Utilitarianism vs Rights Based Ethics

[Kanastrous]

[Eris]

One major criticism people have is that it forces people to do things that they have the right not to do. Or in some cases says it's okay to violate other people's rights.

This is the main problem with stagnant rights-based systems: They are subjective. Utilitarianism, when properly applied, is based off of objective measures of harm and benefit, and thus innately much more reliable and flexible than any subjective system, which is why I advocate basing a mutable rights-based system based off of the same objective standards that Utilitarianism holds.

I believe the problem referenced isn't so much one of subjectivity, but a general claim, if I might be allowed to extrapolate, that for any general good that utilitarianism can propose, it cannot be ruled out that the optimal distribution of that good will lead to what we think are intuitively horrible results, despite them being in theory optimal. (Okay, it wasn't explicitly worded that way by Lord MJ (I think), but I'm extrapolating to the general form of the objection.)

Now, I'm not exactly a fan of our intuitive moral notions, but to give justice to the view, I can think up some sample cases. Picking a standard example, it does not rule out slavery. It can always be the case under a utilitarian system (with one proviso I'll get to later) that there is some schema that would permit us to enslave other persons since the detriment done to them is vastly outweighed by the greater individual benefit to a much larger number of persons, and let's say as well some advantage to the society generally.

One commonly taken response is to say that this would never happen. This is true, but it's also missing the point. The point is that utilitarianism cannot rule such a case out on principled grounds. If there were a way for such a situation to arise, the utilitarian would, the argument goes, be obliged to support the enslavement as morally permissible, perhaps even morally required.

Maximisation of the good will always let in some very odd things (hanging the innocent man, enslaving people, satiating the pleasure monster, etc.) given certain starting conditions, and the thought is that this is because it has no principles that rule out certain types of actions or behaviours as impermissible not because they lead to bad results, but because they are inherently objectionable. The point of this example and others like it, then, are to show that we still don't want these inherently objectionable practices to take place, even if they are balanced by a greater good. Ergo, utility cannot be the only good, and must be replaced or at least complimented by some other moral standard. Rights, duties, whatever. Just something more than just utility.

Now, on to my proviso, and this is just more a general curiosity on my part. This all is somewhat dependent on what you consider utility to be, although in most cases it doesn't make much of a different for all practical purposes. You suggest that utility is in some way more objective than rights, if I read you correctly at least. What did you have in mind when you use the word utility? Clearly nothing like classical utilitarianism -- happiness is a notoriously squishy concept.

[TheKwas]

The point of this example and others like it, then, are to show that we still don't want these inherently objectionable practices to take place, even if they are balanced by a greater good. Ergo, utility cannot be the only good, and must be replaced or at least complimented by some other moral standard. Rights, duties, whatever. Just something more than just utility.

I don't think that follows at all. The greater good is still being served.

If the hanging of an innocent person causes the maximization of utility (it would have increase the goodness of things by a pretty big amount), then the innocent person should be hung.

As harsh as it sounds, it's what we do in practice as well. Military commanders are always willing to risk killing innocent civilians in an attempt to bomb out the bad guys and win the war. If we have to make sure that we don't harm a single innocent person during times of war, then we would be the worst warriors in history, and utility certainly wouldn't be maximized in the end. The Nazis would have certainly won WWII, Hamas would have driven the Jews back into the ocean, and the Taliban would have spread across the entire Sunni world. Those who simply do not reconigize the same 'rights' that we do would have destroyed us utterly.

[Kanastrous]

then the innocent person should be hung.

Hanged.

[General Zod]

As harsh as it sounds, it's what we do in practice as well. Military commanders are always willing to risk killing innocent civilians in an attempt to bomb out the bad guys and win the war. If we have to make sure that we don't harm a single innocent person during times of war, then we would be the worst warriors in history, and utility certainly wouldn't be maximized in the end. The Nazis would have certainly won WWII, Hamas would have driven the Jews back into the ocean, and the Taliban would have spread across the entire Sunni world. Those who simply do not reconigize the same 'rights' that we do would have destroyed us utterly.

