worst descision to split forces in history

[Sea Skimmer]

Stalin would likely have remained in Moscow till the end like Hitler did with Berlin, if the USSR lost him the political collapse would have carried over to both the army and the economy, letting Germany win by default.

The entire Soviet goverment had already left the city well in advance, moving to Gorky, and Stalin had a trin standing by at all times to take him out of the city. He wasn't stupid and he still had plenty of places to go unlike Hitler

But its unlikely the Germans could ever have taken the city anyway, not for more then five minutes anyway. Read Panzer Leader, the Germans where totally exhausted, some Panzer regiments had a few as nine tanks left, and the German field commanders actually wanted to fall back several hundred miles to secure defenses.

[phongn]

Where did they get the power to get "all of Germany"? Oh, right, I forgot - last time the D-Day force was nearly thrown off-coast, and that counteroffensive in Ardennes was so bad they called Russia and said "Start the offensive so that the Germans would be forced to stop!!!".

Uh, D-Day was not nearly thrown off-coast. Where did you read this? Even if the Germans had succeeded in throwing back some forces to the beach, the massed Allied naval force and air armadas would probably have stopped any German force trying to push the invaders back to the sea.

In hindsight, the Ardennes was not as bad as it seemed at the time, even if Churchill requested help. The Germans were not really in any position to do grevious harm, especially due to their lack of supplies (and the stubborn defense of key areas such as Bastogne)

[Big Phil]

What "Stalin propaganda"?

Churchill's special telegram to Stalin, Jan.6 1945 (translated from Russian, so sorry for any dumb mistakes).

"Very hard battles are going on the Western Front... You know from your own experience, how alarming is a situation when you need to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of intiative... I would be vert grateful, if you could inform me, could we count on a large Russian offensive on the Visla front or on some other vector during January or anytime, that you would like to inform us of. I would not transmit this top-classified information to anybody, except field marshall Brooke and General Eisenhower, with an obligation to keep top secrecy in mind."

Answer from Stalin to Churchill:

"... considering the situation our Western Allies are in on the Western Front, the Stavka has decided to force the build-up and, ignoring weather conditions, start a wide offensive on the central front not later than the second half of January. You can be sure that we would do everything possible, to help out the glorious forces of the Allies"

Churchill's reply, 9 Jan. 1945

"I am very grateful for your exciting letter... We and the Americans throw into battle everything we have. The news I have from you now has very much encouraged General Eisenhower, because it gives certainity that the Germans would have to divide their reserves between the two our battlefronts"

Ignoring that the Red Army was not completely ready for this major offensive, and that the Tehran conference decisions did not oblige the Red Army to do a winter offensive, the Stavka decided to fulfill the wish of the Allies.

On the 12th of January, ahead of slated time and actually without any obligation to do so except a moral one, the Red Army started a massive offensive from the Baltic to the Carpates, on a 1200-km wide front. Hitler's defence was broken, his command immediately started moving divisions: from 12 to 31 January 7 divisions were moved to the Eastern front, 4 of them tank divisions.

The winter offensive in Ardennes and Elsas immediately came to a halt, the German command had to move the 6th SS tank army to the Eastern front, and after that - 16 more divisions. Their forces retreated on the Western Front.

On the 8th of February, the Allied Command retaliated in a massive offensive against the Germans and throw back their lines to December 1944 positions.

The German advance in the Ardennes had already been stopped cold by Christmas - 10 days after the beginning of the battle. Hard fighting continued for over a month, but the Germans didn't lose here because of a Russian attack...

[K. A. Pital]

but the Germans didn't lose here because of a Russian attack...

I didn't say "the Germans lost because of a Russian attack".

Allies request to start a russian offensive to destroy the German plans on the Western front? Check. The Russians did as requested? Check. As a consequence, the Germans immediately redeployed a whole SS Panzer Armee from West to East and even more forces later? Check. It heavily undermined their capability on the Western Front? Check.

There were several advances in Ardennes. The operation continued right until the Jan-12 offensive begun. They had to massively redeploy forces from West to East, which caused them to stop the January strikes and fall back on initial position, and so "the defensive capability of the German forces on the Western Front was crucially/critically undermined. We lost our last strategic chance to hold the Rhein line", according to Hasso von Manteufel. It's not me speaking, but the Nazis who executed this operation.

[CmdrWilkens]

A couple of points and thoughts here as relates to whether or not Germany would have been able to repel the allies even with a reduced Soviet threat ( one which would have to launch from bases much further east than Moscow, the one valid problem with taking Moscow, for the Russians, was the volume of their rail traffic which moved through the city. A side note to the point in Panzer General would be that Panzer divisions are attack and counter-attack units, not static defensive units that's what infantry is for and they were not nearly as worn down nor would any of them been had the principal focus shifted). Anyway lets assume for starters that the offensive reaches Moscow then is forced back in the Russian counter attack. The attacks at Stalingrad the next year will likely win the city for the Germans temporarily as they can hold the rest of their line better with the soviets having a harder resupply situation due to the shift in the relative strength in the lines. Thus Zhukov's Uranus will still triumph but at a greater cost while Mars will still be a collossal failure. The sapping of Russian manpower will not be insignificant and while still immensly greater than Germany's it will take them time to recover, time that will leave the counter offensive stalled well short of the Ukraine by time 1944 rolls around.

