Why would it? Godel's incompleteness theorem simply says that, given any axiomatic system complicated enough to encode the natural numbers, there are propositions which cannot be proven without adding additional axioms. So when you add the additional axioms, you can now prove the proposition, but now there are more propositions whose truth you can't settle.TithonusSyndrome wrote:Also, while I probably have grossly misunderstood what it actually means, doesn't Godel's Incompleteness Theorem completely deep-six the notion of the universe being as Neo saw it?
As an example, the ZF axioms of set theory straightforwardly lead to the natural numbers. Chief among the propositions that fall 'outside the cloth' is the Axiom of Choice, which is equivalent to such results as the Tychonoff Theorem(1), Zorn's Lemma(2), the Well-Ordering Theorem(3), and the theorem which states that if between two sets there exists a surjection, there is an injection the other direction. Formulated, the Axiom of Choice seems innocent: Given any collection C of nonempty sets, there exists a set A such that A is composed of one element from each element of C. So, if you have a bunch of piles, you can pick one thing from each pile. But the things you can prove with it include the Banach-Tarski Paradox (look it up).
- Any product of compact spaces is compact
- Any set with a partial order in which every totally-ordered subset is bounded above has a maximal element
- Given any set, there exists an ordering such that under that order every subset has a least element