This 94 page report by the DoD is the result of sifting through about 600,000+ captured Iraqi documents and a lot of video footage.
There's also a ton of interesting things in here:This study found no "smoking gun" (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda. Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-state actors was spread across a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. Some in the regime recognized the potential high internal and external costs of maintaining relationships with radical Islamic groups, yet they concluded that in some cases, the benefits of association outweighed the risks.
A review of available Iraqi documents indicated the following:
• The Iraqi regime was involved in regional and international terrorist operations prior to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq.
• On occasion, the Iraqi intelligence servIces directly targeted the regime's perceived enemies, including non-Iraqis. Non-Iraqi casualties often resulted from Iraqi sponsorship of non-governmental terrorist groups.
• Saddam's regime often cooperated directly, albeit cautiously, with terrorist groups when they believed such groups could help advance Iraq's long-term goals. The regime carefully recorded its connections to Palestinian terror organizations in numerous government memos. One such example documents Iraqi financial support to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank.
• State sponsorship of terrorism became such a routine tool of state power that Iraq developed elaborate bureaucratic processes to monitor progress and accountability in the recruiting, training, and resourcing of terrorists. Examples include the regime's development, construction, certification, and training for car bombs and suicide vests in 1999 and 2000.
Can you imagine it? Chlabi being cacked, and us not having to deal with him? There's also a segment excerpting a memo where Saddam asks what kinds of weapons are available in Iraqi embassies overseas -- the one in India had "Plastic explosive charges and booby-trapped suitcases". Although I'm dubious of that; because you'd have a lot of that anyway for internal duties, such as arming embassy guards, and plastic explosives to destroy sensitive equipment if the embassy is attacked. The real WTF on that list (page 23) is: "Gulf nations - Explosive material outside the embassies".Under Saddam, the Iraqi regime used its paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam training camps to train terrorists for use inside and outside Iraq. In 1999, the top ten graduates of each Fedayeen Saddam class were specifically chosen for assignment to London, from there to be ready to conduct operations anywhere in Europe.
[snip inserted memo]
An example of the kind of mission implied in the BLESSED JULY capability is documented in a series of memoranda from April 2000. The intended target was the leader of the Iraqi ational Congress, Ahmad Chalabi. Using a forged passport, the Fedayeen volunteer was to travel through northern Iraq, making his way to London "for the purpose of executing a sanctimonious [sic] national duty which is eliminating the hostile agent Ahmad Chalabi." (10) The operation failed, in part, because the Iraqi agent failed to obtain a visa to enter the United Kingdom.
....I reached the "footnotes" and on page 68 it says for footnote 11:
200 kg of explosives! that's more than you need to carry out destruction of sensitive equipment.The summary also states that more than 200 kilograms of TNT were stored in the Iraqi embassy in Athens, Greece. The explosives ended up buried in the Iraqi embassy garden in Germany after the Iraqi consulate in Bayern (Bavaria) was closed.
There was also extensive development of IEDs and EFPs inhouse by Saddam's intelligence agencies before OIF:In addition to supplying arms to Iraq's overseas missions, the lIS managed a research and production capability for high-technology bombs, components, and silencers. In a series of memoranda dated 4 September 1999, various elements of the lIS report on coordinating the production, testing, and delivery of a sophisticated car bomb using military-grade explosives. Brief summaries of four documents in particular capture the almost routine process surrounding the manufacture of car bombs:
1. A request from lIS Section 27 to lIS Directorate 6 for 40 kilograms of RDX, primer-cord, advanced detonators and other materials. 14
2. An approval memorandum from lIS Directorate 4 to Section 27 to load a vehicle with 50 to 75 kilograms of explosive material and provide to the At Ta'mim Intelligence Branch [M52] for a "special duty.,,15
3. A follow-up memorandum from the senior engineer for lIS Section 27 to his director confirming that his Top Secret-Confidential-and Urgent job number 2/1999/20 has been completed. The memorandum included such details as the final explosive charge weight (56 kilograms), and the fact that the device had a 30-minute electronic timer and came equipped with a hidden safety switch. The explosives were disguised as washing detergent packets and the detonator was hidden in a pack of cigarettes. Finally, the engineer notes that the "abovementioned bombs" were delivered to the "beneficiary representative" [an lIS agent] according to the "special forms" with a "full explanation about the detonating method, storing, and transportation."
