PainRack wrote:Patrick Degan wrote:
Excuse me, but how do those exceptions destroy the general observation? The very existence of the government monopolies while independent salt and iron concerns were prohibited only lend further weight to the argument. Furthermore, the government may have allowed licensing to an extent of their salt and iron franchises, but this did not seem to lead to a general loosening of the socioeconomic structure of Chinese society or of its doctrinal base.
Except that they disprove the argument that Confucianism is the key cause of what caused the decline.
Funny, but you don't demonstrate exactly
how the argument is disproven. Confucian ideology is definitely at the root of the very hierarchical system which governed all aspects of Chinese society and established a lineage system which ordinary people simply couldn't operate outside of. Free enterprise, on the other hand, requires a relatively hands-off environment in order for any concern to be able to establish itself and operate freely.
Furthermore, how does one argue that since Confucianism disaproves salt and iron monopolies, ergo, the existence of salt and iron monopolies prove that Confucianism is the key element in dictatorial behaviour which caused the decline and fall of the Chinese civilisation?
Excuse me, but that is not at all my argument. Your strawman of it, perhaps...
The key reason for the backwardness of China lies in the Industrial Revolution. A revolution that occured in Britainand which spread outwards from there.
But that doesn't answer the question of
why there was no Industrial Revolution in China of the same sort as what occurred in Britain and the west, does it?
Unless one can show that Confucianism disallows the Industrial Revolution, its illogical to attribute the decline to Confucianism. Ergo for corruption, inept imperial leadership and unequal access to education.
Confucianism did not "disallow" the Industrial Revolution; it merely made for a society which was too hidebound to recognise and grasp the forces of change and innovation. Higher education was aimed at preparation for the examination system which was the only access into the imperial bureaucracy and the one real avenue for upward mobility in Chinese society, and that education had degenerated into rote memorisation of classical texts. That does not build a foundation for a dynamic society.
The main arguments that can be raised is Confucianism attitude towards merchants and the role of women and peasants. Yet, by the Tang dynasty, both attitudes had died out. Not only that, education became more and more liberalised and free from the drudgy of the classics. More emphasis was placed on essays in the Imperial Exam which displayed critical thinking in areas of governance and agriculture among other subjects, with less emphasis placed on classical literature memorisation. Similarly, amongst the military, the idea of the "gentlemen" art slowly died, with more practical aspects of horsemanship and archery slowly coming to the foreground when choosing officers.
Oh
really:
The Encyclopaedia Britannica wrote:Confucianism was perceived by the Mongols as a Chinese religion, and it had mixed fortunes under their rule. The teachings of the Neo-Confucian school of Chu Hsi from the Sung period were introduced to the Mongol court at Chung-tu in the late 1230s but were confined to limited circles there and in North China. Confucian scholars enjoyed the benefits extended to the clergy of all religions, but they were dealt a strong blow by the discontinuation of the literary examinations following the Mongol conquest. For many centuries the examinations, based on Confucian texts, had been the basis for the selection of officials and for their privileged position within the state and society. After Kublai's accession, Confucianism had a more cordial reception at the Mongol court through the efforts of Chinese advisers like Liu Ping-chung and the great Confucian master Hsü Heng. Under their stewardship a certain Confucianization took place in government and education. Chinese rituals were performed for a while in the dynastic temple (t'ai-miao), erected in Chung-tu in 1263. State sacrifices were offered to Confucius, and the study of the Classics was encouraged. Many of the rites observed at the court that were either Tibetan Buddhist or inherited from the Mongol nomadic past were continued, however. The emperor Buyantu (ruled 1311–20), one of the most Sinicized Mongol rulers, reintroduced the examination system in 1313, but it remains doubtful how well the examinations functioned. They certainly did not guarantee an official career, as those under the Sung and, to a certain extent, under the Chin had done.
