Nazi camp guard morality

[Adrian Laguna]

I've come up with a couple of situation where, using utilitarianism, it seems that a guard in a Nazi concentration camp would be doing something moral good or neutral by electing to stay a guard rather than requesting to be sent to the front.

1) Suppose one is a camp guard (drafted and wound-up a guard somehow) and does little things to make the lives of a few inmates slightly less of a living hell, wouldn't the moral thing be to stay rather than request being sent to the front? After all, the chances are overwhelming that whoever replaces one will not be so nice, and there is a possibility that he might even be mean. Thus transferring would cause a net increase in suffering, which is bad, no?

2) Now suppose the same camp guard is not nice, but also not mean. He just stands around guarding, doesn't bother the prisoners, doesn't do anything for them either. If he requests getting sent to the front he'd be in the unpleasant situation of being shot at. Meanwhile back at camp someone would replace him for no change at all in the camp's situation or that of the prisoners. Hence the transfer would affect him only, and it would affect him adversely. This is, again, a net increase in suffering, though less so than the earlier example. Since nobody would be affected positively by his leaving, or negatively by his staying, wouldn't then electing to stay be justified?

Is there anything wrong with my logic or premises? I would really like to hear if there is.

[fgalkin2]

Your scenarios are highly unlikely. Most camp guards were Ukranean and Baltic auxillaries, who were rabid anti-semites, and volunteered for guard duty, knowing full well what they were getting into, and relishing the chance to abuse Jews horribly. If this sounds surprising, remember that the Ukraneans, invented the pogrom, and Cossacks used to flay Jews alive for amusement during the Civil War. The Batlics, of course, were so infatuated with the Germans, they would go with anything their Nazi overlords ordered.

The high-ranking officers in the camps were German SS men and women, but the vast majority of them were volunteers, and knew exactly what they were doing.

Have a very nice day.
-fgalkin

[Rahvin]

Your scenarios are highly unlikely. Most camp guards were Ukranean and Baltic auxillaries, who were rabid anti-semites, and volunteered for guard duty, knowing full well what they were getting into, and relishing the chance to abuse Jews horribly. If this sounds surprising, remember that the Ukraneans, invented the pogrom, and Cossacks used to flay Jews alive for amusement during the Civil War. The Batlics, of course, were so infatuated with the Germans, they would go with anything their Nazi overlords ordered.

The high-ranking officers in the camps were German SS men and women, but the vast majority of them were volunteers, and knew exactly what they were doing.

Have a very nice day.
-fgalkin

Even granting the unlikely hypothetical scenario, participating voluntarily in the administration of a death camp increases net suffering, even if you try to rationalize that your replacement might be "meaner" to the inmates. You might be slightly less evil for trying to improve their situation as you're able, but it would be similar to a slave master who whips his slaves slightly less often. "Slightly better" does not equate to "justified."

It would also still be better to volunteer for front line duty, as the increase in your personal suffering is still less than the total suffering caused by your participation in causing the deaths of millions. Even the certainty of replacement doesn't excuse the fact that you would be directly associating yourself with something that causes a massive increase in net suffering.

[Big Phil]

These scenarios did happen quite often in Japanese prison camps. Some guards were vicious while others (often those who had spent time in the USA, Australia, or Britain) were friendly and sneaked extra food to the prisoners.

But regarding the OP:

#1 Yes, the guard is helping more than other guards but, lets face it, he's still a guard at a Nazi concentration camp. Whatever good he's doing is overwhelmed by the premise of the camp itself.

[Rye]

I find it difficult to imagine myself as a concentration camp guard without attempting to kill all the other guards through mass poisoning. I suspect that would be a superior course of action than the alternatives posted.

[K. A. Pital]

Joining the partisans and selling the knowledge you have about the camp is the moral course of action.

[TheKwas]

You might be slightly less evil for trying to improve their situation as you're able, but it would be similar to a slave master who whips his slaves slightly less often. "Slightly better" does not equate to "justified."

The difference is that a slavemaster always has the option of just setting his slave free, while this hypothetical situation only always for two courses of action. If there were more courses of action to choose from, then Stas Bush's action would have been the best.

It would also still be better to volunteer for front line duty, as the increase in your personal suffering is still less than the total suffering caused by your participation in causing the deaths of millions.

The hypothetical situation dictates that there's going to be a replacement, so even if you leave, total suffering of the prisoners stays the same.

I'm always annoyed when people can't operate within the limits of a hypothetical situation

Even the certainty of replacement doesn't excuse the fact that you would be directly associating yourself with something that causes a massive increase in net suffering.

This argument has nothing to do with Utilitarianism, however.

[Stuart]

I've come up with a couple of situation where, using utilitarianism, it seems that a guard in a Nazi concentration camp would be doing something moral good or neutral by electing to stay a guard rather than requesting to be sent to the front.

I'd echo Stas's comment on this. Your putative guard has two viable moral options. One is to pick up his submachine gun and start shooting the other guards and keep doing it until he goes down. The other is to desert, contact the partisans, give them as much information as he can then take part in an attack to bust out the concentration camp prisoners.

1) Suppose one is a camp guard (drafted and wound-up a guard somehow) and does little things to make the lives of a few inmates slightly less of a living hell, wouldn't the moral thing be to stay rather than request being sent to the front? After all, the chances are overwhelming that whoever replaces one will not be so nice, and there is a possibility that he might even be mean. Thus transferring would cause a net increase in suffering, which is bad, no?

No. The problem is that it is always possible to argue that "it would be worse if I wasn't here to make it better". It's the standard excuse made by everybody who has ever been involved in crimes against humanity "I know it was wrong but the others would have been so much worse". In reality, if somebody has the moral sense to realize what they are doing is wrong, by choosing to continue doing so, they are seeing the difference between good and evil and consciously choosing the evil. That makes their culpability all the greater compared with another guard who simply does not comprehend that what he is doing is wrong.

2) Now suppose the same camp guard is not nice, but also not mean. He just stands around guarding, doesn't bother the prisoners, doesn't do anything for them either. If he requests getting sent to the front he'd be in the unpleasant situation of being shot at. Meanwhile back at camp someone would replace him for no change at all in the camp's situation or that of the prisoners. Hence the transfer would affect him only, and it would affect him adversely. This is, again, a net increase in suffering, though less so than the earlier example. Since nobody would be affected positively by his leaving, or negatively by his staying, wouldn't then electing to stay be justified?

This is just an extreme case of the first situation. Here our putative guard doesn't even have the consolation of choosing a benefit over evil.

In both cases, your putative guard is more culpable than the 'evil-only' guards not less and should be treated accordingly. His claims to "morality" are spurious and self-serving.