US needs more subs to counter China ...

[Pelranius]

The incident with the Kitty Hawk and the Song honestly seems to have been planned on the part of the Chinese. It really doesn't mean very much because the route of the carrier group was public knowledge, so all the PLAN had to do was to send one of their subs to sit there. I seriously doubt that there would be much chance of a Chinese submarine running smack into an American carrier group by pure chance, since the ocean is a pretty big place. Just gave something for the USN and alarmists to go crazy over, and one of the PLA's mission objectives seems to be dicking around with the Defense Department.

[PainRack]

You have no idea what you are talking about. A submarine will fucking massacre a merchant convoy today, no single navy on earth can assemble as proper escort for its merchant shipping or anything close too it. All of NATO couldn’t have properly defended the sea lanes to Europe.

OT, but this is due to the fact that the Cold War ended and the various frigates/escort ships being decomissioned, right?

[Sea Skimmer]

OT, but this is due to the fact that the Cold War ended and the various frigates/escort ships being decomissioned, right?

Even at the height of NATO sea power the alliance never had enough escorts for the North Atlantic… let alone every other place on earth Soviet submarines could have started sinking things. This shouldn’t be a surprise, no one had enough escorts against surface or submarine raiders in 1914 or 1939 either, it took years of war to ramp up numbers in a way we just couldn’t do in a modern war. In the interims raiders ran rampant, but the western allies got saved both times by simply having massive merchant fleets and huge rates of replacement construction. This is not to say NATO would be helpless, far from it, but a serious shortfall of numbers was present. This got worse from the mid 1950s onward as the alliances hoard of reserve ships from WW2 all became obsolete and got scrapped.

However, largely unknown to NATO, Soviet naval doctrine shifted pretty strongly away from an anti commerce war after the 1960-65 period, so in an actual war the escort shortage wouldn’t have been as critical as it could be. Unfortunate the Soviets shifted doctrine because they knew a war was going to go nuclear; and they could shortcut destroying merchant ships by simply blowing away every deepwater port in Europe.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

While we're talking about getting the USN more Virginia class subs, how about getting the USAF the 381 F-22 fighters the blue suits keep demanding? Not enough pork to support that? You congressmen are fucking hypocrits.

Erm.. the current Secretary of Defence just got into a fight with his generals and had one of them ... fired?

[thejester]

OT, but this is due to the fact that the Cold War ended and the various frigates/escort ships being decomissioned, right?

Even at the height of NATO sea power the alliance never had enough escorts for the North Atlantic… let alone every other place on earth Soviet submarines could have started sinking things.

How much would that have been offset by G-I-UK?

[Sea Skimmer]

How much would that have been offset by G-I-UK?

Its value as choke point would depend on how many subs the Soviets surged past it before a war began, if too many got past then heavily defending the gap would simply be a drain on resources in a short war senario. In a long way the subs would have to start to return to base to rearm and so the gap had more value. Also keep in mind some of its key elements, like SOSUS, also presented major points of vulnerability (this led to SURTASS ships and the Type 23 frigate to provide mobile wide area sonar coverage). In all likeness the area would have seen the death of many Soviet subs, but it wouldn’t be a free ride in return especially for the surface ships which would have only limited protection from Soviet air attacks, besides having to deal with submarines counter hunting. But, as mentioned above, a Soviet surge into the Atlantic to wage a commerce war wasn’t a likely strategy after the 1950s.

Later the Soviets themselves saw the GIUK gap was a defensive choakpoint too, a first line of defence against the advance of NATO aircraft carriers and amphibious ships towards mother Russia.

[Omega18]

So far as force levels are concerned, even in 2025, there'll probably be 30x SSN-774s, 3x SSN-21s, and 12x SSN-688i (relying on gs.org's decomm dates here) in the USN (not including whatever new submarine the USN may start building in the meantime). That's still 45 SSNs - it's highly doubtful the Chinese are going to be able to match that sort of level (never mind technology) by 2025, if ever.

One things to at least note is the past rate of Virginia Class Submarine construction has been one-a-year, which would put you around 20 Virginia (SSN-774s) Submarines as of 2025. I believe the future goal is 1.5 per year, but this should put into better perspective why there is concern about the submarine production rate.

The other point worth noting more explicitly is a definite concern would be something like a sudden Chinese invasion attempt of Taiwan, and the issue would be with any short term superiority in subs in the area China could create. Basically the particular concern for the US would be subs not deployed or based in the Pacific could take awhile to actually get to the Taiwan general area, while China could have their subs all there quite quickly.