The system of the Yüan, as introduced in 1313, provided different types of curricula for Mongols, other foreigners (se-mu jen), and Chinese; also, the requirements were different—Chinese had to show their complete mastery of the curriculum, whereas Mongols and other foreigners had to give only a mediocre performance. This inequality was even formalized for the candidates who were to be admitted to the state academy (kuo-tzu chien). The first examinations were held in the presence of the Emperor in 1315, and, of the 300 persons granted the title of doctor (chin-shih), 75 were Mongols, 75 were other foreigners, 75 were northern Chinese (han-jen), and 75 came from southern China; they all received official positions within the bureaucracy, Mongols the higher and Chinese the lesser posts. The positions of power within the hierarchy remained in the hands of the Mongols and other foreigners.
Under Buyantu, for the first time, the interpretation and commentaries of the Neo-Confucian school were made obligatory. This cemented Neo-Confucian ideology not only among the Chinese literati who wished to pass an examination but also for future generations. Chinese Confucian orthodoxy from the 14th to the 19th century therefore rested largely on the foundations it had received under the Yüan. In spite of all this, Classical scholarship under the Yüan did not produce a single remarkable work but struggled under an adverse political and intellectual climate. Striving to preserve their sacred tradition, the Confucian scholars were content with expounding the doctrines laid down by the Sung philosophers, seeking to harmonize the different philosophical issues and points of view rather than exploring new horizons.
PainRack wrote:Unless one wish to argue that the governing philosophy of Confucianism, which places high value on loyalty, obediance and piety is the cause for China failure, its impossible to say that Confucianism is the cause for China decline. And if one chooses to argue that, remember that certain attitudes which derive from Confucianist philosophy such as the value of diplomacy, fiscal conservatism and responsibility, social welfare(in terms of education) are those which are also prized in our modern day society. The fact that such values can be taken to extremes, such as the laissez faire attitude listed above or pacificism, are the same attitudes as those found in liberal societies today. Yet, can one argue that these values are destructive to society?
Yes, it placed high value on obedience, piety, and loyalty. It also discouraged innovative thought and free scientific inquiry. It's emphasis on the preservation of tradition as a supreme virtue acted as a negative force against any trend toward progress.
Conservative elements which very evidently were not powerful enough to halt the introduction of the potato or the smallpox vaccine, nor were they operating from an ideology that society was already in a perfect form which had to be preserved intact, which would have loaned the force of centuries of tradition behind the resistance. Western conservatism was nowhere near as despotic or absolute as its Eastern counterpart.
Yet, the attitudes you argue about AREN"T confucianist at all. The idea of the Middle Kingdom is not a Confucian idea. The idea that China is perfect is similarly not a Confucian idea.
Oh really:
Basic cultural differences existed between the Chinese and Western Europeans. To Westerners, the individual was more important than the group. The Chinese took the opposite view. Westerners believed in the supremacy of law. The Chinese believed in an all-powerful emperor. Westerners placed a high value on technology and material wealth. The Chinese considered proper relationships far more important. According to Confucian thought, Chinese society at this time was divided into four classes. In order of importance, they were scholar-gentry, who governed in the name of the emperor; peasants, who provided food and taxes; artisans, who crafted useful objects; and merchants, who made profits by selling things that the peasants and artisans produced. Thus, while Westerners held merchants and business people in high regard, the Chinese tended to despise merchants, who "neither plow nor weed."
Paul Thomas Welty and Miriam Greenblatt, The Human Expression, 4th ed. (Peoria, Ill.: Glencoe, 1992), 234.
While Confucius placed great emphasis on the rites and customs of the past, believing that obedience of the rites is what will create a "perfect" human which will lead to harmony and etc etc etc, these attitudes were not ones which caused the eventual decline and fall of the Chinese civilisation.
At best, worship of the past is a Confucian ideal and if you examine chinese history instead of a superficial, stereotypical facade of its decline, you will notice that this WASN"T the reason for its eventual decline.