There is usually a certain acceptable level of civilian casualties expected, but that doesn't necessarily mean the military is going to go around killing wholesale regardless of civilian presence. Killing a few civilian contractors on a military base to destroy the base would be acceptable, but carpet bombing of a city to get at one target would not if there are less destructive methods of doing so, etc.

[TheKwas]

And how do they determine the acceptable level of casualties, and why don't they kill civilians wholesale? Utility.

[Kanastrous]

Killing a few civilian contractors on a military base to destroy the base would be acceptable, but carpet bombing of a city to get at one target would not if there are less destructive methods of doing so, etc.

A literal reading of the Geneva Conventions lays responsibility for placing that one in-city target, upon the side that placed it there.

To the degree that the Geneva Conventions' standards, are relevant.

[General Zod]

A literal reading of the Geneva Conventions lays responsibility for placing that one in-city target, upon the side that placed it there.

To the degree that the Geneva Conventions' standards, are relevant.

On the other hand, there are many ways of demolishing the base without wholesale destruction of the city with modern weaponry.

[Eris]

I don't think that follows at all. The greater good is still being served.

If the hanging of an innocent person causes the maximization of utility (it would have increase the goodness of things by a pretty big amount), then the innocent person should be hung.

So you're willing to bite that particular philosophical bullet then? Perhaps if we go to an example that presses the point a bit more, which is why I personally prefer examples like enslavement than hanging the innocent man.

Say you can vastly increase the general utility by taking a small fraction of the population and brutally torturing them once a day through the use of some very peculiar device. Would you condone its use?

Yes, the situation is absurd, but the point is, utilitarianism cannot rule out such absurd cases. You can of course bite the bullet and admit that any case where the utility is maximised is permissible, and any reluctance we have is just evolution given squeamishness. Then the objection isn't a problem for you. I would not subscribe to such a view, however, and not only because I find other parts of utilitarianism to be objectionable.

As harsh as it sounds, it's what we do in practice as well. Military commanders are always willing to risk killing innocent civilians in an attempt to bomb out the bad guys and win the war. If we have to make sure that we don't harm a single innocent person during times of war, then we would be the worst warriors in history, and utility certainly wouldn't be maximized in the end. The Nazis would have certainly won WWII, Hamas would have driven the Jews back into the ocean, and the Taliban would have spread across the entire Sunni world. Those who simply do not reconigize the same 'rights' that we do would have destroyed us utterly.

Straw man much? You're conflating a civilian practical case the weird wacky world of the military. You'll notice that no reasonable rights based ethicist will say that rights are perfectly immutable. Our right to privacy can be overturned with a warrant. Habeas corpus can be suspended in times of war. The notion that somehow a rights based system is committed to never ever conducting a war because it might hurt people is preposterous.

In fact, it's more likely that there are cases they are required to go to war, namely those in which they step in to intervene in cases where there are massive human rights violations. Take Darfur - I would warrant a large percentage of rights based ethicists would say we should intervene, even if innocent deaths are unavoidable. Innocent deaths are already happening, and we have a duty to step in and prevent more violations from occurring, or so an argument could go.

[Eris]

Sorry for the double post, but I hadn't noticed this my first glance through.

And how do they determine the acceptable level of casualties, and why don't they kill civilians wholesale? Utility.

Please define the notion of utility please, or moreover, what under your understanding consists of the good in regards to utility?

Think carefully before you answer this question.

[TheKwas]

Say you can vastly increase the general utility by taking a small fraction of the population and brutally torturing them once a day through the use of some very peculiar device. Would you condone its use?

Yes, the situation is absurd, but the point is, utilitarianism cannot rule out such absurd cases. You can of course bite the bullet and admit that any case where the utility is maximised is permissible, and any reluctance we have is just evolution given squeamishness. Then the objection isn't a problem for you. I would not subscribe to such a view, however, and not only because I find other parts of utilitarianism to be objectionable.