The question now is how does this affect D-Day. Quick answer...it doesn't. By the end of May the head of the Reichsbahn was already informing Berlin that Paris and most of Western France was essentially cut off from long distance resupply trains and his engineers had literally told him there was no point in even attempting repairs ebcause they would be destroyed before they were finsihed or shortly thereafter. Moreover attacks on synthetic and Romanian oil production would lower the former to the point that av-gas production was 2% of normal by mid-June (though it must be noted the loss of Romania to the Soviets had a hand in this the big difference in that scenario is that any increase in available fuels will go to the 1800 tanks in the east fighting the Red Army to a standstill since the Tiger remained king of the battlefield it simply didn't have enough fuel to manuever as history did play out). The long and short is that the Allied offensive would come ashore with total air superiority against an enemy with no hope of resupply, movement severly constrained by the aforementioned air superiority and an industry at home that was being systematically crippled by the allied offensive.

What does all this mean to the original point? Not spliting Army Group Center probably means about a 70/30 chance East Germany remains free and 60/40 that the Soviets do not control Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The allies had the troops and the firepower to cruise into Germany. Indeed I think the WORST devision of all time was to split the principal effort after the Normandy breakout into the "broad-front" strategy. All US feelings aside Montgomery's Army Group in the north had the terrain and the potential logistic bases from which to drive into Germany, roll up Army Group B and then finsih the job before the end of 1944. Alternatively a strong push by Patton in the south, while geographically less favorable, could have ended the war before the year did.

That alone would qualify as a bad split but even worse was the decision to retake the French ports in Brittany. Literally Eisenhower ordered allied troops to fight WEST rather than east towards Germany all for a series of ports which would bring supplies to the lines no quicker than the makeshift port at Normandy and FAR slower than the facilities at Antwerp could. This diversion of forces would be the biggest brake, not self applied, to the Allied offensive and had it not been done, had the Allies pressed on EVEN with the situation as it would be without a German victory at Moscow they could have been in Berlin before the first snowfall. A German surrender with the Soviets still on the outskirts of eastern europe completely changes the landscape of the cold war as mentioned before and for that reason alone I'd go with either the broad front strategy or its concurrent attacks on Brittany as the worst split forces decision.

[K. A. Pital]

The sapping of Russian manpower will not be insignificant and while still immensly greater than Germany's it will take them time to recover, time that will leave the counter offensive stalled well short of the Ukraine by time 1944 rolls around.

Russians don't sack out the Wehrmacht's power and make no massive surroundings? That's incredibly bad. Moreover, if they're stuck in Ukraine in 1944, that means they lack the power to advance. This only means Hitler has more reserves for the Western Front.

The long and short is that the Allied offensive would come ashore with total air superiority against an enemy

Why in the Reich would Hitler keep all his forces tied in Russia in 1944, if the Russians lack power to advance and have been essentially standing in one place for 2 YEARS? That's incredibly lame. This means the Wehrmacht and the Panzertruppe doesnt' suffer massive losses.. and the financial resource of the Reich is not wasted as much as it was. Which essentially closes the way for both the Allies and the Russians into Europe. Forever. Unless you grind the Nazis into earth with A-bombs.

The allies had the troops and the firepower to cruise into Germany.

Prove it. Actually, with a little more competency the Germans might've thrown the landing force off-shore - with total Allied air superiority. If we assume that the German's resources and hands are a little more loose on the East, that gives them a strong chance of developing long-range bombers and finishing the advanced fighter programmes ahead of time. Hell, if they succeed in 1943 and Russian offensive is just stuck, the Germans could even try another BoB. And I'm not speaking about redislocating divisions to the West well in advance of any possible landing.

Indeed I think the WORST devision of all time was to split the principal effort after the Normandy breakout into the "broad-front" strategy.

You think it's possible to make a non-broad-front offensive on the Western Front and achieve victory? All this "coulds" simply ignore the defending German forces and the real capabilities of the Allies. Remember, the Allies' front was crumbling in Ardennes' offensive. That alone speaks of the "potential" to "finish it up before the end of 1944". How do you assault someone without a front? Especially if his counterattack sends your whole front crumbling. There's a degree of realism, which can't be simply tossed out, after all.

[Sea Skimmer]

Prove it. Actually, with a little more competency the Germans might've thrown the landing force off-shore - with total Allied air superiority.

The Germans never came even close to defeating any of the invasion beaches by counter attack and only the attack at Omaha was seriously checked by the beach defense. 21st Panzer got in-between Sword and Juno but they without because of stiff resistance and constant naval bombardment. It was the only armored force that could have arrived in action the first day even if Hitler hadn’t been asleep. Once the Allies where established onshore the Germans couldn’t throw them off. Leeping the beachhead isolated wouldn't do any good since the Allies also landed in the South of France. Everyone always likes to forget about that operation.

If we assume that the German's resources and hands are a little more loose on the East, that gives them a strong chance of developing long-range bombers and finishing the advanced fighter programmes ahead of time. Hell, if they succeed in 1943 and Russian offensive is just stuck, the Germans could even try another BoB. And I'm not speaking about redislocating divisions to the West well in advance of any possible landing.

Another Battle of Britain you say? Against an enemy with a preexisting enormous margin of air superiority and far greater aircraft and fuel supplies? Yes I’m sure the Nazi uber planes will sweep everyone from the sky even though the British got jets into service first. Not to mention the allied technological advantage like SCR-584 radar and proximity fuses.

[K. A. Pital]

Leeping the beachhead isolated wouldn't do any good since the Allies also landed in the South of France. Everyone always likes to forget about that operation.

