Originally posted by Publius: "Actually, the Kyoto Protocol would be totally ineffective at curbing air pollution, due to the fact that it would not apply to developing nations such as India and the People's Republic of China -- whose use of environmentally protective regulation is relatively nonexistent. "
Your argument is nothing different than stating that we shouldn't reduce emissions because other countries aren't going to.
No, that is your interpretation of the argument, not the argument itself. The argument itself simply states that the overall effect of the Protocol would be nil because of the fact that only some states are restricted.
Please prove that a reduction in emissions would require a reduction in production.
Admittedly, one's perception of economics is not easily provable. That reduction of emissions would require reduction of production is such a perception -- not necessarily provable.
To wit: Such proof is not available.
Thank you for admitting that your earlier statements regarding them were pointless then. If they are not producing as much pollution, then they don't need controls.
Then you admit that restriction of pollution in general is not the purpose of the Protocol, but that restriction of pollution by certain parties is -- the Kyoto Protocol was marketed (so to speak) as a means of reducing pollution
in totum.
I'm still waiting for the numbers to back up your statements. When you can show that the emissions per person in underdeveloped nations is as large as in developed nations, then you can make a case that they should be restricted.
Regrettably, such numbers are not available. Nevertheless, the very fact that underdeveloped states are not required to observe environmental restrictions reveals that the intent of the Protocol is not reduction of pollution, but reduction of pollution by certain parties.
Then you won't mind providing said statements.
Not at all.
The Sedition Act of 14 July 1798, which remained in force until 3 March 1801 (per the terms of the Act), placed lengthy restrictions on the freedom of speech regarding the United States Government, the Congress, the House of Representatives, the Senate, or the President of the United States. It was implicitly held to be constitutional by virtue of never having been nullified by the Supreme Court, which first established its power of judicial review in
Hylton v. United States (1796). (It should be noted, however, that after President Adams left office, all fines accrued under the Sedition Act were repaid and all convictions were pardoned by the Jefferson Administration.)
The Espionage Act of 15 June 1917 (and its later amendment by the Espionage Act of 16 May 1918, Pub. L. 553-554; Stat. 40) placed restrictions on the freedom of speech and of the press, including provision for fines of up to $10,000 and twenty years' incarceration. The constitutionality of the statutes was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Schenck v. United States (3 March 1919; 249 US 47), in which the Opinion of the Court found that the freedom of speech is not absolute, and that the Congress has the right to restrict speech used in such circumstances and is of such nature as to create a clear and present danger.
In
Gitlow v. New York (1925), the Supreme Court found that a State may restrict abuse of the freedom of speech in the form of utterences that are "inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime or disturb the public police."
In 1940, the Congress enacted the Alien Registration Act (54 Stat. 671; 18 U.S.C. 2385), more commonly known as the Smith Act, which provides for the fining or twenty years' incarceration, and five years' disqualification from employment by the United States or any department thereof of "[w]hoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District, or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force of violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government." Its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Dennis et al. v. United States (4 June 1951), and is even now in effect.
As you can see, restriction of the freedom of speech is entirely legal under many circumstances, in the opinions of both the Congress and the Supreme Court.
Publius
Edit: Minor correction of orthography.
