Saw this crap at richarddawkins.net, it's too late to go through with a fine-tooth comb, but it just reeks of so much bullshit and I think every sentence contains a strawman.Why atheism cannot be correct
Alan Roebuck’s latest essay for VFR takes the form of an open letter to an atheistic think tank called the Center for Inquiry, proceeded by an introduction.
Introduction to the ideas in the letter
Liberalism must be opposed fundamentally, because if you accept, even tacitly, your opponent’s premises, you will eventually be forced to accept his conclusions. And the philosophical foundation of liberalism is atheism, because atheism makes man the supreme being, and means that there are no absolutes.
But nowadays, most apologists for atheism do not call themselves atheists. They say, “Atheism requires proving a universal negative, which is impossible. So I’m not an atheist. I just think there’s no reason to believe in a God, so I don’t. Call me a naturalist [or infidel, or freethinker, or agnostic.]” (But note that it is not impossible to prove a universal negative; mathematicians do it all the time.)
More importantly, the atheistic apologist says, “Since my position does not posit the existence of anything, it is the default position. The burden of proof falls on the theist to prove a God exists, and if the proof fails, I am justified in my unbelief.” The atheist then finds what he regards as flaws in each theistic proof, and believes his position is justified.
Professional atheistic organizations have apparently deliberately chosen this approach within the last 20 years or so. They presumably do this because they think it makes their job easier, and because the word “atheism” still sounds bad to the public they want to influence.
Superficially, their position seems strong. When we examine the world with our senses, we do not encounter any entity that could be called God. Since God is extra-ordinary, so it seems, belief in God requires extra-ordinary evidence before the rational man will believe.
But atheism has many weaknesses. Its main weakness is that man cannot live by the proposition “no God exists.” Man, being man, needs general principles to guide him, the most important of which are principles that tell him what is real and what is not (metaphysics), what knowledge is and how it is attained (epistemology), and what is morally right and wrong (ethics).
Therefore, atheism requires additional beliefs in order to be a livable creed. In order to avoid blatant irrationality, atheists must be metaphysical naturalists, meaning they believe that only physical objects and their properties really exist. Epistemologically, atheists are empiricists, believing that all knowledge comes to us from our five senses. And in the realm of ethics, atheists believe either that morality is relative to the group (the less popular position, because it discredits atheism by implying, for example that murder would not be wrong if society in general held it to be not wrong), or else that moral principles evolve along with the human race.
In this essay, I do not take the approach of proving God exists. Within the atheistic worldview, that is impossible. Instead, I argue that naturalism, empiricism and the ethical theories of atheism are false, indeed illogical. This also implies that, contrary to their assumption, atheism cannot be the “default position,” because irrationality cannot be the default position. (Since this is an essay rather than a book, I do not try to be comprehensive in my critique) This is presuppositional apologetics in action: demonstrating the absurdity of their presuppositions, showing that their worldview fails.
Here is my letter to the Center for Inquiry, an atheistic (they say, scientific) think tank and public policy organization that recently issued a “Declaration in Defense of Science and Secularism.”
Dear Center for Inquiry:
I have read the statements of principle on your website, and there are some things I can agree with. Postmodern relativistic irrationalism needs to be strongly rebuked by being demonstrated to be false. Furthermore, you are right to decry the widespread ignorance of and even hostility to science.
But the statements on your website, and your basic position of naturalism (the doctrine that nothing exists but physical entities and their properties), make some fundamental intellectual errors. These errors doom your enterprise, and explain much of the public’s hostility to a scientific establishment that declares itself, erroneously, to be the acme of truth and clear thinking.
Although you have not stated it directly, you have clearly implied (and many naturalists have openly stated) that you believe science to be the highest form of knowledge, by which you presumably mean the most certain and the most precise. You have also taken the position that nothing can be considered knowledge, that is, justified true belief, unless it has been verified or at least supported by science. But these beliefs are actually irrational, because your view of science is self-refuting, and therefore necessarily false. Here’s why:
The validity of science clearly requires the validity of many forms of knowledge that are non-scientific, such as the laws of logic and mathematics, the knowledge that our senses are basically reliable in providing us with knowledge of an objectively existing reality, and certain moral knowledge, e.g., that you ought to report your data and results honestly. But none of these forms of knowledge are proved by using the scientific method. For example, the truths of mathematics are in no way proved by observation, hypothesis formation, and experimentation. The fundamental facts of mathematics are known by intuition, that is, the faculty of the mind that is capable of grasping truths immediately, without engaging in a process of reasoning. What might at first glance appear to be “experimental verification” of mathematical truths is simply the placing of mathematical facts before the student, so that he can see them clearly and thus understand and agree with them. Similar comments pertain to the laws of logic, the reliability of the senses, and (as explained more below) morality.
