Could the Roman Empire have gotten bigger?

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Post by Thanas »

pieman3141 wrote:Yes, it could've. The problem is that there's really nowhere to go, except east. Think: Germania has poor soil, little easily-accessible resources, and nasty dirty people (from a Roman POV). Why go there? To the South, you've got the Sahara, a place where nobody wants even today. One avenue is that they could've possibly entered Arabia, Yemen, or Axum, though. Good Indian Ocean ports, too.
They did move the frontier in arabia forward, but eventually they ran into too many problems with Persia and focused their energy on that state.
Ultimately, the Romans lacked a faster form of communication, or more precisely, a regulated form of rapid communication. Horses were the fastest thing in common use. I'm sure they could've used smoke signals, but as far as I know, no encoding was used to speed this up.
The romans did use smoke signals, most notably in their border forts, but smoke signals are not exactly a reliable form of communication. And communications were pretty fast for ancient times, with mesasages taking about 15 days to reach Rome/Constantinople if there was an emergency, though admittedly less important messages could take months. However, I think the biggest problem is logistics. The Romans were masters of it, sure, but supplying a force of 100.000 men on the Rhine and supplying a similar force on the vistula are two different things entirely. Especially with all those things a legionary was entitled to or needed.
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Post by Maxentius »

Thanas wrote: The romans did use smoke signals, most notably in their border forts, but smoke signals are not exactly a reliable form of communication. And communications were pretty fast for ancient times, with mesasages taking about 15 days to reach Rome/Constantinople if there was an emergency, though admittedly less important messages could take months. However, I think the biggest problem is logistics. The Romans were masters of it, sure, but supplying a force of 100.000 men on the Rhine and supplying a similar force on the vistula are two different things entirely. Especially with all those things a legionary was entitled to or needed.
On a somewhat unrelated note, I've heard a story that Tiberius crossed pretty much the breadth of the Empire in twenty-four hours, utilizing extensive remounts, upon hearing of Germanicus' death. Do you know if there's any credence to that story? All my attempts to verify it have turned up nothing, which leads me to believe it's entirely apocryphal.
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Post by Thanas »

^Well, the story of crossing the entire empire within a day is of course completely impossible, considering that it takes longer to traverse from Europe to Syria with a car/ferry.

However, there are numerous stories from which this might have evolved into the story you have heard. There is Tiberius hurrying back to Rome at the death of Augustus, which was from Illyricum to the city of Nola. Also, the message of the death of Tiberius on Capri toook only 48 hourse (about 200 km iirc) to reach Rome.

The most prominent example of someone hurrying to tell someone of a death is Hadrian hurrying to Germania in order to tell Trajan that Nerva had died. He was in competition to his relative and eventually used a combination of ship/horse/chariot to reach Trajan first. I believe Cassius Dio covers this.

Those examples of someone hurrying to reach someone are a standard topoi used to either discredit someone (the rush of the heir to the throne) or to paint him as a positive example of family loyalty. So I would say the story you have heard is most likely a variant of those examples listed above, although by itself it is of course highly unlikely it ever took place.
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Post by The Duchess of Zeon »

Take a look, it'll be useful for what I'm explaining.

The problem is one of defensive frontage. You need less frontage; it means you can increase your concentration of defensive positions and build more extensive fortifications, and you can potentially man all of those with fewer personnel. Also, part of the problem with using the Rhine and Danube as borders is that if they were secure, then they could be transportation corridors, allowing the transport of grain from the interior out to the sea and then along the coast to points where it is needed. You can't do that if the border is harried by pirates on the other side, not on a massive scale anyway.

The correct border in the south is obviously the Dniestr, not the Dniepr. It isn't off in the middle of the Ukraine where the barbarians have the advantage and there's nothing behind it. It's backed by the Carpathian mountains, so you can fortify the passes and the Danube flats can be flooded if necessary to impede the passage of an army once they've been developed with irrigation canals. So you really have two lines of defence by developing your southern border long the Dniestr. Now, I'd then extend the northern border down the Vistula toward the Carpathians, until we get to a point where the river is generally to shallow to matter and it's a straight shot over to the Carpathians. That could be covered by extensive walled fortifications, with the curve of the Vistula and the Carpathians behind them also being covered with a series of forts to impede movement, which could be used as a killbox against any barbarian group penetrating the main defensive wall, holding them in place for a mobile army to respond and attack well away from the centres of civilization in the area.

