Question for atheists: What happens when we die?

[Arthur_Tuxedo]

I've noticed something, so I'll skip right to the end. Let me know if there's a point you still want to make that I'm ignoring.

Let's imagine a subatomic particle that's always exactly like every other of its kind. You woldn't say that they're all the same particle, or that if you disintegrated one and replaced it with another, it would be the same as nothing happening.

No, I would not say that nothing happened, but I would say that if it is put in an identical state as the original, then one particle is as good as another. I have no particular attachment to my individual particle qua particles, but only in so far as their presence is necessary for me to keep living. I "lose" particles all the time throughout my lifetime, but so long as they are replaced with other particles to keep my bodily functions, it makes no difference to my person identity. I'm simply applying the same kind of view to the brain in particular--if my neurons are replaced with functionally identical synthetic ones, it is of no import that if one carbon atom is substituted with another. Under your view, as you've already stated, this kind of 'robotization' is a systematic way of killing oneself.

Wait a minute, are we having the same debate? I thought you were advocating that making a copy and letting the original die was just as good as repairing damage to the brain. If all you're talking about is replacing neurons with synthetic equivalents, I agree that it would be a non-event. For some reason, I thought the original person was talking about gradually cutting out chunks of the brain and replacing them with computerized counterparts. Don't ask me why I thought that, but that was the point of view I was responding to.

[Kuroneko]

Wait a minute, are we having the same debate? I thought you were advocating that making a copy and letting the original die was just as good as repairing damage to the brain.

If there the the jump is instantaneous in the subjective sense, there is no functional difference between this and synthetic replacement in psychological terms. If there is no such difference, the only possible difference remaining is if the particular materials that the brain is made of is assigned some grave importance, which I deny. So yes, in particular cases sufficiently exact copy to replace that replaces the original is just as good as repairing damage, since psychological continuity is preserved. In the "fission" scenario, the two diverge in terms of thought processes, so it is not a problem to consider them different persons if that is what you insist on. The problem of identifying which the the "real one" in this scenario is present, I admit, but my contention is that since it is also present in your interpretation as well (in the analogous hemispherectomy scenario), it is not a fatal flaw in the sense of causing your interpretation preferable.

If all you're talking about is replacing neurons with synthetic equivalents, I agree that it would be a non-event. For some reason, I thought the original person was talking about gradually cutting out chunks of the brain and replacing them with computerized counterparts.

I'm not sure where you're getting that from. But more to the point, why is replacing chunks of the brain really different from replacing individual neurons if these 'chunks' are configured to be functionally equivalent to the original? Functional equivalence was, after all, an implicit assumption of having a "digital copy" made from what seems to be the start of this particular discussion, here.

[R. U. Serious]

It is observable that two otherwise identical but physically separate objects are not the same.

Yes, of course, I stated above, that there are two distinct physical entities. This is s self-evident, that it would be asurd to debate it. But the discussion does not revolve around physical entities, it revolves around person/self/consciousness.

Let me repeat my question: How is that "special something" (you derive from a concrete physical representation of a self, which you claim is an constituve part of the self) different from the concept of the mythical "soul" as new age hippies, or religious folks use the term?

[NecronLord]

As an aside, according to this position, an actual teleportation (without possibility of a copy) represents a true death. Is this a fair consequence of your view?

I believe he's on record as stating this before, though I could be mistaken. Though of course, that would, one assumes apply only to a Travel by Wire type teleportation. There's plentiful examples of other types, of course.

[FSTargetDrone]

May I quote:

"...Life is a short, warm moment
And death is a long cold rest
You get your chance to try
In the twinkling of an eye
Eighty years, with luck, or even less..."

Humans are both "cursed" and "blessed" with the knowledge that someday all that we are as a person will cease to exist. Some people delude themselves thinking that one day they can't possibly no longer be. So society has invented the concept of an afterlife to try to blunt that sharp reality that each of us, our memories, our feelings, everything that makes us each who we are will pass into nothingness. It's quite disturbing when you think of it.

I used to believe in that terrible lie, that there is something beyond. If there is, so be it, I'll see you all at the party, but I'm not counting on it.

