Kuroneko wrote:drachefly wrote:I did not here mean that our minds necessarily use logic to think; I meant that our minds can be described logically: at any one moment, you are not both thinking about cats and not thinking about cats (or whatever); if you define a symbol to mean one thing, it does not also mean something else (though it is perfectly possible to think you had defined a symbol well, but be wrong); and so on.
If you wish to simply re-affirm the law of non-contradiction, you are of course free to do so, as it can always be rescued after making sufficiently many distinctions, but this doesn't mean it has any more a priori import beyond the fact that this law is present in some systems of logic.
In the earlier debate over this I had been a part of, the assumption of the law of non-contradiction was indeed the main point at hand.
My strategy was to point out that you don't need it as an assumption.
Kuroneko wrote:A proposition like "I am in a house right now" has an unclear truth value when one is stepping through the door.
This would fall into the category of 'statements that are not propositions' that I alluded to. In this case, 'in' and 'now' are problematic.
Kuroneko wrote:As you are a physicist, I wonder whether you are ever bothered by the Everett many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Everything else but that bothers me. Maybe not in Everett's version.
Kuroneko wrote:One can say that such things are not 'really' part of our ontology, and that we merely play a kind of language-game when we engage in such talk, but there always seemed to me something deeply unsatisfying in such "we pretend they're there but they're not" moves.
If you're taking that interpretation, then they are there, no pretending involved. You just don't get to see most of them.
.. I do not see the connection to counterfactuals. Also, as for the ad-hoc principles, the MW interpretation is just quantum mechanics when looked at with no sugar-coating.
Kuroneko wrote:Theories that require many layers of ad hoc hypotheses and distinctions are less preferable to those that do not. That's why I simply can't buy into an empathic affirmation of the rules of logic.
The rules are just what you define. The question I was working on was whether there was
any subject matter it could describe.