The 'omnipotence' paradox...

[Kuroneko]

Also regarding determinism vs fate, even with confusing quantum jiggery pokery, I don't see how that would affect a deterministic universe that just so happens to behave in a difficult to understand way. I suspect determinism to be the case, but pragmatically, there would be no difference either way, I'd still feel in control and I'd still think and do the things I do.

Yes. As I said, I don't consider the 'question' of free will to have any importance.

Kuroneko: I think you are talking about different things. Omniscience, when talked about in philosophy, generally means knowledges to the answers to "all possible statements" as opposed "all observable facts" or "all existing facts" which is what you seem to be talking about.

No; that's actually quite in line with what I was saying. Not all statements are propositions, i.e., simply true or false. A straightforward example from logic is "this statement is false", which requires a bit more than a "yes/no" to answer the question of its truth. But, under this looser meaning of "statement" and "knowing the answer to", it becomes possible for a question like "will A perform action C?" to not be answerable in terms of "yes/no" even for an omniscient being. The argument from QM was presented to show that this is actually somewhat plausible for our own universe, not just possible in the abstract. In particular, it would have this question answerable only in terms of probabilities.

[Surlethe]

From that and the definition of omniscience, it follows that if G is omniscient, then for any proposition p, G knows the truth value of that proposition. Certainly, the statement "X will occur" is a proposition; ... .

"Certainly"? I agree with the ultimate conclusion that this is a genuine proposition, but I don't see it as either obvious or certain. At least, not in the sense you need it to work, i.e., a literal proposition about the future, thus treating "future" as an actually existing object/state.

I don't see why it's a stretch to treat the future as an actually existing object/state -- or, barring that, why we can't treat it as the things which will exist at some point in time. The statement "X will occur" merely says that X will or will not occur at some point; I'm having trouble seeing how that could be either both true and false or neither true nor false.

It's quite possible to self-consistently deny this. The interpretation of future contingents has a rather long history in philosophy, starting with Aristotle's distinction of "definite" and "indefinite" truth.

What, exactly, is the distinction Aristotle makes between the two?

Something analogous to this is present in moral philosophy as well--for example, some schools of thought interpret "murder is immoral" as a statement about the preferences of the one who stated it rather than a genuine moral proposition.

Well, it certainly says something about the preferences of the person who said it, but how could it have some value other than binary true/false? After all, isn't that how a proposition is defined?

How, exactly, is moral autonomy compatible with determinism? I suppose people tend to fixate on free will in and of itself because we like to think we have some control over our lives, instead of acting out a predetermined pattern.

If one rids oneself of the traditional but unjustified dualistic conception of mind and body, thus identifying the "self" with the central nervous system of the body, "autonomy" simply means that the decision process behind "making a choice" is dominated by this system in some appropriate sense. There doesn't seem to be any inconsistency with this interpretation. A fortiori, it's possible to argue that determinism is necessary for true moral accountability (in complete reversal of employing this a defense of non-determinism), since then by punishing agents that have performed an evil action we are assured this was a genuine failure on their part, rather than their action being some sort of random fluctuation that simply happened to them. Determinism puts moral responsibility directly on the agent, while indeterminism, lacking a satisfactory account of what's behind the decisions, seems to treat moral choices as something that "just happens" to moral agents, rather than being genuinely formed by them.

I don't quite understand how determinism is necessary for moral accountability: even if the decision-making process is dominated by the central nervous system -- i.e., even if the person is autonomous -- how does this imply punishing agents who have performed evil assure a genuine failure on their part? The decision-making process is completely determined, and therefore, how can it "fail"? Doesn't failure imply the option of succeeding, which does not exist in a deterministic model?

[Surlethe]

I guess, though, if it's not necessary to a broader theory, an unknowable entity is almost trivially sliced out by Occam's Razor.

Well yeah, but tentative conclusions like "I don't believe x exists due to the lack of evidence for it," are different from "it definately does not exist because everything that exists must exist within the dimensions we exist within," which is what it looked like you were saying.

