I was under the impression that the pro-transfer side was mathematical in nature in that if Jim's brain runs its 'mind software' like A and we copy A to a computer while instantly ending the brain's existence, copy A will be mathematically equivalent to Jim. Of course the physicality argument points out that it will still be a copy as the original meat is dead. However, for the copy's consciousness was only interrupted in a manner that is, subjectively, like sleep. To the outside world it could be Jim secretly typing things in another room in terms of accuracy.Dooey Jo wrote:Is there anything else in the whole world that behaves the way the pro-transfer people say the mind works? Not even computer software works like that (disregarding that the brain is in fact not a computer running software); cloning an instance of a program would only make them functionally the same, but they will still have unique process IDs, or running on physically different computers, or whatever. I can think of only one thing that is supposed to work that way; a soul that follows the mind it's bound to. It seems to me that this debate has deeply religious overtones, especially as it goes exactly the same way every time it's brought up, with the pro-transfer people only coming up with different analogies to say the same thing over and over, with no new reasoning or evidence.
This seems to lie where the opinion lies: do you consider yourself some kind of software that can exist independently of your brain and thus be cut and pasted elsewhere or that the destruction of the brain eliminates you. I lean to the former myself as I don't really ponder philosophical implications of moving software from computer to computer and the brain -is- a computer, if a buggy and poorly understood one.
Of course the latter analogy does give you a way to tell a copy from the original even then, but for all practical purposes the subjective consciousness of the surviver is uninterrupted and by the software definition, alive and 'equivalent' to the original.
It's not a 'soul', it's more like saying the contents of a book and an e-book of the same novel are identical. Physically, no they aren't. However, if the text is what matter in defining a novel, then information wise, yes they are. It's not a soul as much as information. To go back to the software, yes you can say the programs have different locations or on a different computer, but the programming/information the program is running is identical.
This seems similar to Wong's life process argument in that even if all atoms are changed there is still a process occurring. The pro-transfer argument would limit this process to the information representing the mind being created by neurons firing in the brain. Since I don't think neurons EVER stop firing, saying that constitutes a human being isn't that much of a stretch. Of course, if a scan could occur while the subject was cryogenically frozen so neurons did stop firing or a person could be awakened from such a state, information would have just as much validity.
I'd certainly prefer the whole nanomachines in my head gradual build-up since it makes me feel better (and would probably be cheaper), but I see know reason to deny myself more life if I can transfer my software to a computer, if only for friend's and family to have a me/a perfect copy to talk to.