Also, you could fortify the Oder as a second frontier beyond that one, again allowing a fallback point. Those forts don't need regular garrisons--the garrisons from the first line forts would fall back to them, or else reinforcements would be sent up to them. This creates a much shorter perimeter than the Rhine-Danube frontier, and one which has some measure of ability for a coherent defence in depth.
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Post by Thanas »

The Duchess of Zeon wrote:Take a look, it'll be useful for what I'm explaining.

The problem is one of defensive frontage. You need less frontage; it means you can increase your concentration of defensive positions and build more extensive fortifications, and you can potentially man all of those with fewer personnel. Also, part of the problem with using the Rhine and Danube as borders is that if they were secure, then they could be transportation corridors, allowing the transport of grain from the interior out to the sea and then along the coast to points where it is needed. You can't do that if the border is harried by pirates on the other side, not on a massive scale anyway.
Actually, the Romans could, since they were the undisputed masters of the Rivers up until Adrianople. For example, on the height of the Alamannic excursions into Gaul, Julian could still count on his troops being supplied via Britannica by the roman fleet, and this also what eventually enabled him to go on the offensive.

The Roman fleet on the Rhine almost mustered some 300 ships at that time, with the only other people who had any resemblence of a Navy being the Saxons, although they were not enough to threaten the supply routes.
The correct border in the south is obviously the Dniestr, not the Dniepr. It isn't off in the middle of the Ukraine where the barbarians have the advantage and there's nothing behind it. It's backed by the Carpathian mountains, so you can fortify the passes and the Danube flats can be flooded if necessary to impede the passage of an army once they've been developed with irrigation canals. So you really have two lines of defence by developing your southern border long the Dniestr.
Correct. However, I would like to point out that the Romans already had extensive fortifications on the Pruth River which seemed to have been the roman frontier after Trajan's conquest of Dacia. However, extending the River up to the Dniestr means that one has to deal with the Sarmati and Roxolani. Now, I believe that the Roman empire under Antoninus Pius would have been strong to do that, but it would have been at a horrible cost. Even Marcus Aurelius, who could call on some of the best generals the Roman empire had (the generals who utterly destroyed Parthia and even reached media), had great trouble dealing with them. Granted, there was the plague, however it should be worth noting that Commodus decided not to extend the empire in that area even though he had the chance. So I doubt that the Romans would have decided to do that - essentially there is nothing but steppe filled with hostile people.
Now, I'd then extend the northern border down the Vistula toward the Carpathians, until we get to a point where the river is generally to shallow to matter and it's a straight shot over to the Carpathians. That could be covered by extensive walled fortifications, with the curve of the Vistula and the Carpathians behind them also being covered with a series of forts to impede movement, which could be used as a killbox against any barbarian group penetrating the main defensive wall, holding them in place for a mobile army to respond and attack well away from the centres of civilization in the area. Also, you could fortify the Oder as a second frontier beyond that one, again allowing a fallback point. Those forts don't need regular garrisons--the garrisons from the first line forts would fall back to them, or else reinforcements would be sent up to them. This creates a much shorter perimeter than the Rhine-Danube frontier, and one which has some measure of ability for a coherent defence in depth.
Are you arguing for something that would look like this?

Image

That was the concept proposed to Commodus in 180 and which was vetoed due to too many problems with it. It might have been viable, but probably not for the roman empire in such a weakened condition.

