The concept of 'remorse' in regards to moral judgments

[ArcturusMengsk]

Inspired in part by this thread.

We often say of an individual who has violated some social norm or another that he can be forgiven if he is truly sorry - if this is not the only factor, then it is certainly chief amongst them. And the justification seems simple enough: we understand that an individual who feels sorrow for his deeds, misjudgments, etc. has placed a negative value on them and will be averse to doing them in the future.

However, would not the same line of reasoning hold true for an offender, violator of norms, etc. who simply no longer took an interest in committing an infraction of the same sort in the future? Disinterest is just as strong a motivator as guilt (or, perhaps more accurately, it is an absence of motivation). And, if I'm correct in this line of reasoning, does it not follow that this faith in the 'transformative power of guilt and repentance' have its roots in another source, namely religious faith?

[Kanastrous]

I am devoid of religious faith, but I still feel guilt for certain actions I've taken. And repentance has zero value, in the sense of repentance-before-God, because I don't have any reason to expect that there's a God that's interested in whether or not I have committed a particular act, much less repented having committed it.

So I don't believe that religious faith has anything to do with it.

Whether or not the human beings I may have wronged accept my repentance, or see value in my feeling guilty, is between me and them.

[ArcturusMengsk]

I am devoid of religious faith, but I still feel guilt for certain actions I've taken. And repentance has zero value, in the sense of repentance-before-God, because I don't have any reason to expect that there's a God that's interested in whether or not I have committed a particular act, much less repented having committed it.

So I don't believe that religious faith has anything to do with it.

Whether or not the human beings I may have wronged accept my repentance, or see value in my feeling guilty, is between me and them.

No doubt of it: guilt is ingrained in the human condition. Whether or not guilt (a sort of reciprocal violence) is a part of human 'nature', so-called, is a contestable position, however. And, regardless, it seems a mystery to me how particular sentiments are to be measured out in regards to the severity of any given infraction - there are, of course, no scales upon which such things can be weighed upon. It is an entirely intuitive value judgment, at any rate.

[Kanastrous]

It's not intuitive; it's cultural.

If you are imprinted with a cultural reality-tunnel holding that masturbating is horrific and awful and an offense against everything decent, then the odds are that you'll feel desperately guilty for jerking off.

If you are imprinted with a reality-tunnel holding that raping ten-year-old girls can be acceptable, then the odds are that no quantity of raped little girls on your conscience, will make you feel guilty, at all.

[ArcturusMengsk]

It's not intuitive; it's cultural.

Its origins are cultural, no doubt of it. I'm more curious as to how one goes about deriving an exact figure for how guilty an individual should feel before he is considered forgiven - if we are not to claim that it is utterly arbitrary, there must be a relatively precise standard against which it can be weighed without recourse to specific intents and actions. I hold that there is, in fact, no such scale; that the concept of guilt and repentance is in fact quite outmoded, and that we must now look towards making an offender or criminal disinterested in the offense. 'Guilt' presupposes a slew of concepts which simply do not exist, such as a causal relationship between thought and effect which cannot stand without presupposing the existence of, on some level, an agent responsible for the translation of a thought into action.

[Kanastrous]

*shrug*

I'm uninterested in repentance, or feelings of guilt on the part of criminals. And whether a perpetrator of a reprehensible act avoids re-offending because he feels badly about it, because he fears divine judgment, because he fears human retribution, or because we were smart enough to put him down and take him out of circulation, doesn't impress me as mattering very much.

[Metatwaddle]

I hold that there is, in fact, no such scale; that the concept of guilt and repentance is in fact quite outmoded, and that we must now look towards making an offender or criminal disinterested in the offense.