Therefore, you are making the absurd claim that science is more certain than the knowledge it is based on, which would make science more certain than itself! In reality, the reverse is true: mathematics and logic, for example, are preconditions of science, and therefore more certain and precise than science. Science is obviously not the highest form of knowledge.
Since it is clear that many non-scientific forms of knowledge are more certain and clear than science, you will have to abandon your claim about science. Furthermore, since there are at least some non-scientific truths that can be known, you will have to withdraw your claim that nothing can be known unless it has been justified scientifically.
You are also equivocating on the word “scientifically.” Naturalists will say that a necessary part of the definition of scientific inquiry is the assumption of naturalism. But reality is not determined by definitions: if you have good extra-scientific evidence for naturalism, then you are justified in your definition of science, but if not, you are not justified. In any case, we have to see that evidence; you cannot just say “naturalism is true.” Now, John Q. Public does not know that naturalism is a necessary part of science. He thinks you scientists just dispassionately examine the evidence, and go wherever it leads. If then you do not tell him that you do not prove naturalism, but just assume it, then you are for all intents and purposes lying to John Q. Public.
And this assumption of naturalism, coupled with your beliefs about the superiority of science as a way of knowing, produces another example of irrationality: If science is the highest form of knowledge, then naturalism, which cannot be proved scientifically, is less certain than science, in which case making naturalism a part of science will weaken science, not strengthen it.
Also, you have said: “Many modern thinkers have argued that we should examine our beliefs and theories carefully and assent only to those for which there are adequate grounds.” Although this sounds reasonable at first sight, it is, if interpreted in the most natural way, irrational: if “adequate grounds” means a proof, in the sense of giving other propositions that imply the proposition being proved, and if every proposition requires adequate grounds, then we have an endless process: “What are the adequate grounds for A? B and C. And what are the adequate grounds for B and C? D and E. And what are the adequate grounds for D and E?” Et cetera. This produces either circular reasoning, or else an infinite regression, both of which leave all knowledge without any justification.
The conclusion is inescapable: if we are to know anything, there must be at least some truths that we know without proof. These truths would have to be known either by intuition, by our direct experience of the proposition, or by our trusting the words of a trustworthy authority. All of us use these means of knowing every day. For example, we know “if A is taller than B, and B is taller than C, then A is taller than C” by intuition: when we contemplate this proposition, and when we understand what it means, it becomes self-evident. We know what we had for breakfast by direct experience; no proof is needed. And most of the specific facts we know (such as the results of the last election, the gross national product of Bolivia in 2004, or the mass of Jupiter), we know because we believe what an authority tells us. In principle, we could verify some of these facts for ourselves, but life is too short for us to verify for ourselves any but a tiny handful of the propositions that we have to believe in order to do the business of living. And even so, the verifications of these truths ultimately come down to either intuition or direct experience.
(In fact, knowing something by intuition can be seen as a specific type of knowledge by “direct experience”: you see it with your mind, and you grasp it directly, without engaging in a process of reasoning.)
So what exactly do you mean by “adequate grounds” for a belief or a theory? How do you know what type of grounds are “adequate”? Presumably, for you, “adequate” means “naturalistic.” But then we must ask, “What naturalistic grounds are there for the belief that only naturalistic grounds are adequate?” It is clear that any justification of the principle that only naturalistic grounds are adequate has to transcend naturalism, because the brute facts of the natural world do not have any justification, if a transcendental realm does not actually exist. If naturalism is true, the world is just a brute fact, without any cause or meaning, other than a meaning we make up for ourselves, which would be a subjective meaning, not an objective one. So in your worldview, you must either accept naturalism without any grounds, thus violating your principle of giving adequate grounds, or else you must refer to a non-naturalistic justification, in which case you violate your naturalism. In either case, your position is untenable.
This shows that naturalism itself is self-refuting: if it is true, there can be no reason to believe it. Any possible justification of naturalism would have to have a super-naturalistic origin, thus nullifying naturalism.
Therefore people are allowed to seek non-naturalistic grounds for their beliefs and theories, and they are allowed to believe some things without giving proof.
We have shown that if science is to be valid, then there must be at least some forms of knowledge that are “higher,” that is, more certain and more precise, than science. Furthermore, we have shown that all knowledge is based on propositions that are true, but are not proved, that is, they are either received directly by the mind, or are believed because the authority who provides them is trustworthy.