Indeed. I back down from that. There's nothing wrong in saying, "We don't have enough knowledge to conclude if A is true or false", but, as you said, that's hardly the same as using that to conclude the truth value of A.

[Surlethe]

Actually, I think you misunderstood my objection regarding quantum mechanics. Having omniscient knowledge of the future means knowing the configuration of the universe at the relevant points in time, but if wavefunctions are fundamental, then this amount to knowing some sort of "universal wavefunction" in its exact form. This would be natural interpretation of omniscience regarding the future, but it classically corresponds to probability distributions of choices rather than choices. Put simply, there is no choice to know in the absolute sense under this interpretation (although the wavefunction would give a fair impression of it through decoherence).

Ah, I think I see: if we accept a "universal wavefunction" for now, we're not going to be able to know whether or not the statement "Surlethe is typing a reply to Kuroneko right now" is true; we're only going to be able to know probabilities for that statement.

Which suggests to me another reductio ad absurdum of omniscience: it suggests that the proposition "X particle has Y momentum and Z velocity" is knowable, and that, in turn, violates the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle. Then we reduce into the thread we had a few weeks ago about turning off Uncertainty: everything explodes.

[Singular Intellect]

No; that's actually quite in line with what I was saying. Not all statements are propositions, i.e., simply true or false. A straightforward example from logic is "this statement is false", which requires a bit more than a "yes/no" to answer the question of its truth. But, under this looser meaning of "statement" and "knowing the answer to", it becomes possible for a question like "will A perform action C?" to not be answerable in terms of "yes/no" even for an omniscient being. The argument from QM was presented to show that this is actually somewhat plausible for our own universe, not just possible in the abstract. In particular, it would have this question answerable only in terms of probabilities.

So, if I understand you correctly Kuroneko, you're suggesting an omniscient being would percieve all reality, at all levels, simply as degrees of probability? Rather than the typical interpretation of 'true or false' as you put it.

Which, if I've understood you correctly, would define what we consider knowledge merely to be what we percieve to be as 'high probability'.

[SWPIGWANG]

snip

Ah, I think I see: if we accept a "universal wavefunction" for now, we're not going to be able to know whether or not the statement "Surlethe is typing a reply to Kuroneko right now" is true; we're only going to be able to know probabilities for that statement.

Actually, now I think of it, it might work like this.

If we take the infinite branching world interpretation, then we can deduce this:
1. If we take on branch, the past is perfectly defined: i.e. the Wave Function converges.
2. If we take a projection into the future, then we know the RELATIONSHIP of the current universe to every future branch universe. You can not deduce it down to one universe as all universes all exists. Probability is used as an description of how an in-universe observer sees the relationship of the branch universes.

An observer in the universe can never observe other branch universes, as we do now.

----

it suggests that the proposition "X particle has Y momentum and Z velocity" is knowable, and that, in turn, violates the Heisenburg Uncertainty Principle.

You don't even need to go there. You can just ask the general question "what is the answer to the unanswerable question?" or something of the type.

When confronted with this, you can either break logic or you can invalidate statements as being impossible.

[Kuroneko]

I don't see why it's a stretch to treat the future as an actually existing object/state -- or, barring that, why we can't treat it as the things which will exist at some point in time. The statement "X will occur" merely says that X will or will not occur at some point; I'm having trouble seeing how that could be either both true and false or neither true nor false.

What's so incomprehensible about denying the reality of the past and future? After all, (presumably) no one experiences either directly. It's more reasonable to demand justification for the reverse. Suppose I say "Surlethe will reply to this post within a day." If you actually do, this prediction will turn out to be true. But does it mean that this statement was true the time I typed it? If you think so, you're projecting (the then) present state of truth into the past, but there doesn't seem to be anything that makes this move deductively valid. Hence, your original statement is not analytic. It doesn't mean it's not justifiable; one can try to justify it along the lines of "given our knowledge of the universe [esp. relativity], it is reasonable to conclude that the future [and past] are as real as the present," but this sort of justification, while convincing, is not obvious (nor is it completely unquestionable). And here we come full circle--your original statement was neither obvious nor analytically true.

