US Missile Defence in E. Europe - the view from Russia

[Vympel]

Interesting read

US Missile Defence In Eastern Europe: The View From Russia

Mikhail Barabanov

Plans to push the front lines of the US missile defence system into Eastern Europe have led to the most significant crisis in US-Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This crisis is neither accidental nor artificial, but the inevitable result of the foreign and defence policies currently pursued by the USA and Russia.

Missile defence in light of America’s “grand strategy”

Like it or not, America is clearly the sole superpower in a unipolar world system. The highly productive US economy forms the core of the global economy, the dollar is still the world’s main currency, and US markets set the standard for the consumer and entertainment industries. The bulk of humanity looks to America as a cultural and moral beacon. The US also possesses the greatest military force on earth, spending more on defence than all other nations combined. Moreover, its armed forces are located across the globe in an aggressively interventionist posture, and are able to project American power to every corner of the world.

For the foreseeable future, no state, not even China, will be in a position to challenge the US in terms of its integral power. Consequently, the world order will retain its current configuration of one superpower versus several more or less influential powers for the next few decades. This situation is without a doubt highly advantageous for the USA, and the basic tenets of its foreign policy are aimed at preserving this distribution of power. On this score the American elites are in full agreement. Both main parties have and will continue to pursue very similar foreign policies. The current, so-called “Bush Doctrine,” which some criticize for its unilateralism, is, in fact, nothing other than the natural expression of a fundamentally American tradition.

Henry Kissinger once wrote that the aim of a world state would be to achieve, “absolute security, in other words, a state of affairs whereby all external issues are automatically resolved as internal issues.” In writing these lines, Kissinger had the USSR in mind, but today, one is tempted to attribute such ambitions to American strategists. Certainly, the American doctrine of maintaining a “preponderance of power” implies a certain “levelling” of all other states to the point where they are unable to resist, and thus would not consider resisting a determined application of American will. The effects of this principle apply first and foremost to the great powers of the world, whose ability to stand up to the US in case of confrontation must be minimized.

The US strategy of levelling all other potential centres of power is most critically expressed in terms of its complete military superiority. This includes denying other states the ability to inflict significant harm against its territory. The prevention of attacks against the continental US is a fundamental element of American defence policy, and thus a natural focus for the expansion of military systems; moreover, one that enjoys the full support of domestic popular opinion. The only question that remains is how quickly such a system can be built.

Clearly, Russia’s nuclear forces continue to present the greatest potential threat to the United States, and thus remain a major irritant to the US strategic psyche. Russia’s nuclear arms are the only means on earth capable of challenging the superpower status of the United States, inflicting unacceptable losses, and in the most extreme case, of destroying the US as a nation. China is capable of building such a force in the future. The neutralization of Russian and Chinese capabilities would have tremendous significance for the national security of the US and would represent the full attainment of the principal goals of American foreign policy.

However, to date, the quantitative and qualitative size of Russia’s strategic nuclear force has kept this goal beyond reach. The missile defence systems currently slated for deployment cannot repel a Russian nuclear attack. However, the US could eventually build such a system, with the first stage capable of intercepting a limited missile strike against American territory. This would effectively eliminate the threat of attack from “third-class” states like Iran and North Korea, and would deny them the means of responding to American pressure or threats.

By establishing even a limited missile defence system, the US reduces the number of states that can aspire to genuinely independent action on the world stage. However, the United States should realize that missile defence systems directed “exclusively against Iran and North Korea,” including those planned for Eastern Europe, are seen by Russia as directed against it as well. For in the large scheme of things there is no fundamental difference between US policy towards Iran and North Korea on the one hand, and Russia on the other.

Clearly, technological problems and cost are all that limit the current focus of the system to America’s weaker opponents. Russians are convinced that as soon as the US develops the capacity to deploy a full-scale missile defence system, they will do so, notwithstanding the most vehement Russian protests. In fact, all attempts from the Russian side to engage the US in real negotiations on this score have proven fruitless, and are likely to remain so in the future.

The East European context of American missile defence

The decision to deploy the “front lines” of the missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic is completely in tune with US foreign policy and should be viewed as a successful political move. By establishing the system on the borders of Russia, the US has signalled a complete rejection of Russian influence in Eastern Europe, or anywhere else, and confirmed that America’s sphere of influence covers the entire globe.

By the same token, the US is providing strong support to the new regimes of Eastern Europe in terms of their own “Eastern policy,” as well as their role as the “American lobby” within the European Union. The Czech Republic and Poland have become de-facto bastions of US influence in Europe, advancing American interests against Russia and Western Europe.

