AP: A-Q more powerful, terrorism increases.

[SirNitram]

AP through odd source; blame Google News

WASHINGTON - Al-Qaida has rebuilt some of its pre-Sept. 11 capabilities from remote hiding places in Pakistan, leading to a major spike in attacks last year in that country and in neighboring Afghanistan, the Bush administration said yesterday.

Attacks in Pakistan more than doubled from 375 to 887 between 2006 and 2007, and the number of fatalities jumped by almost 300 percent from 335 to 1,335, the State Department said in its annual terrorism report.

In Afghanistan, the number of attacks rose 16 percent, to 1,127 incidents last year, killing 1,966 people, 55 percent more than the 1,257 who died in 2006, it said.

The report said attacks in Iraq dipped slightly between 2006 and 2007, but they still accounted for 60 percent of worldwide terrorism fatalities, including 17 of the 19 Americans killed in attacks last year. The other two were killed in Afghanistan.

More than 22,000 people were killed by terrorists around the world in 2007, 8 percent more than in 2006, although the overall number of attacks fell, the report says.

The report once again identifies Iran as the world's "most active" state sponsor of terrorism for supporting Palestinian extremists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it says elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps continued to give militants weapons, training and funding.

"In this way, Iranian government forces have been responsible for attacks on coalition forces," State Department counterterrorism coordinator Dell Dailey told reporters. Iranian forces are also giving weapons and financial aid to the Taliban in Afghanistan, he said.

About 13,600 noncombatants were killed in 2007 in Iraq, the report says, adding the high number could be attributed to a 50 percent increase in the number of suicide bombings. Suicide car bombings were up 40 percent and suicide bombings outside of vehicles climbed 90 percent over 2006, it says.

In Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, al-Qaida and its affiliates remain "the greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its partners" despite efforts to combat followers of Osama bin Laden and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, according to the report. It says Zawahiri has emerged as the group's "strategic and operational planner."

"It has reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities through the exploitation of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri," the report says.

Dailey, however, stressed that al-Qaida is still weaker overall than it was before Sept. 11, 2001.

Of particular concern are al-Qaida sympathizers who attacked a UN building in Algeria last year, killing more than 40 people and wounding more than 150, the report says.

In Pakistan, the State Department recorded more than 45 suicide bombings in 2007, up from just 22 such incidents between 2002 and 2006. Last year's included the December attack that killed former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and an October attack on her homecoming parade that killed more than 130 people, the worst suicide attack in Pakistani history.

It would appear, based on logic and objective fact, that a military response has not actually worked. Perhaps it's time for, say, another method.

[Darth Wong]

It's funny how certain people seem to be completely incapable of understanding that Al-Qaeda is not an army. It's a political movement. Like any movement, it has a certain level of organization, certain leaders and figureheads, etc. But it's not an army in the traditional sense. Wiping out Al-Qaeda "fighters" in a battle here or there has little effect on the strength of the movement.

[HemlockGrey]

I don't think a military solution is ineffective because of the nature of the organization but because of the nature of the situation. Obviously you can't militarily destroy "al-Qaeda" as an international organization, but in the context of the Afghan occupation al-Qaeda could be said to constitute an irregular army operating out of the Pakistani tribal areas- it is a political movement in part, but the military wing of the movment still needs bases to operate out of. If the United States could attack into Pakistan, which is obviously impossible for any number of reasons, then al-Qaeda's ability to operate as it is currently doing would be greatly reduced. It wouldn't be destroyed as an organization, but it would not have the ability to menace Afghanistan and Pakistan as it does now. Let's not forget that after the invasion of Afghanistan the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the country were almost destroyed, and it was only because they were able to escape in Pakistan that they've rebuilt their strength.

[Illuminatus Primus]

It's funny how certain people seem to be completely incapable of understanding that Al-Qaeda is not an army. It's a political movement. Like any movement, it has a certain level of organization, certain leaders and figureheads, etc. But it's not an army in the traditional sense. Wiping out Al-Qaeda "fighters" in a battle here or there has little effect on the strength of the movement.