What, exactly, is the distinction Aristotle makes between the two?

If I recall correctly, Aristotle treats propositions regarding the future as true iff they are true in every possible outcome, and false iff they are false in every possible outcome. This would mean that my above prediction regarding your reply is neither true nor false until you make it or the time limit runs out. As such, am I so far neither correct nor incorrect.

[Edit: missing block fixed.]

Well, it certainly says something about the preferences of the person who said it, but how could it have some value other than binary true/false? After all, isn't that how a proposition is defined?

You're begging the question. The point of contention is is whether that statement is a proposition at all.

I don't quite understand how determinism is necessary for moral accountability: even if the decision-making process is dominated by the central nervous system -- i.e., even if the person is autonomous -- how does this imply punishing agents who have performed evil assure a genuine failure on their part? The decision-making process is completely determined, and therefore, how can it "fail"?

I mean a moral failure--simply that the outcome did not conform to morality. Determinism (if true) assures us that this failure had some cause inherent in the agent, so that the agent is responsible for it by virtue of this cause.

[Surlethe]

What's so incomprehensible about denying the reality of the past and future? After all, (presumably) no one experiences either directly. It's more reasonable to demand justification for the reverse. Suppose I say "Surlethe will reply to this post within a day." If you actually do, this prediction will turn out to be true. But does it mean that this statement was true the time I typed it? If you think so, you're projecting (the then) present state of truth into the past, but there doesn't seem to be anything that makes this move deductively valid.

The future I can see demanding justification for it, but the past? Doesn't memory serve to make denial of the reality of the past prima facie ridiculous? It seems to me that there can be a symmetry argument made for the eventual reality of the future, but there seems to be some confusion with tenses in my head. I'll have to think on this.

Speaking of thinking, here's a thought: suppose I make a similar prediction, "Kuroneko will reply to this post within twelve hours". Then the claim is one of the eventuality of your reply, yes? I think there is a very subtle distinction between the statement "A reply by Kuroneko exists in the future" (which presumes the future exists), and "A reply by Kuroneko will exist after a given amount of time has elapsed" (which does not, I don't think -- it only presumes that time will continue to elapse, and makes a prediction about the current state of things after so much time has elapsed). I'm obviously having trouble articulating the distinction (real or imagined), though.

Hence, your original statement is not analytic. It doesn't mean it's not justifiable; one can try to justify it along the lines of "given our knowledge of the universe [esp. relativity], it is reasonable to conclude that the future [and past] are as real as the present," but this sort of justification, while convincing, is not obvious (nor is it completely unquestionable). And here we come full circle--your original statement was neither obvious nor analytically true.

Out of curiosity, how is "obvious" defined in this sense?

What, exactly, is the distinction Aristotle makes between the two?

If I recall correctly, Aristotle treats propositions regarding the future as true iff they are true in every possible outcome, and false iff they are false in every possible outcome. This would mean that my above prediction regarding your reply is neither true nor false until you make it or the time limit runs out. As such, am I so far neither correct nor incorrect.

Saying a given proposition regarding the future (I want to say all propositions regarding the future are predictions, but I'm not entirely sure if that follows) is true or false iff it is true or false respectively in every possible outcome strikes me as almost tautological.

You're begging the question. The point of contention is is whether that statement is a proposition at all.

Yes, that is the point of contention. The questions weren't intended to be rhetorical: I was clarifying the definition of a proposition and asking how that particular statement (i.e., "Murder is wrong") doesn't satisfy the definition (or, if you wish to interpret it another way, I was making a rather weak appeal to incredulity).

I mean a moral failure--simply that the outcome did not conform to morality. Determinism (if true) assures us that this failure had some cause inherent in the agent, so that the agent is responsible for it by virtue of this cause.