I think you're right in principle, but I'm not sure if this is possible. A rapist is clearly interested in having sex with women (or men) by force because certain elements of his psyche crave the power rush, are turned on by his victim resisting him, or whatever, and this may be intractable and hard to change. A burglar is interested in stealing expensive things because, well, it gets him expensive things, and it's all but impossible to make someone uninterested in money. A drunk driver was probably never really interested in his crime in the first place; he just wanted to drive somewhere and happened to be drunk. It's hard to make someone uninterested in committing a crime again when they weren't even interested in the crime itself in the first place. Of these three, I think the one who has the best chance of becoming uninterested in committing his crime again (presumably through some sort of psychological rehabilitation) is the rapist.

I think that the idea of guilt (which I don't like too much myself, but what the hell) acknowledges that there is a reason to commit such crimes, but holds that there are principles of morality that are more important than one's immediate personal gain. The problem is that by the time someone's committing serious crimes, it's a little late to instill moral values.

Also, you said in your original post that

we understand that an individual who feels sorrow for his deeds, misjudgments, etc. has placed a negative value on them and will be averse to doing them in the future.

It seems to me that someone who is merely uninterested in committing future crimes has placed a value of zero on his crimes, not a negative value.

'Guilt' presupposes a slew of concepts which simply do not exist, such as a causal relationship between thought and effect which cannot stand without presupposing the existence of, on some level, an agent responsible for the translation of a thought into action.

I'm not sure about that. Couldn't "guilt" just mean that, as you said, the person has assigned a "negative value" to his actions and is unlikely to commit such crimes again?

[ArcturusMengsk]

I think you're right in principle, but I'm not sure if this is possible. A rapist is clearly interested in having sex with women (or men) by force because certain elements of his psyche crave the power rush, are turned on by his victim resisting him, or whatever, and this may be intractable and hard to change. A burglar is interested in stealing expensive things because, well, it gets him expensive things, and it's all but impossible to make someone uninterested in money. A drunk driver was probably never really interested in his crime in the first place; he just wanted to drive somewhere and happened to be drunk. It's hard to make someone uninterested in committing a crime again when they weren't even interested in the crime itself in the first place. Of these three, I think the one who has the best chance of becoming uninterested in committing his crime again (presumably through some sort of psychological rehabilitation) is the rapist.

As an individual who has voluntarily associated myself with the 'lowest common denominator' of society, I have a different perspective on this. While I've never known a burglar, I have made the acquaintances of a rapist and a drunkard; in the former, from what I gleaned through conversation, it was not so much a raw feeling of power - power as a dominating, overbearing force - which drove him to his crime as it was a desire for a particular form of experience which I can quite relate to: a desire for ego-obliteration, power as a reactive sort of force directed against the self. In such a case it is quite clear to me that the rapist requires ego-reinforcement; he is far too weak a thing on his own to live without the need for violence. Guilt as a preventative measure here does far more harm than good in this instance.

As for the drunkard: having been one myself at one point, and having associated with them frequently, I'm quite aware of the joyful narcotizing effect of alcohol. I'd suggest it's the same in this case also: a feeling of weakness which invites self-destruction (contrariwise to the braggadocio sometimes adopted by alcoholics as compensation). This is not to beautify either, but simply to point out that a feeling of weakness is just as often as important a motivator as anything else.

I think that the idea of guilt (which I don't like too much myself, but what the hell) acknowledges that there is a reason to commit such crimes, but holds that there are principles of morality that are more important than one's immediate personal gain. The problem is that by the time someone's committing serious crimes, it's a little late to instill moral values.

And it is precisely morality which must be gotten rid of for genuine progress to take root; if ours were an ethical society, wherein each individual felt himself personally obliged to a code of conduct of a more immanent nature, I believe that crime rates might be drastically reduced. There is a world of difference between ethics and morality - chiefly that the former is beneficial, whereas the latter is almost universally harmful.

It seems to me that someone who is merely uninterested in committing future crimes has placed a value of zero on his crimes, not a negative value.

A 'zero value' is a negative value in regards to motivation; one either wishes to do a thing or he does not.