While I agree, I still don't see why the Germans should counter-attack the invasion with exactly same resource as they had in real 1944.

It was the only armored force that could have arrived in action the first day even if Hitler hadn’t been asleep.

The Germans were pretty misdirected, and it was also late 1944, when the bombing campaign against Germany has already been a success.

Another Battle of Britain you say? Against an enemy with a preexisting enormous margin of air superiority and far greater aircraft and fuel supplies?

If the Nazis do nothing, the gap will not go away. It's simple.

Yes I’m sure the Nazi uber planes will sweep everyone from the sky even though the British got jets into service first.

That sounds rather strange. The Gloster never even battled an airforce, from what I know, unlike the Messerschmidt jets. When they formally "wrote" it into service means nothing. The fact is that it was only used against the Vau, eventhough "introduced" in 1944. And it saw no combat even in 1945, IIRC. The Me was technically ready to go off production lines in 1943, hindered by Hitler's decision. So what's the point?

Not to mention the allied technological advantage like SCR-584 radar and proximity fuses.

Proximity fuze? Check your years. Their use was closer to war's end. And the Germans were working on such projects, too, so the point is if they had resources free from the horrible waste in Russia, they could complete a lot of the projects even before the Allies.

[Seydlitz_k]

A German Counterattack of the D-Day beaches would have been successful, only if it had taken place within the first few hours of the attack. The problem is that wargames had been scheduled for that same day, and Rommel was celebrating his wife's b-day. Thus the higher echelons of the German forces in Normandy were all out of reach for various hours after the attack itself.

Many divisions already had their engines gunned and ready to go, but because the German high command was nowhere to be found, they were to stay there for hours. The counterattack of the 21st PZ was launched on the intiative of it's own commander, and it was pretty successful. It was stalled by Canadian artillery near the beaches because it was completley unsopported.


I'd like to suggest another contender for worst spilt in history: The First World War.

The Central Powers foolishly decided to launch an attack both on Russia and France simultaneously, leading to some of the bloodiest battles in history.

[Wanderer]

Proximity fuze? Check your years. Their use was closer to war's end. And the Germans were working on such projects, too, so the point is if they had resources free from the horrible waste in Russia, they could complete a lot of the projects even before the Allies.

Alot of those projects were pipe dreams.

The Me 262 had unreliable engines that were good for 10 hours at most. Training men to use them was slow and dogfighting in a Me 262 wasn't a good ideal...

The Arado 234 was an excellent design, but bottlenecks and bombing prevented its production in numbers.

The He 162 was intended by Goering for use by Hitler Youth Glider Graduates to sink or swim in combat

The Kramer X-4 Air to Air missiles would suffer from a shortage of necessary motors that got destroyed when a off target B-24 bombed the factory they were being made in to rubble.

If Germany could solve those problems, I can forsee them turning things around in the Air. Otherwise too little too late.

[Wanderer]

The worse decision to split up would be convoy PQ.17

Words just fail to describe this disaster.

[Sea Skimmer]

While I agree, I still don't see why the Germans should counter-attack the invasion with exactly same resource as they had in real 1944.

Because the Atlantic wall was already very porous and even a considerable addition of Nazi resources wouldn’t have made it much stronger at any given point. Meanwhile the French transportation network was in poor shape, historically some Panzer divisions took over a month to reach Normandy. Larger German forces with larger supply demands moving over the same transport network doesn’t work out well.

The Germans were pretty misdirected, and it was also late 1944, when the bombing campaign against Germany has already been a success.

The Germans would still be misdirected, I wonder how many of the extra divisions would get sent to Norway? Given Hitler’s stupidity he’d probably reinforce the panzer division in that country to a full Panzer corps.

If the Nazis do nothing, the gap will not go away. It's simple.
That sounds rather strange. The Gloster never even battled an airforce, from what I know, unlike the Messerschmidt jets. When they formally "wrote" it into service means nothing. The fact is that it was only used against the Vau, eventhough "introduced" in 1944. And it saw no combat even in 1945, IIRC. The Me was technically ready to go off production lines in 1943, hindered by Hitler's decision. So what's the point?

The Meteor wasn’t used against the German airforce because it was far more useful against the V1, had short range and just wasn't necessary. The Me262 also had very short range and a mere 9-10 hour engine life, which make it pretty useless for offensive air operations over Britain.

Proximity fuze? Check your years. Their use was closer to war's end.

Wrong, production commenced in early 1942 and the first kill came in January 1943, wartime production exceeded 22 million units used not only for air defense but also for conventional artillery support.

And the Germans were working on such projects, too, so the point is if they had resources free from the horrible waste in Russia, they could complete a lot of the projects even before the Allies.

The Germans had something like 40 different proximity fuse programs and none of them came anywhere close to the US’s radar system. The German radar effort was far behind what the Allies had, they had no equvilent to any of the later Allied radars and the eastern front did not drain away the kind of technical resources required for such R&D. In fact the better the Nazis do the more likely Hitler is to cancel useful projects as unnecessary in favor of wasting money on stupid shit like the P1000 and P1500.

[K. A. Pital]

historically some Panzer divisions took over a month to reach Normandy

That makes sense, looking at the massive Allied bombing campaign. However, the closer to Germany, better the network. They immediately redeployed a whole SS Panzer Army in January 1945 from the West to the East, that sure speaks something about their capabilities.

Larger German forces with larger supply demands moving over the same transport network doesn’t work out well.

