Free will? DO we even have any free will?

[Rye]

It appears to me that, when I wake up thirsty, it's the free exercise of my will to stand, go to the kitchen, and draw a glass of water to drink. Or to tolerate being thirsty, in order to stay warm under the covers.

It does not appear to me that I am being marionetted around by some form of predetermination, in the process.

A couple of things here: In regards to general determinism, there's no reason you would feel like you were being led by deterministic forces, because that's not how the brain is wired. The human perception is basically an extremely specialised system of stimulus and response. A whole load of IF->THEN rules that drive behaviour, because the universe being deterministic doesn't mean it is expedient for biological organisms to evolve to predict chaotic (too difficult to understand) trends that it may be a part of.

Your perception itself is as much a part of the system as chemical reactions or gravity. When you walk everywhere, you just accept gravity as the norm, you don't feel like your movement is being determined by gravitational factors, when in truth, it actually is to an enormous extent. Likewise, this applies to everything, internal and external.

In regards to more general and understandable examples of your body forcing your choice; try holding your breath for a couple of minutes. As you withhold more from your biology, your body screams at you with building intensity to take a different course of action till eventually it becomes exceptionally difficult to ignore.

Sure, I can imagine that all of my actions and decisions have been predetermined, and I'm just running on tracks, but where's the evidence to suggest that?

Name one thing you did that was not a reducible to a result of preceding events? We're all products of our environment since we are never distinct from it.

There's also the rather crazy idea I had once, where I imagined the future to be as consistent as the past and therefore no more changable. Our understandings of the future are changable (thus we may define certain things as "potential"), but in the future, after the coin has been tossed, it will only have one outcome, and that outcome was reducible entirely to the finite amount of contituant parts that led up to it. This view did not sit well with my intuitive brain, however, so I try not to think along those lines, but unless there's something I'm missing, it still makes (some) sense.

Whereas at least I have a form of evidence that I act according to my own will, in that memory lets me follow the sequence on actions and/or inputs and/or decisions, that apparently led me to choose to perform one series of actions instead of another.

It's a metaphysical position, really, not one that can really be distinguished based on evidence. Unless you count weird quantum shit that seems to "know" what it's doing before it does it, but I'm not qualified to argue that.

Anyway, it appears to me that Occam's Razor suggests that I want to perform a given action because I anticipate desirable consequences is a simpler solution than there's some invisible, unquantifiable dimension to reality which predetermines my actions while allowing me to perceive them as consequences of my own will.

What's unquantifiable about all future events being the logical consequences of constant, unthinking nature? Frankly, yours assumes some part distinct from the rest of reality and not subject to all-encompassing natural progress. Some sort of acausal homunculus that chooses (i.e causes) things "by definition". I find that less palatable with what the rest of the universe has hinted at, let alone what behavioural psychology et al have hinted at.

I'm sure questions like "do we have free will" are big-time popular with philosophers. I just don't see how they're relevant to day-to-day life.

It's not. Then again, 2000 year old zombies shouldn't be informing people on who is deserving of civil rights, so the world is mad enough to entertain such questions. Of course, it's not like a stardestroyer vs a mole of defiants is really relevant to day to day life. They're thought experiments and entertainment.

[Darth Wong]

It appears to me that, when I wake up thirsty, it's the free exercise of my will to stand, go to the kitchen, and draw a glass of water to drink. Or to tolerate being thirsty, in order to stay warm under the covers.

And how do you make that decision? Through various chemical processes occurring in your brain: a brain which is hard-wired to react in certain ways, and which has been conditioned by environment to acquire certain patterns of thought which will dictate your actions.

Your "free will" is a function of chemistry and circumstance. This is something they'll point out in any Philosophy 101 class.

[Kanastrous]

I don't have time to respond properly right now, but if I ever have the option to choose a rank around here, I want acausal homunculus.

[ray245]

A better term for "free will" is "freedom of action". We have limited freedom of action. "Free will" itself is a meaningless term.

Considering either concept 'Christian' boggles the mind. If he meant it in the obvious sense, 'did Christians invent the concept of free will', that's terrifying.