4. To complete the car bomb task, the lIS staff officer includes a collection of "special forms" as part of the mission documentation. For example:
a. The Duty Assignment Confirmation Form where the engineer and the lIS agent account for the exchange,
b. The Inspection Certificate Form that verifies the car bomb meets chemical, electrical, and mechanical standards and is "ready to execute the duty."
c. A Duty Delivery Form that certifies the training of the operator and provides the bomb warranty as good for "only one month from date of delivery" as well as a recommendation that they use a Duracell battery instead of an everyday version "for the importance of the duty."
A similar example is found in the documentation of a June 2001 operation carried out by the lIS against the Iranian-supported Iraqi dissident group, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution (al-Da'wah Party). The target of this operation was not identified by name, but the target location was identified as a lecture hall in Qum, Iran.
Connections with TerrorThe development of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) progressed from booby-trapped cars and disguised explosive packages to actual roadside bombs designed to be used in civilian areas. An IIS memorandum dated 5 August 2001 describes in detail the manufacture and testing of a powerful type of lED that could be exploded by remote control and "vectored like rays so it will largely [destroy] the objective. 21 These devices were tested in a "residential area," with an emphasis on wireless detonation from 100 to 200 meters, and camouflaged to match the area.
There's also an internal memo written in 1993 identifiying the following groups as having connections with the IIS:
Fatah - Revolutionary Council (Abu-Nidal's Organization)
Palestine Liberation Front
Force 17 (Palestine)
Renewal and Jihad Organization
The Palestinian Abd al-Bari al-Duwaik (aka Abu Dawoud)
Islamic Jihad Organization [Egyptian Islamic Jihad]
Islamic Ulama Group - Islamic Scholars Group (Pakistani)
The Afghani Islamic Party
Jam'iyat Ulama Pakistan - Pakistan Scholars Group
The aid to palestinian groups extended not only from money to suicide bomber families, but also logistical and training:
There's also a marginal connection with HAMAS:Throughout the decade after OPERATION DESERT STORM, Saddam's support to Palestinian terrorist groups remained extensive. His funding of the families of suicide bombers attacking Israel is well documented in the open media, but Saddam's support did not stop there. For example, in a 2002 document, the Chief of Staff of Saddam's al Quds Army orders each brigade to build a replica of an Israeli settlement in its headquarters area so that fighters can train in a realistic environment. 56
There was a lot of action in the Kurdish areas; from planting bombs in trucks carrying relief aid to killing various people to force out NGOs such as Doctors without Boarders; and attempting assassinations of journalists:26 March 2003
We have lately been visited by representatives of the Hamas movement in Baghdad who inform us of the following points:
The leadership of the movement in Damascus called us a number of times to make sure we renew our commitment to you against the foolish American attack.
A request to open our border check points to let the volunteer fighters participate in the war.
An offer from Hamas leader, Dr. al-Rantisi to carry out demonstrations and suicide attacks to support Iraq. (64)
Abu Ghraib; that name keeps coming up, like a bad penny.In 1995, for instance, an IIS agent was assigned a secret mission to kill two Swedish journalists by blowing up their car with two sticks of dynamite. Before the agent carried out the mission, he informed his brother, an officer in the Kurdish security forces, of the details of the attack-which his brother promptly passed them on to his superiors. According to a captured document, Kurdish security in the area decided to let the IIS agent blow up the car but told him he could use only one stick of dynamite-the Swedish journalists would be wounded and not killed. 76
Both journalists apparently survived the blast. However, when the IIS brought its agent in for interrogation, the agent immediately broke down and confessed everything. An IIS tribunal closed the matter by sending the agent to Abu Ghraib prison for life.
So anyway, from reading this, I've come to the following conclusions regarding OIF:
1.) Bush and Co pulled off that classic police operation -- "bringing in" a guy for murder one; and finding out that while he didn't commit murder; he committed a lot of assault and battery charges along with a ton of other felonies.
2.) Bush and Co picked the absolute WORST place to invade from a post-war standpoint; a place where the enemy intelligence agencies had done extensive pre-war development of suicide tactics; car bomb tactics, IED tactics, and the preparation side of all that - which does go a lot further in understanding the rather unique nature of the insurgency in Iraq - it's heavy preponderance of explosive-based tactics, which are normally the exception, not the norm.