Hmm. See above. Maybe they would not be able to counterattack immediately, but they would, sooner or later, enjoy the benefits of superior forces.

Given Hitler’s stupidity he’d probably reinforce the panzer division in that country to a full Panzer corps.

That's silly. Anyway, I guess he'd move a Panzer Armee from the East - maybe not directly to the battlefront, but westwards enough to make a difference if the Allies would advance successfully. With superior resources even Ardennes could've played differently.

because it was far more useful against the V1, had short range and just wasn't necessary

Exactly. It wasn't really useful against the German air forces.

The Me262 also had very short range and a mere 9-10 hour engine life, which make it pretty useless for offensive air operations over Britain.

If they'd plan a fighter for such operations, they would surely work on increasing the resource. I mean, in real 1944 it was totally irrelevant - they would only defend anyway.

production commenced in early 1942 and the first kill came in January 1943, wartime production exceeded 22 million unit

I heard about 400,000 ready in 1943, but not used en masse. PFs for artillery were only used in 1944, IIRC.

the eastern front did not drain away the kind of technical resources required for such R&D.

I have to agree. It's irrelevant for radar R&D. The Germans simply sucked on this one.

Hitler is to cancel useful projects as unnecessary in favor of wasting money on stupid shit like the P1000 and P1500

Why? He's not even getting desperate. Why use money on something so stupid? Maybe he'd finish the Vau instead. That would have some use. And mass-deploy "Wasserfall".

[CarsonPalmer]

I'm going to have to disagree that even a full Panzer Army could have seized Antwerp. There really is no way that offensive could have won the war.

[CmdrWilkens]

The sapping of Russian manpower will not be insignificant and while still immensly greater than Germany's it will take them time to recover, time that will leave the counter offensive stalled well short of the Ukraine by time 1944 rolls around.

Russians don't sack out the Wehrmacht's power and make no massive surroundings? That's incredibly bad. Moreover, if they're stuck in Ukraine in 1944, that means they lack the power to advance. This only means Hitler has more reserves for the Western Front.

No because in this scenario he is STILL going to get bogged into Stalingrad and probably Kursk as well. The only difference is that the reserves will be available to patch the holes and hold the front ONLY so long as he does not strengthen his forces in the West. Hitler was fanatically obsessive about taking on the Russians and so long as a chance existed that he could stem the Russian counterattack and himself go on the offensive he would not shift his forces back to the western theater which (at the time is still quiet). A German Moscow in late '41 doesn't change the Russian counter attack it just means Hitler has the forces to check it rather than having to fold completely back without changing the disposition of forces.

The long and short is that the Allied offensive would come ashore with total air superiority against an enemy

Why in the Reich would Hitler keep all his forces tied in Russia in 1944, if the Russians lack power to advance and have been essentially standing in one place for 2 YEARS? That's incredibly lame. This means the Wehrmacht and the Panzertruppe doesnt' suffer massive losses.. and the financial resource of the Reich is not wasted as much as it was. Which essentially closes the way for both the Allies and the Russians into Europe. Forever. Unless you grind the Nazis into earth with A-bombs.

See above. Again a Moscow that goes German still doesn't prevent the counter attack so the Panzertruppe will STILL bleed in Stalingrad and probably at Kursk as well. Hitler doens't get some huge bonus to troop strength he just can patch the hole sin his lines to hold of the Russian counter attack better than happened in history. The Reich would still be sinking the same billions into the eastern front they just wouldn't be losing as badly for all of it.

The allies had the troops and the firepower to cruise into Germany.

Prove it. Actually, with a little more competency the Germans might've thrown the landing force off-shore - with total Allied air superiority. If we assume that the German's resources and hands are a little more loose on the East, that gives them a strong chance of developing long-range bombers and finishing the advanced fighter programmes ahead of time. Hell, if they succeed in 1943 and Russian offensive is just stuck, the Germans could even try another BoB. And I'm not speaking about redislocating divisions to the West well in advance of any possible landing.

1) Their resources will NOT be a little more loose on the East. The best our scenario allows for is a more stable defensive line that the Germans can hold for longer. Hitler's manic obsession with Russian garuntees that the forces you seem to think can appear won't

2) EVEN if we assume Hitler is willing to allow a division or two of Panzers to move back east (and Panzer divisions are the only kind of force that will be effective in counter attacking the Allies) we run into several problems:

a) Transporting them through France will be all but impossible. Actually getting them to the potential front will be hellish at best and their ability to familairize with the terrain and be effective is doubtful

b) Even if they can get moved to France chances are they will not be released to Rommel's control until sometime on June 7th or 8th. OKW's Panzer Group West had something like 3 Panzer Divisions which it could not give control of to Rommel and there is little reason to think any extra divisions would not be so encumbered. Lacking the ability to deploy forward (again if they even can effectively) they will be relegted to showing up after the invasion has taken place much as the 12th SS, 2nd Panzer, and Panzer Lehr divisions were. In all the above cases had control been ceeded to Rommel they MIGHT have made a difference being close enough to effect a counter attack on the 6th.

c) The MIGHT above brings the other point that even a second or third counteer attacking Panzer division might not have been enough to blunt the invasion forces. The sheer volume of men an material moved ashore vatly outmatched anything the Germans could reasonably bring to bear and adding another Panzer division or two just compounds the transport and supply problems while coming nowhere close to ensuring a victory or even a more satisfying stalemate than the one Rommel directed.

