Designing a test to determine continuity of consciousness

[petesampras]

Um, except most people don't give a fuck if their identity lives on if they are dead. I fail to see how it's perfectly ok to be in oblivion just because no one else can tell the difference.

Did you read what I wrote before responding? Peoples desire to not die is explained perfectly using evolution. It has nothing to do with protecting the self, regardless of whether the self can be described purely as information or not. It is thus utterly irrelevant to this argument. Living things, like us, try to protect our physical existance because of millions of years of evolution making that a strong fitness attribute. It's a simple to explain as that.

[Resinence]

I read what you said, I just don't agree that a clone that isn't linked to the original person and/or AGI is the same entity. I wouldn't have a problem turning my original body into catfood if a dual consciousness clone or ship of theseus method was used. I'm not saying that the body is important at all, I'm saying that with an unlinked flash clone the original sentience is still trapped in the original body and is thus destroyed when it dies. And I'm pretty sure this is what everyone else is saying as well. I would consider even a perfect data clone a separate sentience to what it was copied from, if it is a single sentience in control of 2 linked brains/computers and one is destroyed I would still consider the remaining entity the same sentience.

[petesampras]

I'm not saying that the body is important at all, I'm saying that with an unlinked flash clone the original sentience is still trapped in the original body and is thus destroyed when it dies.

What, exactly, is this sentience? Whatever it is, you agree, it seems, that it is not a property of the exact matter that makes up your body. You must disagree that it is the information contained in this matter, since that will survive in a perfect clone. So what is it? What empirical tests could exist to demonstrate its existance. How, exactly, can it be trapped in a body when it dies?

And I'm pretty sure this is what everyone else is saying as well. I would consider even a perfect data clone a separate sentience to what it was copied from, if it is a single sentience in control of 2 linked brains/computers and one is destroyed I would still consider the remaining entity the same sentience.

What do you mean by a sentience controling a brain? A brain is not controlled by any 'sentience', whatever that is. It controls itself through the firing of neurons.

[Singular Intellect]

Here's a question for your little simulation 'theory' then. If I upload a virus to kill only one simulation person, what happens to the other simulation person? If nothing, then they clearly have seperate subjective frames of reference because one exists and the other no longer does. If my virus designed to kill only simulation one person and both die, then they aren't seperate as you asserted previously.

Which is it? Make up your fucking mind already.

That would make the two simulations different from an information point of view, I clearly stated that the simulations were identical. If you change the information in one simulation, i.e. uploading your 'virus', then you can distinguish between them in terms of the 'subjective frames of reference' of the inhabitants. But that is not a problem for my position. If you look back, it is your position that the identity of mental processes are a product of more than just information.

Yes, and I've clearly shown that the key difference is frame of reference, as you have just confirmed by admitting that if one entity obtains information different from the other, only the one entity obtains it. The fact you setup a system where two entities are inputted with identical information is irrelvent, they are still two seperate entities by your own admission.

You said seperate, seperate by definition means different frames of reference. For a mind this would be the subjective frame of reference of self.

The case is closed by your own fucking logic.

[petesampras]

Here's a question for your little simulation 'theory' then. If I upload a virus to kill only one simulation person, what happens to the other simulation person? If nothing, then they clearly have seperate subjective frames of reference because one exists and the other no longer does. If my virus designed to kill only simulation one person and both die, then they aren't seperate as you asserted previously.

Which is it? Make up your fucking mind already.

That would make the two simulations different from an information point of view, I clearly stated that the simulations were identical. If you change the information in one simulation, i.e. uploading your 'virus', then you can distinguish between them in terms of the 'subjective frames of reference' of the inhabitants. But that is not a problem for my position. If you look back, it is your position that the identity of mental processes are a product of more than just information.

Yes, and I've clearly shown that the key difference is frame of reference, as you have just confirmed by admitting that if one entity obtains information different from the other, only the one entity obtains it. The fact you setup a system where two entities are inputted with identical information is irrelvent, they are still two seperate entities by your own admission.