But how can this be, if naturalism is true? Naturalism (as a metaphysic) means by definition that nothing exists except physical entities and their properties. And epistemological naturalism means that all knowledge is obtained from the senses. But, for example, the laws of mathematics (which according to the foregoing analysis must be more certain than science and also known without proof) are clearly not physical entities, or their properties. And they are not proved by sense perception, because what we perceive with our senses is never exact, as mathematical entities are. The Pythagorean Theorem, for example, is never validated by any physically existing triangle; it is a statement about a universal class: all right triangles. How then can the Pythagorean Theorem exist, if naturalism is true? To understand this dilemma, consider the following thought experiment:
Even according to naturalism, it is possible that the human race is the only species in the entire universe that is intelligent enough to grasp mathematics. So according to naturalism, when we go extinct, and if no other intelligent species has evolved to take our place, then the Pythagorean Theorem will pass out of existence. But how can a non-physical entity “pass out of existence?” Does the fact that a treasure is buried at such-and such a location cease to exist when the last pirate to know its whereabouts dies? It is intuitively clear that the Pythagorean Theorem never passes out of existence, even if no mind exists to think it.
Naturalism fails to account for the existence of mathematics, which really exists. This is another proof that naturalism is false.
Finally, your worldview cannot account for morality. Real morality consists in saying “you ought to do this” or “you ought not to do that,” but these “oughts” are not the type of entity that can evolve, via Darwinism or otherwise. Darwinism at most can explain why people behave as they do (I don’t think it can even explain that), but it can never prove that they ought to behave as they do. Without this “ought-ness,” this “incumbency,” morality becomes meaningless as a guide to life, and any assertion that you ought to do X is meaningless in your worldview. At most, you can only say “If you want Y, then you ought to do X,” but this still leaves unanswered the question “Why should I want Y?”
For example, naturalistic ethics (in its currently popular form) declares that we ought to do what we can to alleviate poverty, but it can give no reason why we ought to care about poor people whom we don’t know and who have no impact on our lives. At most, your worldview says “If you want the entire human race to flourish, then you ought to care about improving the lives of the poor,” but you cannot prove that one ought to want the entire human race to flourish. What would you say to all the misanthropes of the world? You ultimately have no argument why they ought to care, so if it is necessary for them to act as if they care, you will have to use force.
Some naturalists try to dodge this problem by admitting that morality can be objective, and that we can know it by intuition, not by testing it scientifically. But where then do these “oughts” come from? In the naturalistic worldview, they simply exist without any origin or reference to anything beyond themselves. But such morality is not really morality, because if a moral precept does not originate from a legitimate authority (which would have to be a person), there’s no reason why we have to obey it, in which case it is not really morality. To understand this point more clearly, consider the following thought experiment:
Imagine an archaeological dig that has uncovered an ancient city, and suppose the archaeologists have uncovered a tablet saying “No chariots allowed on this street, by order of the king!” Question: is it still true, in the year 2007, that chariots are not allowed on the street? Clearly no, because the authority who issued that rule, and backed it up, no longer exists. It is no longer the case that chariots are not allowed on that street. If there is no personal authority to back it up (to “ground it”), a moral rule is null and void. If morality is to exist objectively, there must be an authority who grounds it.
The scientific method cannot ground, that is, prove the objective truth of, morality, because morality (the sum total of all valid “oughts”) does not consist of physical objects or properties thereof. Therefore, a “scientific” morality cannot be an improvement over the “spiritualist-paranormal” ethics you decry. On the other hand, the biblical view of ethics makes sense: if a legitimate authority says you ought to do it, it is objectively true that you ought to do it. This view of ethics at least has a chance of being valid, whereas your view fails radically.
Furthermore, if our intuition tells us that some acts are objectively wrong, and are not just declared so by a consensus of society, then we must identify the cause of objective morality. This cause, whatever it is, must be non-naturalistic, which is more evidence that naturalism is false.
In conclusion, if you want to be rational, you will have to abandon your claims about science, and admit that non-scientific knowledge can be just as valid as, if not more valid than, science. You will also have to admit that all our knowledge is based ultimately on believing propositions that are not proved but are grasped directly, or are believed because of the trustworthiness of the authority, and not because of “adequate [naturalistic] grounds.” Finally, you will also have to admit that with a purely naturalistic worldview, you cannot create a society that understands and respects morality, because you cannot explain the evident existence of objective moral principles.
In short, naturalism cannot account for the most basic facts of reality.
Therefore, if you want to be rational, you will have to be some sort of “supernaturalist” or, as it is usually called, theist. Non-natural entities can exist, so you should examine the evidence to see which form of theism is the most likely to be true.
Of course, the real issue here is atheism. You believe there is no God, and so you want a comprehensive system of thought and social organization premised on atheism. Fair enough, but it isn’t going to be as intellectually easy to create as you seem to think. You will have to declare, arbitrarily, certain ways of thinking to be invalid, namely those ways of thinking that cannot be proved by reference to only naturalism. But then John Q. Public will rightly suspect that you are trying to pull the wool over his eyes, and he’s not going to take it.
(unfortunately, I don't get a real 4 day weekend like the REST of the Army, so I'll probably only get a view of this late in the afternoon)