As far as Chinese sub acquisition rates go, at least some sources suggest that since 1999 China has produced at least 10 Song Class Submarines, (some sources put the number notably higher) plus 2 Yuan Class Submarines, and my understanding at least is 8 Kilo Class Submarines (beyond the 4 ordered and delivered prior to 1999) are scheduled to be delivered to China by 2010. China has also commissioned possibly 2 Shang Class Nuclear Attack Submarines during the same period. (Its pretty definitive that at least one has been commissioned.)

Basically while the Congressmen may have been exaggerating a bit, the rate of submarine acquisition for China recently has certainly been higher than you are suggesting.

[Stuart]

The incident with the Kitty Hawk and the Song honestly seems to have been planned on the part of the Chinese. It really doesn't mean very much because the route of the carrier group was public knowledge, so all the PLAN had to do was to send one of their subs to sit there.

I doubt it; the actual carrier routes aren't public knowledge in the detail required and it would only need a couple of miles difference to render teh whole operation moot. The area travelled is criss-crossed by navigation routes, its a junction area of significant importance. Its easy to imagine a Chinese boat going out crossing teh course of a US carrier group. Having said that, its certainly possible that the Chinese set it up; there's no evidence to support that though and the actions of the submarine are consistent with an accidental meeting.

I seriously doubt that there would be much chance of a Chinese submarine running smack into an American carrier group by pure chance, since the ocean is a pretty big place. Just gave something for the USN and alarmists to go crazy over, and one of the PLA's mission objectives seems to be dicking around with the Defense Department.

But, its a heavily travelled part of the sea; the chances of a particular submarine meeting a particular carrier group at a particular time are low but the chance of a submarine meeting a carrier group at some time or another is cumulatively high. The sea is indeed a very big place which is actuallya good reason why this wasn't a set-up. As I said, it only needed the carrier to be five or six miles off course and the whole set-up fails.

[Pelranius]

I doubt it; the actual carrier routes aren't public knowledge in the detail required and it would only need a couple of miles difference to render teh whole operation moot. The area travelled is criss-crossed by navigation routes, its a junction area of significant importance. Its easy to imagine a Chinese boat going out crossing teh course of a US carrier group. Having said that, its certainly possible that the Chinese set it up; there's no evidence to support that though and the actions of the submarine are consistent with an accidental meeting.

But, its a heavily travelled part of the sea; the chances of a particular submarine meeting a particular carrier group at a particular time are low but the chance of a submarine meeting a carrier group at some time or another is cumulatively high. The sea is indeed a very big place which is actuallya good reason why this wasn't a set-up. As I said, it only needed the carrier to be five or six miles off course and the whole set-up fails.

On the other hand, given the general route of the carrier being available (which can be extrapolated from the destinations) and the use of Chinese maritime patrol aircraft (probably one of those modified Y-8 transports) the PLAN could probably direct the submarine in question to the carrier's path. On the other hand, if they wanted to avoid the carrier group, they could have as just easily radioed instructions to the captain to get out of the way (they probably wouldn't want us to get too good a hearing on the Song's individual acoustic signatures and like)

I am also under the impression that given how rare Chinese submarine patrols are (usually no more that several a year, if the DoD reports can be trusted), that wouldn't leave much room for the accumulation of chance.

My theory for the behavior of the sub captain is that he or someone else in the crew probably got spooked by the presence of the carrier group.

[Stuart]

The article isn't talking about force levels directly, they're trying to make out that they're in danger of being out-submarined by the Chinese.

Which comes directly back to the force level issue. If we continue building submarines at the rate of one per year hat we're doing at the moment, eventually we will drop to 25 SSNs or thereabouts - we may hold teh line at 30 by stretching the fleet life to that many years. At the moment the US Navy is projecting a force level of 28 boats unless the construction rate of the SSN-774 goes up to two per year in 2010. This article is intended to be in support of that plan - which has wide congerssional support.

Those submarines have to be split amongst four oceans - we have to support deployments in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Even with 45 boats un the fleet, that gives us around 10 - 12 boats per deployment area. Allowing for the fact that we need three boats to keep one on station, that means we have, at best, a total of around 15 - 16 boats deployable in total at any one time. That's three or four per deployment area. In contrast, the Chinese have the initiative, they can surge their boats at any time they choose so the 3:1 ratio doesn't apply to them. They simply aim to have X number of boats ready to go at a specified date. They can't have their whole fleet operational, but they can have a signficant percentage of them and they can concentrate them at the desired point.