Indeed I think the WORST devision of all time was to split the principal effort after the Normandy breakout into the "broad-front" strategy.

You think it's possible to make a non-broad-front offensive on the Western Front and achieve victory? All this "coulds" simply ignore the defending German forces and the real capabilities of the Allies. Remember, the Allies' front was crumbling in Ardennes' offensive. That alone speaks of the "potential" to "finish it up before the end of 1944". How do you assault someone without a front? Especially if his counterattack sends your whole front crumbling. There's a degree of realism, which can't be simply tossed out, after all.

A force without a front cannot counter attack. The Germans in the late summer of 1944 were too disorganzied to plan or marshall for a counterattack. Had either Montgomery's northern plan or Patton's southern plan been approved a crushing weight of allied power would have hit German troops who were unable to re-establish defensive line and would have invested the rear of the units not attacked thus bagging them by cutting off their supply lines. TRUE mobile warfare requires that you lessen your concerns about flank protection and drive THROUGH the enemy in order to disrupt his rear and force the surrender of his forces once they are deprived of logistical support. Moreover the German troops on the frontier were at the breaking point. Given the chance to be free of Hitler's direct control by a severing of communications with Berlin there is every reason to believe they would have surrendered en mass. Such a quick strike would be in Berlin before a "counter-attack" like the Bulge could be effected. Moreover with allied forces in the zones targeted by the counter attack well rested and supplied such an attack would brewak like water on the rocks before being trapped almost exactly as the real attack was (ignoring that fuel reserves were so low that it took weeks of hoarding and planning to give the Ardennes offensive even half the gas it needed to reach Antwerp).

The Allies decided to give the Germans a reprieve jsut when they were winning the OODA cycle by applying pressure and maintaining a high op tempo. That reprieve is the SOLE reason why they could muster enough froce to strike back. Without it the forces moved into position would be, at best, used to patch holes as an Allied spearhead churned straight for Berlin or through the industrial heartland of the Ruhr.

[phongn]

A German Counterattack of the D-Day beaches would have been successful, only if it had taken place within the first few hours of the attack. The problem is that wargames had been scheduled for that same day, and Rommel was celebrating his wife's b-day. Thus the higher echelons of the German forces in Normandy were all out of reach for various hours after the attack itself.

They probably would've been chewed up en route due to complete Allied air dominance and then if they got closer to the shore the massed firepower of the Allied naval armada would have stopped any counterattack cold.

[K. A. Pital]

The only difference is that the reserves will be available to patch the holes and hold the front ONLY so long as he does not strengthen his forces in the West.

Nice cop-out. No, it doesn't work that way.

he would not shift his forces back to the western theater which (at the time is still quiet)

God, what can be there "quiet" in 1944? Assuming the Allies are pumping up their bombing campaign? The Germans might be misdirected, but they would be expecting an attack.

A German Moscow in late '41 doesn't change the Russian counter attack

Actually, it makes a "Russian counter-attack" not only nigh unfeasible, but IMHO completely doomed. Moscow as a hub would be lost, the Stavka would be moved to Kuybishev. The Germans taking Moscow means they succeed in another massive encirclement operation. Okay, their forces were exhausted, but you already twist reality so that they take Moscow, which only means their operation is a success. The operation did not just include taking Moscow, it included the demolishing of the Russian force. Same with Stalingrad. You're turning massive battles in German favour, and then... what? Counter-attack? With your platzdarms overturned and transport hubs destroyed?

The Reich would still be sinking the same billions into the eastern front they just wouldn't be losing as badly for all of it.

Cop-out. If you're not losing as badly, that means you don't waste forces as you did in reality. Massive encirlements of '44 will never happen in such a scenario. Hell, there might even be no tomorrow for Russia, if they lose both Moscow and Stalingrad without a massive encirlement of German troops.

The best our scenario allows for is a more stable defensive line that the Germans can hold for longer.

"Longer"? A force is not some abstract "time that we can hold". A force is a force, which, if applied, could overturn battles. You already overturned a few.

Transporting them through France will be all but impossible.

But they did transport them to the German border. If the Allies advance, there would be forces to meet them.

their ability to familairize with the terrain and be effective is doubtful

So? They're a force. Force redeployment from front to front is not the best thing, but it certainly helps if there's no other way out.

they will be relegted to showing up after the invasion has taken place

Which is still a change - there'd be more of them. And with Russians still out there, massively lacking forces, Nazis would not hesitate to throw everything into a counteroffensive on the Western Front. But this time, they won't fail.

The sheer volume of men an material moved ashore vatly outmatched anything the Germans could reasonably bring to bear

The problem is that "sheer" is a number. 37 divisions is a number. Should the Germans have exceedingly more, and gather them on critical points, there'd be no huge success. Going under naval artillery is not needed - the Germans just need to demolish this force faster than reinforcements arrive.

A force without a front cannot counter attack. The Germans in the late summer of 1944 were too disorganzied to plan or marshall for a counterattack.

"Too" disoranized? They may have been disorganized in the vinicity of the landing area. That doesn't mean one can just march his way into Berlin.

a crushing weight of allied power would have hit German troops who were unable to re-establish defensive line and would have invested the rear of the units not attacked thus bagging them by cutting off their supply lines

Which would lead to your own supply line to be stretched thin. It would be possible with an act of force to simply disrupt this line.

TRUE mobile warfare requires that you lessen your concerns about flank protection and drive THROUGH the enemy in order to disrupt his rear and force the surrender of his forces once they are deprived of logistical support.