Too bad, really...

The more I think about it, the more depressing it is. I will go on no more about it here.

[Arthur_Tuxedo]

Wait a minute, are we having the same debate? I thought you were advocating that making a copy and letting the original die was just as good as repairing damage to the brain.

If there the the jump is instantaneous in the subjective sense, there is no functional difference between this and synthetic replacement in psychological terms. If there is no such difference, the only possible difference remaining is if the particular materials that the brain is made of is assigned some grave importance, which I deny. So yes, in particular cases sufficiently exact copy to replace that replaces the original is just as good as repairing damage, since psychological continuity is preserved. In the "fission" scenario, the two diverge in terms of thought processes, so it is not a problem to consider them different persons if that is what you insist on. The problem of identifying which the the "real one" in this scenario is present, I admit, but my contention is that since it is also present in your interpretation as well (in the analogous hemispherectomy scenario), it is not a fatal flaw in the sense of causing your interpretation preferable.

Determining the "real" one doesn't really concern me, and may actually be a nonsense term in this context. I'd be perfectly happy to be the fake one, in fact, rather than be consigned to oblivion.

If all you're talking about is replacing neurons with synthetic equivalents, I agree that it would be a non-event. For some reason, I thought the original person was talking about gradually cutting out chunks of the brain and replacing them with computerized counterparts.

I'm not sure where you're getting that from. But more to the point, why is replacing chunks of the brain really different from replacing individual neurons if these 'chunks' are configured to be functionally equivalent to the original? Functional equivalence was, after all, an implicit assumption of having a "digital copy" made from what seems to be the start of this particular discussion, here.

I see. Well, I have no fresh arguments left to make, and rather than repeat myself until one of us gets tired, I think any readers should be left to agree or disagree.

Yes, of course, I stated above, that there are two distinct physical entities. This is s self-evident, that it would be asurd to debate it. But the discussion does not revolve around physical entities, it revolves around person/self/consciousness.

Let me repeat my question: How is that "special something" (you derive from a concrete physical representation of a self, which you claim is an constituve part of the self) different from the concept of the mythical "soul" as new age hippies, or religious folks use the term?

I never said there was a special anything. I simply point out that I interpret the world with my brain, not an exact-but-physically-distinct copy. If my unique brain goes bye-bye, then I won't see, hear, or feel anymore, and the thought that there's now another brain that can be called "me" with perfect legitimacy doesn't make me want to avoid that outcome any less. No soul or "special something" required.

I believe he's on record as stating this before, though I could be mistaken. Though of course, that would, one assumes apply only to a Travel by Wire type teleportation. There's plentiful examples of other types, of course.

It would depend on the manner of teleportation, but if it works how Star Trek transporters are thought to work by SD.netizens (disintegrating the person, sending their data to a receiver, and building a clone at the other end), then that would most certainly kill the only "me" that I'm interested in keeping alive.

[General Zod]

It would depend on the manner of teleportation, but if it works how Star Trek transporters are thought to work by SD.netizens (disintegrating the person, sending their data to a receiver, and building a clone at the other end), then that would most certainly kill the only "me" that I'm interested in keeping alive.

This is largely up in the air actually. Considering that you retain consciousness through transport (as proven in the episode that deals with Barclay's transporter phobia), then it doesn't kill you by any means. Since you retain some degree of consciousness while in transport.

[Stark]

This is largely up in the air actually. Considering that you retain consciousness through transport (as proven in the episode that deals with Barclay's transporter phobia), then it doesn't kill you by any means. Since you retain some degree of consciousness while in transport.

Since it's impossible for even a disassembled brain to have experiences, this is clearly not what happens here. The 'zomg teh brakly saw worms' argument has been done to death with regard to transporters.

[TithonusSyndrome]

I like to think that maybe in the last few seconds or so, you start hallucinating and your concept of time disappears so that you end up in some kind of unending coma-dream that lasts an eternity.
But, probably not.