Of course it's hard to imagine such a situation because I'm focusing in on just the enslaved persons rather than those who are actually benefiting from those actions (you don't even describe to me how they are, so of course I can't imagine it). This creates a immediate gut reaction of sympathy with just the slaves. So yes, squeamishness.

If you phased the question differently, it's quite possible that the same distribution of utility would involk a different gut reaction. The classic examples are the train analogies where in one situation, you pull a switch to make a train switch tracks to avoid hitting 6 men, but instead just 1 on a side track, and the other situation you have to push a fat guy infront of the train so that it won't kill the other 6 guys.

What I'm wondering at this point is if you don't subscribe to Utilitarianism for this reason, what do you subscribe to? Do just create a 'right' whenever you feel squeamish? How do you know when certain rights should be scrapped (such as in times of war)? If rights are not always valid, as you argue, how do you draw up the criteria for when a right can be ignored? Would such a criteria be that a right can be ignored if such an action would stop more rights being violated in the future? Sort of a 'net right gain'?

If so, it seems to me like you really are an utilitarianist, but you just treat the rules of utilitarianism (rights) as utility itself.

Please define the notion of utility please, or moreover, what under your understanding consists of the good in regards to utility?

Think carefully before you answer this question.

First, let me clarify that bit, because I can see it getting me into trouble already.

I doubt Military Generals use utility as a measure in dermining what is an acceptable level of causalities in many cases (they often will care more about the 'mission'), but we, the general public, judge the morality of such actions based on utility.

With that out of the way, I define utility in the same way most utilitarianist do, I think: A measure of satisfaction.

Hopefully that answers your question.

[Darth Wong]

Yes, the situation is absurd, but the point is, utilitarianism cannot rule out such absurd cases.

Sure it can, but a lot of people who dislike it try to paint it in the worst possible light by interpreting it in such a manner that it can't. Remember that there are two forms of utilitarianism: act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. Many criticisms of utilitarianism assume that act-utilitarianism is the only variant, so it is incapable of working with any kind of principle. In fact, "principles" are handled by rule-utilitarianism, and rule-utilitarianism is the only variant which can be applied to government policies and laws, because policies and laws are, in fact, rules.

[TheKwas]

But doesn't that go back to your other point that rules should depend on utility in the first place? If they find a situation like the one Eris described, and they can determine that maximizing utility in this situation wouldn't set a precedent that would lower utility in the long run, then they should form their rules in such a manner that allows for this case. Something like "No one is to be tortured except these people by this device for these reasons".

[Eris]

Of course it's hard to imagine such a situation because I'm focusing in on just the enslaved persons rather than those who are actually benefiting from those actions (you don't even describe to me how they are, so of course I can't imagine it). This creates a immediate gut reaction of sympathy with just the slaves. So yes, squeamishness.

I don't describe the persons actually benefiting, nor do I much describe the people suffering, except to belabour the point. If you wish, I'll also belabour that the benefits to society are fantastically incredible, including extended, pain free life spans and really great orgasms.

But all that is orthogonal to the point. What's important that we are intentionally inflicting grievous harm on a subset of the population for the benefit of the rest. In extreme cases, do you find this justifiable? Utilitarianism says yes, and unless you to admit that we can ignore extreme suffering, and are in fact at least morally justified in doing so, then this creates a tension in the view.

If you phased the question differently, it's quite possible that the same distribution of utility would involk a different gut reaction. The classic examples are the train analogies where in one situation, you pull a switch to make a train switch tracks to avoid hitting 6 men, but instead just 1 on a side track, and the other situation you have to push a fat guy infront of the train so that it won't kill the other 6 guys.

*ahem* Allow me to quote myself, "Now, I'm not exactly a fan of our intuitive moral notions, but to give justice to the view, I can think up some sample cases."