You said seperate, seperate by definition means different frames of reference. For a mind this would be the subjective frame of reference of self.

The case is closed by your own fucking logic.

You have defined this 'subjective frame of reference' as being a fundamental part of the identity of a mind. You have also refuted the idea that a minds indentity can be defined purely through information. In the above example, which you gave, the difference between the two systems is soley describable using information. You are trying to demonstrate that two minds can have identical information but be different minds. In this example of yours the information, in the form of the information describing the different subjective frame of reference (which you have attributed as part of the identity of the mind), is different. So it has no bearing on the argument. Remember that the recording of this virus infecting an individual in one of the simulations is just ones and zeros, same as every mental process of the individuals. It is all just information, and, in a computer - information does not depend upon it details of its storage. 0010 is 0010 whether it is in a register, in memory or on the harddrive. This is not a difficult concept to grasp.

[petesampras]

The more fundamental point, that you don't grasp, can be explained with the following example..

If I decide to shut down the computer which is running these simulations I need to take data present in the memory about the two individuals in the two seperate worlds and write it to the harddrive. Thus in the morning I can load them in again and resume the simulation. If I were to run the data through a compression algorithm, which looked for similar blocks of data, it would see two identical data blocks, which represent the minds of the two individuals, and compress them to a single data block. When I decompress it, it would extract the two individuals and the simulation could run again. Now, compressing the data of a simulation and then extracting it again does not alter the simulation in any way. Yet only one copy of the two minds existed on the computer overnight. The reason the simulations are completely unaffected is because the no information was lost. And that is my position.

[Singular Intellect]

That would make the two simulations different from an information point of view, I clearly stated that the simulations were identical. If you change the information in one simulation, i.e. uploading your 'virus', then you can distinguish between them in terms of the 'subjective frames of reference' of the inhabitants. But that is not a problem for my position. If you look back, it is your position that the identity of mental processes are a product of more than just information.

Yes, and I've clearly shown that the key difference is frame of reference, as you have just confirmed by admitting that if one entity obtains information different from the other, only the one entity obtains it. The fact you setup a system where two entities are inputted with identical information is irrelvent, they are still two seperate entities by your own admission.

You said seperate, seperate by definition means different frames of reference. For a mind this would be the subjective frame of reference of self.

The case is closed by your own fucking logic.

You have defined this 'subjective frame of reference' as being a fundamental part of the identity of a mind. You have also refuted the idea that a minds indentity can be defined purely through information. In the above example, which you gave, the difference between the two systems is soley describable using information. You are trying to demonstrate that two minds can have identical information but be different minds.

Because I assert information alone doesn't make the mind, frame of reference is also a component, and your example actually proves that by admitting one entity is capable of getting input the other is not. Whether it actually does or not is irrelvent.

In this example of yours the information, in the form of the information describing the different subjective frame of reference (which you have attributed as part of the identity of the mind), is different. So it has no bearing on the argument. Remember that the recording of this virus infecting an individual in one of the simulations is just ones and zeros, same as every mental process of the individuals. It is all just information, and, in a computer - information does not depend upon it details of its storage. 0010 is 0010 whether it is in a register, in memory or on the harddrive. This is not a difficult concept to grasp.

You obviously don't fucking get it, do you? You asserted these two entities are seperate, therefore they are. The fact they can be fed identical information is fucking irrelevent, beause you openly admitted that if only one of them recieves alternate input, only that one entity has it. It's frame of reference is irretuably different because it can recieve different input than the other entity. Whether that fact is merely theoritical or realized by actual practice doesn't matter.

[petesampras]

You obviously don't fucking get it, do you? You asserted these two entities are seperate, therefore they are. The fact they can be fed identical information is fucking irrelevent, beause you openly admitted that if only one of them recieves alternate input, only that one entity has it. It's frame of reference is irretuably different because it can recieve different input than the other entity. Whether that fact is merely theoritical or realized by actual practice doesn't matter.

No, it is clearly you that don't get it, because you have come full circle again!