I think their ability to rebuild would've been significantly stymied if we'd actually successfully captured or killed even a majority of the Al Queda forces and leadership in Afghanistan after 9/11. We failed to even do that. A big thing is that the people are much more important than infrastructure and productive abilities: as Shep, et al, have gone on and on about, American conceptions of war are heavily preoccupied with destroying the enemy's productive capacity to wage war. With Al Queda, however, that productive capacity is easily replaced, hidden, and moved; its infrastructure is off-the-shelf and hard to locate and destroy. Its web of communications and organization - largely the relationships built and cultivated by the leadership and experienced members - are its main asset. Therefore, it is much more in some way like fighting organized crime - you need to bust up the family and detain or eliminate the experienced leadership capable of keeping the coalitions together.

Unfortunately we took over a month to go in, trusted tribal locals to do most of our dirty work, and poorly managed the borders. Oops.

[Grand Admiral Thrawn]

The report once again identifies Iran as the world's "most active" state sponsor of terrorism for supporting Palestinian extremists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it says elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps continued to give militants weapons, training and funding.

"In this way, Iranian government forces have been responsible for attacks on coalition forces," State Department counterterrorism coordinator Dell Dailey told reporters. Iranian forces are also giving weapons and financial aid to the Taliban in Afghanistan, he said.

Is there any actual proof that Iran is helping the Taliban? When they were in power the Iranians were always opposed to them and gave a great deal of support to the Northern Alliance. Iran has no interest in seeing them return to power.

[SirNitram]

Is there any actual proof that Iran is helping the Taliban? When they were in power the Iranians were always opposed to them and gave a great deal of support to the Northern Alliance. Iran has no interest in seeing them return to power.

I'm certain there are groups in Iran supporting the Taliban. The Jundullah, or 'Army Of God', a bunch of militant Sunnis on the Afghan border who enjoy a permenant place on the terrorist group list, I believe. It's quite possible Shiites organizations with ties to the government also help the Taliban. The problem is the same as the 'Iran is sponsoring attacks in Iraq': Where's the proof it's from the ones in power? Or is every abortion clinic bomber from the US an agent of US sponsored terrrorism?

[Kamakazie Sith]

It would appear, based on logic and objective fact, that a military response has not actually worked. Perhaps it's time for, say, another method.

I agree. Our approach to the situation is so conflicting that we'll end up defeated ourselves.

However to be fair, in order for a military response to work it must be directed at whatever you want destroyed. The military is currently focused on Iraq with limited lip service to Afghanistan, and surgical strikes against A-Q leadership.

[Warsie]

However to be fair, in order for a military response to work it must be directed at whatever you want destroyed. The military is currently focused on Iraq with limited lip service to Afghanistan, and surgical strikes against A-Q leadership.

And that the US can't bomb in Pakistan heavily or send troops there quickly as they have to consult with the Pakistanis, meaning a safe zone as mentioned in the article.

[thejester]

I think you have to draw a line between the al-Qaeda organisation in Pakistan and the movement overseas.

It's still a matter of debate, but everyone in the field agrees that at some point al-Qaeda decentralised. Almost simultaneously, the events of 9/11 thrust bin Laden's ideology firmly into the spotlight - the clash of civilizations model that allowed any angry young Muslim worldwide to plug in and become part of the struggle. Thus even as the central core of the al-Qaeda organisation was having its guts ripped out in Afghanistan, the movement grew quickly.

Which in the end has left us with the situation we have now - where the core of the al-Qaeda organisation has begun to rebuild in Pakistan, as the report mentions, but the bulk of the overseas work is being done either by pre-existing organisations that have joined up such as JI and Zarqawi's mob or by cells such as the London bombers who have no formal contact with AQ and instead have accessed their ideology through the media. So IMO the concern still must be not the actual core rebuilding of AQ but the effect of the mass movement it has spawned, particularly in disaffected Muslims in the West.

[Ender]

It would appear, based on logic and objective fact, that a military response has not actually worked. Perhaps it's time for, say, another method.

Like what?

[Kamakazie Sith]

However to be fair, in order for a military response to work it must be directed at whatever you want destroyed. The military is currently focused on Iraq with limited lip service to Afghanistan, and surgical strikes against A-Q leadership.

And that the US can't bomb in Pakistan heavily or send troops there quickly as they have to consult with the Pakistanis, meaning a safe zone as mentioned in the article.

Which doesn't really matter though because our focus is on Iraq.

[SirNitram]

It would appear, based on logic and objective fact, that a military response has not actually worked. Perhaps it's time for, say, another method.

Like what?

If I knew how to stop terrorism, Ender, I think I'd be soon considered the hero of the early 21st century. Sadly, I ain't that brilliant.