A high school friend of mine held to this idea, which he referred to as some sort of premortem "time dilation" that strips you of more and more of your critical faculties as it picks up steam, and depending on whether or not you submitted warmly to the sensation or railed angrily against your fate determined whether or not you were in "heaven" or "hell", respectively.

A story arc in Garfield, of all comics, has been suggested to deal with this notion: http://garfieldisdead.ytmnd.com/

[Frank Hipper]

Let me misquote Mark Twain to sum up my thoughts on death:

I was dead for billions and billions of years before I was born, and it didn't bother me a bit. Why should I be afraid of dying?

[R. U. Serious]

[...] If my unique brain goes bye-bye, then I won't see, hear, or feel anymore , and the thought that there's now another brain that can be called "me" with perfect legitimacy doesn't make me want to avoid that outcome any less. No soul or "special something" required.

So, you say the duplicate can be called "you" with "perfect legitimacy", yet you still insist, that you won't see, hear or feel anymore (implying that somehow the duplicate can not be perfectly, legitimately called you...?). I see. There's really no point in continuing to argue.

[K. A. Pital]

So... Arthur_Tuxedo thinks that on one side, the brain is a lump of flesh that has nothing to do with the distinctive "I", but on the other side, considers the replacement of the brain with an identical information carrier "death"? That's logically unmaintainable. Either materialistic, and then there's nothing about the brain we can't duplicate and replace, and therefore, no death. Or you're ascribing bullshit transcedental qualities to the brain, which it simply doesn't have.

[Darth Wong]

Let me misquote Mark Twain to sum up my thoughts on death:

I was dead for billions and billions of years before I was born, and it didn't bother me a bit. Why should I be afraid of dying?

Interesting philosophy, but I will continue to fear death anyway.

[CaptJodan]

You know, I get where Arthur is coming from and might be the only one, but because I can't argue it any better than he has, I'm pretty much at a loss too.

To me, because these two entities will be experiencing different realities the moment after this coping thing takes place, and that alone to me makes them seperate. The fact that the "original's" eyes are not connected to the "copy's" eyes through neural connections means the brain that dies, dies. Whatever consciousness was inside that brain is dead, because that consciousness cannot be looking through eyes and hearing through ears it was not physically connected to.

But, as I said, I can't argue it very well.

[Arthur_Tuxedo]

So... Arthur_Tuxedo thinks that on one side, the brain is a lump of flesh that has nothing to do with the distinctive "I", but on the other side, considers the replacement of the brain with an identical information carrier "death"? That's logically unmaintainable. Either materialistic, and then there's nothing about the brain we can't duplicate and replace, and therefore, no death. Or you're ascribing bullshit transcedental qualities to the brain, which it simply doesn't have.

The "therefore, no death" is the part where you fall down. Even if the replacement brain is utterly identical to any outside observer, it's not the same brain. Disintegration and replacement with a perfect clone is not the same as nothing happening. And if you're the one who got disintegrated, you're dead.

Now, it's true that the perfect clone can be called "you" with total legitimacy, and from any outsider's perspective, nothing happened. But the original no longer sees, hears, feels, and is dead. The fact that you can't tell anyone that you're dead makes no difference.

I still haven't seen why perfect-cloning someone and then not destroying the original is any different. If you get cloned in such a manner, you will see, hear, and feel through the senses of one of the two, not both, and any uncertainty about which is the "true" one is utterly irrelevant to that fact. So if you destroyed one of the two at the moment of cloning, why would you think that you would continue to see, hear, feel through the senses of the other clone when you wouldn't have if both were still around? I understand that the proponents of this argument do not believe in a soul or consciousness outside the physical brain, although I do not understand how this argument could fail to require such a thing, so I will ask you to stop telling me that my argument requires one.

I believe I've just summed up every argument I've made in this thread, and I still can't think of anything new to say, which is why I was trying to leave it to the readers to decide for themselvse. Debate resolution on forums can be a real problem, and it would be nice if more people knew when a debate was going in circles and didn't insist on repeating themselves until someone gets tired and conceeds or storms off with an "I can't even talk to you" like R.U. Serious.

[K. A. Pital]

The "therefore, no death" is the part where you fall down. Even if the replacement brain is utterly identical to any outside observer, it's not the same brain.