Never have I, or anyone else, denied that two copies of the same entity, when running concurrently, can be distinguished as seperate entities. Two copies of Moby Dick can be distinguished as seperate books, but they are the same story. If I destroy one copy, the other is not destroyed, but that does not make them different stories, does it?

[Ohma]

No, it is clearly you that don't get it, because you have come full circle again!

Never have I, or anyone else, denied that two copies of the same entity, when running concurrently, can be distinguished as seperate entities. Two copies of Moby Dick can be distinguished as seperate books, but they are the same story. If I destroy one copy, the other is not destroyed, but that does not make them different stories, does it?

So again, what are you arguing? Because nobody has said that two simulated minds containing the same memories and emotional responses aren't technically the same, or indistinguishable by a casual observer.

What has been argued is that just because two simulated minds (or a simulated one and a biological one) react indistinguishably from each other, doesn't mean that they aren't separate entities (which would have to be the case for the "if I kill person A then person B, who is identical to A, is still alive so technically person A never died" argument to be anything other than semantics).

You keep saying that everyone is wrong, but never explaining how other than to say that you weren't arguing something.

[petesampras]

So again, what are you arguing? Because nobody has said that two simulated minds containing the same memories and emotional responses aren't technically the same, or indistinguishable by a casual observer.

What has been argued is that just because two simulated minds (or a simulated one and a biological one) react indistinguishably from each other, doesn't mean that they aren't separate entities (which would have to be the case for the "if I kill person A then person B, who is identical to A, is still alive so technically person A never died" argument to be anything other than semantics).

You keep saying that everyone is wrong, but never explaining how other than to say that you weren't arguing something.

For the final time. My position is as follows....

The fact that two things are different by some measure does not mean that they are different by all measures. "six" and "6" are different strings of text, but they are the same number.

Two exact copies of the same person are different physical entities. They have different brains. If you kill one, it is dead, regardless of the presence of the other. That does not mean that they have different minds.

The mind is a sum of behaviours and memories. Just like stories and mathematical equations these things can be fully described without reference to their physical medium. The number 6. The story of Lord of the Rings. Punching someone if they look at you funny. None of these things depend on a particular medium to define them. They are abstract.

Abstract things have the property that, if you have two instances of them, they are the same. Two copies of the story Moby Dick are the same story. The books are different entities, but the stories are the same. You can destroy one copy and the story remains. Destroy one of two identical brains and the entity that is that brain is destroyed, but any abstract properties embodied in that brain will survive in the other. All the memories, thoughts, behaviours. They survive, and it is those abstract entities that define a mind.

[Gigaliel]

To approach it from a different argument, wouldn't the perspective idea make cutting and pasting an AI a billion times across thousands of computers make you technically a genocidal maniac?

Perspective seems valid since you can always state that the universe has guaranteed you a continuous physical path. However, the mental concept states that empirically identical informational paths define who you are.

I would note that if perfect replicas were available, then they would achieve every single goal your mind wants (or will want in the future). 100% certainty.

Given this, what what would your particular self have to live for other than implementing your goals as long as your expensive body and uncopied memories are worth it?

Obviously, self-preservation of your perspective. However, that exists because only your perspective could implement your goals in the past. This is no longer true as an identical one can be created.

To be a bit nihilistic, to optimally affect the material universe, this seems to follow. People may have widely different goals that may be worth dying frequently for or not.

To answer the original question, if there is no empirical difference, why would the universe decree you died? If billions of people can be murdered every second by merely pasting the same file over itself over and over again by one definition, doesn't that trivialize the concept of death? Since only the personal perspective would notice its destruction, the universe would act that your identical copy was you. If we're going to be materialistic about it, if you'd lived their would have been very little change.

So, death would become amnesia for self- mere memory loss. Unless someone wants to -finally- bite the bullet that copying a file and pasting over itself is murder, which is a bit impractical and pointless.

(Here's hoping I don't sound like a jackass.)

[Wyrm]

Because I assert information alone doesn't make the mind, frame of reference is also a component, and your example actually proves that by admitting one entity is capable of getting input the other is not. Whether it actually does or not is irrelvent.