True mobile warfare? Oh rly? The truth is it requires your own logistics to be on par with your force movements. If they are not - too bad, but you're not going anywhere.

Moreover the German troops on the frontier were at the breaking point. Given the chance to be free of Hitler's direct control by a severing of communications with Berlin there is every reason to believe they would have surrendered en mass.

Severing communications with Berlin on a whole front? Ridiculous. Even the Germans, however successfull they were on Barbarossa, could not wholly severe phone line communications with the border.

Such a quick strike would be in Berlin before a "counter-attack"

Well, now it comes to utter nonsense. It's over a good thousand kilometers. Your line would be stretched thin. Even a 200-km "appendix" would represent a supply problem. Before getting to "Berlin", your forces are simply going to get encircled en masse - and later destroyed.

ignoring that fuel reserves were so low that it took weeks of hoarding and planning to give the Ardennes offensive even half the gas it needed to reach Antwerp

Certainly. But why would fuel reserves be low, if the Germans are wasting MUCH, MUCH less on the Eastern Front?

Allied spearhead churned straight for Berlin or through the industrial heartland of the Ruhr.

A thin-stretched vector. The Germans made the same mistake when stretching out to Stalingrad. Outcome? Massive encirclement.

[Seydlitz_k]

A German Counterattack of the D-Day beaches would have been successful, only if it had taken place within the first few hours of the attack. The problem is that wargames had been scheduled for that same day, and Rommel was celebrating his wife's b-day. Thus the higher echelons of the German forces in Normandy were all out of reach for various hours after the attack itself.

They probably would've been chewed up en route due to complete Allied air dominance and then if they got closer to the shore the massed firepower of the Allied naval armada would have stopped any counterattack cold.

You are overestimating the capabilities of Naval and Aerial power. The truth is, aside from destroying fixed positions and general area bombardment, Naval gunfire would be to innacurate to hit a moving force. Even if they tried, they would do massive damage to their own troops.

Air power suffers much the same problem. You can hit know enemy positions or enemy armoured coloums heading towards a concentration point. There is nothing to hit once the enemy is under way conducting an attack though, especially without risk of hitting your own men. From a safe height, it's hard to tell friendly troops apart from enemy troops even on an open field. Imagine the notorious bocage terrain of Normandy.

An early, full German counterattack would have devastated the allied troops. In the first few hours, allied troops were still disorganized, and there was a fair amount of confusion on the beaches as more troops had to be landed, the wounded evacuated, prisoners sorted, etc. Couple this with the little armour and ATG's the allies would have had at their disposal early on, and it dosn't bode well.

[PeZook]

This may seem like a peanut gallery post to some, but I just couldn't let that last post slide...

You are overestimating the capabilities of Naval and Aerial power. The truth is, aside from destroying fixed positions and general area bombardment, Naval gunfire would be to innacurate to hit a moving force. Even if they tried, they would do massive damage to their own troops.

Which is of course why naval gunfire directed against counterattacks at allied beachheads in Normandy and near Anzio resulted in such massive Allied casualties from friendly fire.

Quite frankly, you're flat out wrong. Naval gunfire is quite adequate at bombardning roads and bridges close to shore, and supporting troops in combat with the enemy.

Air power suffers much the same problem. You can hit know enemy positions or enemy armoured coloums heading towards a concentration point.

Which, naturally, is what armored collumns will be doing most of the time, because they can't really attack without moving into the area first. And let me tell you that an armored division on the move is a gigantic collumn of vehicles, several kilometers long, with absolutely no space to maneuver to avoid air attacks. With proper intelligence, provided by sources like radio intercepts, spies and the french resistance movement, a division marching in daylight would get absolutely massacred by allied attack aircraft.

There is nothing to hit once the enemy is under way conducting an attack though, especially without risk of hitting your own men. From a safe height, it's hard to tell friendly troops apart from enemy troops even on an open field. Imagine the notorious bocage terrain of Normandy.

The concept of "close air support" seems to be pretty alien to you, unlike to most armies of WW2, beginning with the Germans in, who used aircraft working in close concert with ground troops to great effect in every theater of the war. Yes, it is quite possible to support infantry closely from the air, even with weapons like napalm, provided proper organization.

An early, full German counterattack would have devastated the allied troops. In the first few hours, allied troops were still disorganized, and there was a fair amount of confusion on the beaches as more troops had to be landed, the wounded evacuated, prisoners sorted, etc. Couple this with the little armour and ATG's the allies would have had at their disposal early on, and it dosn't bode well.

Of course an early panzer counterattack would have destroyed the beachhead. The question is just how quick it should be and in what numbers. The only division which counterattacked was massacred and failed to actually accomplish anything.

[phongn]

At Omaha beach, Allied destroyers provided direct fire support for the invaders (moving as close to coast as possible). In addition, American command-and-control - while primitive by modern standards - was quite capable of having on-call fire support from air or artillery without massive friendly fire casualties.

In addition, a pair of light cruisers at Salerno were quite useful at beating up the panzers trying to throw back the Allies; there is a lot more firepower (and organization) at Normandy.

[CarsonPalmer]

Stas Bush, there is really no reason Hitler would have less forces in Russia, considering the fighting is basically the same, just farther to the east.

[K. A. Pital]

Stas Bush, there is really no reason Hitler would have less forces in Russia

Except he would have lost a lot less forces in Russia. "Basically the same"? The whole premise ruins many huge encirclement operations against the German forces. You don't encircle and demolish forces? There's more forces left.