This policy enjoys full support from within Eastern Europe, and has little to do with historical grudges or any sort of anti-Russian sentiment. Instead, it reflects the utterly rational and conscious choice of Baltic and Eastern European elites to support confrontation with Russia. The Eastern Europeans are perfectly aware that their real value to the US lies in their geopolitical position as a base of operations and buffer zone against Russia. In their minds, the worse their relations with Russia become, the more they can rely on political, economic and military support from the US. Unfortunately, the American actions have only reinforced this attitude.

In fact, it is precisely its potentially anti-Russian flavour that makes missile defence so appealing to the Polish and Czech elites. Their governments have made their cold-blooded calculations and concluded that American payments for their role as anti-Russian springboards will more than compensate for the losses they incur as a result of worsening relations with Russia. Accordingly, it would only make sense for Russia to respond to this policy by demonstrating the error of such calculations, and to show precisely how and the degree to which the security of Eastern Europe will suffer should they continue to lend their polities to such aggressive designs.

Military aspects of US missile defence for Russia

Even a limited missile defence system adds a significant degree of uncertainty to the strategic planning of the other nuclear powers, and undermines the principle of mutual nuclear deterrence. As Russia continues to make significant reductions to its nuclear missile forces, and while China stays at current levels, American capacity to intercept even a few dozen intercontinental ballistic missile warheads could interfere with the ability of any party to inflict unacceptable losses against the United States in case of nuclear war.

This is particularly relevant with respect to US designs to further develop its missile defence capacities. While the current system is clearly experimental, the goal is to create a full scale system for the US mainland and beyond. Up to 100 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) could be deployed in Alaska and California within a decade, and their numbers in Poland are also likely to be increased.

In the medium term (to 2020), the number of deployment areas throughout the world could increase to six or seven, with 100-200 interceptors each, raising the total arsenal to 1400 antimissiles with significantly improved performance indicators. The US is now developing a new multiple kill vehicle (MKV) kinetic interceptor that disperses “shrapnel” to destroy decoys and multiple warheads.

According to current projections, Russia is unlikely to maintain more than 500-600 nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles beyond 2020. By that time, the US missile defence system will be able to intercept up to half of this number, according to the calculations of some Russian experts. Most alarmingly, the US could conduct a counterforce disarming first strike with some confidence that the Russian nuclear response could be almost entirely neutralized.

Unfortunately, Moscow cannot avoid giving serious consideration to the remote possibility that US leaders would be tempted by their ability to inflict a nuclear strike against Russia – again, the only country capable of destroying America – without fear of retaliation. The campaign against Iraq has shown how flippant, irresponsible and opportunistic Washington can be towards critical matters of war and peace. And the blame lies not only on George Bush, but on both political parties that voted so “patriotically” in Congress, along with the jingoistic howling of the “free” press and television. After Iraq, there is no clear reason why the rest of the world should expect the US, that is, the American elites and the American people, to behave in a reasonable and restrained manner when they consider themselves to be under threat.

From the Russian point of view, the retention of a significant nuclear retaliatory capability by Russia remains the best guarantee of peace for the whole world. The US missile defence system undermines the Russian deterrent and its ability to fulfill this role.

The effect of the first dozen American ground-based interceptors deployed in Poland will clearly not be decisive, or even significant, but their deployment will have an incremental effect Russia’s nuclear capability over time. The Russian Armed Forces purchase only six or seven new RS-12M “Topol-M” (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missiles per year. The theoretical neutralization of even one or two such missiles by a dozen Polish interceptors already imposes a significant cost on Russia.

The only practical way for Russia to counteract the steady advancement of American strategic superiority is to purchase new land and sea-based ballistic missiles. There is no question that Russia can presently afford such purchases, but the deployment for instance, of 30-50 land-based ICBMs, including those with multiple warheads like the recently tested RS-24, would require an annual defence budget increase of at least 20% after 2007. This is in line with planned defence spending increases, but a new escalation of nuclear capabilities after a period of nuclear disarmament would surely have a negative effect on international politics, destabilize relations among the nuclear powers, and increase the potential for an accidental or unintended triggering of nuclear war. Efforts to control the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will also be discredited, but these factors clearly are clearly less significant for Russia than the necessity of maintaining the effectiveness of its nuclear forces.

