Russia To Expand Naval Capabilities

[Sidewinder]

Russia To Expand Naval Capabilities
Oxford Analytica 04.17.08, 6:00 AM ET

Russia's lack of genuine aircraft carriers has long limited its naval capabilities and reflected the navy's status as an essentially coastal force whose role was to deny neighboring waters to enemies.

Russia has just one aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, which was built in Soviet times and is not a substantial asset. Technically characterized as a "heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser," it carries 17 fixed-wing aircraft, compared with the 90 deployed by a U.S. Nimitz-class carrier.

Carrier battle groups. On April 4, Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky confirmed that Russia would build five to six new aircraft carriers. Since last year there has been talk of establishing powerful task forces, but the recent statement gave concrete details on what some observers had hitherto discounted as empty dreams:

-- New carriers. The design of the new carriers has not been finalized, although it is likely that they will be full-deck nuclear-powered vessels carrying both air groups of 30 to 40 aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Construction of the first is reportedly due to start in 2012 or 2013, although this is not included within the current State Arms Program (which covers 2007 to 2015). It has also been announced that new training facilities for naval aviation pilots are to be built, to be ready for use by 2010.

-- Battle groups. The aircraft carriers will be just the basis for joint task groups, due to be completed between 2050 and 2060. These will include a range of assets, including submarines, surface combat units and a full array of aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as small Naval Infantry commando forces.

Although it is unclear just how he reached these figures, Vysotsky told a press conference that the formation of these battle groups will increase the navy's combat effectiveness by up to 300%.

"Blue water" doctrine. These formations are not defensive and only make sense in the context of a comprehensive review of naval doctrine. Rather than concentrating on denying Russian waters to enemies, this doctrine addresses the active domination of foreign seas and the use of battle groups as means of projecting both military and political power globally. Such a shift has been foreshadowed:

-- Mediterranean deployment. While Russian ships have periodically passed through the Mediterranean, Moscow has not sought to maintain a permanent deployment there in the past.

However, in 2006 Russia began to reactivate two facilities on the Syrian coast, dredging the port at Tartus (where its 720th Logistics Support Point had been mothballed since 1991) and building new docks at Latakia.

In 2007, the Admiral Kuznetsov exercised in the Mediterranean as part of an unprecedentedly large task force, and former naval Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Masorin expressed his view that Russia needed a permanent presence there.

-- Indian Ocean exercises. Military cooperation with India was underlined in 2003 when, in its largest out-of-area deployment for a decade, the Russian navy sent six warships to join the INDRA-2003 exercise in the Indian Ocean. Since then, Russian ships have been regular participants in Indian exercises and, notwithstanding disputes over arms transfers, 2008 promises the largest such deployments yet.

-- Arctic control. NATO and the European Union are increasingly concerned about the prospect of naval confrontations with Russia over maritime resources. Norway and Russia are at odds over hydrocarbon reserves in the waters around Spitsbergen, for example, and Moscow is trying to assert its claims to the Arctic shelf.

Also, as global warming opens new shipping routes across the Arctic, their control will become a potential bone of contention. Moscow has already suggested that its navy would "provide security" for vessels on these routes, an offer being interpreted as a claim to control over this new North-West Passage.

-- Flying the flag. Deployments to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and the Arctic have only minimal military implications. Their real significance is that they reflect a growing willingness on the part of Moscow to see its fleet as a political instrument, able to consolidate and draw attention to alliances, underline military revival and support economic claims.

This is something President Vladimir Putin underlined in a closed meeting with military commanders in February, and a role for which the navy is uniquely well suited. Thus, major exercises in the North Atlantic in January--the largest in post-Soviet times--were also intended to warn NATO against antagonizing Russia further.

As much as the militaristic nut in me wants to go, "Awesome!" at the thought of 5-6 Russian aircraft carriers flying the flag, I have to wonder how they're going to pay for that many ships, not to mention the air wings and escorts these ships need.

[PeZook]

Ain't gonna happen, most likely.

Of course, Russia is raking in oil money, but building 5-6 aircraft carriers is no small task, and training the required personell is going to be even tougher.

Plus, where exactly do they need to project this much power? They can't challenge NATO dominance over the Atlantic anyway, since it's bracketed by land bases - maybe they are anticipating a possible conflict with China? But China's navy is a joke ; It will take them decades to even catch up to where the Russians are now.

[Sea Skimmer]

Its not any big deal for Russia to afford several aircraft carrier battlegroups over 20 years or so, though 5-6 new ones is pushing it awful hard, more like 30 years to build that I’m betting. The Soviets could have had a big carrier fleet BTW, but the dumped hoards of money into building SSGNs (two Oscars cost as much as a Kuznetsov for example, so the Oscar class alone could have bought a half dozen carriers) and placing huge SSM batteries on surface ships to pursue a flawed tactical doctrine. Even the Ulyanovsk supercarrier would have wasted what could have been more hanger space mounting a dozen P-700 missile. .