[Shroom Man 777]

Hooray, America freedomized Afghanistan. Now no one cares about what's going on in Pakistan. It'd be great, in a totally horrible way, to see the relatively sane Prime Minister Musharraf (who went over to the Daily Show, once) get ousted and replaced with some whackjob. Then Afghanistan's problems will be displaced into Pakistan. It'll be like Afghanistan Mk. II, but with nuclear weapons. Right beside India. Hooray.

[TithonusSyndrome]

It would appear, based on logic and objective fact, that a military response has not actually worked. Perhaps it's time for, say, another method.

Like what?

If I knew how to stop terrorism, Ender, I think I'd be soon considered the hero of the early 21st century. Sadly, I ain't that brilliant.

I know Kissinger gave some interview a few years ago suggesting that the only way to stop terrorism would be to slowly culturally reform the Middle East altogether by letting the fruits of the enlightenment seep in over a period of what could be as long as centuries. He was obviously trying to sell the neocon version of Orwellian perpetual warfare, but I can't help but think that he might've been righter than I would have liked. AQ and their ilk will thrive as long as there is a home for their batshit stupid fundamentalism, and they won't give that up overnight.

[Sarevok]

Hooray, America freedomized Afghanistan. Now no one cares about what's going on in Pakistan. It'd be great, in a totally horrible way, to see the relatively sane Prime Minister Musharraf (who went over to the Daily Show, once) get ousted and replaced with some whackjob. Then Afghanistan's problems will be displaced into Pakistan. It'll be like Afghanistan Mk. II, but with nuclear weapons. Right beside India. Hooray.

Someday someone is going to sit down with a calculator and come up with following conclusions.

Death toll from WoT > 911 deaths. Multiplied by a suitable order of magnitude.

Cost of WoT > Price of towers + plane. Multiplied by a suitable order of magnitude.

Does not compute. Yet there you have the worlds most powerful nation curing an ass itch by placing a fragmentation grenade in the buttcrack.

If America gave each and every Al-Qaeda member a free ticket to America and a hunting licence for shooting people even then they would be hard pressed to cause as much death and damage America did in "curing" the world of terrorism.

[MKSheppard]

It would appear, based on logic and objective fact, that a military response has not actually worked. Perhaps it's time for, say, another method.

What would you suggest? Because the other methods, like using law enforcement to handle it haven't. (see the Cole thread).

Anyway; Al Quaeda is facing a growing problem. It hasn't been able to score (or claim linkage) to a major attack against the West since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the London Train Bombings in 2005. They've only been able to score major attacks in muslim countries; like a series of eight suicide attacks carried out in Algeria, which killed 100+ Algerian civilians; which of course, have pretty much destroyed any chance of them getting traction in Algeria.

Link to details on Algerian problems for Al Q

Likewise in Iraq; Al Quaeda is losing ground as well; because they followed up their initial "We Stand Against The Zionist American Occupiers!" support within the Iraqi population base by of course, killing everyone, Sunni and Shiite alike in series after series of increasingly bloody attacks; typified by increasingly lopsided kill ratios; like a couple of American soldiers killed in the blast, and 50+ civilian bystanders who were there in the wrong place at the wrong time.

A Typical Day in Iraq Now - scores of dozens of civilian muslim casualties and relatively few infidel casualties

This increasingly bad public relations problem that Al Q is being faced with now is a real threat to them - the increasing loss of public opinion and support within the muslim world due to their increasingly bloody tactics which are high in casualties for everyone except the infidel.

Mao Zedong, who was the only modern leader to successfully win and execute a guerilla war in modern history all by himself knew the importance of maintaining good relations with the civilian population; and his dictums and policies still guide the PLA to this day. Fortunately for us, Al Quaeda never read Mao.

Anyway, here's a story by the LA Times on the increasing Al Q problems:

Al Q Losing Support

Gap opens between Al Qaeda and allies
A backlash builds over the network's tactics, including suicide attacks. Its leaders try to defuse the anger.
By Josh Meyer
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer

April 24, 2008

WASHINGTON — Al Qaeda increasingly faces sharp criticism from once-loyal sympathizers who openly question its ideology and tactics, including attacks that kill innocent Muslims, according to U.S. intelligence officials, counter-terrorism experts and the group's own communications.