Ah, a "because I say so" type argument. How original.

Here's the fundamental problem with your "frame of reference" argument with regards to any 'self as information' type paradigm (or, indeed, to any strictly materialist paradigm at all): any subjectivity residing in your consciousness, in order for that subjectivity to have any physical meaning at all, it must be, in and of itself, an objectively-definable state of the brain. If that subjectivity is a brain state, it is transferable to an exact physical copy of yourself. That physical copy of yourself has the same brain state as yourself, and that brain state signifies your subjective "frame of reference". The copy therefore has the exact same subjective frame of reference as yourself, because it has the same brain state.

You assert there is physical meaning to your "subjective frame of reference." Therefore, by the above argument, that transfers to your copy. Its assertion that it is you is just as physically meaningful as your own assertion that you are you.

To assert otherwise is to deny that consciousness is, at its root, a wholey physical process. You therefore are arguing the existence of a soul. You call it a "subjective frame of reference," but that's just pseudoscientific windowdressing bullshit: you think that people have souls, and there's no two ways about it. I deny souls in any form, as they are unobservable and therefore not part of science; it's all wetware, dearheart.

You lose. Good day, sir.

[Sikon]

For the reasons discussed in my first post in this thread, looking at someone's head by anything in the electromagnetic spectrum or anything else available and creating a truly exact brain copy with no imprecision will probably remain impossible at any technology level ... one of the reasons that gradual replacement of original neurons with new artificial neurons has more potential once technology advances enough.

But neglect that for the moment and just focus on the topic of imaginary exact duplication:

Wyrm and petesampras, maybe your views would be better clarified if you answered the following thought experiments:

1) Pretend you are given the opportunity to save a moderate amount of time and money on a journey by going to your destination through magic-tech perfect flash cloning, analogous to the Star Trek transporter, where an exact duplicate of your brain and body is created with the original destroyed. Would you do it?

2) I'm aware that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics may be invalid, but, as a thought experiment, pretend it was valid:

If you knew with absolute certainty that another brain identical to your brain currently exists in a parallel universe, an exact physical copy, would you still be motivated to go to substantial efforts to keep yourself alive, to prevent destruction of this body here? Please answer in the context of your views on continuity of consciousness.

*****

I'm trying to take this out of the realm of potentially only arguing semantics, instead seeing how decisions would be made.

[petesampras]

For the reasons discussed in my first post in this thread, looking at someone's head by anything in the electromagnetic spectrum or anything else available and creating a truly exact brain copy with no imprecision will probably remain impossible at any technology level ... one of the reasons that gradual replacement of original neurons with new artificial neurons has more potential once technology advances enough.

I think we all realise this.

But neglect that for the moment and just focus on the topic of imaginary exact duplication:

Wyrm and petesampras, maybe your views would be better clarified if you answered the following thought experiments:

1) Pretend you are given the opportunity to save a moderate amount of time and money on a journey by going to your destination through magic-tech perfect flash cloning, analogous to the Star Trek transporter, where an exact duplicate of your brain and body is created with the original destroyed. Would you do it?

No.

2) I'm aware that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics may be invalid, but, as a thought experiment, pretend it was valid:

If you knew with absolute certainty that another brain identical to your brain currently exists in a parallel universe, an exact physical copy, would you still be motivated to go to substantial efforts to keep yourself alive, to prevent destruction of this body here? Please answer in the context of your views on continuity of consciousness.

My desire to stay alive, i.e. to prevent the destruction of this body, has nothing to do with consciousness. It is a fundamental instinct implanted into me by millions of years of evolution. I will try to keep this body alive regardless of exact copies in this, or other, universes.

*****

I'm trying to take this out of the realm of potentially only arguing semantics, instead seeing how decisions would be made.

Admirable, but, at least from my perspective, meaningless. These issues would not effect the decisions I would make. They are an interesting philosophical debate, that is all.

[Singular Intellect]

Because I assert information alone doesn't make the mind, frame of reference is also a component, and your example actually proves that by admitting one entity is capable of getting input the other is not. Whether it actually does or not is irrelvent.