I'm not sure about that. Couldn't "guilt" just mean that, as you said, the person has assigned a "negative value" to his actions and is unlikely to commit such crimes again?

What I mean by 'guilt' is that deep-seated feeling that one has violated a primordial law of existence, which is an absurdity and ought to be abolished.

[K. A. Pital]

What I mean by 'guilt' is that deep-seated feeling that one has violated a primordial law of existence, which is an absurdity and ought to be abolished.

I doubt people think societal laws are "primordial". Guilt is the feeling that societal norms have been violated, by an individual who thinks those norms are principally right. Nothing more, nothing less. And it is useful.

[Metatwaddle]

I think you're right in principle, but I'm not sure if this is possible. A rapist is clearly interested in having sex with women (or men) by force because certain elements of his psyche crave the power rush, are turned on by his victim resisting him, or whatever, and this may be intractable and hard to change. A burglar is interested in stealing expensive things because, well, it gets him expensive things, and it's all but impossible to make someone uninterested in money. A drunk driver was probably never really interested in his crime in the first place; he just wanted to drive somewhere and happened to be drunk. It's hard to make someone uninterested in committing a crime again when they weren't even interested in the crime itself in the first place. Of these three, I think the one who has the best chance of becoming uninterested in committing his crime again (presumably through some sort of psychological rehabilitation) is the rapist.

As an individual who has voluntarily associated myself with the 'lowest common denominator' of society, I have a different perspective on this. While I've never known a burglar, I have made the acquaintances of a rapist and a drunkard; in the former, from what I gleaned through conversation, it was not so much a raw feeling of power - power as a dominating, overbearing force - which drove him to his crime as it was a desire for a particular form of experience which I can quite relate to: a desire for ego-obliteration, power as a reactive sort of force directed against the self. In such a case it is quite clear to me that the rapist requires ego-reinforcement; he is far too weak a thing on his own to live without the need for violence. Guilt as a preventative measure here does far more harm than good in this instance.

As for the drunkard: having been one myself at one point, and having associated with them frequently, I'm quite aware of the joyful narcotizing effect of alcohol. I'd suggest it's the same in this case also: a feeling of weakness which invites self-destruction (contrariwise to the braggadocio sometimes adopted by alcoholics as compensation). This is not to beautify either, but simply to point out that a feeling of weakness is just as often as important a motivator as anything else.

I understand what you're saying about alcoholics and drunks, although my reasons and experiences with drinking have been slightly different. I'm less clear on what you mean with the rapist. Tell you what- I happen to know someone who's performed psychological examinations on a number of criminals, including many on death row. Next time I get the chance, I'll ask her about this. (I'm seeing her tomorrow, but I doubt that I will have time to discuss this with her.) Until then I will trust that what you say is true.

I think that the idea of guilt (which I don't like too much myself, but what the hell) acknowledges that there is a reason to commit such crimes, but holds that there are principles of morality that are more important than one's immediate personal gain. The problem is that by the time someone's committing serious crimes, it's a little late to instill moral values.

And it is precisely morality which must be gotten rid of for genuine progress to take root; if ours were an ethical society, wherein each individual felt himself personally obliged to a code of conduct of a more immanent nature, I believe that crime rates might be drastically reduced. There is a world of difference between ethics and morality - chiefly that the former is beneficial, whereas the latter is almost universally harmful.

I usually use the words interchangeably; I'm not sure what you think is the difference. Are you saying that ethics is more of a personal code of conduct, whereas morality is something prescriptive that authority figures try to instill in others?

It seems to me that someone who is merely uninterested in committing future crimes has placed a value of zero on his crimes, not a negative value.

A 'zero value' is a negative value in regards to motivation; one either wishes to do a thing or he does not.