Ah, I see. I would tend to think, however, that responsibility for a particular action implies the ability to have done otherwise; doesn't determinism remove that, regardless of whether or not the decision-making process is divorced from the body? Or is there a point I've missed along the way?

[Rye]

All observation is lagged, including everything we sense in our own minds, so the past simply must exist, the present is an ideal, what we actually experience has already happened.

[Kuroneko]

The future I can see demanding justification for it, but the past? Doesn't memory serve to make denial of the reality of the past prima facie ridiculous?

Let's not loosen what is meant by "reality" in this context. If what is meant is the denial that the past "had" existed in some limited sense, then yes, it is prima facie ridiculous. However, what's actually being denied is that the past is just as real as present, which is prima facie plausible, although it does lead to a fairly ugly ontology that forces interpreting statements of the past as statements about the present (present records especially).

Speaking of thinking, here's a thought: suppose I make a similar prediction, "Kuroneko will reply to this post within twelve hours". Then the claim is one of the eventuality of your reply, yes?

Yes, but does this mean that when you made this statement, you were already incorrect (and just didn't know it), or does it merely mean that when twelve came and passed, you were made incorrect? Pragmatically, it makes almost no difference, but as far as the deductive force of your prior argument is concerned, it is a rather crucial distinction.

I think there is a very subtle distinction between the statement "A reply by Kuroneko exists in the future" (which presumes the future exists), and "A reply by Kuroneko will exist after a given amount of time has elapsed" (which does not, I don't think -- it only presumes that time will continue to elapse, and makes a prediction about the current state of things after so much time has elapsed). I'm obviously having trouble articulating the distinction (real or imagined), though.

Given the standard format of weather predictions regarding rain done today, these predictions are never wrong, except in a negligibly small number of cases. Not because they predict rain with near-unerring accuracy, but rather because they don't--a typical weather report gives a probability of rain instead. Perhaps that's all that can be known, even if the state of the whole universe is known and arbitrarily high processing power is available. Put another way, there is a hidden assumption in your argument that the future can be known in absolute terms if sufficient information about the present state is available, and this assumption is far from being unquestionable. If it's not part of the class of things that can be known beyond probabilities no matter how much present information is available, there is no problem in an omniscient being not knowing it in absolute terms.

Out of curiosity, how is "obvious" defined in this sense?

As far as I was concerned, something along the lines of "not requiring substantial evidence to justify."

Saying a given proposition regarding the future (I want to say all propositions regarding the future are predictions, but I'm not entirely sure if that follows) is true or false iff it is true or false respectively in every possible outcome strikes me as almost tautological.

Nevertheless, it is far from tautological. Perhaps you're treating "iff" as if it was a mere "if". The implication is bidirectional; what it implies is that statements regarding the future that are not themselves tautologies or inconsistencies are incapable of being either true or false in the absolute sense (regardless of human limitations of knowledge). And that is definitely not a tautology, but the essence of the determinism/indeterminism distinction.

Ah, I see. I would tend to think, however, that responsibility for a particular action implies the ability to have done otherwise; doesn't determinism remove that, regardless of whether or not the decision-making process is divorced from the body? Or is there a point I've missed along the way?

When one typically talks about being "forced into" performing some action, the most relevant part is whether the situation they were in absolves them from moral culpability and/or puts it onto someone else. Shooting someone because he or she were about to kill you is much more morally acceptable than shooting someone because he or she cuts in line in a grocery store. Either way, the decision to shoot was made by an agent, and morality determines whether or not it was an appropriate response to the given stimuli. I'm having trouble seeing how determinism is supposed to undermine this. On the other hand, I've never successfully performed any action other than exactly whatever it was that I did, and have rather grave doubts that anyone else has either, so I'm not certain what this nebulous "ability to have done otherwise" actually means or why it is necessary to postulate it. Rather, it seems like a lot of metaphysical baggage for no substantive gain.