Ah, a "because I say so" type argument. How original.

Here's the fundamental problem with your "frame of reference" argument with regards to any 'self as information' type paradigm (or, indeed, to any strictly materialist paradigm at all): any subjectivity residing in your consciousness, in order for that subjectivity to have any physical meaning at all, it must be, in and of itself, an objectively-definable state of the brain. If that subjectivity is a brain state, it is transferable to an exact physical copy of yourself. That physical copy of yourself has the same brain state as yourself, and that brain state signifies your subjective "frame of reference". The copy therefore has the exact same subjective frame of reference as yourself, because it has the same brain state.

You assert there is physical meaning to your "subjective frame of reference." Therefore, by the above argument, that transfers to your copy. Its assertion that it is you is just as physically meaningful as your own assertion that you are you.

To assert otherwise is to deny that consciousness is, at its root, a wholey physical process. You therefore are arguing the existence of a soul. You call it a "subjective frame of reference," but that's just pseudoscientific windowdressing bullshit: you think that people have souls, and there's no two ways about it. I deny souls in any form, as they are unobservable and therefore not part of science; it's all wetware, dearheart.

You lose. Good day, sir.

No, I'm not asserting the existence of souls or anything like. Frame of reference is objectively verfiable...even a rock has a frame of reference, but it lacks any awareness of it. That's because it's a rock, not a brain.

Awareness of independent frame of reference for self is considered factual (if you think otherwise, then that means you do not understand the question or concept of "where are you right now?").

It's impossible to duplicate this frame of reference because you can only move it or alter the perception of it. Creating a seperate frame of reference with identical physical makeup and energy composition does not transfer a frame of reference, it's creating a new one.

The only way an awareness of frame of reference for self could be identical is if two entities occupied the exact same space/time, which is physically impossible.

[Wyrm]

No, I'm not asserting the existence of souls or anything like. Frame of reference is objectively verfiable...even a rock has a frame of reference, but it lacks any awareness of it. That's because it's a rock, not a brain.

Awareness of independent frame of reference for self is considered factual (if you think otherwise, then that means you do not understand the question or concept of "where are you right now?").

Oh, I thought you were saying something substantial with your frame of reference bullshit. My mistake. Your frame of reference argument is simply, "I need to be aware of and interact with my environment to be considered intelligent." Well, no shit. The entire evolutionary utility of awareness of one's environment is that it's a useful paradigm for survival.

It's impossible to duplicate this frame of reference because you can only move it or alter the perception of it. Creating a seperate frame of reference with identical physical makeup and energy composition does not transfer a frame of reference, it's creating a new one.

The only way an awareness of frame of reference for self could be identical is if two entities occupied the exact same space/time, which is physically impossible.

The only way this bullshit makes sense is if there is some physical difference between two locations that are not dependent on the locations' immediate environments. The problem: there is no such thing — so long as the immediate environments of your location are identical, the physics will be identical. Precisely replicate the environments along with the person, and you completely replicate the physics, and therefore, they are identical in every physical sense.

[Wyrm]

Wyrm and petesampras, maybe your views would be better clarified if you answered the following thought experiments:

1) Pretend you are given the opportunity to save a moderate amount of time and money on a journey by going to your destination through magic-tech perfect flash cloning, analogous to the Star Trek transporter, where an exact duplicate of your brain and body is created with the original destroyed. Would you do it?

Depends on how sure I would be to be reconstituted at the other end.

2) I'm aware that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics may be invalid, but, as a thought experiment, pretend it was valid:

If you knew with absolute certainty that another brain identical to your brain currently exists in a parallel universe, an exact physical copy, would you still be motivated to go to substantial efforts to keep yourself alive, to prevent destruction of this body here? Please answer in the context of your views on continuity of consciousness.

Almost certainly, there exists a "me" identical to another universe's in the many-worlds hypothesis. However, the other me's in the other universes are also physically irrelevant to this one. (That's part of the many-worlds hypothesis — if I couldn't interact with the alternate universes, they would actually be a part of this universe.) As such, there is still only one of me in this universe, and it would be deprived of my great presence should I shuffle off.