I'm not so sure about that. Right now I don't want to go to the mall and shop for a new pair of shoes, and I'd assign a zero value to that (because I don't particularly care to do it). I also don't want to pour lighter fluid on myself and bust out the Zippo, and I'd assign a negative value to that. More to the point, I don't want to walk the streets right now and kill the first person I see (even if I were guaranteed not to get caught), because that would cause suffering for his family and friends, and even if he had no loved ones, I still believe that it is unethical to end the life of a conscious person. I would assign a negative value to that, too.

Now, there are quite ordinary circumstances under which I'd perform an action to which I have assigned a zero value (e.g. my old shoes are worn out). But there are hardly any circumstances that would cause me to kill a stranger, and probably none which would cause me to light myself on fire.

I'm not sure about that. Couldn't "guilt" just mean that, as you said, the person has assigned a "negative value" to his actions and is unlikely to commit such crimes again?

What I mean by 'guilt' is that deep-seated feeling that one has violated a primordial law of existence, which is an absurdity and ought to be abolished.

Hm. Well, I've never felt guilt to that degree myself. Do current criminal rehabilitation programs try to establish such an extreme degree of guilt? If so, I agree that they may be taking things too far.

[ArcturusMengsk]

What I mean by 'guilt' is that deep-seated feeling that one has violated a primordial law of existence, which is an absurdity and ought to be abolished.

I doubt people think societal laws are "primordial". Guilt is the feeling that societal norms have been violated, by an individual who thinks those norms are principally right. Nothing more, nothing less. And it is useful.

Not to my experience, though it's undoubtedly different from yours. Having been raised in a devoutly religious Orthodox household, I often was made to feel as though any immorality I committed was, in some sense, a transgression against an innate law of nature (hence my compensatory and axiomatic opposition to Kantianism). And I've found that it's very often the same in individuals without any religious inclination whatsoever - they'll 'sin' and become so utterly miserable as to be nearly incapacitated. A great deal of this depends on how one is raised, but it also seems to me to be a common theme of Western culture. We have grounded our moral system in a worldview which is, quite simply, no longer believable. If we were to admit the relative arbitrariness of most societal norms, however, and provide an ethical context for those which are not - i.e. root them in their usefulness in regards to life, as opposed to their factual existence on a transcendental level - they would, by virtue of their nearness, be much more welcome, I believe.

There is no "moral law in man"; what we call conscience is an instinct which has been ingrained in man through long years of domestication. Because its justification in relation to our course of action is transcendental, and because it comes about only half-consciously, we often pay it no heed. If, however, we were to formulate a consistent ethical system without grounding save in utility, I think that we should find a much more useful, much more acceptable, system.

[K. A. Pital]

And I've found that it's very often the same in individuals without any religious inclination whatsoever

Perhaps decades of religious legacy in the West has created that. I can't say I've seen such things in the FSU.

[ArcturusMengsk]

I'm less clear on what you mean with the rapist. Tell you what- I happen to know someone who's performed psychological examinations on a number of criminals, including many on death row. Next time I get the chance, I'll ask her about this. (I'm seeing her tomorrow, but I doubt that I will have time to discuss this with her.) Until then I will trust that what you say is true.

Please, do. It's a subject I'm enormously interested in.

I'm not sure what you think is the difference. Are you saying that ethics is more of a personal code of conduct, whereas morality is something prescriptive that authority figures try to instill in others?

Not quite. Morality is generally viewed as transcendental in origin, applicable to all men everywhere, at all times; it thus presupposes the psychological, biological, and situational equality of each and all. It can be taken to derive either from "God" or from "nature", but it is always external to context.

Ethics, to the contrary, are contextually-dependent codes of conduct most often associated with a professional or public activity, i.e. the Hippocratic Oath. I hold that, by conceptualizing a system of ethics grounded in activity (for we are not 'beings' but doings; we ourselves are an activity), one has gained an enormous advantage over the moralistic conception of human affairs. Simply the fact that it is grounded in an immediacy - an 'ethics of life', of sorts - is an advantage: it makes it that much nearer to us, and it no longer seems foreign.