Ray, try reading a book, or even a philosophy website. Christians hacked on about free will a great deal because without free will punishment for sinners is pretty unethical, but with free will 'God's design' is pretty weak. They were *concerned* with it, they don't *own* the concept.

Seriously, read a book. As Mike says, this is pretty much the second philosophy question ever.

Well, if I am ever rich enough to pursue such stuff, I will definelty hope to study things like philosophy in university.

And I have read a few books regarding some of these areas, but given the nature of philosophy itself, I can hardly find a book that can really a strong position on these kind of issues.


Do you have any websites or books to recommend me?



Oh ya, and the reason I think we don't have free will is because every thing, no matter how minor it is, will affect us in how we make our decision.

Things like seeing some stars at night yesterday can somehow influence your decision.

We may think we control our own destiny because we don't know how much we are affected by other factors, and just think things happen by chance.


Take for example, the knowing of your friends is not by chance, you get to meet certain people because you might be born with certain degree of intelligent, and having social influence that may allow you to go to a certain school.


Your friends is also there because they are born to maybe certain family, having certain influence that make them get into the same school as you.

Having some social factors that inflence their decision to go to a certain school.

And thus, you get to know your friends. And because you get to know them, your friends will influence you as well, causing you to make certain decision as well.


Another example may be you having a interest in science fiction or science. It may be because you have parents who holds some science degree, or having been exposed to lots of scientifc essays and etc at a young age.


But you are exposed to them because certain external factors may cause you to get into contact with those stuff. The essay that get you interested in chemistry is written because the author is influenced by other factors from genetics to enviromental factors to write that essay.


And me writing this post is due to me maybe inheriting some sort of natural interest in certain subjects, like philosophy in this case, together with natural factors like having parents,teachers or friends who is also interested in this kind of stuff, or even getting to read stuff about philosophy because I'm somehow lead to reading these stuff on the internet.


And thus, I will create this topic, and thus I will write this post in a certain style.

So by this reasoning, we don't have free will, we are sort of just a toy for nature itself, or nature is sort of just what it is because that how things were supposed to be.

[Stark]

I don't have time to respond properly right now, but if I ever have the option to choose a rank around here, I want acausal homunculus.

I hope when you choose it, the admin concerned replaces it with 'Pretentious' instead, for the lulz. I mean, you never considered that your brain is a chemical machine, and that chemistry is deterministic? Even personality-wise, people are creatures of habit: true 'free will' would mean people would be able to choose arbitrary courses of action, instead of being reasonably predicatable based on their past experiences.

Ray, it's pretty easy to find basic philosophy texts on this, but don't expect them to be very enlightening. In my experience philosophers are needlessly obtuse and pretentious instead of clear and concise. However, free will advocates would say that factors that influence your decision don't compromise the essential act of deciding, that you're exercising 'freedom' when you choose one door or the other, or Sprite or Coke, or whatever. A determinist would say that this is the result of genetics, previous experience, habit, or other predictable stimulus.

[Rye]

It depends on the philosopher. Philosophical arguments go through something akin to evolution. Language becomes unnecessarily verbose or "specialised" based on what came before, lots of which is centuries old. So you get a load of junk. I've always prided myself on attempting to make my views "straight talking" philosophy while trying to preserve nuance.

As for straightforward philosophers on matters like this, I would suggest guys like A.C. Grayling and Steven Pinker as well as other popular science authors (though make sure you see whether the books are well received generally).

[Kuroneko]

I'm sure questions like "do we have free will" are big-time popular with philosophers. I just don't see how they're relevant to day-to-day life.

I hope you'd agree that moral responsibility is relevant to day-to-day life. That's where the question of whether an action corresponds to the actor's will comes up, as at least a mitigating factor for culpability if not always an absolution. Now, you might say that this is not how the concept is usually characterized (or alluded to), in this thread or in by most people, and you'd be right. It's exactly backwards.

I believe that the Christian apologetics got it half-right. Free will is a concept inextricably tied to morality, at the very least in the sense that there is no use for it otherwise (but it does no good to treat it as an invention intended to absolve God of anything; the question is older than Christianity). No "acausal magic" suffices here, since something with no causes "just happens" and shouldn't be considered anyone's fault. On the other hand, a deterministic view would have free will as the degree to which one's actions conform to one's will. Supposing a deterministic universe, the fact that one's will itself would be in some sense determined by the structure of the physical substrate (brain, etc.) is actually a bonus, as any improper (or, alternatively, laudable) action that is free in the above sense would be genuinely the fault of the agent and not merely some acausal cosmic accident.