Or are you taking the bigger approach and arguing for something like this (red primary line, yellow secondary line of defense):

Image

Now, I don't think you do, but I just wanted to ask to make sure, because to even imagine that such a concept could have existed in the first place is somewhat to much RTW to me.
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Post by CmdrWilkens »

I think the Red is what she is advocating and from a purely geographic standpoint it is probably the most defensible frontier one could have against anyone coming out of the Russia steppe. What I am unqualified to answer is if Rome would, in the post Trajan-era have been able to call upon enough resources to succesfully conquer all the way to the Vistula. The Dnieper is much more doable in terms of distance and the security of Dacia but I just don't know about getting to the Vistula from the Rhine (or alternatively seizing between the Vistual and the Oder from bases on the Danube then campaigning down the Elbe)
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Post by Thanas »

CmdrWilkens wrote:I think the Red is what she is advocating and from a purely geographic standpoint it is probably the most defensible frontier one could have against anyone coming out of the Russia steppe. What I am unqualified to answer is if Rome would, in the post Trajan-era have been able to call upon enough resources to succesfully conquer all the way to the Vistula. The Dnieper is much more doable in terms of distance and the security of Dacia but I just don't know about getting to the Vistula from the Rhine (or alternatively seizing between the Vistual and the Oder from bases on the Danube then campaigning down the Elbe)
The idea seems impossible if one examines the reigns of the emperors.

Hadrian spent his entire reign consolidating the gains of Trajan in Dacia and dealing with the revolts. Marc Aurel and afterwards also is out of the question due to Parthia/plague/Sarmati etc.

So this leaves us with the reign of Antoninus Pius. However, such an extension over the course of 23 years is entirely within the realm of fantasy. Tiberius spent 4 years wasting his troops in Germania without any territorial gains whatsoever. And this would be an era where german tribes were expanding once again.

Seriously, the empire was already taxed to the breaking point within the invasions of the Parthicans and the Sarmatian tribes. There is no way the Romans would expand that fast.
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Post by Bellator »

The main problem for the Romans was the lack of pre-existing permanent settlements in areas like Germany and Scotland. They could waltz in, destroy any force in their way, but would be unable to hold on to their conquest. The native people would pick up and move to an area outside of direct Roman control. This is exactly what happened when the Romans did try to conquer Germany during the reign of Augustus.

There was no way for the Romans to control the teritory, because there were no permanent centers of power. These did exist in Gaul, Spain, Greece, Libya, Egypt, Dacia, etc. They did not exist in Germany, and wouldn't until the middle ages. This also explained the troubles Charlemagne had, centuries later, when trying to subdue the Saxons.


The second problem was that from the time of Antoninus Pius onwards, the Roman Empire steadily DECLINED in population, making it much harder to get the resources and manpower needed to expand further. The last emperor that did expand the empire in a serious way was Trajan. As Thanas pointed out, that leaves Hadrian, Marcus A., Antoninus P. And for various reasons these were not the most opportune times.
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Post by The Duchess of Zeon »

I was suggesting the red line, but I only believe it to be plausible in the context of a successful conquest of Germania by Augustus.
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Post by Thanas »

Bellator wrote:The main problem for the Romans was the lack of pre-existing permanent settlements in areas like Germany and Scotland. They could waltz in, destroy any force in their way, but would be unable to hold on to their conquest. The native people would pick up and move to an area outside of direct Roman control. This is exactly what happened when the Romans did try to conquer Germany during the reign of Augustus.

There was no way for the Romans to control the teritory, because there were no permanent centers of power. These did exist in Gaul, Spain, Greece, Libya, Egypt, Dacia, etc. They did not exist in Germany, and wouldn't until the middle ages. This also explained the troubles Charlemagne had, centuries later, when trying to subdue the Saxons.
There were quite a lot of permanent centers of power in the area by the germans, one example being the holy oaks and groves. Even a cursory reading of the wars of Germanicus reveals that he did base his strategy on the locations of those centers.

