Last stand of the Rawalpindi

[acesand8s]

The HMS Rawalpindi was a British armed merchant cruiser in WWII. While on patrol for German vessels off Iceland in 1939, she spotted two battlecruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, trying to break out into the Atlantic. She was spotted and radioed off a contact report. Rather than surrendering, the British captain decided to fight it out with the two German ships and was rather quickly sunk.

Wiki link

Though this is often cited as a brave last stand by the RN, I've frankly never understood it. It strikes me as rather stupid. Once she got off the contact report, there was no point to further fighting. It wasn't like the Rawalpindi could have done any appreciable damage to the German ships or that the Rawalpindi herself was a prize that had to be kept out of German hands.

Is there something I'm missing here? Was there, for example, another British force in the vicinity that could have engaged the two German ships if the Rawalpindi managed to delay them long enough?

[The Duchess of Zeon]

The HMS Rawalpindi was a British armed merchant cruiser in WWII. While on patrol for German vessels off Iceland in 1939, she spotted two battlecruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, trying to break out into the Atlantic. She was spotted and radioed off a contact report. Rather than surrendering, the British captain decided to fight it out with the two German ships and was rather quickly sunk.

Wiki link

Though this is often cited as a brave last stand by the RN, I've frankly never understood it. It strikes me as rather stupid. Once she got off the contact report, there was no point to further fighting. It wasn't like the Rawalpindi could have done any appreciable damage to the German ships or that the Rawalpindi herself was a prize that had to be kept out of German hands.

Is there something I'm missing here? Was there, for example, another British force in the vicinity that could have engaged the two German ships if the Rawalpindi managed to delay them long enough?

The Germans were convinced that such a force existed by the stand, so they turned around and went home again. Captain Kennedy sacrificed his life and his ship for the purpose of single-handedly stopping two German battlecruisers from commerce raiding--and even at the cost of 238 other men, that was not very bad of a trade.

Anyway, all elite military services more or less require examples of extreme bravery against hopeless odds as part of the substantiative mythos of their lineage which inspires future deeds.

[Eleventh Century Remnant]

Re-reading Barnett's account of the action, it seems as if Rawalpindi had little opportunity to avoid it. Salmon and Gluck were capable of twice her speed.

According to Scharnhorst's log as quoted by Barnett, first sighting was at 1507, Scharnhorst moved to intercept and positively identified a merchant cruiser, from 21,000 yards, at 1532. Rawalpindi's sighting report was not transmitted to the admiralty until 1551.

Scharnhorst ordered Rawalpindi to heave to at 1535; Rawalpindi steered to open the range and buy time to verify, identify (incorrectly) and report the contact. For some reason, the Germans chose not to open fire until 1604, at 8,250 yards.

Fire was not continuous- the Germans ceased fire to allow smoke to clear at 1610, and turned away to avoid a spurious torpedo track at 1614; but the last shots were fired at 1617.

27 of the 38 survivors from Rawalpindi were picked up by the German ships, the rest by the next ship in the patrol line, the Town class HMS Newcastle, which sighted and was sighted by the germans at 1815- accurate identifications seem to have been made on both sides- and both declined contact.

There was an extensive attempt to intercept the German ships on their way back, which failed due to poor search capabilities and not yet effective signals intelligence- and which put two British battleships temporarily out of action, Rodney with a rudder casualty and Nelson after hitting a mine.

The whole idea of mounting a blockade with armed merchant cruisers was a desperate stopgap, good enough for stopping freighters but against warships, nothing more than staking them out for the enemy to kill off; were not most of the AMCs withdrawn and converted to troopships later in the war?

Refusing to back down, no matter what the odds, is strategically a good thing but occasionally exacts a high tactical price. Captain E.C. Kennedy almost certainly knew the odds, and chose to play that out, like other RN officers who found themselves in similar circumstances later in the war.

[acesand8s]

I would add that the aspect of the Rawalpindi that makes it stand out relative to similar incidents during the war (e.g., Jervis Bay, Acasta & Ardent, Glowworm, or Kormoran, to mention a different navy) is just how outgunned the AMC was relative to her opponents and the absence of potential benefits to continued resistance. Every second Jervis Bay kept fighting against Admiral Scheer meant a greater chance of merchant ships escaping. Acasta & Ardent were giving Glorious some potential for escape and had a chance of damaging the Twins with their torpedoes (and did in fact manage to do so).

The Germans were convinced that such a force existed by the stand, so they turned around and went home again. Captain Kennedy sacrificed his life and his ship for the purpose of single-handedly stopping two German battlecruisers from commerce raiding--and even at the cost of 238 other men, that was not very bad of a trade.

That is new to me, thank you. My impression had been that the radio signal itself was enough to deter the attempted breakout.

Scharnhorst ordered Rawalpindi to heave to at 1535; Rawalpindi steered to open the range and buy time to verify, identify (incorrectly) and report the contact. For some reason, the Germans chose not to open fire until 1604, at 8,250 yards.

My understanding for the delay was that Scharnhorst attempted to get the AMC to heave to several times and fired a series a warning shots. Those repeated demands for surrender were the cause for the delay in opening the engagement. The Germans opened fire after the Rawalpindi commenced firing.

