Admiral Valdemar wrote:Agriculture uses a lot more than many think. And the die-off is not going to be the same as the Third World. [...]
My previous post's figure of 1.7% of total U.S. energy consumption being used for agriculture is from a reliable government source, as shown before,
a publication of the state of Kansas discussing figures for the whole U.S.
In contrast, your article is written for its political bias.
Still, the following particular part of it is not too bad, though not perfectly accurate:
Article wrote:Agricultural energy consumption is broken down as follows:
31% for the manufacture of inorganic fertilizer
19% for the operation of field machinery
16% for transportation
13% for irrigation
08% for raising livestock (not including livestock feed)
05% for crop drying
05% for pesticide production
08% miscellaneous
The above quote from your article would imply energy usage in agriculture being ~ 3.2 times greater than that involved in fertilizer production alone.
They also say:
Article wrote:To give the reader an idea of the energy intensiveness of modern agriculture, production of one kilogram of nitrogen for fertilizer requires the energy equivalent of from 1.4 to 1.8 liters of diesel fuel. This is not considering the natural gas feedstock.9 According to The Fertilizer Institute (
http://www.tfi.org), in the year from June 30 2001 until June 30 2002 the United States used 12,009,300 short tons of nitrogen fertilizer. Using the low figure of 1.4 liters diesel equivalent per kilogram of nitrogen, this equates to the energy content of 15.3 billion liters of diesel fuel, or 96.2 million barrels.
While they obviously expect readers to be intuitively impressed by their 96 million barrel figure, a relevant comparison is U.S. oil consumption of around 7600 million barrels annually
(~ 2004 data here). Supposing ~ 96 million barrels a year for fertilizer would be ~ 1.3% as much. Combine with their earlier figures implying energy usage in agriculture being ~ 3.2 times greater than that for making fertilizer. Then, their figures would lead to an estimate of several percent of U.S. energy being used in agriculture.
While that's not very much anyway, actually their figures aren't right.
A far better publication is
here, from a relatively reliable .gov website. Not only does the preceding report show how energy use in U.S. agriculture is a bit more than 1.5 quadrillion Btu, compared to 100.4 quadrillion Btu total
(2004), they also show the components of the figure, graphs of changes over past years, and more info.
Of course, total energy involved in the food industry can be greater, like all of the energy used by restaurant workers driving to their jobs, plus everything else that could be added up depending upon one's criteria. For example, there would tend to be more energy indirectly invested in an expensive restaurant meal per hundred calories than in the corresponding portion of goods like a supermarket bag of flour. But that isn't very relevant for the necessary food supply. Rather, the primary concern is that involved in producing food before much extra processing. And that's not much, not compared to the total energy supply.
Admiral Valdemar wrote:[...] Instead, you'll see material possessions start to disappear as more and more people find it harder to buy, or rather "consume", the products made today that keep the economy afloat. [...]
The general idea of potentially a very major economic depression is something suggested by me before, including in my preceding post, though it would not tend to last forever. But the particular degree of such effects matters a lot, a topic covered more later.
Admiral Valdemar wrote:[...] If you want to make an electric fleet you're going to use energy. The monetary costs of scooters, buses and trams mean nothing. [...]
On the contrary, very inexpensive items don't use an enormous amount of energy to manufacture, and their cost implies a low upper limit on the cost of the energy used in production.
For example, for the
previously illustrated electric bus with $54000 cost shared among enough passengers for ~ $100 capital cost per passenger, that implies under $100 per person of energy involved in its manufacture.
Only a moderate percentage of manufacturing cost is electricity and fuel. For example, much less than 1 barrel of oil per person would be involved in making that bus, relative to the number of people transported by it.
Admiral Valdemar wrote:[...] To do any of what you propose to convert to electrical vehicles will literally kill the economy and take decades to do. [...]
You really haven't countered the electric vehicle cost figures illustrated before, such as $1000+/person for good electric motorcycles and ~ $100/person capital expense for some electric buses. Obviously, those examples are relatively inexpensive models, not the fanciest, but this discussion is about the survival of modern civilization.
Today, electric vehicles are almost 100% outcompeted by vehicles running on relatively inexpensive oil products. In the future, electric vehicles either may or may not be primarily outcompeted by vehicles running on synthetic fuel or by other possible competition. But there will be transportation, one way or another. Even a cheap electric bus is far more practical than walking for the commuting distance of a lot of people.