Not to mention that this identical me in the other universe, if it really was identical, is in just as dire straights as I am. Keeping this self alive increases the chances that at least one of the identical mes survives in at least one of the universea.

[Singular Intellect]

No, I'm not asserting the existence of souls or anything like. Frame of reference is objectively verfiable...even a rock has a frame of reference, but it lacks any awareness of it. That's because it's a rock, not a brain.

Awareness of independent frame of reference for self is considered factual (if you think otherwise, then that means you do not understand the question or concept of "where are you right now?").

Oh, I thought you were saying something substantial with your frame of reference bullshit. My mistake. Your frame of reference argument is simply, "I need to be aware of and interact with my environment to be considered intelligent." Well, no shit. The entire evolutionary utility of awareness of one's environment is that it's a useful paradigm for survival.

It's impossible to duplicate this frame of reference because you can only move it or alter the perception of it. Creating a seperate frame of reference with identical physical makeup and energy composition does not transfer a frame of reference, it's creating a new one.

The only way an awareness of frame of reference for self could be identical is if two entities occupied the exact same space/time, which is physically impossible.

The only way this bullshit makes sense is if there is some physical difference between two locations that are not dependent on the locations' immediate environments. The problem: there is no such thing — so long as the immediate environments of your location are identical, the physics will be identical. Precisely replicate the environments along with the person, and you completely replicate the physics, and therefore, they are identical in every physical sense.

Except they don't occupy the same position in space time, which I've said how many times already?

[Seggybop]

Bubble Boy, is the thing you call "frame of reference" the same as your personal perception of your self within your body? Like the awareness that there is a "you" within your body that receives information from your senses and from your memory and outputs to your appendages?

[Wyrm]

Except they don't occupy the same position in space time, which I've said how many times already?

You missed the point that it doesn't matter a whit whether or not you and your clone "occupy the same position at the same time", fucknut! Thanks to Noether's theorem and the fact that the universe conserves both energy and linear momentum, the physics of different places and times are completely identical given the same configuration of matter and energy. We can replicate you and your immediate surroundings, transport them over time and distance, and there will be no physical difference between you and your copy.

Because there is no physically meaningful difference between two locations with identical physical environments, you and your copy have exactly the same standing in terms of your "subjective frame of reference." If that reference frame is valid for you, it's just as valid for your clone. Unless your arguing for a "soul."

I say again, for your subjective frame of reference to be meaningful in any materialistic paradigm, it must be physical, or otherwise you are arguing for a immaterial "soul" of some sort. Copying you and your immediate surroundings either copies the physically meaningful subjective frame of reference (owing to the physical symmetries in the universe) or that "subjective frame of reference" is not physically meaningful, and therefore is elaborate windowdressing for a "soul."

[Singular Intellect]

Bubble Boy, is the thing you call "frame of reference" the same as your personal perception of your self within your body? Like the awareness that there is a "you" within your body that receives information from your senses and from your memory and outputs to your appendages?

Yes. You have this awareness/perception of 'yourself' in your own body as a result of your physical pattern and brain makeup, but you don't have it in another body even if that other body has an identical brain, identical thoughts, memories and physical makeup. You can't move your arm and expect the other body to move as well. Your clone might move his same arm as well, but that would depend entirely on yours and his mental approach to the matter.

Think of it as looking into a mirror. What you're seeing is a absolutely perfect replica of yourself, but I'd hope an intelligent individual wouldn't point at the reflection and say "I'm in there", rather than correctly pointing at their own body and saying "I'm in here".

I for exmple would have a great time with this experiment, as both my instant clone and myself would play a game to see how much we move identically and act identically before our different frames of reference started to influence behavior and thoughts.

[Wyrm]

Bubble Boy, is the thing you call "frame of reference" the same as your personal perception of your self within your body? Like the awareness that there is a "you" within your body that receives information from your senses and from your memory and outputs to your appendages?