[Eleventh Century Remnant]

Not according to the German logs, as cited by Barnett, which record incoming fire from 1607 onwards, three minutes after Scharnhorst opened fire followed by Gneisenau, and one hit- on Scharnhorst's quarterdeck, which failed to detonate. Both parties were well within engagement range- had been since at least 1532.

A warning shot was fired at 1602, Rawalpindi dropped smoke floats, and then the Germans opened fire in earnest. Waiting so long to open fire, after giving warning after warning, and taking that long to realise they were going to be ignored- patience is one thing, but that crosses the line into hesitancy.

Either that, or they were waiting for Captain Kennedy to see sense, and he saw Duty instead.

As you forgot to take account of, HMS Newcastle did encounter Scharnhorst and Gneisenau just over two hours later; she was part of the Northern Patrol, the next ship in the line, and had gone to Rawalpindi's assistance- far too late, of course.

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were still in the area picking up survivors; the presence of another- and, re-reading, it seems that they did not correctly identify Newcastle, the log mentions a 'large ship'- that was the point at which they abandoned the search and steamed east at high speed.

Such a force not only existed, it had come looking for them in extremely short order. Newcastle, only a 6-inch cruiser, had no business attacking two battlecruisers, and no radar to shadow them with through the night, otherwise things might have gone differently.

[Sea Skimmer]

The whole idea of mounting a blockade with armed merchant cruisers was a desperate stopgap, good enough for stopping freighters but against warships, nothing more than staking them out for the enemy to kill off; were not most of the AMCs withdrawn and converted to troopships later in the war?

Well that was just the way you had to go things, and the threat was far more unarmed Nazi merchant ships and comparably armed Nazi disguised merchant raiders then it was Nazi battleships. Most AMCs did begin converting into transports by the end of 1942, but this was because aircraft and radar had taken over much of the patrol role and most German surface raiders had by then been sunk or otherwise put out of action. The need for the AMCs was real in 1939, technology quickly made them obsolete but such is the story of many weapons in WW2. The loss of a couple of them to German heavy warships was utterly irrelevant, expending an AMC to even turn back a German raid was more then worthwhile for the Royal Navy, and much better then losing a real cruiser.

Experience with AMC conversions also led to more useful vessels like auxiliary AA ships, catapult armed merchant ships, escort carriers and fighter direction ships. IIRC the first Allied amphibious command ship was also a former AMC.

[Stuart]

Though this is often cited as a brave last stand by the RN, I've frankly never understood it. It strikes me as rather stupid. Once she got off the contact report, there was no point to further fighting. It wasn't like the Rawalpindi could have done any appreciable damage to the German ships or that the Rawalpindi herself was a prize that had to be kept out of German hands. Is there something I'm missing here? Was there, for example, another British force in the vicinity that could have engaged the two German ships if the Rawalpindi managed to delay them long enough?

There's a lot here. One is that you know what was happening, who was on each side etc. In the actual action, nobody did. The Germans did not know whether the Rawalapindi was alone or whether she was just an outlying member of a larger group. When she turned and fought, that was a strong indicator that there were additional British ships in teh vicinity - in the near vicinity - and their appearance was only a matter of time. Essentially Captain Kennedy was bluffing but the bluff worked. If he had hauled down his flag he would (in addition to becoming an object of contempt and derision for the rest of his life) have confirmed that there were no additional British warships in the area and tehc ommerce raid would have gone on.

Another point is psychology. I've touched on this a couple of times in the TBO stories. The Britsih have a tradition; if somebody corners a British warship, she would attack, teeth bared and regardless of odds and do as much damage as she could with whatever weapons she had until she was physically put under the water. They did it often enough so it was a factor thate very enemy commander had to bear in mind. That commadner had to figure on the fact that, although his victory was certain, he was going to get damaged. If a ship is a long way from home without support, even trivial damage is a mission-kill. So, said enemyc ommander may well back off rather than fight a battle where he will get hurt winning.

Another point is quite simple. Warships are built to fight, not strike their flags. If their captains are going to surrender (or scuttle) just because the odds are against them, why bother building the ship? If the intent is to "save lives" then one could save a whole lot more just by scuttling the ship as part of her commissioning ceremony.

By the way, Captain Kennedy's son is Ludovic Kennedy the naval historian and broadcaster.

If you want to see how a warship should NOT be commanded, look up the history of the Graf Spee and her 'captain'.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Pretty gutsy captain. *salutes*

If you want to see how a warship should NOT be commanded, look up the history of the Graf Spee and her 'captain'.

The captain was a bit of a nut, especially scuttling his ship without a fight, and he went down with her, quite for nothing.

[Black Admiral]

The captain was a bit of a nut, especially scuttling his ship without a fight, and he went down with her, quite for nothing.

Actually, Langsdorff didn't go down with his ship - he shot himself in his hotel room several days later.

[Sea Skimmer]

Actually, Langsdorff didn't go down with his ship - he shot himself in his hotel room several days later.

He had no real choice in the matter once he decided to scuttle; he would have easily gotten the death penalty at a court marshal had he returned to Germany, and his utter disgrace was certain. The German navy promoted Langsdorff mostly on the basis of his administrative skills in the first place; this was not wise for a navy with so few major warships and no shortage of men who had served in WW1. I can’t help but think a paper pushing mentality, combined with twice having been knocked unconscious in the battle, was a large factor in his decision to simply give up.