Admiral Valdemar wrote:[...] It's the energy cost which you're going to be ploughing into building those nuke plants and keeping agriculture up to spec, unless you convert to CTL, in which case say hello to even lower grain yields than today within another decade or two as AGW takes its toll. [...]
You repeat claim after claim, but you have not countered the specific figures in my previous post. For example, you don't counter the figure referenced
before of <= 4 PJ energy cost for construction of a typical nuclear power plant versus 300 PJ payback per decade. You just ignore it, continuing to try to convince readers that the energy cost is excessive.
With a lot of people, repeating the same thing over and over again can be effective, many having an instinct to believe that which repetition has made familiar, particularly if it seems to be the belief of the majority, a common method in marketing and propaganda. For example, if you were speaking to the public and repeatedly referred to energy cost in the same sentence as nuclear power, eventually more people would associate nuclear power with excessive energy cost in their minds, without any actual quantitative supporting evidence needing to be found. However, such doesn't work with those who know to look for supporting calculations and figures, evaluate them (or notice their non-existence), and check references.
So far your pattern has been saying any countermeasure discussed for replacing peak oil energy losses would kill the economy and/or require too much energy.
In addition to lacking proper supporting calculations, that whole mode of thinking is hardly productive.
In contrast, while what is said here has obviously negligible effect to the world either way, the basic philosophy of my arguments is beneficial, insofar as enough people sharing it would lead towards specific, practical, helpful action. The world already has way too many people with an opposing view, like the segment of environmentalists who focus on "problems" of nuclear power, who contribute to historical lack of progress on switching the energy source.
Admiral Valdemar wrote:[...] If you want to make an electric fleet you're going to use energy.
You use italics as if such is a special thought, but that everything involves some energy usage is obvious. Rather, one of the differences between you and me is that I look up appropriate quantitative figures, like those in my last post.
The energy costs versus payback of nuclear power plants was covered before with specific figures. The energy involved in operating the electric motorcycle was illustrated in detail in my last post to be ~ <= 2% of the total electricity consumption by the average U.S. household (direct and indirect). The energy involved in manufacturing its rechargeable battery is still less than the preceding figure for recharging it hundreds of times a year, and overall its payback ratio for energy cost is excellent. A similar situation applies with the other examples.
Admiral Valdemar wrote:[...] If you're looking at a 10% or more decline, which is well within the confines of reality, you're looking at less than a decade before you're using half of your available liquid energy. [...]
Ten percent or more annual decline is vastly above what various major past local peak oil events shown in my preceding
post's graph suggest as the typical trend. It shows typically around 15% drop in the first decade after peak, +/- 5%, corresponding to historically <= ~ 2% average decrease per year. Anyway, see the historical data for various countries shown in the graph, and observe the lack of seeing a bunch of sharp drop-offs after local peak oil events. Anything is nominally possible in worse-case scenarios with enough external events influencing the situation, but the preceding general trend has happened again and again as shown in the graph.
It was illustrated
before how only ~ 47 billion out of ~ 160 billion gallons of annual U.S. gasoline and diesel vehicle fuel consumption are used by commercial trucks, most rather being less necessary individual usage like people commuting and going places with often 1 person per car.
Today, most of the public mainly hasn't even heard much about peak oil. Though undesirable, one can't be surprised that funding for switching the energy source is today so many orders of magnitude less than
the amount of other spending when the public worries more about terrorism than peak oil. After all, politicians reply to voters, lobbyists, etc.
However, at some time like several years into world peak oil, once the situation is blatantly obvious enough, then the current situation changes. Peak oil effects may tend to eventually become the primary news story theme, once they become major enough. And then figures in millions of dollars for programs can become instead billions of dollars, with orders-of-magnitude increases possible as illustrated in more detail
before.
Aside from the effect on businesses with the changed market and changed relative competitiveness of gasoline alternatives, that leads to pressure on the government for countermeasures like really devoting a significant portion of GDP to alternative fuel production, implementing electric public transportation, etc. Because peak oil is not instant doom, the majority of original industrial capability tends to remain at that point, enough for some helpful measures.
Of course, such is very undesirable compared to how there should have been a switch away from fossil fuels in advance, but civilization survives, a little like it survived the Great Depression.
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I assume you aren't suggesting that there will be zero future energy usage, so the question becomes how much energy is available, how much is needed for what purposes, and so on.