The political reaction in Russia to US missile defence

Today, as before, the United States appears to cherish the illusion that Russia’s harsh reaction to American plans for missile defence is related to the supposedly “undemocratic” character of President Putin’s regime. They assume the existence of a more accommodating domestic constituency ready to acquiesce to US missile defence plans and to American hegemony in general.

Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Putin’s regime is about as pro-Western as one could possibly imagine for Russia, and is much more positive in its orientation to the US than the vast majority of Russians. If Russia held a truly unconstrained electoral campaign among the main political parties, the debate on foreign policy would not be one of pro- versus anti -Western arguments, but rather a fierce competition among anti-Western political forces to stake out the most radically anti-American ground. If anything, Putin’s “managed democracy” has served to restrain this tendency. Every trifling restraint suffered by the utterly marginal handful of liberal politicians in Putin’s Russia gains the rapt attention of the West, while the real war waged by the Russian authorities against the explosion of fascist parties, including a proliferating number of nationalist, “patriotic,” anti-immigrant and ultra-conservative groups, passes unnoticed. In this respect it is worth noting that National-Bolsheviks are often the biggest presence at demonstrations held by the so-called “liberal opposition.”

The pronounced anti-American and anti-Western orientation among the most educated segments of the population, including among the youth, is a characteristic feature of Russian social and political life. It is precisely this class, that forms the current and future political elite, which feels the greatest hostility towards the West. The deep antipathy among the youth towards America is clear to anyone who cares to survey the Russian internet. Mind you, as Pushkin said 180 years ago: “the government is the only European in the country.”

This tendency cannot be attributed to “Putin’s propaganda” or even the global worsening of America’s image after the invasion of Iraq. It has a deeper, more fundamental cause. A general, popular consensus has slowly emerged in post-Soviet Russia as to the principal goals and tasks of national state-building, and it is not at all clear whether the authorities themselves have promoted the formation of this consensus or interfered with its crystallization. In any case, the majority of Russians have a clear desire to see Russia as a great power among the global power centres; not a satellite of the US and not a member of the European Union, with an independent foreign and defence policy. One could even formulate this consensus as the “reestablishment of Russia as a great power in economic, political, military and, to the extent possible within the borders of the former Soviet Union, territorial terms.”

It is not at all clear that this ambition is acceptable to the US or the EU, and many Russians suspect that the West as a whole would be much more comfortable dealing with a less influential Russia. The conviction that Russia’s aspirations are fundamentally counterpoised to Western policy, and that the West poses an obstacle to Russia’s national rebirth and modernization, is the real source of the anti-Americanism and anti-Western sentiment of Russian society today. Putin’s regime is, if anything, adapting to this trend, but certainly not directing it.

There is very little that the US can do to influence this deep-seated sentiment in Russian society, and it is not surprising that Russian-American relations have reached a stalemate. Insofar as US missile defence can prevent the re-emergence of Russia as a great power, Russian policy, and the Russian public, will support measures to prevent its deployment. This pattern will hold regardless of who sits in the Kremlin.

Russia does not threaten the US and has no reason to harm American interests. But the very existence of Russia as an independent power appears to be unacceptable to the US, in light of the fundamental aspects of American foreign policy as expressed in the past few years. As a result, US Russian relations appear to be doomed to confrontation.

In historical terms, such relations would appear to be the norm among great powers, and have very little to do with the internal political system of the states in question, characterized as democratic or otherwise. Moreover, this confrontational orientation has reflected, as a rule, a domestic social consensus supporting interstate competition. In this respect one might recall how Great Britain, the de-facto superpower of the 19th century, vied with France and Russia.

Anglo-French competition in the second half of the 19th century was accompanied by a naval arms race, confrontation in the colonies, a struggle for spheres of influence and allies, mutually aggressive propaganda and undercover operations. When the French expedition led by Marchand ran into the forces of Lord Kitchener in southern Sudan, the two great powers went to the brink of war for the sake of an oasis. It was only because the British held a few extra ships that France stepped back and war did not break out. And this took place between two democratic states with parliamentary governments. The democratic government, parliament, political parties, free business and press of each country actively supported an escalation of imperial competition with the historical enemy on the other side of the Channel. The democracy of each state probably did more to amplify this struggle than anything else, and such competition did not pose an obstacle to the normal development of trade, cultural and personal ties between the rival nations.

And so when we look for a deeper pattern to explain the recent cooling of relations between Russia and the US, including over the issue of missile defence, one should not imagine a resumption of the Cold War. The Fashoda incident, and the model of great power competition it represents, provides a much more relevant historical template for the future of relations between Russia and America.