This would be a mild case of why it is that our moral intuitions can be unreliable. There does seem to be an ick factor built into our psyches, and moreover there are clear counterexamples, areas in which clearly immoral people think they're moral.

But that's all beside the point; perhaps it was a mistake to use the word squeamish. You still haven't addressed the objection that inflicting brutal conditions, even if does produce an overall net utility increase, is wrong despite that. There are two ways you can go: either admit that utility is not the only moral consideration, or alternatively raise the counter-objection that we just think torturing people is wrong in and of itself, and not just for its effects. It really is just the effects, and such a hypothetical would be a good thing, and it's just our moral notions that are mistaken.

These are the two options to take, unless I'm missing some other one in which case please point it out to me, but so far you've merely pointed out that we have different reactions to different situations, even very different reactions to only slightly different situations. This is true, but it doesn't address the objection.

What I'm wondering at this point is if you don't subscribe to Utilitarianism for this reason, what do you subscribe to?

Mmm, let's say for the moment I'm a rights based ethicist. I'm not, as I'll get into later, but for the moment let's say I am and see what kind of theory might be spun out from it.

Do just create a 'right' whenever you feel squeamish?

That would be silly. While our squeamishness no doubt has biological roots, and is consequently not wholly arbitrary, there's far too much variation between people to make anything more than some hesitant claims about morality. It's a semi-reliable indicator, not a source of moral force.

How do you know when certain rights should be scrapped (such as in times of war)?

This would depend a lot on how the system of rights itself is structured. As a general idea, it would have to be a case where there is some greater danger to the rights of other people. A murderer has lost their right to freedom because they pose a clear risk to the right to life of other people.

To bring up your specific example, soldiers wave their rights to life when they start shooting at you or defending criminal regimes (say, to bring up the ever popular Nazis, Germans or their allies who defended a regime that put over 10 million people to death). You'll notice, though, that this isn't widely applicable. Intentionally killing POWs or civilians constitute war crimes after all. And this is because, so the rights ethicist might say, the soldiers are violating rights where they have no business to.

If rights are not always valid, as you argue, how do you draw up the criteria for when a right can be ignored?

Under this view a right is always "valid." That is, it's not that the right has a truth-preserving form, but rather that a right always has moral force. It just happens to be the case that there are overriding concerns. The decision making principles behind determining where these rights could be violated would generally have to be in agreement with the notion that there are more and less important rights, and that in general the preservation of these rights should be promoted since it is inherently a bad thing to violate them, if sometimes necessary.

Would such a criteria be that a right can be ignored if such an action would stop more rights being violated in the future? Sort of a 'net right gain'?

Say, a search and seizure of weapons from someone with a criminal record to prevent them from committing a later murder? Sure, although I wouldn't call it net right gain. That may just be terminological, though. The idea, I think, isn't a bad one.

If so, it seems to me like you really are an utilitarianist, but you just treat the rules of utilitarianism (rights) as utility itself.

Utilitarian, not utilitarianist. And the claim betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of both rights ethics and utilitarianism. For utilitarianism, there is one good, utility, and its maximisation is what makes something good. In a rights based system it is the rights of the individual that makes the good. We do want to maximise the extent to which we can preserve those rights, but it's not that maximisation which makes something good, but the inherent quality of the rights themselves.

Furthermore, rights ethics can admit to degrees. One right can be inherently more important than other rights - the right to free speech might be more important than the right to having chocolate given to you by the government every Wednesday, for instance. Utilitarianism cannot do this, since it's just the quantity of utility that's important. If you introduce qualitative differences in the good gained from different kinds of utility, then you've abandoned utilitarianism, since you've admitted there's more than one good. That is, it's not just utility that makes something good, it's utility plus this other thing.

Now, as it happens, I'm not a rights ethicist. I'm a quirky sort of deontologist, sort of a Kant meets Darwin girl. That's not exactly relevant, though, since I'm not really concerning myself with my own ethics. Rights ethics I think don't work out in the end, but not for the reasons you seem to be holding.