I also doubt your suggestion that the people would be able to pick up and move. By all historical accounts, this did not happen. Instead, when Augustus governed Germania, most germans were all too happy to move into roman oppida. Germans were not nomads like the Sarmati or Roxolani, but mostly farmers. Farmers do not just abandon their land, the very base of their existence. You also seem to forget that most germans lived in (albeit crudely) fortified villages at that time.
The second problem was that from the time of Antoninus Pius onwards, the Roman Empire steadily DECLINED in population, making it much harder to get the resources and manpower needed to expand further. The last emperor that did expand the empire in a serious way was Trajan. As Thanas pointed out, that leaves Hadrian, Marcus A., Antoninus P. And for various reasons these were not the most opportune times.
I would be vary of such estimates, since there is no real statistical basis to go on. The mainly accepted view is that the decline in the third century was halted by the start of the fourth century. However, there really is no way to make a definite assumption about the whole empire. We have regions who flourished dramatically (like Africa, no single city shrunk during the third/fourth centuries), yet also Regions who we do not know anything about.

The Duchess of Zeon wrote:I was suggesting the red line, but I only believe it to be plausible in the context of a successful conquest of Germania by Augustus.
Ah, thank you for clarifying. It makes much more sense now. In that case though, why do you suggest pushing all the way up to the vistula? The Elbe river seems a better solution to me, since it would allow one to link up with the Erzgebirge and Bohemia from where you would only have a comparatively small strip of Land to cover until the carpathian mountains. It also has the added benefit of not opening up the flank to possible gothic attacks from scandinavia.

My main problem with your solution is really the huge strip of forest and swam infested land nowadays known as Eastern Germany/Poland.

Likewise, I would still choose to keep the Pruth River, for the resons that it would be easier to supply and garrison than the Dniestr.

like in this example:
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Post by Bellator »

There were quite a lot of permanent centers of power in the area by the germans, one example being the holy oaks and groves. Even a cursory reading of the wars of Germanicus reveals that he did base his strategy on the locations of those centers.
Of course he based his strategy on those locations, that's the way they approached all their wars. Take out the enemies power centers, and they will fall apart. The reason this did not work in Germany is precicely because of the nature of German society. Even if the Romans held all the power centers, they had little control over the population. Unlike in Gaul, where controlling the power centers was for the most part sufficient.

In that sense I wouldn't even considered them real power centers, comparible to the ones found in Gaul, since their "power" was far more limited. There is no German equivalent of Alesia or Avaricum in terms or size, power or control over the population.
I also doubt your suggestion that the people would be able to pick up and move. By all historical accounts, this did not happen. Instead, when Augustus governed Germania, most germans were all too happy to move into roman oppida. Germans were not nomads like the Sarmati or Roxolani, but mostly farmers. Farmers do not just abandon their land, the very base of their existence. You also seem to forget that most germans lived in (albeit crudely) fortified villages at that time.
German society was only semi-sedentry, and whole people frequently picked up their stuff and moved after they exhausted the land, or if invaders entered. This happened frequently and on a regular basis. Obviously not nearly as frequently as true nomadic people, but the Germans were far less settled than the Gauls. There were almost no long term permanent settlements to speak of in Germany, prior to the age of Charlemagne. For all the things the Germans copied from the Romans, building permanent cities was not one of them. The extreme example of Völkerwanderung, though obviously not common, were only possible because of the very nature of German society and the fact that they did not rely on permanement settlements. This was the case when the Cimbrians were on the move, and was still the case at the very end of the Roman empire.
I would be vary of such estimates, since there is no real statistical basis to go on.
Archeological evidence of cities shrinking in population (based on the city walls, for instance). This combined with reports from Roman officials complaining about depopulation in the countryside.
The mainly accepted view is that the decline in the third century was halted by the start of the fourth century.
Even if that would be the case, the population didn't go back to earlier levels, which is what would have been needed to man and pay for future expansion.
However, there really is no way to make a definite assumption about the whole empire. We have regions who flourished dramatically (like Africa, no single city shrunk during the third/fourth centuries), yet also Regions who we do not know anything about.
True, there are exceptions. But even if, for the sake of argument, we accept that population wasn't declining, shipping volumes in the mediterian, tax revenues, and the amount of specie were declining. This meant that Rome simply didn't have the resources needed to fund future expansion. And this all may have a different explanation, the most simple one would be shrinking population levels (due to plague, environmental issues, or whatever), for which there is at least some evidence.
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Post by Thanas »