[MKSheppard]

What bullshit.

"We can deploy ABM, and thousands of quasi-ABM sites in the form of SA-5s and advanced SAMs all over our country, but nobody else can deploy missile defense; because that's destabilizing"

[Vympel]

What bullshit.

"We can deploy ABM, and thousands of quasi-ABM sites in the form of SA-5s and advanced SAMs all over our country, but nobody else can deploy missile defense; because that's destabilizing"

Russia's extremely limited ABM is in accordance with the now-defunct 1972 Treaty - the notion that the (largely withdrawn) S-200s and S-300s were/ are a credible defence against America's nuclear forces is ridiculous. It's not even close. That'd be like saying Patriot PAC-3 should worry the Russians.

(also, the USSR never deployed thousands of S-200s or S-300s, it's more like hundreds combined)

[DavidEC]

If they wanted to stop missiles from Russia, wouldn't they cover the Northern-Russia/North-Pole/Canada axis of attack with the ABM infrastructure instead of the Middle-East/E.Europe/W.Europe/N.America axis? It is my understanding that ICBMs would travel over that route in an attack, and in any case Russia's SSBNs can sit virtually anywhere and launch. Until America builds the infrastructure for that I'm not sure what to say. I am not concerned for human rights and liberty of movement for Russian missiles.

[brianeyci]

What bullshit.

Don't be a douche; Russia is worried about the Americans having the capability to completely neutralize their nuclear arsenal. They bash the ABM system because they know once it works, it can be easily scaled and deployed everywhere, so they're trying everything they can to hinder its development.

Sounds like a joke but give it a few decades and it's entirely conceivable the Americans could have the ability to launch pinpoint strikes and neuter the Russian nuclear deterrent. And according to game theory, given a choice between possible mutual annihilation and guaranteed victory with a first strike with minimal losses to self, the rational approach is to always attack first. That's a valid concern, and doesn't even require a facist or Nazi government. Just a very fearful government.

About the only thing stopping this is the biological imperative not to kill one's own species and level headed leaders, and frankly the Russians would be naive to trust in either. So they will build more weapons, and it is destabilizing, whether you admit it or not.

Why not be honest and admit it's destabilizing, but it's good for Americans, since that's the only people who matter?

[Tanasinn]

It's destabilizing, but there's absolutely no reason for a powerful nation to avoid better defense in order to "play fair." That's idiocy of the highest degree.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

It's destabilizing, but there's absolutely no reason for a powerful nation to avoid better defense in order to "play fair." That's idiocy of the highest degree.

Certainly, true. But don't expect others to then. So don't expect Russia and China to cooperate on Iran, on anything else. After all, it is in their interest to have America preoccupied. Why, from their perspective, America mired in Iraq is a good thing, and they might even goad Iran to continue their support for the Shia militia.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

If they wanted to stop missiles from Russia, wouldn't they cover the Northern-Russia/North-Pole/Canada axis of attack with the ABM infrastructure instead of the Middle-East/E.Europe/W.Europe/N.America axis? It is my understanding that ICBMs would travel over that route in an attack, and in any case Russia's SSBNs can sit virtually anywhere and launch. Until America builds the infrastructure for that I'm not sure what to say. I am not concerned for human rights and liberty of movement for Russian missiles.

Pfft. Since when did Human rights and Liberty of Movement ever factor in the strategic equation?

[brianeyci]

Sure there is. Ever heard of overkill?

The United States will reduce any nation which uses nuclear weapons to rubble. This is not an understatement, especially if nuclear weapons are used against American citizens. Meanwhile, the greatest human instinct is self-preservation.

I don't buy the idea that rogue nations can ever threaten the US. Gun-type is the only kind of bomb a shithole will ever have the technical expertise to make, and the North Koreans proved you can fuck up even that. Meanwhile, miniaturizing the nuke to fit on a ballistic missile is a non-trivial matter.

[brianeyci]

The problem as I see it isn't "avoiding defense" or expecting the Russians to avoid defense. There are different kinds of defense.

The problem I see is strategic versus tactical. That is why analogies to say, a treaty banning swords or machine guns are not applicable. It's true that no weapons system has ever been destroyed through treaty, but nuclear weapons occupy a special place in the world order. It's universally understood use them and you're annihilated, by massive overwhelming force.