[CmdrWilkens]

The premise is that Germany does NOT split Army Group Centre and they somehow manage to take Moscow. remember the original point of this thread was about split force decisions. IF the Germans concentrate their striking power and IF it is enough to take Moscow it will NOT be enough to HOLD Moscow for long. We aren't talking about re-writing history to give the Germans some huge victory they had no chance at we are simply allowing their spearhead to thrust deeper by remaining more compact. It will not change the troops available to the Russians for a counter-attack it merely alters the geography of their luanching pad and alters the distance the Germans will fall back upon being attacked. Taking Moscow will damage the Soviet ability to follow up on its counter attack but it will not change their ability to launch in the first place. What this means is that the Germans will not get pushed as far back before they can counter attack and create a defenisble line but it will not change the situation that greatly. The Germans will lose fewer troops, the Soviets more but the net balance serves only to slow the Soviet repsonse throughout '42 and '43 so that Germany will be able to keep its armored force in better shape to blunt the counter attacks that will still be launched in '43 and then the real wave which began in '44. Hitler simply does not possess enough firepower to actually knock the Russians out of the war unless he had managed to seize the Caucus oil fields sooner or sever the Volga sooner but there is NO reason to believe that the German Army planners will not come upon this idea until summer 1942 and by then American aid will still enable the Russians to defend Stalingrad and entrap the 6th Army.

You aren't talking about what would stem from the original premise you're talking about a radically different scenario where the Germans achieve all of their wildest dreams...that simply isn't going to happen simply by keeping Army Group Center together. Conversely scrapping "broad front" for a single compact thrust by either Montgomery or Patton can lead to a decisive change in the situation based on what they both did, especially the later, before the gas was turned off.

[K. A. Pital]

CmdrWilkens

The premise is that Germany does NOT split Army Group Centre and they somehow manage to take Moscow.

So? What do you mean by "take" Moscow? If they take Moscow, as a huge transport hub it will cease to function.

NOT be enough to HOLD Moscow for long

Taking a city requires more forces than holding it.

allowing their spearhead to thrust deeper by remaining more compact

If the massive encirclements at Moscow and Stalingrad still occur, nothing will change. If they don't... Hitler avoids losses.

Taking Moscow will damage the Soviet ability to follow up on its counter attack but it will not change their ability to launch in the first place.

So? It's arguable even that "following up" with Mars so quickly after Moscow was a good idea.

Hitler simply does not possess enough firepower to actually knock the Russians out of the war

I know. But he thought otherwise.

and by then American aid will still enable the Russians to defend Stalingrad and entrap the 6th Army.

So... where's the difference? If the Germans suffer the same blow at Stalingrad, it's all the same. And what "american aid" - lend-lease, you mean? In 1941-1942 lend-lease was miniscule. In was more in late-war and post-war contributions. The Russians, for the most part, enabled themselves.

Conversely scrapping "broad front" for a single compact thrust by either Montgomery or Patton can lead to a decisive change

So you scrap "broad front" for the Germans and it means jack shit. You scrap it for the Allies and teh uber strike goes straight to Berlin? Cop-out. It doesn't work that way. Your supply lines have to be on par with the advance tempo. There's a thousand kilometers to Berlin. What "decisive change" are you talking about? For the Allies to push in a single vector, slam into Germany, stretch supply lines, get encircled and die? The force density on the Western Front does not allow for that. Massive encirclements require low forces density, long-range "runs" too. When the density is high, it comes to attrition combat. And it was high in the West - evenso higher than in the East.

[CmdrWilkens]

CmdrWilkens

The premise is that Germany does NOT split Army Group Centre and they somehow manage to take Moscow.

So? What do you mean by "take" Moscow? If they take Moscow, as a huge transport hub it will cease to function.

Which would not be neccessarry for the winter '41 counter attacks since most of the stockpiling and preparation was done before the Germans would have a realistic shot at taking the city. By taking the city I mean ocupying the area it occupies with military force. That does NOT hwoever mean that the forces which were used in the actual counter attack would be caught in this action. Likely as not they would have been held back and used as a counter attack force EXACTLY as they were in 41. You keep confusing Mars and the defensive parries in 41. The former was the pre-planned counter offensive in 42 while the later, which I'm speaking of, was simply the forces and thrusts against the German offensive when they DID turn towards Moscow in 41 there being no paticular operational name I'm aware of since it was defensive in nature and not a planned counter-offensive.

NOT be enough to HOLD Moscow for long

Taking a city requires more forces than holding it.[/quote]

Before I laugh this off I'd just take a look at Iraq right now to prove you wrong. Taking a city requires a certain expenditure of forces to eliminate the enemy but requires the addition of forces in order to repel a counter attack or a counter offensive aimed at returning the city. Taking a city requires eliminating the defenders, holding it requires sufficient force to repel a coutner attack and in the case of Moscow the counter attack will be ferocious. The one that did take place which stopped the Germans a dozen miles out will now be luanched after they have occupied the city but there is little reason to doubt that it will succed in pushing them back.

allowing their spearhead to thrust deeper by remaining more compact

If the massive encirclements at Moscow and Stalingrad still occur, nothing will change. If they don't... Hitler avoids losses.