Please define the notion of utility please, or moreover, what under your understanding consists of the good in regards to utility?

Think carefully before you answer this question.

First, let me clarify that bit, because I can see it getting me into trouble already.

I doubt Military Generals use utility as a measure in dermining what is an acceptable level of causalities in many cases (they often will care more about the 'mission'), but we, the general public, judge the morality of such actions based on utility.

We do, do we?

With that out of the way, I define utility in the same way most utilitarianist do, I think: A measure of satisfaction.

Hopefully that answers your question.

By a measure of satisfaction I take it you mean what many utilitarians call happiness. It answers my question, sort of.

[Eris]

Yes, the situation is absurd, but the point is, utilitarianism cannot rule out such absurd cases.

Sure it can, but a lot of people who dislike it try to paint it in the worst possible light by interpreting it in such a manner that it can't.

I like to think of it less so much as painting it in the worst possible light and more as testing the limiting cases of the theory.

More seriously...

Remember that there are two forms of utilitarianism: act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. Many criticisms of utilitarianism assume that act-utilitarianism is the only variant, so it is incapable of working with any kind of principle.

This is true, although in the common discourse not exactly wildly debilitating assumption, since most people defending utilitarianism outside of a philosophy department have act utilitarianism in mind.

In fact, "principles" are handled by rule-utilitarianism, and rule-utilitarianism is the only variant which can be applied to government policies and laws, because policies and laws are, in fact, rules.

In practice, it makes for a perfectly functional moral theory. I do worry somewhat about it's lack of any kind of direct address to moral motivations, but since those are largely private, that doesn't damage its function in practice.

I don't think, however, it addresses the sorts of limiting cases I was bringing up, since it actually raises an odd situation when tested with them. An act utilitarian is in fact obligated to consent that the very strange utility-monster cases, but a rule utilitarian has a peculiar dilemma. Since, let's say, they're bound by their rules of conduct, they are obligated to reject the situation as grossly immoral.

However, the source of morality of their rules is maximising utility, and since the example is set up such that it is clearly the case that maximising utility would mean breaking the rules, it's not at least immediately clear how the rule utilitarian should go. If they go with condoning it, they're an act utilitarian with some practical rules of thumb, but rejecting means that the rules themselves have primacy over just the maximisation of utility. You could mount a defence along the lines that allowing the violations in and of itself more often than not leads to bad consequences, or a society in which utility is in general not maximised, so it's not immediately clear that the view fails even with this objection, but I still think there's a tension there.

In practice the internal tensions to utility and qualms I have about motivations aren't as important, though, and you're correct in saying that rule utilitarianism is too often discounted, despite being a more nuanced theory.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

In some cases, it needn't even be a strict rule vs act dichotomy. In practice, it's almost impossible. One of the primary philosophical discussions about Rule Utilitarianism is how it can sometimes collapse into act-utilitarianism anyway. Rules can sometimes be 'broken' but you have to determine when to do it.

It would probably be in situations where the benefit is so great but the situation so rare is not to cause any significant long-term social problems. It's extremely difficult to be either or, because you will have to bite a bullet at some point if you try, because both can lead to undesirable states.

Utilitarianism is also more complex than just merely act vs rule. There are dozens of varieties that fall into both categories.

[Darth Wong]

Umm, where was it ever written that one must choose between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism at all? Most people who study ethics have no problem combining more than one system, in a kind of "filtration" system. In other words, if it passes by system #1 without being declared unethical, then you run it by system #2. If it makes it past system #2 without some kind of problem, then you can say that it is ethical. Failure to meet the requirements of either system makes it unethical. You don't have to choose one and ignore the other.

In fact, many ethicists like to use even more systems than that, and some even adopt a "majority rules" approach, where something is unethical if the majority of ethics systems rule that it is.