A litany of complaints target Osama bin Laden's network and its affiliates for their actions in Iraq and North Africa, emphasis on suicide bombings instead of political action and tepid support for, or outright antagonism toward, militant groups pressing the Palestinian cause.

The criticism apparently has grown serious enough that Al Qaeda's chief strategist, Ayman Zawahiri, felt compelled to solicit online questions. He responded in an audio message released this month. For more than 90 minutes, Bin Laden's second-in-command tried to defuse the anger.

In March, Zawahiri released a 188-page Internet book to rebut complaints, particularly those of an influential former Islamic militant who said Zawahiri and Bin Laden should be held accountable for violence against Muslims.

Sayyed Imam Sharif, an Egyptian physician who once was a senior theologian for Al Qaeda, was one of Zawahiri's oldest associates. The author of violent manifestoes over the last two decades, Sharif did an about-face while incarcerated in Egypt. Several other prominent Muslim clerics and former militants have similarly condemned Al Qaeda.

Such rifts have been emerging for several years, but they have become increasingly contentious lately, in cyberspace and on the streets of some Arab countries. In addition to Zawahiri, Al Qaeda leaders, including Bin Laden himself, have gone on a public relations offensive. In October, Bin Laden asked followers for forgiveness for the deaths of civilians in Iraq.

Analysts with U.S. and allied intelligence agencies differ over whether the backlash poses significant risks for Al Qaeda, or whether it is simply a public relations problem. The organization is expanding its pool of hard-core recruits, according to one U.S. counter- terrorism official. And Internet communications and other intelligence have shown that its anti-American message continues to resonate with extremists throughout much of the Islamic world.

But Al Qaeda also has sought to use regional groups to become more mainstream and expand its power base. It is in these groups that most of the conflict is occurring.

"We know that all of this matters to Al Qaeda and that its senior leadership is sensitive to the perceived legitimacy of both their actions and their ideology," Juan Carlos Zarate, the White House's deputy national security advisor for combating terrorism, said in a speech Wednesday at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "They care about their image because it has real-world effects on recruitment, donations and support in Muslim and religious communities for the Al Qaeda message."

Some counter-terrorism experts say they suspect that some criticism may have been planted on websites by Western intelligence agents, or lodged by imprisoned radicals who have been coerced.

But Zarate and others say the dissent is real and widespread.

"There has been a growing rejection of the Al Qaeda program and message," said Zarate, who added that the U.S. and its allies have encouraged the backlash by exploiting rifts between Al Qaeda and once-supportive Islamic fundamentalists objecting to its tactics.

U.S. officials cite a variety of evidence, including intelligence, Internet traffic, statements from Al Qaeda leaders, polling data and even songs by popular Pakistani and Indonesian musicians.

Prominent Saudi cleric Salman Awdah sent an open letter to Bin Laden in September in which he condemned violence against innocents and said Al Qaeda was hurting Muslim charities by its purported ties to them.

"Brother Osama, how much blood has been spilled?" wrote Awdah, who is believed to be independent of the Saudi government. "How many innocents among children, elderly, the weak and women have been killed and made homeless in the name of Al Qaeda?"

"Who benefits from turning countries like Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon or Saudi Arabia into places where fear spreads and no one can feel safe?"

In London this week, former extremists launched the Quilliam Foundation, an organization dedicated to discrediting Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.

Zawahiri described his audio message as the first of several "open meetings" and answered complaints, many of them asking why Al Qaeda had killed innocents, including students on a passing bus who died in a bomb attack on the Algerian Constitutional Council in December.

"Excuse me, Mr. Zawahiri, but who is it who is killing with Your Excellency's blessing the innocents in Baghdad, Morocco and Algeria? Do you consider the killing of women and children to be jihad?" asked one questioner whom Zawahiri identified as a geography teacher.

"Were we insane killers of innocents as the questioner claims, it would be possible for us to kill thousands of them in the crowded markets," Zawahiri responded. The deaths of any innocents were the result of "unintentional error or out of necessity. . . . The enemy intentionally takes up positions in the midst of the Muslims for them to be human shields for him."

Others asked about Al Qaeda's legal authority, and questioned why Zawahiri criticizes the militant groups Hamas and Hezbollah, which are fighting Israel, for their participation in politics.

Zawahiri's often-rambling explanations referred listeners to his recently released book, "The Exoneration," which primarily rebuts statements by Sharif, whom Zawahiri suggests was coerced into criticizing Al Qaeda. Sharif denies that.