What you fail to realize is that the brain is nothing but a material carrier with defined properties and nothing beyond it, it's a carrier of information process which is your mind, so that's not "changing minds", that's a mind, which is the summary of brain information process, changing it's carrier. From the perspective of the mind, there would be no discontinuity and no death. If mind can be separated from it's carrier, which is the PREMISE of the whole fucking thing, that's just a mind changing shells.

The point is, we're replacing the box in which the mind is stored, not the mind. That would be analogous to moving a file from one hard drive to another - from the "file's perspective", and from the outside perspective, it's the same file. The hard drive is merely storage medium.

[Arthur_Tuxedo]

The "therefore, no death" is the part where you fall down. Even if the replacement brain is utterly identical to any outside observer, it's not the same brain.

What you fail to realize is that the brain is nothing but a material carrier with defined properties and nothing beyond it, it's a carrier of information process which is your mind, so that's not "changing minds", that's a mind, which is the summary of brain information process, changing it's carrier. From the perspective of the mind, there would be no discontinuity and no death. If mind can be separated from it's carrier, which is the PREMISE of the whole fucking thing, that's just a mind changing shells.

The point is, we're replacing the box in which the mind is stored, not the mind. That would be analogous to moving a file from one hard drive to another - from the "file's perspective", and from the outside perspective, it's the same file. The hard drive is merely storage medium.

And you accuse me of ascribing metaphysical qualities to biochemical processes? There is no evidence whatsoever that there is a "mind" that is separate from the physical neurons and synapses of the brain. The mind is the carrier. Different carrier, different mind. Otherwise identical, but physically distinct.

[Admiral Valdemar]

Interesting philosophy, but I will continue to fear death anyway.

Is it the fear of your actual passing away, or the fact that you won't be around your friends and family anymore for eternity once it happens? I find a lot of people who fear death merely hate the idea of parting with their loved ones, rather than the act of dying. That's probably what led to the evolution of afterlives in the first place, since most who believe in them do not fear how they go out simply because it is a minor nuisance between them and eternally being reunited with their loved ones.

What you fail to realize is that the brain is nothing but a material carrier with defined properties and nothing beyond it, it's a carrier of information process which is your mind, so that's not "changing minds", that's a mind, which is the summary of brain information process, changing it's carrier. From the perspective of the mind, there would be no discontinuity and no death. If mind can be separated from it's carrier, which is the PREMISE of the whole fucking thing, that's just a mind changing shells.

The point is, we're replacing the box in which the mind is stored, not the mind. That would be analogous to moving a file from one hard drive to another - from the "file's perspective", and from the outside perspective, it's the same file. The hard drive is merely storage medium.

Since the body of your average adult human replaces every atom within it on a decade basis, it's hard to really think replacing the brain on a modular basis without conscious interruption would result in death. Your neurones may not regenerate like other cells, but they do displace molecules and have others come in. So really, is the me of today the same as me 10 years ago? Obviously not, since my mental and physical attributes are different, but my identity is consistent even if my shell and ghost are continuously altering down to physical processes.

[K. A. Pital]

And you accuse me of ascribing metaphysical qualities to biochemical processes? There is no evidence whatsoever that there is a "mind" that is separate from the physical neurons and synapses of the brain. The mind is the carrier. Different carrier, different mind. Otherwise identical, but physically distinct.

If the mind is not separable from the carrier, that means transfer to a digital carrier is not possible. But this was the premise - we replace the brain with an artificial analogue or digital carrier.
The mind is not "separate" from the brain in the sense that it can only exist on a "brain", just like a file cannot exist outside the hard drive. There's nothing "metaphysical" here, the file is merely information that is physically stored on a hard drive. But this infromation, if moved to a differend HD, doesn't "die", "cease to exist", etc. etc. Neither from subjective nor from objective perspective.

You also failed to adress how is it so that the subjective mind would not see replacement of it's brain parts as death at any point, because it will retain the same-functionality parts up to the point when it's completely artificial. When does the death precisely happen, at what point in time?