The problem is that once Confucius' ideals became codified into doctrine, that doctrine was observed and applied with increasing rigidity with each passing century.
Big deal. The fact remains that Chinese society had been robbed of the social and ideological tools to exploit those advances on a large scale due to centuries of its Confucian tradition. The reformers lacked enough support to overcome the corrupt, fossil establishment.
Prove that Confucianism was what did this, instead of the lack of a secular education on science, which China never had because of its supernatural inclination and attitudes, instead of the lack of monies and funds which was a constant problem throughout the Yuan dynasty, and last but not least, because technical expertise was simply not available on a scale large enough.
Let's see what Prof. Henry Tsai Shih-shan (History dept., University of Arkansas) had to say on the matter:
Linky
"Fear of change is an enduring legacy of Confucianism," says Henry Tsai Shih-shan, a University of Arkansas history professor who has written several books on the Ming dynasty. "Chinese continually fail to appreciate that expansion can create power and wealth, not chaos."
Further, you toss out "supernatural inclination and attitudes" as the supposed catch-phrase answer to the entire question while ignoring the fact that neither Buddhist nor Taoist traditions (the prevailing religious/philosophical influences in Chinese society during the period in question) and teachings are particularly mystical or concerned with superstitious practises, and therefore cannot support your theory or explain the fact of Chinese stagnation. Insular and tradition-bound they might have been, but the Chinese certainly were not the Voodoo People. To punctuate both points:
.pdf Link
Intensive And Extensive Growth In Imperial China wrote:The bureaucratic system was the major force maintaining China as a unitary state. The
bureaucracy was a docile instrument of the Emperor (as long as he did not seriously breach the mandate of heaven), but exercised autocratic power over the population, with no challenge from a landed aristocracy, an established church, a judiciary, dissident intellectuals, the military or the urban bourgeoisie. They used a written language common to all of China, and the official Confucian ideology was deeply ingrained in the education system. This system was relatively efficient and cheap to operate compared with the multilayered structure of governance in pre–modern Europe and Japan. It facilitated central control by maintaining an efficient communications network and flow of information which enabled the imperial power to monitor and react to events. It maintained order without massive use of military force. It created the logistics (the Grand Canal) for feeding a large imperial capital on the edge of the Empire. It raised and remitted taxes to maintain a lavish imperial household and the military establishment. It maintained the Great Wall as a defensive glacis against barbarian invaders. Maintenance of a single economic area did not ensure a single national market for goods because of high transport costs, but it had an important impact in facilitating the transmission of best–practice technology. New techniques which the bureaucracy sponsored or favoured could be readily spread by use of printed matter. Thus the gap between best–practice and average practice was probably narrower than it was in the polycentric state system of Europe. The economic impact of bureaucracy was generally very positive in agriculture. Like eighteenth century French physiocrats, the Emperor and bureaucracy thought of it as the key sector from which they could “squeeze” a surplus in the form of taxes and compulsory levies. They nurtured agriculture through hydraulic works. They helped develop and diffuse new seeds and crops by technical advice. They settled farmers in promising new regions. They developed a public granary system to ensure imperial food supplies and mitigate famines. They commissioned and distributed agricultural handbooks, calendars etc. Outside agriculture, the bureaucratic system had negative effects. The bureaucracy and gentry were quintessential rent–seekers. Their legal and customary privileges defined their status, lifestyle and attitudes. They were the group which dominated urban life. They prevented the emergence of an independent commercial and industrial bourgeoisie on the European pattern. Entrepreneurial activity was insecure in a framework where legal protection for private activity was so exiguous. Any activity that promised to be lucrative was subject to bureaucratic squeeze. Larger undertakings were limited to the state or to publicly licensed monopolies. Potentially profitable activity in opening up world trade by exploiting China’s sophisticated shipbuilding and navigational knowledge was simply forbidden.