Bellator wrote:Of course he based his strategy on those locations, that's the way they approached all their wars. Take out the enemies power centers, and they will fall apart. The reason this did not work in Germany is precicely because of the nature of German society. Even if the Romans held all the power centers, they had little control over the population. Unlike in Gaul, where controlling the power centers was for the most part sufficient. In that sense I wouldn't even considered them real power centers, comparible to the ones found in Gaul, since their "power" was far more limited. There is no German equivalent of Alesia or Avaricum in terms or size, power or control over the population.
Obviously your definition of power center is a different from mine, you mean those centers without one cannot survive, whereas I simply take the term to mean those places where power is consolidated.

In that context, it is certainly true that the german culture was not city-centered. However, it was certainly settlement-centered, in that we have several hundreds of little settlements. You do not need a lot of population to project power, especially political or religious power. We have several reports of Germanicus devestating tribes by ravishing their heartlands. In fact, one of the major successes of his campaign, the recovery of two of the eagles, were in fact made after capturing a major settlement or religious center.

But yes, it is true that the "power centers", if such a term is even applicable in this context, were far less significant in military terms. Yet then again, the Romans never managed to reach the major settlements of Arminius.
German society was only semi-sedentry, and whole people frequently picked up their stuff and moved after they exhausted the land, or if invaders entered. This happened frequently and on a regular basis. Obviously not nearly as frequently as true nomadic people, but the Germans were far less settled than the Gauls. There were almost no long term permanent settlements to speak of in Germany, prior to the age of Charlemagne.
This is quite wrong. German migration was comparitively small until the time of the huns, with migrations like the Alamanni being the exception instead of the rule. Feddersen Wierde, which is an example of a typical german settlement, was populated from the first to the ffth century AD - without interruption.

You are of course correct that the germans were far less settled than the gauls, but to suggest that there were almost no long term settlements is quite wrong.
For all the things the Germans copied from the Romans, building permanent cities was not one of them. The extreme example of Völkerwanderung, though obviously not common, were only possible because of the very nature of German society and the fact that they did not rely on permanement settlements. This was the case when the Cimbrians were on the move, and was still the case at the very end of the Roman empire.
Certainly not, and Julian's campaigns seem to prove otherwise. The germans did rely on permanent settlements (see the example provided above), the problem was that they were quite skilled in evading armies and then rebuilding the settlements within quite a short time. For example, the settlements of the Alamanni were almost the same during the third and fourth century, and this was the german tribe credited with the biggest migration until the fifth century.
I would be vary of such estimates, since there is no real statistical basis to go on.
Archeological evidence of cities shrinking in population (based on the city walls, for instance). This combined with reports from Roman officials complaining about depopulation in the countryside.
Do you have access to a library? If so, I would suggest you read the excellent essays by Whittaker/Garnsey and Ward-Perkins in the Cambridge ancient history, which explain why all this evidence is in fact, nearly worthless. If not, I can try and paraphrase the most important parts here.
Even if that would be the case, the population didn't go back to earlier levels, which is what would have been needed to man and pay for future expansion.
Again, this is doubtful, because we do not even know the extent of the decline of the population besides some literarary evidence which is unreliable due to rhetorics.

As I said, the commonly accepted viewpoint is (paraphrased from the essay linked above):
According to the more recent and authoritative analysis, there was no general decline or transformation of classical cities in the west until the sixth and seventh centuries
And the east was flourishing.
True, there are exceptions. But even if, for the sake of argument, we accept that population wasn't declining, shipping volumes in the mediterian, tax revenues, and the amount of specie were declining.
Your evidence for that is what, exactly? Where do you get that from?
This meant that Rome simply didn't have the resources needed to fund future expansion. And this all may have a different explanation, the most simple one would be shrinking population levels (due to plague, environmental issues, or whatever), for which there is at least some evidence.
Again, this is not definite. I could just as easily point out that in the third and fourth century, the roman empire could afford to guarantee price stability and almost free issue of wine, pork, olive oil and grain in the urbs, a feat not managed before at any time. The average member of the plebs was issued about a gallon of free wine per day.

