of observers. If an individual's perception of reality does not conform with the objective measurements an overwhelming majority agree on, then we agree that person is delusional.

I'm never completely comfortable with this thought because it implies that I could be "delusional." If reality is defined by consensus than it would appear that I do not have automatic access to it, despite thought and sentience. I can't tolerate self-contradiction that this implies possible.

Maybe I'm going into a direction that would lead to a dead end, but I'd think that "knowledge" is possible for all observers. However knowledge would be "the properties and sumation of the results of measurements" and things like "external/internal reality" (as traditionally defined) is irrelevent as the either method of generation have no effect on the measurement or the comprehension of it. Such ideas are not and can not be "knowledge", but empty logical constructs that is useless.

[Kuroneko]

uhhh....What does "before the fact" and "after the fact" mean? I think this has something to do with denying a certain reality is possible because it is improbable "before the fact." This is an error because the sum of the all probability is one, despite the low chances of each individual event, or something? I understand what sets of outcomes are and how they are calculated (for example, given a 1/6 chance/side fair die, the chance of it being even is 1/6*3) but I still don't get what the term before and after the fact means means.

The conditional probability of A given B is P{A|B} = P{A∩B}/P(B), i.e., the probability of both and A and B occuring divided by the probability of B occurring. Intuitively, the probability measure is "rescaled" to a known event B that has already occurred. That is why it is also called posterior probability, "after the fact" that B occurred. For example, the probability of getting a poker hand A♣K♣Q♣J♣10♣ is only 1/C(52,5) = 3.8477e-7, only a bit higher than one-in-three-million. That's the prior, or "before the fact" probability. However, given that a royal flush has occurred, the probability of that hand is exactly 0.25, since there are four possible royal flush hands, one for each suit.

I could try saying that the probability of continous events to be zero since the probability of any discrete event in the set is zero...... (runs before the horrible curbstomp via the 3vil created by sir issac newton...grrrrr)

An "event" is a subset of the probability space. Obviously, not all events have probability zero, since the entire space is an event, trivially being a subset of itself. [*]

I'm never completely comfortable with this thought because it implies that I could be "delusional."

Why is that a problem? Quite the contrary, it would seem to me that any epistemological system which denies the very possibility of this is suspect.

If reality is defined by consensus than it would appear that I do not have automatic access to it, despite thought and sentience. I can't tolerate self-contradiction that this implies possible.

The only thing you have automatic access to is your experience itself; the lack of such access is not the fault of this particular philosophy.

Maybe I'm going into a direction that would lead to a dead end, but I'd think that "knowledge" is possible for all observers.

Perhaps. But even if so, could information available to others remove the status of "knowledge" from the beliefs of an observer? There doesn't seem to be any reason why the status of some information being knowledge cannot be something dynamic and susceptible to revocation. After all, absolutist conceptions of knowledge have a long history of failure.

[*] Edit: More formally, an event is a member of the σ-algebra of the probability space, under the usual assumption of event probabilities being σ-additive. (There are theories of probabilities which are not, but their are a fringe minority.)[/size]

[SWPIGWANG]

I'm never completely comfortable with this thought because it implies that I could be "delusional."

Why is that a problem? Quite the contrary, it would seem to me that any epistemological system which denies the very possibility of this is suspect.

Knowledge is suppose to be "an reflection of existence in the mind" or something like that. If knowledge is just something that can be proven "wrong", than how can we say we knowledge is not merely a form of speculation on reality? Sure there is the difference in methodology, but fundamentally it merely makes "better" speculation rather than an irreducible atom of truth.

If reality is defined by consensus than it would appear that I do not have automatic access to it, despite thought and sentience. I can't tolerate self-contradiction that this implies possible.

The only thing you have automatic access to is your experience itself; the lack of such access is not the fault of this particular philosophy.

The problem is simply that my experience may contradict "reality." The solutions may involve me tossing out my own observation or to toss out "reality." However I don't think I can toss out my observation because my observation is I have access. To selectively toss out my observation depending on my observation of other people seems very strange too me.

Delusional just don't cut it. To think of oneself as delusional is to doubt the integrity of the mind, whose absence makes knowledge impossible. I can not think that "I am incapable of thinking" as it is an contradiction, and similarly, my senses tell me that I dont sense, is similarly so.

One needs to reconcile personal observation and other people's observation without tossing one out arbitarily. One (easy) method of doing this is to simply to believe in non-uniform senses in which the same external reality generates different sensory results. This way we get a noncontradictory result.

Some futher thought into the matter makes "external reality" or whatever irrelevent since we knows through senses and correlation with different minds. (we know of other minds exist through this) The actual natural of the sense generator is wholely irrelevent to actual "knowledge."