[K. A. Pital]

AV brough up an interesting point. What if we manipulate human evolution in such a way to introduce mechanical cells in the future which will take place of the dying human ones, in such a way that a human body is entirely mechanized by an age and from thereone continues into immortality, where is even the subjective notion of death?

There is not even the perception of death, which can arise in a mind that is moved to an artificial carrier instantly.

[Admiral Valdemar]

I haven't read all of this thread since I last posted, but has anyone brought up anything like epiphenomenalism? A lot of dualists tend to believe that while self arises from mental processes, such mental processes cannot affect the physical universe, so we are, in effect, running a program with defined cause and effect.

I think that ties in somewhat with the idea of the quantum mind too and qualia, since while it's obvious there's no metaphysical component of our mind, simply pinning down what our physical manifestation of the mind really is is a pain in the arse.

[Tolya]

After reading some of the above posts, a question came to my mind:

supposedly we develop technology that allows us to make perfect copies of things, structure wise.

And then, we make a perfect copy of Mr. John Doe's brain. Every neuron is in its proper place.

Do you think such copy would represent the very same Mr. Doe as the original, together with all the experiences and memories?

Im not trying to make a point, Im simply interested in your opinions.

[Admiral Valdemar]

After reading some of the above posts, a question came to my mind:

supposedly we develop technology that allows us to make perfect copies of things, structure wise.

And then, we make a perfect copy of Mr. John Doe's brain. Every neuron is in its proper place.

Do you think such copy would represent the very same Mr. Doe as the original, together with all the experiences and memories?

Im not trying to make a point, Im simply interested in your opinions.

Yes, why wouldn't it?

What you have to ask yourself now is, does this lead to something akin to entanglement? Copying something that precisely would be a feat anyway.

[Dooey Jo]

If the mind is not separable from the carrier, that means transfer to a digital carrier is not possible. But this was the premise - we replace the brain with an artificial analogue or digital carrier.
The mind is not "separate" from the brain in the sense that it can only exist on a "brain", just like a file cannot exist outside the hard drive. There's nothing "metaphysical" here, the file is merely information that is physically stored on a hard drive. But this infromation, if moved to a differend HD, doesn't "die", "cease to exist", etc. etc. Neither from subjective nor from objective perspective.

The information contained in the file doesn't go away, but you are not actually moving anything, merely changing part of the structure of another HD to be identical with the one which contained the original file. If those bits on the original HD had a point of view, they wouldn't notice anything, unless they were changed, in which case they would notice that they had changed, not that they had re-appeared on a different HD. The "moved" bits would however notice that they are now on a different HD (or perhaps more properly, the bits on the new HD would notice that they now contain information that is identical to the file on the other HD).

Re-applying this analogy to the brain, means that creating an exact copy of the brain also creates an exact copy of the mind, but you have not transferred anything; you have duplicated. If you want to actually transfer your thought processes and memories to a different medium, I don't see how you could do that without some sort of gradual process. Too big a change, and you would effectively create a new person, which may or may not be identical, but that doesn't really matter, because I'm pretty sure the original would protest against being replaced by a perfect copy. I would at least, which is why I also don't particularly like the Raëlians' idea of an after-life (which is basically creating a perfect copy to replace you when you die. Great for your friends, but sucks for the you that died).

[K. A. Pital]

Re-applying this analogy to the brain, means that creating an exact copy of the brain also creates an exact copy of the mind, but you have not transferred anything; you have duplicated. If you want to actually transfer your thought processes and memories to a different medium, I don't see how you could do that without some sort of gradual process.

What is the difference, perception aside? Replacing chunks of the brain simply gives more comfort to the person and he's sure that his conciousness does not cease at any given moment up until he's fully artificial. Replacing the brain as a whole, similar, does not have his conciousness perceive anything like a cease, not at all. Yes, we can argue that it's two minds, but really, if they're totally identical what's the difference from an individual POV? The mind in the new brain will continue from the personal experiences of the same mind, same individual, and to him it would not seem any type of death. Neither to the outer spectators.

So really, there's no inner perception of death and no outer evidence of it, why would people be afraid of it and perceive it as death?