The other feature of this bureaucratic civilisation which had long–term repercussions on economic development, was the official Confucian ideology and education system. By comparison with the situation in Europe in the middle ages, its pragmatic bias gave it the advantage. The official orthodoxy was probably most benign during the Sung dynasty. Educational opportunity was widened by state schools which provided a broader curriculum than the bureaucratic academies in later dynasties. Taoism and Buddhism were in decline. Neo–Confucian thought was reinvigorated and at that time was free of the dogmatism it displayed in later centuries (see Kracke, 1953, and Miyazaki, 1976). Needham (1969) argued that the Chinese bureaucracy was an enlightened despotism, more rational than European Christendom; more meritocratic in its concentration of the best minds in situations of power and hence more favourable to the progress of “natural knowledge” than the European system of military aristocratic power. After the European Renaissance and the development of Galileian and Newtonian science, the balance of advantage changed. Needham argues that China was never able “to develop the fundamental bases of modern science, such as the application of mathematical hypotheses to Nature, the full understanding and use of the experimental method, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and the systematic accumulation of openly published scientific data” (Needham, 1981, p. 9). However, he adds that the European breakthrough was due to “special social, intellectual and economic conditions prevailing there at the Renaissance, and can never be explained by any deficiencies either of the Chinese mind or of the Chinese intellectual and philosophical tradition”. China failed to react adequately to the Western challenge until the middle of the twentieth century, mainly because the ideology, mindset and education system of the bureaucracy promoted an ethnocentric outlook, which was indifferent to developments outside China.
As the above extract indicates, a system based upon the bureaucratic enforcement of Confucian doctrine sapped away the impetus toward any large-scale development of native Chinese technological abilities and robbed the Chinese civilisation of the fullest exploitation of its economic and scientific potential. Not mysticism as you would have it.
And of course, what little abilities were developed were quickly destroyed or consumed by the European powers it encountered. The 8 powers expedition managed to engage and destroy the most modern of the Qing cannon and the armoury that built it. Furthermore, while Japan was protected from physical exploitation by the other European powers by the USA, China was not. What little concentrated industries that occured were in the ports, which quickly fell under European control. The cottage industries that existed in the other parts of China simply couldn't compete in steel and iron production, even if China could had the monies and expertise to build the railways.
Furthermore, one cannot simply neglect the role of the European in continuing to keep China down. The Opium wars and the resulting reparations severely depleted China finances. Starting from a false position of strength, they never had the time to rebuild as successive wars and failures depleted her strength further whereas Japan did, protected as it was under the wing of the US.
And what you continue to ignore is just what
put China in such a position of weakness that it could not resist European incursion and exploitation in the first place. You focus on a symptom while ignoring the root cause of the disease.
The problem with that argument is that it does not destroy the overall observation. Why did China, a nation which had a far more advanced civilisation than Europe could dream of before the middle of the 19th century, wind up in a position where she was utterly helpless to resist European exploitation? They had centuries on the West and yet England and the other colonial powers overtook them in just three decades.
Because England and other colonial powers underwent industrialisation and China instead went on human labour.
A so-called answer which actually explains nothing.
I'm not a sociologist, so I have no idea what theory can explain that. Is it because of the relative scarcity of land in England as oppposed to China? Is it because of the lack of agricultural land to support a vast animal population, while retaining the argicultural expertise to support a vast human populace which caused China to focus on human labour instead of labour saving machines?
China had no lack of arable land to support its human and animal populations and at least had agricultural production well-enough organised to obviate against the danger of famine. Furthermore, your argument here is self-contradictory: a country which supposedly lacks the agricultural capacity and expertise to support livestock as well as its human population but somehow can support a large labour-force? Doesn't track —particularly as Chinese civilisation was no less primitive or poor than 17th century Europe before the West gained the upper hand.
All that is known is that in a land where a horse equals to 7 human labourers, industralisation took a second place to throwing more human bodies at a problem.
A lot more is known that that. Chinese history is not exactly a mystery to the rest of the world.