Such criticism ultimately could undermine Al Qaeda, said Frank Cilluffo, a former White House counter-terrorism official who is director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University.

"It has raised the bar in using violence to achieve its objectives, and people are starting to ask a lot of hard questions. It is losing popular support," he said. "It is occurring within the strategic thinkers, but also among the rank and file."

Some of the earliest manifestations of the dissent were in Iraq. The first leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab Zarqawi, killed so many Shiite and Sunni Muslims that a 2005 letter allegedly from Zawahiri told him to stop.

The violence continued after Zarqawi was killed by U.S. forces in 2006, and angry Sunnis were driven to form councils of neighborhood volunteers with U.S. support to counter the foreign fighters that helped make up Al Qaeda in Iraq.

In North Africa, some radicals have rebelled against a merger with Bin Laden's network, objecting to the wave of suicide bombings that have killed women and children since last April, as well as to efforts to send the group's young men to Iraq.

Several prominent members of the Al Qaeda affiliate, including regional commander Benmessaoud Abdelkader, have charged that suicide bombings serve Al Qaeda's global ambitions at the expense of their efforts to fight what they view as corrupt and anti-Islamist governments in Algeria, Morocco and elsewhere in North Africa.

Olivier Guitta, a Washington-based counter-terrorism consultant born in Morocco, said some militants have alerted authorities to impending bomb attacks so they could be stopped. "They don't mind hitting the government of Algeria, or France for supporting Algeria. But they do not want their kids to go off and fight in Iraq against the Americans."

In Yemen, old guard Al Qaeda operatives have split with a newly emerging generation of fighters in the last year over the younger militants' violent tactics, starting with a suicide bombing in July that killed seven Spanish tourists and two Yemenis.

In Pakistan, recent polls suggest that Bin Laden's popularity has suffered because of the widespread belief that Al Qaeda has been behind the killing of many Muslims there, including former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Cilluffo said that on a recent trip to the Middle East he interviewed fighters who had just returned from Iraq, many of them disillusioned. "People are saying, 'I didn't sign up to kill fellow Muslims,' " he said.

Fawaz Gerges, an author of two books on Islamic militants who has spent the last several years interviewing militants, cited evidence of "major fault lines" within Al Qaeda in chat rooms and other Internet venues. "Bin Laden's statement and this one [from Zawahiri] really tell us about the gravity of the crisis."

But several officials and experts suggested that Al Qaeda was mostly trying to do a better job of reaching out to more mainstream recruits.

"Using this Q-and-A is a way to legitimize Al Qaeda and seek input and increase their following, and not be seen as a hierarchical organization that is divorced from its followers," said Farhana Ali, a counter-terrorism analyst at Rand Corp. "This is an issue of survival. They are trying to stay plugged in to Muslim opinion."

[Illuminatus Primus]

Of course without us in Afghanistan and the GWOT, the A-Qists only scored two hits in CONUS in eight years, one of which was a bust (WTC '93 and '01). So the idea that somehow we have proven they are weaker is crap. As is assigning the Spanish and London bombings to the Afghan/Pakistan A-Q, which clearly did not directly support those operations with planning or logistically.

[Illuminatus Primus]

Of course, applying Shep's standard of "allies and sympathizers now criticize and disagree! they are losing!" means the U.S. must have been losing the GWOT since the run-up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

[MKSheppard]

Of course without us in Afghanistan and the GWOT, the A-Qists only scored two hits in CONUS in eight years, one of which was a bust (WTC '93 and '01).

I never specifically said "CONUS" in my post; Primey, I said "against the west". In between the '93 and '01 WTC hits, Al Q managed three major attacks on "Western targets"; namely the two African embassy bombings which killed hundreds of Africans, and the USS Cole attack.

[MKSheppard]

I forgot about the Madrid attacks in 2004.

[MKSheppard]

As is assigning the Spanish and London bombings to the Afghan/Pakistan A-Q, which clearly did not directly support those operations with planning or logistically.

It didn't stop them from using it as propaganda, though...

[Illuminatus Primus]

As is assigning the Spanish and London bombings to the Afghan/Pakistan A-Q, which clearly did not directly support those operations with planning or logistically.

It didn't stop them from using it as propaganda, though...