Before going further, let's determine more specifically what you are arguing.
Which of the following comes closest to your expectations of the future U.S. electricity supply (e.g. the number of kilowatt-hours):
1. At a time 5 to 15 years after the start of peak oil, U.S. electrical generation will most likely be:
- 50% to 100+% as much as before peak oil.
- 10% to 50% as much as before peak oil.
- 1% to 10% as much as before peak oil.
- Zero or under 1% as much as before peak oil.
2. Fifty years after peak oil, U.S. electrical generation will most likely be:
- More than before peak oil.
- 50% to 100% as much as before peak oil.
- 10% to 50% as much as before peak oil.
- 1% to 10% as much as before peak oil.
- Zero or under 1% as much as before peak oil.
Which of the following comes closest to your expectations of the future U.S. supply of liquid fuel, where liquid fuel includes that produced from remaining oil plus the amount of alternative fuel production (e.g. the number of Btu annually):
3. At a time 10 years after the start of peak oil, U.S. liquid fuel consumption will most likely be:
- 70% to 100+% as much as before peak oil.
- 40% to 70% as much as before peak oil.
- 10% to 40% as much as before peak oil.
- 1% to 10% as much as before peak oil.
- Zero or under 1% as much as before peak oil.
4. Fifty years after peak oil, U.S. liquid fuel consumption will most likely be:
- 70% to 100+% as much as before peak oil.
- 40% to 70% as much as before peak oil.
- 10% to 40% as much as before peak oil.
- 1% to 10% as much as before peak oil.
- Zero or under 1% as much as before peak oil.
5. If one's answer to #4 above is B, C, D, or E, the main reason for liquid fuel production not being greater is which of the following:
- Economic or technical inability to produce that much liquid fuel.
- Social or political factors against producing that much liquid fuel, such as governments enforcing energy conservation.
- Technical changes affecting efficiency, e.g. changes in the percentage of shipment by trucks versus trains, more efficient engines, or other such factors.
- Liquid fuel having little or no advantage then, such as there being good enough widespread electric vehicles or popular public transportation.
- A combination of the above, specifying which.
6. As for potential die-off expectations, for the U.S. they are:
- 0% of the U.S. population of 300+ million dying from starvation, like zero percent did in all past U.S. history including the Great Depression.
- 1% to 20% of the U.S. population dying from starvation.
- 20% to 90% of the U.S. population dying from starvation.
- All or more than 90% of the U.S. population dying from starvation.
7. As for potential die-off expectations, for the world they are:
- 0% or under 10% of the world population of 7+ billion dying from starvation.
- 10% to 30% of the world population dying from starvation.
- 30% to 90% of the world population dying from starvation.
- All or more than 90% of the world population dying from starvation.
If there is an expectation for die-off by causes other than starvation, that can be specified for this and the question before it.
8. At a time 5 to 15 years after the start of peak oil, the economic output or GDP of the U.S. will be:
- 70% to 100+% as much as before peak oil.
- 40% to 70% as much as before peak oil.
- 10% to 40% as much as before peak oil.
- 1% to 10% as much as before peak oil.
- Zero or under 1% as much as before peak oil.
9. Fifty years after peak oil, U.S. GDP will be:
- Substantially more than before peak oil.
- Around the same as before peak oil
- 50% to 100% as much as before peak oil.
- 10% to 50% as much as before peak oil.
- 1% to 10% as much as before peak oil.
- Zero or under 1% as much as before peak oil.
The following two questions are about the world, currently having under a billion people with a relatively good standard of living in industrialized countries plus another six billion people primarily in much poverty.
10. At a time 5 to 15 years after the start of peak oil, GDP of the world will be:
- 70% to 100+% as much as before peak oil.
- 40% to 70% as much as before peak oil.
- 10% to 40% as much as before peak oil.
- 1% to 10% as much as before peak oil.
- Zero or under 1% as much as before peak oil.
11. Fifty years after peak oil, GDP of the world will most likely be:
- Substantially more than before peak oil.
- Around the same as before peak oil.
- 50% to 100% as much as before peak oil.
- 10% to 50% as much as before peak oil.
- 1% to 10% as much as before peak oil.
- Zero or under 1% as much as before peak oil.
While I am asking Admiral Valdemar the questions 1 through 11 above, it would be interesting if some other people also posted their expectations. Optionally they could substitute another country for the U.S. in the poll questions, mentioning which country.