This speaks against a lack of resources. Furthermore, there is an easier explanation for why the roman empire did not expand anymore - a) it was not worth the cost - true for most german territories and even for Dacia, which was supposed to be "rich" or b) enemies with a different fighting style and a capable military occupied it - case in point, the dacians. In short, lack of resources does not really solve the problem.
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Post by The Duchess of Zeon »

Thanas wrote:
The Duchess of Zeon wrote:I was suggesting the red line, but I only believe it to be plausible in the context of a successful conquest of Germania by Augustus.
Ah, thank you for clarifying. It makes much more sense now. In that case though, why do you suggest pushing all the way up to the vistula? The Elbe river seems a better solution to me, since it would allow one to link up with the Erzgebirge and Bohemia from where you would only have a comparatively small strip of Land to cover until the carpathian mountains. It also has the added benefit of not opening up the flank to possible gothic attacks from scandinavia.

The Roman Navy can control the Baltic with trivial ease, and either walling off Jutland or simply conquering it would not be difficult, either, as there's no terrain to aide a defence by the local tribes. I'd prefer at least the River Oder, since it still allows an extensive defence in depth, though the depth of the Vistula is a preference to me--keeping the border as short as possible is the ideal. And a border on the Dniestr (perhaps just as a forward posting) at least lets you fall back to the Pruth before allowing opponents access to the Danube valley. It's reasonable to suppose anyway that the conquest of Germania would have been followed by the proposed conquest of Bohemia late in Augustus' reign, which means the conquests of Trajan would have essentially completed the border you have proposed with very little changes. However there is some evidence of Roman settlement on the coast east of the Prut, so a trivial advance of the border to the Dniestr by Trajan in those circumstances might well be possible. That leaves the issue of the Elbe--Vistula border region to Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius. One interesting possibility there is that they could campaign north from the Carpathians and trap the tribes in a rather neat pocket using Roman galleys on the Vistula, Oder, and Elbe for harrying and movement of troops to defeat all opposition in detail.

The land might be worthless, but that just makes it even better from my standpoint--it means that if the Vistula border is overrun, you can fall back to the Oder, and if the Oder is overrun, you can fall back to the Elbe. All you really need to do is build an extensive road network in the area and colonial garrisons; founding cities and etc is less necessary since the whole point of the region is to suffocate the advance of a barbarian horde, and the much shorter length of the overall border would arguably make the defence in depth of this proposed border no more expensive than the historical defence, while it would be a much stronger defensive belt that would make it very difficult for any Barbarians to reach and ravage internal Roman lands.
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Post by Thanas »

Hmmm. I wonder if that might not be too modern a thinking. Especially considering the defense in depth idea - it seems way too suited to modern speeds of advances for me. Considering that the top speed of advance for a roman army was 36 miles per day - using roman roads, a huge barrage train and being unopposed - I believe the whole defense in depth idea of such a wide area is somewhat too modern.

Especially when there already was some sort of defense in depth, the primary example being the german limes. Consider - you have the first garrisons a few hours away from the border, with the legions as a huge mobile reserve, being a few days of marching away. All of this does not require such huge stretches of land you propose.

Now, your idea may be to give the romans large swaths of worhtless land to abandon in the time of need. However, this is somewhat self-defeating. Germania for instance was used in a similar fashion at first. Yet within twenty years we have several huge settlements and a growing city culture, all who needed defending. The reasons for that are that with garrisons and soldiers commerce follows. Heck, after two hundred years the german cities were among the largest in the empire, like Augusta Trevorum. The Roman legions had an enormous supply of luxury goods shipped to them. Such merchants would stay in the vicii and soon be joined by the dependants of the soldiers and the barbarian settlers looking for protection. I see no reason why a similar process would not be happening on the Vistula River, therefore rendering the whole idea of expendable terrain somewhat moot.

Add to the top of that the enormous logistical problems. For example, the roman legionary was entitled to olive oil, which was imported from Greece, Spain or Northern Africa. In your scenario, the romans would have to ship it all the way to the Vistula.