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

Umm, where was it ever written that one must choose between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism at all? Most people who study ethics have no problem combining more than one system, in a kind of "filtration" system. In other words, if it passes by system #1 without being declared unethical, then you run it by system #2. If it makes it past system #2 without some kind of problem, then you can say that it is ethical. Failure to meet the requirements of either system makes it unethical. You don't have to choose one and ignore the other.

In fact, many ethicists like to use even more systems than that, and some even adopt a "majority rules" approach, where something is unethical if the majority of ethics systems rule that it is.

I don't think you said it. It's more a case of some people in the real world who attack Utilitarianism look at it from the either/or perspective. They don't realize that you can apply both, but it has some shade of gray. It probably relates to the fact that some people want a black and white system where there are no vagueness or they are "comfortable" with the results. But in a moral dilemma, it's more messy, and you might have to bite a bullet or two because no solutions are good. The right choice being the one one that is less bad.

[Nova Andromeda]

Umm, where was it ever written that one must choose between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism at all? Most people who study ethics have no problem combining more than one system, in a kind of "filtration" system. In other words, if it passes by system #1 without being declared unethical, then you run it by system #2. If it makes it past system #2 without some kind of problem, then you can say that it is ethical. Failure to meet the requirements of either system makes it unethical. You don't have to choose one and ignore the other.

In fact, many ethicists like to use even more systems than that, and some even adopt a "majority rules" approach, where something is unethical if the majority of ethics systems rule that it is.

-I may be a bit confused at the moment about the definitions of act and rule based utilitarianism. I currently understand utilitarianism as an ethical approach to maximize the average happiness of people in society. The "act" version does this calculation for every decision while the "rule" version does the calculation within the context of societal rules/laws.
-If the above definitions are accurate I fail to see how anyone can possibly do the calculations required for act utilitarianism (as it seems to be envisioned). Every moment we must decide between an infinite number of actions: continue typing this, write a check to a humanitarian, take a shower, etc. In addition, one would need to calculate the probabilities for all these actions. Since one can't possibly do this (which is bad) act utilitarianism would seem to require one to reduce utilitarianism to a set of "guide lines" and to get help refining those "guide lines" into a set of rules. Of note, one of those rules will probably be: use act utilitarianism if you run into a problem with your current set of rules.
-To sum up: why divide utilitariansim into "act" and "rule"? It seems like "act" simplifies to "rule" in nearly every case and "act" is should only used when there is a serious problem with using the current "rule set" since there is often a very high risk of making a mistake due to lack of information and/or computational power when using "act."

P.S.: What is the total happiness function commonly used? Does it include negatives like pain as a minus? If so how are the two normally weighted?

[Boyish-Tigerlilly]

I may be a bit confused at the moment about the definitions of act and rule based utilitarianism. I currently understand utilitarianism as an ethical approach to maximize the average happiness of people in society. The "act" version does this calculation for every decision while the "rule" version does the calculation within the context of societal rules/laws.

Rule Utilitarianism doesn't mean that you do a calculation from within the context of social rules and laws. What Rule Utilitarianism means is that you don't do any individual calculations at all. You forgo making individual calculations in every circumstance based on the long-term aggregate utility of a given rule.

Your decisions are based on creating rules of thumb that, if followed, would lead to good results overall not setting a dangerous precedent, etc. You then act in accordance with those general rules. They certainly are reflected sometimes in social rules/laws, but not always. You can make up a "concept rule" that isn't a social law or disagrees with it.

Modern Utilitarianism also doesn't necessarily mean hedonistic utilitarianism. I mentioned before that it's a lot more complicated today, there being at least a half dozen variants. You have versions that still focus on happiness, a more general concept of welfare, ones that consider maximizing "justice" or some other good. You have ones that don't focus on directly maximizing, but indirectly through suffering minimization.

There are utility theories wherein you don't maximize anything, but satisfice. Some have different ways of aggregating.