Yes. You have this awareness/perception of 'yourself' in your own body as a result of your physical pattern and brain makeup, but you don't have it in another body even if that other body has an identical brain, identical thoughts, memories and physical makeup. You can't move your arm and expect the other body to move as well.

That's because your brain is not connected to your clone's arm, not because of your subjective reference frame. If your own arm was severed at the shoulder, you'd have trouble moving it, too. But no clone consciousness is involved with interfering with your will to move the arm.

Think of it as looking into a mirror. What you're seeing is a absolutely perfect replica of yourself, but I'd hope an intelligent individual wouldn't point at the reflection and say "I'm in there", rather than correctly pointing at their own body and saying "I'm in here".

The mirror analogy fails, hard. If you look in the mirror and see that you have a smudge of chocolate on your nose, would you not reach up to your own nose and wipe it off? You may say that the image in the mirror is not yourself, but on some mental level you do, in fact, acknowledge the mirror image as yourself. To recognize the image in the mirror as yourself is one of the important cognitive milestones of development in young children.

I have seen nothing to justify why your "subjective frame of reference" is any different from a physically copyable brain state, to which the clone's is equally as valid as yours.

[Singular Intellect]

Except they don't occupy the same position in space time, which I've said how many times already?

You missed the point that it doesn't matter a whit whether or not you and your clone "occupy the same position at the same time", fucknut! Thanks to Noether's theorem and the fact that the universe conserves both energy and linear momentum, the physics of different places and times are completely identical given the same configuration of matter and energy. We can replicate you and your immediate surroundings, transport them over time and distance, and there will be no physical difference between you and your copy.

What's your point? Just because my clone exists in another point of space time in an identical physical enviroment with an identical makeup doesn't mean I have any awareness of being inside his body anymore than he would have a awareness of being in mine.

Because there is no physically meaningful difference between two locations with identical physical environments, you and your copy have exactly the same standing in terms of your "subjective frame of reference." If that reference frame is valid for you, it's just as valid for your clone. Unless your arguing for a "soul."

I'm not arguing that we wouldn't have the same type of awareness of self. We both would. We'd simply have it in different bodies which by definition are seperate. 'Seperate' being defined as existing in two seperate points of space time.

I say again, for your subjective frame of reference to be meaningful in any materialistic paradigm, it must be physical, or otherwise you are arguing for a immaterial "soul" of some sort. Copying you and your immediate surroundings either copies the physically meaningful subjective frame of reference (owing to the physical symmetries in the universe) or that "subjective frame of reference" is not physically meaningful, and therefore is elaborate windowdressing for a "soul."

Even in your fictional construct where me and my clone are in identical enviroments, 'I' am no more in his body than 'he' is in mine. I could not move his arm if I wanted to, nor could he move mine.

[Singular Intellect]

I have seen nothing to justify why your "subjective frame of reference" is any different from a physically copyable brain state, to which the clone's is equally as valid as yours.

I see you still don't get that I'm not saying my clone's self awareness is any less than mine. It simply exists in another body (ie: different frame of reference of self), thus by definition is seperate. Frankly, as either a clone or the original, I'd consider my other self to be my perfect equal. Frankly I know we'd get along perfectly too.

[petesampras]

What's your point? Just because my clone exists in another point of space time in an identical physical enviroment with an identical makeup doesn't mean I have any awareness of being inside his body anymore than he would have a awareness of being in mine.

Which is only an issue if you believe in the existance of this special property called 'awareness'. Now, awareness as an construct of information processing can be demonstrated to exist. Subjective awareness, which goes beyond the processing of information, cannot be demonstrated to exist.

Do you see the point here? We are not claiming that a perfect clone has this awareness that the original has. We are claiming that the original doesn't have this awareness either. Of course, humans have information constructs in their brains to encode the concept of self indentity, but there is zero evidence that this is anything more to this to deserve this description of 'awareness'. You can describe the phenomena perfectly as information. By occams razor, then, it is just information, and information has the special property that destroying a copy of it does not destroy the information.