Far from opposing determinism, any truly relevant conception of free will requires it.

---

As for philosophers writing cogently on this question, I can recommend Ayer.

[pucky18]

According to some, (not necessarily my view) there cannot be free will in this universe. the argument is that you, like everything around you, are made of atoms. an atom cannot, of itself, do anything, or control itself, instead depending on external stimuli to make it do anything. Therefore, the atoms in your brain are directly dependent on the atoms outside your brain stimulating them, and due to not being able to do anything of themselves they will respond in a automaton-like fashion to the stimuli. Another prong of this argument is that everything is completely dependent on its state directly preceding it, and thus everything in the universe can be traced directly back to the Big Bang. Of course, there is more to these theories than this, and my explanation may not be the best.

[lordofFNORD]

Like in so many discussions, there doesn't seem to be a clear definition of free will here.

Is the brain magically immune from causality? Obviously not, barring extraordinary proof that does not exist.

Are the actions of the brain utterly unaffected by outside events? Again, clearly not.

However, my brain structure and state defines "who I am", and events within the brain map to the process of "making a decision", and at any given moment, that decision proceeds more or less independently of outside events, so in that sense, I (as in my brain) has free will. It's just that I am is shaped by past events in a (probably) deterministic but (probably) chaotic manner (at least to an extent; certain types of changes and structures are clearly NOT chaotic).

As far as I'm concerned, the difference between chaoticly unpredictable decision making and free decision making is semantics.

If deterministic but chaotic isn't good enough for you, then you can always hold out for some kind of quantum effect in the brain, adding a truly random component.

an atom cannot, of itself, do anything, or control itself, instead depending on external stimuli to make it do anything. Therefore, the atoms in your brain are directly dependent on the atoms outside your brain stimulating them, and due to not being able to do anything of themselves they will respond in a automaton-like fashion to the stimuli. Another prong of this argument is that everything is completely dependent on its state directly preceding it, and thus everything in the universe can be traced directly back to the Big Bang.

This is demonstrably false. No examination of starting conditions can reveal how certain quantum effects will occur. The probabilities can be known, but for a given event, uncertainty and randomness appear to be built into the universe. It's unlikely, but not (to my knowledge) impossible for these events to have effects that propagate up enough to effect human decision making.

[pucky18]

This is demonstrably false. No examination of starting conditions can reveal how certain quantum effects will occur. The probabilities can be known, but for a given event, uncertainty and randomness appear to be built into the universe. It's unlikely, but not (to my knowledge) impossible for these events to have effects that propagate up enough to effect human decision making.

Yes, but as far as I know these are random events which we have no control over, thus not having anything to do with "free will." Or are you saying that brains have some mystical ability to bend quantum mechanics to their will? As far as I can see, it is no more possible for a human to make a decision independent at all from external stimuli than it is for a rock to, of its own accord, move around. Even though, with a ridiculous coincidence of quantum mechanics, the rock may technically have a chance to move around, it is so vanishingly unlikely as to be irrelevant.

However, my brain structure and state defines "who I am", and events within the brain map to the process of "making a decision", and at any given moment, that decision proceeds more or less independently of outside events, so in that sense, I (as in my brain) has free will.

Human brains, and brains in general, possess no special property which enables them to break free of causality. everything that goes on in your brain is directly caused by external stimuli, or by chance of quantum mechanics. There is absolutely no way for you to have a thought not completely resulting from external stimuli or blind chance.

[lordofFNORD]

This is demonstrably false. No examination of starting conditions can reveal how certain quantum effects will occur. The probabilities can be known, but for a given event, uncertainty and randomness appear to be built into the universe. It's unlikely, but not (to my knowledge) impossible for these events to have effects that propagate up enough to effect human decision making.