The Russians would not give a fuck if the US invented a weapons system to strap onto M113's which could intercept artillery shells coming from Seoul and deployed hundreds or thousands of them so South Korea could successfully invade North Korea. That is defense too, but on a tactical level, fundamentally different than strategic weapons, and is of course business as usual having satellite states fight each other.

It's the idea that somewhere down the line, nobody can threaten the Americans with total destruction. That's the destabilizing factor, and it is not "bullshit" for the Russians to piss their pants about it or to spread propaganda to delay it as long as possible. They're acting entirely in their own best interests, and so are the Americans.

[Kane Starkiller]

Maybe Russia could spend less time worrying about US missiles in Europe and more time worrying about Chinese pipelines in Central Asia?
Seriously alliance with US might actually be preferable to that with China which is a growing superpower and unlike US it's on Russia's very doorstep.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Maybe Russia could spend less time worrying about US missiles in Europe and more time worrying about Chinese pipelines in Central Asia?
Seriously alliance with US might actually be preferable to that with China which is a growing superpower and unlike US it's on Russia's very doorstep.

Won't work. The last time they did that, they got the raw end of the bargain, and it was merely a decade ago.

[Turin]

Maybe Russia could spend less time worrying about US missiles in Europe and more time worrying about Chinese pipelines in Central Asia?
Seriously alliance with US might actually be preferable to that with China which is a growing superpower and unlike US it's on Russia's very doorstep.

Won't work. The last time they did that, they got the raw end of the bargain, and it was merely a decade ago.

You'll notice this also gives lie to the idea that nation-states will organize themselves around the sole hegemony, rather than organizing against it. Call it blustering if you will, but statements like

Unfortunately, Moscow cannot avoid giving serious consideration to the remote possibility that US leaders would be tempted by their ability to inflict a nuclear strike against Russia – again, the only country capable of destroying America – without fear of retaliation. The campaign against Iraq has shown how flippant, irresponsible and opportunistic Washington can be towards critical matters of war and peace. And the blame lies not only on George Bush, but on both political parties that voted so “patriotically” in Congress, along with the jingoistic howling of the “free” press and television. After Iraq, there is no clear reason why the rest of the world should expect the US, that is, the American elites and the American people, to behave in a reasonable and restrained manner when they consider themselves to be under threat.

From the Russian point of view, the retention of a significant nuclear retaliatory capability by Russia remains the best guarantee of peace for the whole world. The US missile defence system undermines the Russian deterrent and its ability to fulfill this role.

demonstrate the kind of attitude other nations have been taking to the US as a result of our recent history of "diplomacy". ABM has always clearly been aimed at the other nuclear powers and not little piddling rogue states, because it gives the US the ability to strike unilaterally in a way that didn't exist previously.

[Kane Starkiller]

You'll notice this also gives lie to the idea that nation-states will organize themselves around the sole hegemony, rather than organizing against it. Call it blustering if you will, but statements like

However it is clear they are organizing around a somewhat credible challenger: China. The idea of many individually very weak countries organizing against a powerful one isn't the same as this.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

You'll notice this also gives lie to the idea that nation-states will organize themselves around the sole hegemony, rather than organizing against it. Call it blustering if you will, but statements like

However it is clear they are organizing around a somewhat credible challenger: China. The idea of many individually very weak countries organizing against a powerful one isn't the same as this.

It will be decades before China even remotely becomes a threat to the US. Most countries currently prefer to play the middle road and enjoy the benefits of both US and Chinese patronage. However, the ABM changes the strategic situation for both China and Russia and quite frankly, they appear more inclined to cooperate against the US rather than work with it. What incentive do they get from working with the US, other than bowing down to endless demands from the US?

[MKSheppard]

Russia's extremely limited ABM is in accordance with the now-defunct 1972 Treaty

Bullshit. It is in no way limited in any form.

Link to site on A-35

The GALOSH (ABM-1) was 19.8m long, and 2.97m in diameter and weighed 32,700 kg.

Their latest, the GORGON (ABM-4) is 19.8m long, 2.57m in diameter, and weighs 33,000 kg.

In comparison, the Boeing GBI, which can cover virtually all of CONUS from ICBM attack, is 16.8m long, and 1.27m in diameter, and weighs a mere 12,700 kg.

You're telling me that the Commies, despite having a significantly heavier and bigger missisle in all parameters, can only defend a mere 300~ mile radius around Moscow with it, while the Americans with a much smaller missile can defend all of CONUS?

This does not compute.