Maybe I'm going into a direction that would lead to a dead end, but I'd think that "knowledge" is possible for all observers.

Perhaps. But even if so, could information available to others remove the status of "knowledge" from the beliefs of an observer? There doesn't seem to be any reason why the status of some information being knowledge cannot be something dynamic and susceptible to revocation. After all, absolutist conceptions of knowledge have a long history of failure.

If we know the "truth", there is no way other observers can contradict it.

I think we have to redefine what is "known" for fit the model however. Instead of "positive existance", we use negatives and conditional statements to set boundaries of possible reality. Instead of "The car exists", we use "I think the car existed at 3pm, presuming the accuracy of sensory data to external reality model, and intergity of memories, mind and time from that time to the current."

If we do that, than statements can be made to be the "truth." Knowledge is about boundary conditions on what the universe "can not" be.

Or so I think.

[Kuroneko]

Knowledge is suppose to be "an reflection of existence in the mind" or something like that. If knowledge is just something that can be proven "wrong", than how can we say we knowledge is not merely a form of speculation on reality? Sure there is the difference in methodology, but fundamentally it merely makes "better" speculation rather than an irreducible atom of truth.

What's wrong with saying that, exactly? You seem to want a perfect procedural epistemology--one that is capable of identifying (at least some) truths in completely absolute terms. This type of epistemology has a long history of failure.

The problem is simply that my experience may contradict "reality." The solutions may involve me tossing out my own observation or to toss out "reality." However I don't think I can toss out my observation because my observation is I have access. To selectively toss out my observation depending on my observation of other people seems very strange too me. Delusional just don't cut it. To think of oneself as delusional is to doubt the integrity of the mind, whose absence makes knowledge impossible. I can not think that "I am incapable of thinking" as it is an contradiction, and similarly, my senses tell me that I dont sense, is similarly so.

Your confusion is due to a subtle equivocation. You're right in that it would be quite strange to deny the fact of such experience, but that is not at all what is being proposed. It's simply a matter of classification--the view advocated by Mr. Wong and others prescribes viewing the causes of these experiences as internal rather than external. This is not at all similar to "my senses tell me that don't sense [at all]"; it merely puts an alternative explanation as to the causes of such sense experience. There is nothing inherently contradictory in making it possible to conclude that one's own sensory faculties are defective in some way.

One needs to reconcile personal observation and other people's observation without tossing one out arbitarily.

True.

If we know the "truth", there is no way other observers can contradict it.

Why not? The history of dismal failure of epistemological views of this nature makes a very strong case.

I think we have to redefine what is "known" for fit the model however. Instead of "positive existance", we use negatives and conditional statements to set boundaries of possible reality. Instead of "The car exists", we use "I think the car existed at 3pm, presuming the accuracy of sensory data to external reality model, and intergity of memories, mind and time from that time to the current." If we do that, than statements can be made to be the "truth."

This move gives knowledge of only hypotheticals, as shown by those qualifiers you duly add to your statements, all just to give knowledge an air of absoluteness. I do not see why this is an improvement over considering the status of knowledge to be something capable of change.

Knowledge is about boundary conditions on what the universe "can not" be.

Well, not quite. To get a perfect procedural epistemology, one must carry this further, e.g., by noting the justification on what enabled the conclusion that it was a car, all the way down to something incontrovertibly true such as "red here now", as presumably one cannot be wrong about experience qua experience, only its interpretation. That's essentially the foundationalist programme. Do you wish to adopt this stance?

[Darth Wong]

It should be noted that most people will instinctively use multiple-source comparison to test the credibility of an observation, but they don't realize it.

For example, suppose you see an apparition which your conscious mind thinks may not be real. What's the first thing you're going to do? Well obviously, you're going to try and touch it. When you do that, what you're doing is testing to see if two different senses return precisely matching feedback. This verification with two different measuring techniques is something you would do without even thinking about it, and certainly without pondering the concept of epistemology. And the logic is similar: it is less likely to fool two senses than one.

Once you've completed this test, what's the next thing you'll do? You'll probably ask someone else if he can see the apparition too. Once again, you're using multiple-source verification without thinking of the abstract philosophical meaning of it. And if he says yes, then of course, you need to make sure that he's seeing the same thing as you, so you'll compare notes on what you're seeing. Ideally, you'd be able to compare notes so precisely that you could have exact measurements of what you're looking at. This will virtually guarantee that what you're seeing is not just a figment of your imagination.

And then finally, you would attempt to verify your observations with yet another independent source, such as a camera.

In this whole process, the words "epistemology" or "probability" may not ever enter your mind, yet that is what you are doing: you are determining that the probability of this object existing only in your subjective perception is extremely small, by progressively testing it against other observers in a manner similar to what I described earlier with the column.