Yes, but as far as I know these are random events which we have no control over, thus not having anything to do with "free will." Or are you saying that brains have some mystical ability to bend quantum mechanics to their will? As far as I can see, it is no more possible for a human to make a decision independent at all from external stimuli than it is for a rock to, of its own accord, move around. Even though, with a ridiculous coincidence of quantum mechanics, the rock may technically have a chance to move around, it is so vanishingly unlikely as to be irrelevant.

I said it was unlikely. I certainly did not say we have a "mystical ability to bend quantum mechanics to [our] will".

I would expect that quantum mechanics is MUCH more likely to affect our thought process than to move a rock. The displacement of a single molecule, or a change in bonding within a molecule, in a rock has zero macroscopic effect on a rock. It is conceivable that a change on that level in the brain could affect the decision-making process, and it is conceivable that such a change could be caused by quantum uncertainty. I'm not an expert on quantum effects in chemical bonding, and I would bow to someone who is. But comparing it to a rock is not useful.

However, my brain structure and state defines "who I am", and events within the brain map to the process of "making a decision", and at any given moment, that decision proceeds more or less independently of outside events, so in that sense, I (as in my brain) has free will.

Human brains, and brains in general, possess no special property which enables them to break free of causality. everything that goes on in your brain is directly caused by external stimuli, or by chance of quantum mechanics. There is absolutely no way for you to have a thought not completely resulting from external stimuli or blind chance.

"At any given moment" is an operative phrase, here. Obviously my brain is the deterministic (or possibly quantumly influenced) result of past processes. However, current events, and moreso any single current stimulus, has relatively little effect on my brains structure and processes. Thus it is in some sense "free". Which is to say the structure created deterministically from past events will react to current events in a way free from their influence.

You're implication that I claimed "Human brains, and brains in general, possess no special property which enables them to break free of causality" is insulting and deceptive, seeing as I stated the exact opposite:

Is the brain magically immune from causality? Obviously not, barring extraordinary proof that does not exist.

Are the actions of the brain utterly unaffected by outside events? Again, clearly not.

[Kuroneko]

Like in so many discussions, there doesn't seem to be a clear definition of free will here.

I thought it was fairly clear above: the degree to which one's will is free is determined by how much one's actions conform to one's will.

This is demonstrably false. No examination of starting conditions can reveal how certain quantum effects will occur. The probabilities can be known, but for a given event, uncertainty and randomness appear to be built into the universe. It's unlikely, but not (to my knowledge) impossible for these events to have effects that propagate up enough to effect human decision making.

That's something that is highly disputable. Interpreting QM as non-deterministic requires one to treat wavefunction collapse as a real event. On the other hand, under interpretations of QM where the wavefunction collapse is epiphenomenal, QM is manifestly deterministic. But more relevantly, having one's will be acausal is not any sort of advantage for reasons already discussed (and there is no evidence that such effects have any significant relevance to brain operation anyway, Penrose's arguments notwithstanding).

[lordofFNORD]

Like in so many discussions, there doesn't seem to be a clear definition of free will here.

I thought it was fairly clear above: the degree to which one's will is free is determined by how much one's actions conform to one's will.

How is "will" defined then?

If one's "will" is the decision made by one's brain, then clearly free will exists by that definition. It you confine will to be the process in the brain that maps to the subjective experience of conscious thought, then there are certain limitations (I can't "will" myself to stop my heart). But neither of those definitions is particularly satisfying to me.

In my initial post, I mostly tried to sidestep the issue, for just that reason. If you have a satisfying definition of will, please share it.

under interpretations of QM where the wavefunction collapse is epiphenomenal, QM is manifestly deterministic.

I was not aware of the development of decoherence theory; but you appear to be correct.

But more relevantly, having one's will be acausal is not any sort of advantage for reasons already discussed

Referencing:

Yes, but as far as I know these are random events which we have no control over

Sorry for not addressing this earlier. If the random events occur as part of my brain processes, then they ARE me, or at least a part of me. I am the chemical/physical processes/structures in my brain. Therefore, if an acausal quantum process in my brain causes me to make a decision, I am making an acausal decision.

If the quantum event involves a cosmic ray smacking into my brain and displacing a election, that's another story, but that wasn't what I was talking about.