The notion that the (largely withdrawn) S-200s and S-300s were/ are a credible defence against America's nuclear forces is ridiculous. It's not even close.

Really?

Link

Basically it comes downt to several facts:

1.) The SA-5 was tested and developed at the Soviet's officially declared ABM range - Sary-Shagan.

2.) MRBMs and IRBMs were fired in trajectories closely approximating that of early SLBMs at Sary-Shagan during that time period.

So yes, the SA-5 has limited capability against early ICBMs/SLBMs -- remember, it's just a matter of getting something into the right spot at the right time, and is largely a matter of networking.

[MKSheppard]

Don't be a douche; Russia is worried about the Americans having the capability to completely neutralize their nuclear arsenal. They bash the ABM system because they know once it works, it can be easily scaled and deployed everywhere, so they're trying everything they can to hinder its development.

And so? The Russians have had 40 years of experience in deploying and operating an ABM system; what's stopping them from deploying it everywhere instead of building more Topol-Ms?

Building a couple more complexes similar to that around Moscow, and digging out more holes for additional Silo launched ABM-4s means that the russians can then neutralize either:

US SSBN fleet
Much of the US ICBM fleet.

PS - MIRVs dont' work, it's one missile, one kill before the RVs debuss.

[Sidewinder]

Maybe Russia could spend less time worrying about US missiles in Europe and more time worrying about Chinese pipelines in Central Asia? :P
Seriously alliance with US might actually be preferable to that with China which is a growing superpower and unlike US it's on Russia's very doorstep.

Won't work. The last time they did that, they got the raw end of the bargain, and it was merely a decade ago.

Can you provide links to reports on the failed Sino-Russian cooperation? Or are you referring to a failed Russian-American cooperation?

[MKSheppard]

Not to mention that while we completely gutted our entire air defense network in the late 1960s early 1970s, and killed off SAGE, all the Nike Sites; the Russians have kept their air defense network in operation and have constantly updated it, instead of simply throwing it away; so once you neutralize a large part of the US ICBM/SLBM fleet, you've forced the US to use it's bombers to achieve assured destruction of the motherland.

[MKSheppard]

Furthermore, America shouldn't have to cripple it's geopolitical interests to make the Russians feel safer, when the Russians have blown their limited funding for modernization of the strategic forces on

1.) More TOPOL-Ms
2.) The BULAVA SLBM fiasco
3.) That hypersonic wave skimming aeroballistic target which won't work.

instead of spamming GORGON (ABM-4) everywhere and making the motherland immune to attack.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Maybe Russia could spend less time worrying about US missiles in Europe and more time worrying about Chinese pipelines in Central Asia?
Seriously alliance with US might actually be preferable to that with China which is a growing superpower and unlike US it's on Russia's very doorstep.

Won't work. The last time they did that, they got the raw end of the bargain, and it was merely a decade ago.

Can you provide links to reports on the failed Sino-Russian cooperation? Or are you referring to a failed Russian-American cooperation?

The Russian-American cooperation of course.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Furthermore, America shouldn't have to cripple it's geopolitical interests to make the Russians feel safer, when the Russians have blown their limited funding for modernization of the strategic forces on

1.) More TOPOL-Ms
2.) The BULAVA SLBM fiasco
3.) That hypersonic wave skimming aeroballistic target which won't work.

instead of spamming GORGON (ABM-4) everywhere and making the motherland immune to attack.

I don't particularly think fighting nukes with nukes is a particularly good idea.

And those weapons are useless against bombers.

[MKSheppard]

I don't particularly think fighting nukes with nukes is a particularly good idea.

Too bad the latest modernization of GORGON makes it a Kinetic Kill vehicle system like our GBI, and elimiantes the 1 MT warhead.

And those weapons are useless against bombers.

Which isn't a problem, since the Russians never threw away their integrated IADS of radars and SAM sites.

[Mange]

Unfortunately, Moscow cannot avoid giving serious consideration to the remote possibility that US leaders would be tempted by their ability to inflict a nuclear strike against Russia – again, the only country capable of destroying America – without fear of retaliation.

That is nothing but outright paranoia which the Russians yet have to recover from the Cold War era. What rationale does the Russians have to fear a first strike from the United States?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Too bad the latest modernization of GORGON makes it a Kinetic Kill vehicle system like our GBI, and elimiantes the 1 MT warhead.

They finally got around with that? How effective is it?

Which isn't a problem, since the Russians never threw away their integrated IADS of radars and SAM sites.

And stealth bombers?