So? The USSR routinely used left-wing movements and revolutions elsewhere as food for the proles to think their cause for the international worker was a noble, worthy, and successful one. That doesn't mean that at certain intervals while this was happening, the USSR was not losing the Cold War or abating in strength, such as 1980s against the U.S. under Ronald Reagan (peace be upon him).

[Illuminatus Primus]

Of course without us in Afghanistan and the GWOT, the A-Qists only scored two hits in CONUS in eight years, one of which was a bust (WTC '93 and '01).

I never specifically said "CONUS" in my post; Primey, I said "against the west". In between the '93 and '01 WTC hits, Al Q managed three major attacks on "Western targets"; namely the two African embassy bombings which killed hundreds of Africans, and the USS Cole attack.

Yeah, and now they have detached allies like the London and Madrid jihadists who will do their strikes for them without wasting their lucre, ordinance, or manpower. Meanwhile, our war effort has become more sluggish and more costly with less allied participation.

Like all Repulitards, you just endlessly selectively define the criteria for success and operations. If attacking military targets like the goddamn USS Cole, a military unit in the Middle East, is fair game, how come ALL THE BLOWN UP TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN don't count? Of course you don't count the Bali bombing either. Nor do you want to count the attack on that French tanker. The frequency of attacks has hardly gone down overall, moreover, now AQ can prop up their foriegn OPTEMPO because they have independent allies who will carry out operations without cost to them. Whereas we've only become more alone and the costs have gone up exponentially (Iraq's oil revenue will pay reconstruction! I doubt six months!).

I used CONUS because its an intellectually honest criteria of significant attacks against the U.S., unlike your bullshit where the USS Cole somehow doesn't count (how many people died and how much money and manhours were lost to the military over that?) while all the lost manpower, equipment, ordinance, and money in Iraq does not (while propping up a Stirling-quality fiction of a foriegn policy goal only tangentally and barely related to actually abating AQ terrorism).

[MKSheppard]

Of course, applying Shep's standard of "allies and sympathizers now criticize and disagree! they are losing!" means the U.S. must have been losing the GWOT since the run-up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Al Qaeda's effectiveness around the world depends to a very large part on local support for Al Quaeda in that area. They need the support of the locals in order to carry out efficient and effective operations.

For example, in Iraq they need the acquiescence of locals who "didn't see anything" during the placement of large IEDs or the stockpiling of ammunition in order to spring an effective ambush on American Forces.

I could go on in other ways that local support is needed; but I think you get the idea. Increasingly, the locals in Iraq are not liking the insurgents; and are providing the anomyous tip-offs that are needed to find and clear the weapons and explosives caches that the bad guys are reliant on; because they've come to the judgement that while the Americans are still not liked, they at least make pains to avoid civilian casualties during fighting, while the other guys don't. So they're the least offensive choice.

[Illuminatus Primus]

Of course, applying Shep's standard of "allies and sympathizers now criticize and disagree! they are losing!" means the U.S. must have been losing the GWOT since the run-up to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Al Qaeda's effectiveness around the world depends to a very large part on local support for Al Quaeda in that area. They need the support of the locals in order to carry out efficient and effective operations.

Why? Did Bali? Did Mardrid? Did London? And if they did not, how will more of the same somehow prevent future 9/11s or the like since its no longer a necessary lynchpin of support? It is because you say so?

Notice, you still didn't respond to the fact that when support wanes for AQ, its a sign they are losing. When support wanes for the U.S., we're making a stand or some macho shit.

For example, in Iraq they need the acquiescence of locals who "didn't see anything" during the placement of large IEDs or the stockpiling of ammunition in order to spring an effective ambush on American Forces.

Who gives a shit. AQI is not trying to attack America's interests in the U.S. and outside Iraq. They exist and are fighting us because we made the retard choice to go there in the first place.

I could go on in other ways that local support is needed; but I think you get the idea. Increasingly, the locals in Iraq are not liking the insurgents; and are providing the anomyous tip-offs that are needed to find and clear the weapons and explosives caches that the bad guys are reliant on; because they've come to the judgement that while the Americans are still not liked, they at least make pains to avoid civilian casualties during fighting, while the other guys don't. So they're the least offensive choice.

You have yet to explain how this AQI shit somehow abates the abilities of the "core" AQ in NWFP in Pakistan or autonomous allies abroad. We went to war to stop 9/11 repeats. If it doesn't stop the progenitor of the original attack or their autonomous allies who have orchestrated large-scale attacks themselves, then what was the point - how was the war aim served?