(and there is no evidence that such effects have any significant relevance to brain operation anyway, Penrose's arguments notwithstanding).

If no one wants to defend Penrose, I'm willing to set his arguments on lack of evidence and irrelevance in the face of decoherence.

[Kanastrous]

I don't have time to respond properly right now, but if I ever have the option to choose a rank around here, I want acausal homunculus.

I hope when you choose it, the admin concerned replaces it with 'Pretentious' instead, for the lulz.

Why 'pretentious?' I just like the phrase.

If you find use of the phrase in some way pretentious, blame whoever introduced it to the conversation; this is where I learned it...

I mean, you never considered that your brain is a chemical machine,

My folks had taught me that sometime before junior high school. Being raised by physicians is fun.

and that chemistry is deterministic?

Learned that in high school chemistry. Well, more in high-school physics.

My idea of 'free will' doesn't include freedom from the dictates of chemistry, biology, or physics, since it sure seems obvious that those are all governing conditions of my existence and that anything I perceive or do is mediated by them.

I mean, if I had suggested that my will frees me from obedience to the Law of Gravitation, or something similar, I could see why you'd assume I was that dumb.

Since I never said that, I've obviously been saying other stuff to convince you that I'm that dumb.

Even personality-wise, people are creatures of habit: true 'free will' would mean people would be able to choose arbitrary courses of action, instead of being reasonably predicatable based on their past experiences.

Then the degree of 'free will' I believe we have, is far more modest than the definition with which you're working.

free will advocates would say that factors that influence your decision don't compromise the essential act of deciding, that you're exercising 'freedom' when you choose one door or the other, or Sprite or Coke, or whatever.

Makes me a free-will advocate.

A determinist would say that this is the result of genetics, previous experience, habit, or other predictable stimulus.

Makes me a free-will advocate who thinks that the determinists are somewhere between 50% and 99% correct, and I'm content to manuever within whatever percentage of freedom I actually happen to have.

I'm sure it's obvious that I lack instruction in philosophy, so I appreciate whatever I might pick up, here.

[Rye]

I don't have time to respond properly right now, but if I ever have the option to choose a rank around here, I want acausal homunculus.

I hope when you choose it, the admin concerned replaces it with 'Pretentious' instead, for the lulz.

Why 'pretentious?' I just like the phrase.

If you find use of the phrase in some way pretentious, blame whoever introduced it to the conversation; this is where I learned it...

It's not pretentious if you use a word accurately in context; there's no pretense there.

[Kuroneko]

How is "will" defined then? If one's "will" is the decision made by one's brain, then clearly free will exists by that definition. It you confine will to be the process in the brain that maps to the subjective experience of conscious thought, then there are certain limitations (I can't "will" myself to stop my heart).

Yes, "will" is the capacity to make goals and decisions based on them. If I am forced to do something I'd much rather not to on pain of death, then my will is less free for it, since the connection between my actions and my goals and decisions has been diminished. Not completely, one might add, since it is a goal of mine to stay alive, but then this is a matter of degree. And yes, "clearly" free will exists by that definition. I get the feeling that you perceive this last fact to be a problem. Why?

But neither of those definitions is particularly satisfying to me.

You state this without giving any reasons. Are there logical reasons or do you simply prefer things to be murky?

I'm not denying that there are some rather vague conceptualizations of 'free will' that are not equivalent, and that questions causality and determinism permeate those discussions. Rye and others in this thread have already alluded to those versions, and are rightfully dismissive of them. But it seems plain that they only practically relevant notion of free will is the moral one, i.e., whatever is meant when someone has done something "of one's free will." And so, I've interpreted the issue in moral terms.

(It may be worthwhile to note that although I've argued that notions of direct moral responsibility presuppose determinism, that says nothing of the various kinds of ethics in which those questions arise indirectly. For example, virtue ethics focuses on one's character, which in turn can be interpreted as the disposition to perform certain kinds of actions. This is not only compatible with the usual notions of morality, but also an integral part in some contexts, since issues of premeditation and the likelihood of repeat offenses are usually viewed as significant in determining degree of culpability for an immoral action. The only reason I've mentioned it at all is that too many people hold the view that determinism is somehow dangerous to human freedom and responsibility.)

