petesampras wrote:I disagree. The story 'Moby Dick' can appear in more than one book simultaneously. The exact matter used is different, but the story is the same. It is meaningless to refer to one of the books as being 'the real mckoy' and one being a 'knock off'.
Consider the story "Moby Dick" as the information your consciousness holds, and the books as the actual consciousness. If I burn one book, the other is not affected, ergo they are not the same consciousness, although the information is.
petesampras wrote:I would make the claim that the conciousness is the same - since conciousness, like stories, is dependant on information processing and patterns of matter - it is not a property of the matter itself.
If they shared the same consciousness they'd be aware of what the other was doing, surely? Or one would duplicate the actions of the other (which would be hilarious, but hey). You're confusing "consciousness" with "information" - the latter can exist in as many clones of Picard or whoever as you want, the former is unique to every conscious individual because they don't share a hive mind. Think of the consciousness as the ego - it may (up to the moment when experiences begin to differ) be
exactly the same as another one, but that does not mean it
is the other one, in the same way that two identical books are not the same thing.
1.) The mind and therefore conciousness is considered, in cognitive science, not to be an actual property of matter, but one of patterns of matter and the information processing tasks these patterns peform.
In much the same way a CPU's speed is a property of its "pattern" - ie its construction, I assume you mean.
2.) If point 1. holds, then the actual matter used is irrelevant to the conciousness. It only matters that the matter is in the appropriate configurations to process information in the same way.
Assuming by "the actual matter" you mean it is the same element, say, as the original (iron is no substitute for silicon in a CPU, to use the above example).
3.) If point 2. holds, then a perfect copy of an individual must have the same conciousness.
No: a perfect copy of an individual must have a
perfect copy of the copied individual's consciousness, up until the point where differences in experiences cause them to diverge (see below).
4.) Whilst their experiences will diverge from this point, this will not instantly make them different conciousnesses.
Yes it does: they were just perfect copies
at the time the scan was performed. Else you have to try and justify the idea that we have some sort of latent hive mind capability or something that is shared between all our clones. This is I think what some of the others have meant by "mind mystically independent of the body", and I can see why they are arriving at this conclusion based on what has been said: reading this thread I have understood your argument as being that the minds, if identical, are linked (or even just a single one in 2+ bodies) somehow, although I doubt you mean it quite that way.
Otherwise our own conciousness would be changing every second. Our conciousness would in effect be dying every second.
Well our consciousness is changing continually as time passes whilst we're conscious (and possible unconscious), but change does not mean death - that would be like saying you "destroy" a sandwich when you take a bite from it - of course you don't, you merely change it (in this case, take a mouthful from it). Or that when I "change" this website by posting this message, I am in fact "destroying" it - new information is merely inserted into the existing website / consciousness.
Divergence may eventually occur, but it must clearly take a fair amount of time.
The consciousness will cease to be identical as soon as at least one of them absorbs new information (ie the person sees something). Given that it is occuring from that individuals' unique point of view, this will by default be different to every other clone's point of view (and thus the information they absorb). Heck it could happen as soon as the clones regain consciousness from the teleportation and
think something. I suspect though that you're talking about something more noticeable to other people, which of course depends on the situation etc.
The two Rikers are different individuals at the moment of the creation of the second Riker. The two Rikers were simultaneously aware, yet seperate entities from the get go.
Exactly.
A knockoff is still a knockoff, even if it is a PERFECT duplication it's still just a knockoff and not the original.
Exactly - especially when you start going into the ethics of perfectly cloning people as they do with Star Trek teleporters. Heck even the ethics of cloning non-living objects can be a problem: what if I clone a famous painting by teleporter and sell it, but advertise the fact that it isn't the original? I doubt anyone would pay the original's price, even though it's physically identical, because we're like that.