Saying that normative propositions have no truth-value is misleading, because they may still be useful outside of ontology.Originally posted by: -Koba-
I have been waiting to utter forth my devastating (yes, if I may be so bold) criticism of empiricism. By empiricism is simply mean "the belief that all knowledge is empirical knowledge, and that rational methods of inquiry into the empirical are simply normative propositions that have no truth-value whatsoever."
Here, I guess I don't fully understand the folly of a falsifiable beleif system, or even why the statement "All knowledge is either analytic or empirical" wouldn't qualify as an analytical one.To illustrate the utter infeasability of your position, I will argue for several theses: 1) Empiricism, no matter how it is defined, is self refuting 2) Empiricism has relativistic implications and 3) Empiricism, if taken seriously, must allow for a dualistic view of nature.
Firstly, empiricists claim that a priori knowledge of empirical truths is impossible. Thus, what they label mathematics and logic (a priori fields) as are analytic statements; they are meaningless tautuologies, devoid of truth content. It is the same as saying "all unmarried men are bachelors." So if there is a priori knowledge (which math and logic seem to be) it is devoid of truth content. Now the other category of statements that the empiricists allow for are empirical statements: those that can be verified and falsified by experience. Usually this is in the form of a hypothesis in constant need of revision (lightning is the result of X, now I will go and test this) etc. Empiricists then relegate knowledge (and terms) such as "God" or "soul" or "ethics" to that of meaningless - because they are neither analytic, nor empirical, they are akin to phrases such as "grr" or "ldbbbb." These would be "normative" statements; those that describe either the desirability or undesirability of a certain state of affairs. Now we get to the statement "All knowledge is either analytic or empirical." What is the status of this statement? Surely it is not analytic, in that it does not set forth a mere tautology; is it empirical? If it is, I would simply say that your belief system is not axiomatic, but falsifiable, and I have no reason to ascribe to it. If it is not, then the philosophy is still self-refuting; the definition does not meet its own critereon.
Which is why we have parsimony to reduce unpalateable hypothesis that demand constant ad hoc revision in order to separate them from those who don't.Secondly, it must be made clear that Empiricism (by definition, denying all a priori empirical truth) has extremely relativistic (and even authoritarian) implications. Because if empiricism is true (lets ignore for a moment the self-referencial difficulties) then there can never be a sole objective truth about anything. All definitions and arguments can be falsified or "proved" (I will deal with these difficulties in a moment). However, even if the hypothesis is not "proved" by an experiment, there are literally a near-infinite amount of variables to control for. Take for example the hypothesis that when I sneeze, it causes people in africa to die. Now you should offhand reject this as silly and whimsical, in which case you're clearly not an empiricist. A true empiricist would have to test this proposition, because there is not such notion as "causation" that one can rely upon; indeed causation itself can be subject (somehow) to falsification. Even if we don't "see" the sneeze kill people in Africa, we could reformulate the hypothesis to say "People in Africa die from my sneezes only on the first of January" - if this proved unsatisfactory, we could merely add on "when it is raining." Repeat ad infinitum. Certainly this is relativistic, and surely is the tool of dictators: for how else to test the merits of "National socialism" or "Marxism" than to infact impliment such systems and the necessary dictatorships that they usher in? How else to test the "law" of supply and demand than to restrict food to a tribe for a week? To put it bluntly: it's philosophical suicide.
And this is also why the scientific community demands consensus among observers to ensure that these reactions aren't their own personal hallucinations.Thirdly, we must deal with the common belief that empiricists tend also to be monists (that is, some one material underlies all of reality); in modern times, this tends to be a Moore or Quine inspired materialism. Now the problem with such a monism is that it is completely incompatible with the empirical method. For to hypothesize something is to is to adopt a methodological monism: all empirical knowledge must first come through our senses. However, if such a belief is in fact true, how are predictions even possible? Essentially, prediction pre-supposes time-invariant causal relationships (If I throw a ball at the wall, it will bounce back, if I throw glass, it will break) that cannot be justified within the empirciist frame of thinking. For if all empirical knowledge is taken through observation, how can one predict that which one has no knowledge of? You cannot "observe" this link between different observations (that material objects react in a certain manner) and it is thus impossible to predict anything at all; every experiment is simply an observation subjective to both the viewer and in time. If you cannot rationally (that is, before experience) establish causation, then you cannot justify any sort of "progress" within the field of science at all.
I'm sure that a year ago or two I'd be a little more fluent on this, but for now I'm wondering what you might have to say.