[lordofFNORD]

How is "will" defined then? If one's "will" is the decision made by one's brain, then clearly free will exists by that definition. It you confine will to be the process in the brain that maps to the subjective experience of conscious thought, then there are certain limitations (I can't "will" myself to stop my heart).

Yes, "will" is the capacity to make goals and decisions based on them. If I am forced to do something I'd much rather not to on pain of death, then my will is less free for it, since the connection between my actions and my goals and decisions has been diminished. Not completely, one might add, since it is a goal of mine to stay alive, but then this is a matter of degree. And yes, "clearly" free will exists by that definition. I get the feeling that you perceive this last fact to be a problem. Why?

You state this without giving any reasons. Are there logical reasons or do you simply prefer things to be murky?

I suppose there's nothing wrong with that definition. Indeed it's very useful for some purposes, like dealing with the consequences of lack of free will in morality/law. It's certainly much better than my other suggested definition, which comes close to being a tautology.

However, it makes the general case much less interesting, and I don't think that's what people usually think about when they say things like:

what I am concerned about is the existence of free will. The concept falls apart when you started to be aware that your action is pre-determinded by other factors, like your surrondings, your genetic influence and etc.

[Kuroneko]

However, it makes the general case much less interesting, and I don't think that's what people usually think about when they say things like:

what I am concerned about is the existence of free will. The concept falls apart when you started to be aware that your action is pre-determinded by other factors, like your surrondings, your genetic influence and etc.

What do you mean? When most people say "free will", they mean something along the lines of "the capacity to choose one's actions." This is clearly at least compatible with the definition I gave. The point of difficulty when they also add things like the quote you give is some sort of disagreement on what constitutes a "genuine" choice, which is the place where issues of both determinism and morality usually get injected into the discussion. It's true that I view the moral side of the debate as more fundamental because that's the only place where the term has practical and relevant application, and that some people don't see it that way, but this is not a disagreement about the core meaning of the term, but rather what constitutes an adequate answer.

[lordofFNORD]

However, it makes the general case much less interesting, and I don't think that's what people usually think about when they say things like:

what I am concerned about is the existence of free will. The concept falls apart when you started to be aware that your action is pre-determinded by other factors, like your surrondings, your genetic influence and etc.

What do you mean? When most people say "free will", they mean something along the lines of "the capacity to choose one's actions." This is clearly at least compatible with the definition I gave. The point of difficulty when they also add things like the quote you give is some sort of disagreement on what constitutes a "genuine" choice, which is the place where issues of both determinism and morality usually get injected into the discussion. It's true that I view the moral side of the debate as more fundamental because that's the only place where the term has practical and relevant application, and that some people don't see it that way, but this is not a disagreement about the core meaning of the term, but rather what constitutes an adequate answer.

I mean that, except in special circumstances, answering the question your way is not difficult enough to be interesting. If you're looking for solutions to practical problems, interesting is not always good; a quick, obvious and correct solution is not only adequate, it's preferred. However, we learn more from examining difficult and interesting questions than simple and obvious ones. I imagine that the OP trying to learn, not solve a practical moral dilemma.

[Kuroneko]

I mean that, except in special circumstances, answering the question your way is not difficult enough to be interesting. If you're looking for solutions to practical problems, interesting is not always good; a quick, obvious and correct solution is not only adequate, it's preferred. However, we learn more from examining difficult and interesting questions than simple and obvious ones. I imagine that the OP trying to learn, not solve a practical moral dilemma.

I'm not sure if it was 'too easy' if it runs contrary to most people's intuition (the perception that determinism goes against free will is more common), but even if it so, I have to wonder about this apparent proposal to artificially overcomplicate issues. There are plenty of other things that are genuinely complicated in their own right.

[Cykeisme]

I mean, if I had suggested that my will frees me from obedience to the Law of Gravitation, or something similar, I could see why you'd assume I was that dumb.

Since I never said that, I've obviously been saying other stuff to convince you that I'm that dumb.

So you're agreed that your body is bound by the nature of behaviour of the rest of the universe, but for some reason you believe the volume enclosed by your skull is not?

Or is it that you believe your will and consciousness are entirely separate from the contents of your skull?