I mean, sure, if one allows for an eventual conquest of Germania by Augustus (which I have reasons to believe would take far more than just his reign, considering the frisian and batavian situation), it is in theory possible to do this. However I see no real reason why a roman emperor would have done so, especially considering that the romans had no concept of geography as we do.
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Post by Knife »

Hmm, I might be wrong but I think some people in the tread are confusing power projection with the ability to actually defend the held territory. In my very humble and not so expert opinion, most forays outside the Roman Lake were pretty much a strain on the Empire/Republic. The Roman Navy giving tactical mobility to Roman Legions quicker than even the roads the Legions are famous for, putting 'feet on the ground' for the Legions on Northern Africa, Greece, Hispania, ect....
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Post by Maxentius »

Knife wrote:Hmm, I might be wrong but I think some people in the tread are confusing power projection with the ability to actually defend the held territory. In my very humble and not so expert opinion, most forays outside the Roman Lake were pretty much a strain on the Empire/Republic. The Roman Navy giving tactical mobility to Roman Legions quicker than even the roads the Legions are famous for, putting 'feet on the ground' for the Legions on Northern Africa, Greece, Hispania, ect....
Several Roman Emperors launched successful campaigns deep into the Parthian and Sassanid states. Many penetrated all the way to Ctesiphon; Septimus Severus, Heraclius, and Julian being the most noteworthy. And while it is almost certain that their supply trains were enhanced by river barges, the speed of their advance was not inconsiderable, Julian beginning his campaign in March and winning the Battle of Ctesiphon towards the end of May. All of these rather far-reaching operations were conducted entirely bereft of assistance the Roman Mediterranean classes.

Further, it could be argued that the strategic stance of the Late Roman Empire was not of power projection at all, but rather that of defense in depth, specifically the introduction of the Comitatenses and Limitanei, and their respective roles. It's certainly not anywhere near the modern concept, especially considering such broad fronts, but it is a rudimentary application of the concept.

I know you hate Luttvak, Thanas, but wasn't the Roman concept of defense in depth essentially his entire thesis in Grand Strategy? Admittedly, it's been a long time since I read it, and I was a bit young to fully absorb the contents when I did. I should probably reread it, come to think of it.
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Post by Thanas »

Maxentius wrote: Several Roman Emperors launched successful campaigns deep into the Parthian and Sassanid states. Many penetrated all the way to Ctesiphon; Septimus Severus, Heraclius, and Julian being the most noteworthy. And while it is almost certain that their supply trains were enhanced by river barges, the speed of their advance was not inconsiderable, Julian beginning his campaign in March and winning the Battle of Ctesiphon towards the end of May. All of these rather far-reaching operations were conducted entirely bereft of assistance the Roman Mediterranean classes.
Quite true, but I think you may be misinterpreting Knife a bit here - I think he is talking first and foremost of the troubles a roman army would face in actually holding all that land Duchess is suggesting as border country. Admittedly, I was a bit confused to at first, but I think he means the difference between staging raids and holding that conquered land.
If my impression is wrong, my apologies to you, Knife.

Of course, if one looks to a real logistical miracle one only needs to point out the invasion of Britain under Claudius for an earlier example. And I would suggest Avidius Cassius as an addition to your examples about Parthia, him being the only roman general to ever lead his forces into Media himself.
Further, it could be argued that the strategic stance of the Late Roman Empire was not of power projection at all, but rather that of defense in depth, specifically the introduction of the Comitatenses and Limitanei, and their respective roles. It's certainly not anywhere near the modern concept, especially considering such broad fronts, but it is a rudimentary application of the concept.
You are of course right (with the unnecessary addendum that although the defense in depth idea primarily focuses on defensive means, the system was still very much geared up towards offensive wars, but this is rather basic strategy). Yet one must not forget that there was no clean division between field armies and border armies as such - limitanei were still added to the field armies when needed and acquitted themselves well.