Here's the problem...the encirclement at Moscow never occurred. Counter attacks stalled the offensive in 41, Mars failed in 42, the salient was abandoned in late 42 or early 43 and after Kursk the whole line fell back. The Stalingrad encirclement will still go forward but Hitler simply won't lose as much at Moscow and Mars will probably soak up more losses because the loss of Moscow the previous year, despite being reclaimed, will have damaged the tranist networks while the proximity will require more forces due to the urgency of the offensive. Its doubtful the requirements would have been enough to sap the Uranus of the forces neccessarry to repel the German breakout (or break-in by Manstein) so that battle still goes as planend but the Soviets will lose even more of their pants in Mars so they won't be as effective at Kursk, possible to the point that it fights to a draw or a Soviet loss at which point Hitler would definately re-enforce the East at the expense of the West despite the invasion Italy and the loss of North Africa.

Taking Moscow will damage the Soviet ability to follow up on its counter attack but it will not change their ability to launch in the first place.

So? It's arguable even that "following up" with Mars so quickly after Moscow was a good idea.

and by then American aid will still enable the Russians to defend Stalingrad and entrap the 6th Army.

So... where's the difference? If the Germans suffer the same blow at Stalingrad, it's all the same. And what "american aid" - lend-lease, you mean? In 1941-1942 lend-lease was miniscule. In was more in late-war and post-war contributions. The Russians, for the most part, enabled themselves.

Suffering at Stalingrad will be lessened by the ability to hold the Rzhev salient and sap more of the forces in Mars which will draw off forces from Uranus and make both operations more costly perhaps even to the point that some of 6th Army can escape Stalingrad. Again if Moscow is taken then lost in 41 then Mars will draw forces that would have been used in Uranus as the German threat to retake Moscow will require the expenditure of additional effort that has just as much likelyhood of failing as Mars actually did.

Conversely scrapping "broad front" for a single compact thrust by either Montgomery or Patton can lead to a decisive change

So you scrap "broad front" for the Germans and it means jack shit. You scrap it for the Allies and teh uber strike goes straight to Berlin? Cop-out. It doesn't work that way. Your supply lines have to be on par with the advance tempo. There's a thousand kilometers to Berlin. What "decisive change" are you talking about? For the Allies to push in a single vector, slam into Germany, stretch supply lines, get encircled and die? The force density on the Western Front does not allow for that. Massive encirclements require low forces density, long-range "runs" too. When the density is high, it comes to attrition combat. And it was high in the West - evenso higher than in the East.

WOW are you wrong. The Eastern front was broad front regardless the only change is to make Army Group Center more the focus. By abandoing either Leningrad or Kiev (and I'd bet on the former rather than the later) the Germans get to Moscow but even then they can't hold it and it won't knock the Russians out. Do you want to know why? Because the disparity in forces was minimal and it was largely in how and where they were employed.

On the Western Front in 1944 the disparity in abilities was HUGE. Mroeover a single thrust along Montgomery's axis of advance liberates Antwerp MONTHS eariler than it did and provides a huge logistical base for all the further actions into Germany. Moreover Patton ran as far as he did with makeshift supplies and still had the forces and support to continue the offensive until they were deliberately denied to him. In other words the actual conduct of the campaign indicates that Patton was perfectly capable of overcoming logistical shortfalls especially if he had been given support rather than had it turned off. If the axis, again, is in Montgomery's alley then the logistics situaiton provides major basing hundreds of kilometers closer to the front with a huge disparity of forces and if he does make it to Berlin then the Germans collapse unllike the Russians who will NOT collapse if Moscow is taken.

The difference is that the German strategy even if it is narrowed does NOT attack the centers of gravity for the Russians (which would be their own oil supplies in the caucuses) because it presumes to attack the political center of gravity which did not exist in Moscow. Again conversely Berlin (and the Ruhr through which Montgomery would attack) IS ther German political and economic center of gravity. Narrowing or broadening an offensive only matters if the OBJECTIVES are of sufficent worth. The Germans went after the wrong ones and the Americans/British failed to go after the one center which did exist. Berlin WAS the whole deck of cards and it was Eisenhower not understanding the nature of mobile warfare that he sought a broad based destruction of all German military forces in attrition warfare rather than a penetrating thrust against a major center of gravity.

As to force density you are wrong again. The low density was BECAUSE of the broad front strategy and it plays into the hands of a force which packs a high concentraiton of armor and infantry and goes after a signle objective. The reason that the Bulge was scary was because the allies had low force density and the Germans high density headed towards Antwerp. Had they reached their obectives they would have cut off that supply base and severed the Allied lines DESPITE the fact that their flansk and rear were exposed. The whoel point of blitzkrieg and mobile warfare is that you HAVE to expsoe your flanks and rear but that is OK so long as you take the neccessarry objectives to eliminate your opponents ability to strike back. Its like a haymaker punch: if it lands then you opponent is down and has to fall back but if it fails it leaves you wide open. You just don't seem to be grasping this.

So let me again put it in simple terms:

A single thrust by the Germans (or two instead of three as is likely) will not go after significant enough centers of gravity to effect a wholesale retreat by the Russians. Despite some gains in terms of ability to hold the front with greater froce and reducing the ability of the Russians to counter attacks its objectives mean it cannot succeed in its larger goal.

A single thrust by the Allies in 1944 WILL go after a significant enough objective to cause a wholesale German retreat or surrender.


For the record I note how you've never advanced any of the logistics arguments about a German offensive that you do about an Allied offensive and there's a reason why: such arguments, as Patton and Manstein both proved, are bull. Supplies are neccessarry but planners continuously overestimated GROSSLY how hard it would be to resupply attacking offensive forces.