You have ones blend Kantianism with it, etc. Classical Hedonistic Utilitarianism is the one least used/accepted in academic ethics today.
They are moving more toward Preference-based welfare utilitarianism, which can be either act or rule, minimization or maximization.

yping this, write a check to a humanitarian, take a shower, etc. In addition, one would need to calculate the probabilities for all these actions. Since one can't possibly do this (which is bad) act utilitarianism would seem to require one to reduce utilitarianism to a set of "guide lines" and to get help refining those "guide lines" into a set of rules. Of note, one of those rules will probably be: use act utilitarianism if you run into a problem with your current set of rules.
-To sum up: why divide utilitariansim into "act" and "rule"? It seems like "act" simplifies to "rule" in nearly every case and "act" is should only used when there is a serious problem with using the current "rule set" since there is often a very high risk of making a mistake due to lack of information and/or computational power when using "act."

It really is impossible to make detailed, on-the-spot calculations, and you aren't clairvoyant. Utilitarian theory admits this. One way they get around it is that you go by best-evidence and concentrate to expected, projected utility based on evidence you can reasonably get.

R.M. Hare goes into more detail about the problem of being unable to make all possible calculations, and if you haven't enough information, it can be anti-utilitarian to do all the calculations all the time! It can become dangerous and impractical, having opposite results of what you what. This partly leads to his differentiation between the "ideal" abstract moral thinking and the everyday, usual circumstances, wherein our moral intuitions usually tie with general rules of thumb.

[TheKwas]

.

But that's all beside the point; perhaps it was a mistake to use the word squeamish. You still haven't addressed the objection that inflicting brutal conditions, even if does produce an overall net utility increase, is wrong despite that. There are two ways you can go: either admit that utility is not the only moral consideration, or alternatively raise the counter-objection that we just think torturing people is wrong in and of itself, and not just for its effects. It really is just the effects, and such a hypothetical would be a good thing, and it's just our moral notions that are mistaken.

These are the two options to take, unless I'm missing some other one in which case please point it out to me, but so far you've merely pointed out that we have different reactions to different situations, even very different reactions to only slightly different situations. This is true, but it doesn't address the objection.

Sorry about that, I thought I did when I said: " So yes, squeamishness.", which was supposed to be a response to what you said here:

You can of course bite the bullet and admit that any case where the utility is maximised is permissible, and any reluctance we have is just evolution given squeamishness.

I suppose I should have been more clear in retrospect. My answer is yes, I'm willing to 'bite that bullet' and see no reason not.

the claim betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of both rights ethics and utilitarianism. For utilitarianism, there is one good, utility, and its maximisation is what makes something good. In a rights based system it is the rights of the individual that makes the good. We do want to maximise the extent to which we can preserve those rights, but it's not that maximisation which makes something good, but the inherent quality of the rights themselves.

Furthermore, rights ethics can admit to degrees. One right can be inherently more important than other rights - the right to free speech might be more important than the right to having chocolate given to you by the government every Wednesday, for instance. Utilitarianism cannot do this, since it's just the quantity of utility that's important. If you introduce qualitative differences in the good gained from different kinds of utility, then you've abandoned utilitarianism, since you've admitted there's more than one good. That is, it's not just utility that makes something good, it's utility plus this other thing.

Point to you on Rights always being valid, but I don't think I expressed myself fully again.

How does a right ethicist (is that the right title?) determine the hiearchy of rights? If some rights trump other rights when in conflict, how does one determine this? I don't think that saying 'they inherently do' or 'they just do' is a real argument at all (and it's actually an argument given to my by an otherwise smart pro-lifer: life is just inherently valuable, and because it's an inherent characteristic, I don't have to back up that claim). There should be a reason why some rights trump others, and since right ethicists can generally agree on what rights trump others (they all agree that free speech trumps free chocolate), there must be some criteria that they use. Pehaps it's just gut feeling, but I suspect that generally, that criteria is really just utility. Whatever right maximizes the most utility when put in place, is the most important right.