Still, the mechanisms were always the same throughout roman history - first you have the first line (prev. Auxillaries, LRE: limitanei, then the second line prev. legions, LRE: comitatenses and finally the third line: Praetorian Guard/mobile field army of the emperor).
I know you hate Luttvak, Thanas, but wasn't the Roman concept of defense in depth essentially his entire thesis in Grand Strategy? Admittedly, it's been a long time since I read it, and I was a bit young to fully absorb the contents when I did. I should probably reread it, come to think of it.
I don't really hate Luttwak per se. He gets credit for one thing - he forced other historians to do serious work on the subject in order to correct his mistakes. Seriously, the guy is a right-wing conservative nutjob - for example, he was one of the first to coin the familiar "Obama is a muslin" rhyme. Not someone who you would trust to be objective with his work. It is also not as if he was the first to analyze the roman strategy (despite his claims that almost everyone else ignores the roman military :roll:) and most of what he writes has already been discussed in far earlier books. I shudder what travesties his new book on Byzantium is going to contain. But I guess this is the end result if an amateur writes such a book. I would prefer Goldsworthy, Hoffmann and Bohec in a heartbeat, but I don't really hate Luttwak. There are far worse.

But please, do yourself a favour and do not reread his book. Read the one by Bohec instead - it is way better. You can find it in excerpts on google books here. Trust me, far better reading.

A good introductory essay to the transformation of the early to the late roman army is the essay of Karl Strobel, Strategy and Army structure between Septimius Severus and Constantine the great, found in: Paul Erdkamp (ed), A Companion to the Roman Army, pg. 267-286. Maybe it is on google books as well.

Also, yesterday I glanced through the book of Kate Gilliver on the subject of the Roman army and it looked quite impressive at first glance, especially the section of the roman marching orders.
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Post by Fingolfin_Noldor »

A side track, but is there any sources for Heraclius' great foray into Sassanid territory that led to victory?
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Post by ray245 »

Can it be argued that the late roman empire can be defended easier if they carried out an offensive defence?

Meaning they would launch minor invasion into other places that might threatened their position.
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Post by Fingolfin_Noldor »

ray245 wrote:Can it be argued that the late roman empire can be defended easier if they carried out an offensive defence?

Meaning they would launch minor invasion into other places that might threatened their position.
You do realise that the Arab raiding parties were by no means that easy to fend off?
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Post by ray245 »

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:
ray245 wrote:Can it be argued that the late roman empire can be defended easier if they carried out an offensive defence?

Meaning they would launch minor invasion into other places that might threatened their position.
You do realise that the Arab raiding parties were by no means that easy to fend off?
I know that...but it seems that the romans are performing weaker when they are focusing on defending their empire...

I mean the roman empire is so damn huge...defending it will only stretch your army...

I am basically using the argument that the best offense is the best defence.
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Post by Maxentius »

Sending several legions into the heart of the Arabian Peninsula is an excellent way to attrit them and ultimately accomplish nothing.

I'm sure the Sassanids/Parthians would just be chortling with glee to see the frontier stripped like that, too.
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Post by Thanas »

ray245 wrote:Can it be argued that the late roman empire can be defended easier if they carried out an offensive defence?

Meaning they would launch minor invasion into other places that might threatened their position.
That is what they did all the time. The problem is that those places are really hard to invade, and way harder to hold. And the arab raiding parties were actually not much of a problem - if the empire had not been that weakened by the awars and the sassanids, they would have crushed them.

I know that...but it seems that the romans are performing weaker when they are focusing on defending their empire...
Wrong.
I mean the roman empire is so damn huge...defending it will only stretch your army...

I am basically using the argument that the best offense is the best defence.
This reasoning reeks of idiocy and does not even deserve a proper reply.
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Post by Thanas »

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:A side track, but is there any sources for Heraclius' great foray into Sassanid territory that led to victory?
Yes, but could you be a little more specific with what you need?
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Post by hongi »

ray245 wrote: I mean the roman empire is so damn huge...defending it will only stretch your army...
Think man! If defending the Roman Empire stretches the army, campaigning in a far-off land will...stretch it even further. :roll:
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