I'm not so sure about that. Right now I don't want to go to the mall and shop for a new pair of shoes, and I'd assign a zero value to that (because I don't particularly care to do it). I also don't want to pour lighter fluid on myself and bust out the Zippo, and I'd assign a negative value to that. More to the point, I don't want to walk the streets right now and kill the first person I see (even if I were guaranteed not to get caught), because that would cause suffering for his family and friends, and even if he had no loved ones, I still believe that it is unethical to end the life of a conscious person. I would assign a negative value to that, too.

Perhaps this, then, is subjective. My desire to kill someone and buy a new pair of shoes are the same: zero. This, then, most likely depends on personal psychological factors; there are certainly no standards by which one could judge this schemata over that.

[Kanastrous]

And I've found that it's very often the same in individuals without any religious inclination whatsoever

Perhaps decades of religious legacy in the West has created that. I can't say I've seen such things in the FSU.

I wonder if that is entirely to the FSU's advantage.

[Ender]

And, if I'm correct in this line of reasoning, does it not follow that this faith in the 'transformative power of guilt and repentance' have its roots in another source, namely religious faith?

Not quite. It has it's roots in primate heirarchy - it is a modern submission signal. That is it also found in religion is just part of religions "you are not good enough, submit to the almighty and beg" message.

[Junghalli]

To me the problem with disinterest is that it seems rather flimsy as an enforcement of good behavior.

Fundamentally, criminals commit criminal acts because at some level they think it's acceptable. This is pretty the reason behind all human actions: if we didn't at some level think something was acceptable, we wouldn't do it. In order for a violent criminal to be safely reintroduced into society IMO it is necessary to change this perception in them. If they're simply disinterested but haven't changed their basic perspective on the crime ... well, what guarentee do we have that under the right circumstances they won't become interested again in the future?

Guilt per se is probably not necessary, but it can be useful as a means of regulating human behavior. People who feel guilty about something are less likely to do it.

[Illuminatus Primus]

I'm not so sure about that. Right now I don't want to go to the mall and shop for a new pair of shoes, and I'd assign a zero value to that (because I don't particularly care to do it). I also don't want to pour lighter fluid on myself and bust out the Zippo, and I'd assign a negative value to that. More to the point, I don't want to walk the streets right now and kill the first person I see (even if I were guaranteed not to get caught), because that would cause suffering for his family and friends, and even if he had no loved ones, I still believe that it is unethical to end the life of a conscious person. I would assign a negative value to that, too.

Perhaps this, then, is subjective. My desire to kill someone and buy a new pair of shoes are the same: zero. This, then, most likely depends on personal psychological factors; there are certainly no standards by which one could judge this schemata over that.

A negative value is something you not only are disinterested in doing, but are opposed to others doing as well. I would try to prevent or discourage the death of another just as much as I would not like to kill the same person myself. Similarly, one can be disinterested in buying a pair of shoes but be willing to accept a pair of shoes given to him, or have no opinion about others buying shoes themselves. Disinterest suffices in being useful for a healthy society, but active opposition to criminality is better. Simply someone disinterested in stealing in a particular circumstance is probably untrustworthy and undesirable to have in an intimate social contact. However, someone who'd only steal to eat, or only steal from those outside the social unit and under normal circumstances would join me in opposing or preventing others from capriciously stealing from others is much more desirable. The attitude toward transgression by a particular individual must be evaluated on a continuum of benefit and desirability to a.) another particular individual at a personal level of interaction, and to b.) society at large at a general level of interaction. Disinterest (I am currently uninterested in killing dogs.) may suffice in many circumstances and is obviously preferable to enthusiasm (I love to kill any dogs!) or even casual circumstantial interest (I'll kill that dog because it'd amuse me, and even though its our mutual friend's dog), but itself is inferior to more active opposition and strict circumstances of interest (I am opposed to killing dogs, unless I am starving and need to eat it or the dogs are attacking people, which I think are more important than dogs).