However, to add in the confusion with right ethicists, even this hiearchy of rights isn't absolute. If there's a conflict between the right at the very top of the hiearchy, and the rest of the rights down the hiearchy, most right ethicists will argue (as far as I know) that it's quite possible for the multiple rights to trump the single, more important right.

For example, suppose that an economist has made a positive correlation between freedom of speech in the Media and school shootings. If we allow gangsta rap to be played on the radiowaves without censorship, it will directly lead to more violent youth. A young student's right to life is in conflict with the entire rap communities right to free speech (along with a nation's right to enjoy rap music). Obviously the right to life is more important than the right to free speech, but is the right to life for a single individual more important than the right to free speech of an entire community, or the right for an entire nation to enjoy gangsta rap music? Few people would argue that, as I have little doubt the corelation does exist to some degree.

How do they possibly make such a calculation? How do they know when a group of inferior rights can trump a single (or just smaller group of) superior rights? They must weigh or compare them in some sort of fashion.
Of course, in order to compare them, they have to reduce them all to a common weight. It's impossible to compare them otherwise, as then they are just apples and oranges.

To put it in rough mathematical terms you would have to assign the different rights a value (weight), and then times that number by the population who's expressing that right in this conflict.

I could write this out in actual mathematical equations, but I suck at using the internet for that. I'll just say that you just need to use:
E x*weight

What are these values a precise right ethicist would reduce his rights to? I can only assume that he would reduce the rights in terms of utility.


Of course, I'm assuming here that a right ethicist is trying to be precise in the application of his beliefs, but I find that many right ethicists will just get wrapped up in these concepts of rights that they can abstract them and play with them however they want until they find the 'rights' fit in with their evolutionary gut feeling. For this reason I find utilitarians simply more consistent and more accurate in their notions than right ethicists.

[Lord MJ]

Alright, steering clear of the copyright and 'intellectual property' argument going on...

This is the main problem with stagnant rights-based systems: They are subjective. Utilitarianism, when properly applied, is based off of objective measures of harm and benefit, and thus innately much more reliable and flexible than any subjective system, which is why I advocate basing a mutable rights-based system based off of the same objective standards that Utilitarianism holds.

It's hard to really say it's objective since many would argue that tying right and wrong to the measures of harm and benefit isn't correct.

Also most rights based ethicists would vehemlemently disagree that the reason our rights exists is due to societal utility. They would argue that our rights do not come from society but are in fact intrinsic to human beings. (Therefore a society that does not respect an intrinsic right is violating that person's right.) They would argue that even if the government said one day that a certain right doesn't exist anymore, in actuality individuals still have the right and have not lost it, the government is simply choosing to violate the right. Finally they would argue that rights limit social utility, and in order to maximize social utility ethically, society has to work with or around the rights not remove them when they conflict with utility.

[K. A. Pital]

They would argue that our rights do not come from society but are in fact intrinsic to human beings

Which is based on what logical foundation? Pooh-poo? Sorry, but that shit doesn't fly in the face of anyone with a sense of logic. Rights are not innate to humans or animals, a part of which we are, and it's the society which installs and institutes rights for it's own benefits and goals.

"Innate" rights do not have any logical basis behind them.

[Lord MJ]

They would argue that our rights do not come from society but are in fact intrinsic to human beings

Which is based on what logical foundation? Pooh-poo? Sorry, but that shit doesn't fly in the face of anyone with a sense of logic. Rights are not innate to humans or animals, a part of which we are, and it's the society which installs and institutes rights for it's own benefits and goals.

"Innate" rights do not have any logical basis behind them.

The concept of "Innate" rights seems to be the basis of American ideology. Also the doctrine of philosophers such as Locke and Hobbes prior to the foundation of America.

You will be hard pressed to convince even the least fanatical of rights based ethicists that rights are given by society for it's own benefits. They believe that society exists for the sole purpose of serving the individuals (and one large purpose is the protection of those inherent rights.)