A future Russian fleet with a 8-12 SSBNs, 1-2 dozen attack submarines and six carriers each with a half dozen destroyer-frigate escorts is quite possible. The aim for 30-40 aircraft and SSMs onboard makes it sound like the hybrid design philosophy will continue, robbing the new fleet of a great deal of potential effectiveness.

[Sidewinder]

Even the Ulyanovsk supercarrier would have wasted what could have been more hanger space mounting a dozen P-700 missile. .

A future Russian fleet with a 8-12 SSBNs, 1-2 dozen attack submarines and six carriers each with a half dozen destroyer-frigate escorts is quite possible. The aim for 30-40 aircraft and SSMs onboard makes it sound like the hybrid design philosophy will continue, robbing the new fleet of a great deal of potential effectiveness.

One thing I read about in a Dale Brown novel (yeah, I know, he's the retarded spambot of technothriller authors) is that, because the Admiral Kuznetsov class lacked catapults, Su-33 fighters couldn't take off from the ship while carrying a decent amount of air-to-surface weapons, so the idea was to have the carriers use the SSMs for a devastating first strike, and then have the (lightly armed compared to USN and USMC aircraft) fighters finish off the targets.

It may have been stupid for the Soviets to mount SSMs on the Ulyanovsk, but maybe they were concerned the catapults they were designing wouldn't be up to the task of launching a heavily armed Su-33, and stuck with what they thought would work.

[Illuminatus Primus]

I think they just stuck with general tactical confusion.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Did they even lay down the tonnage for the class of warships? Or are they going to dust the old Ulyanovsk blueprints?

[PainRack]

And how is any of that going to change the fact that Russia can't pass ships from the Baltic to the Pacific?

[Stuart Mackey]

And how is any of that going to change the fact that Russia can't pass ships from the Baltic to the Pacific?

Eh? Do Russian ships lack engines? or does the ghost of Togo haunt them?

[PainRack]

Eh? Do Russian ships lack engines? or does the ghost of Togo haunt them?

Russia is literally locked up in every possible way and can't exert naval force unless others let them.

It simply doesn't make sense for them to retain a large naval force, unless they're going to sink a ton of money into creating one, which would essentially become another grey elephant.

[KlavoHunter]

Eh? Do Russian ships lack engines? or does the ghost of Togo haunt them?

Russia is literally locked up in every possible way and can't exert naval force unless others let them.

It simply doesn't make sense for them to retain a large naval force, unless they're going to sink a ton of money into creating one, which would essentially become another grey elephant.

The phrase is "WHITE Elephant".

[Raesene]

Eh? Do Russian ships lack engines? or does the ghost of Togo haunt them?

Russia is literally locked up in every possible way and can't exert naval force unless others let them.

Is there a treaty forbidding the pasage of warships during peacetime through the Skaggerak/Kattegat similar to the restriction of the Dardanelles' "no carrier-rule" ?

While carriers don't make sense in the Baltic, the Northern/Pacific fleet would likely be happy to have some (more).

[Stuart Mackey]

Eh? Do Russian ships lack engines? or does the ghost of Togo haunt them?

Russia is literally locked up in every possible way and can't exert naval force unless others let them.

It simply doesn't make sense for them to retain a large naval force, unless they're going to sink a ton of money into creating one, which would essentially become another grey elephant.

You asked how the Russians were going to get ships from the Baltic to the Pacific, you said nothing about other considerations. If one were to take those geographic considerations into account then are you saying that every time the Russians want to move a ship from the Baltic the the British/Danes will oppose said movement by force? or are you saying that every enemy the Russians will face in the future will be NATO or otherwise in a poisition to use Russia's geography against it? Also are you suggesting that Russia must use its own territory for bases or do you think that they cannot base overseas in advantageous places for some reason?

Russia obvously feels it needs a blue water force and I am quite sure they are aware of their geography and its limitations.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Eh? Do Russian ships lack engines? or does the ghost of Togo haunt them?

Russia is literally locked up in every possible way and can't exert naval force unless others let them.

It simply doesn't make sense for them to retain a large naval force, unless they're going to sink a ton of money into creating one, which would essentially become another grey elephant.

Erm, you do realise that the Russians have a sizable presence in Asia, and they are obviously looking warily across the border where China is, and Japan is a few island leaps away.

The Russians maintain a large naval and shipyard base at Vladivostok for that reason to counter any potential intrusions from the Asian side of Russia. Land enemies may form the bulk of the enemies Russia has, but that doesn't preclude the fact that prior to WWII, the threat of Japanese invasion was very real and the Russian never did forget that. In any case, Russian ships have in the past gone through the northern coast, so I don't see too much of a problem especially when there are nuclear icebreakers.

[atg]

Russian ships have in the past gone through the northern coast, so I don't see too much of a problem especially when there are nuclear icebreakers.

Not to mention with the ice getting thinner that its becoming easier to use that route.

Obviously global warming is a dastardly plot by the Russians to allow them easier ship movement.