That's patently idiotic when you look at the utterly anemic state of the Chinese submarine force- never mind it's navy as a whole. Just where do they get the "3.4 attack subs for every one the US Navy is building"?

Let's see, they're building around three Project O39G and one Project 041 SSKs per year. Since 2006 they've commissioned three Project 093 SSNs and two Project 094 SSBNs. That's a pretty fast building rate. It will be interesting to see whether they can hold it or not.

Leaving aside for a second the dishonesty of almost certainly including SSKs and SSNs as being one and the same,

For coastal and inshore operation or barrier work, an SSK is arguably equivalent to an SSN. Its amusing to note that the same people who criticise the USN for not building SSKs (on the spurious grounds that an SSK can offer similar capabilities to an SSN at much lower cost) are teh first to try and write off the Chinese SSKs as not being worth considering.

there's absolutely no evidence of any Chinese navy intent to churn out either in quantity greater than the rate at which the Virginia's are commissioned - usual Chinese navy practice over the past two decades has been to build a handful of ships of a particular class, usually no more than 8 at the very most, and then move on to the next project - it takes forever and they're not built quickly.

That's flat wrong. Say again, the Chinese have commissioned three Project 093s since 2006 and they have at least three more building. Over the period 2006 - 2008 that means they have equalled the commissioning rate of the SSN-774 class. There are rumors (unconfirmed) of a new Chinese SSN, the Project 095, being designed. The Chinese have built 13 Project 039Gs in the last ofour years and there are at least six more building. There is one Project 041 in commission and four more building. The Chinese built 21 Project 035s and more than 90 Project 033s. Soi building in number isn't their problem. They're turning out an SSK is around three years which is world-standard. Recently pictures of Chinese SSBNs fitting out showed two Project 094s sitting side-by-side in the fitting-out basin at Wuchang.

Your comment is right as far as it applies to the surface fleet but its way off on their submarine fleet.

So far as force levels are concerned, even in 2025, there'll probably be 30x SSN-774s, 3x SSN-21s, and 12x SSN-688i (relying on gs.org's decomm dates here) in the USN (not including whatever new submarine the USN may start building in the meantime). That's still 45 SSNs - it's highly doubtful the Chinese are going to be able to match that sort of level (never mind technology) by 2025, if ever.

Once again, split it over four deployment theaters and remember the Chinese have to worry about one that's their own back doorstep. Suddenly, it becomes a lot less healthy. And there will not be 30 SSN-774s in 2025 unless the building rate goes up in 2010 which is what this article is supporting. So your own numerical analysis is supporting the author's case.

[Stuart]

And my understanding at least is 8 Kilo Class Submarines (beyond the 4 ordered and delivered prior to 1999) are scheduled to be delivered to China by 2010.

All eight were delivered in 2006/2007. They pretty much replaced the last of the old Project 033 boats.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

This does not compute. Aircraft carriers (fixed-wing and rotary) can cover far more ocean than an SSN, are very difficult for a sub to attack (or even detect) and can engage one very easily. You can buy dozens of maritime patrol aircraft for the price of one SSN, and if you saturate the ocean with them, it will become completely impossible for attack subs to actually operate.

The problem is that we currently have no dedicated fixed-wing ASW aircraft on our carriers. That would be an excellent justification for maintaining our current carrier force, however--start deploying ASW squadrons again. But that would mean a replacement for the S-3 Viking.

[Questor]

This does not compute. Aircraft carriers (fixed-wing and rotary) can cover far more ocean than an SSN, are very difficult for a sub to attack (or even detect) and can engage one very easily. You can buy dozens of maritime patrol aircraft for the price of one SSN, and if you saturate the ocean with them, it will become completely impossible for attack subs to actually operate.

The problem is that we currently have no dedicated fixed-wing ASW aircraft on our carriers. That would be an excellent justification for maintaining our current carrier force, however--start deploying ASW squadrons again. But that would mean a replacement for the S-3 Viking.

Isn't there one on the drawing board? I thought I read something an "optionally-manned" aircraft that would replace the S-3, ES-3, C-2, and E-2, and maybe provide more air-refueling capability.

Did that get cancelled, or is it in development hell (to steal a phrase from Hollywood)?

[Ma Deuce]

Isn't there one on the drawing board? I thought I read something an "optionally-manned" aircraft that would replace the S-3, ES-3, C-2, and E-2, and maybe provide more air-refueling capability.

Did that get cancelled, or is it in development hell (to steal a phrase from Hollywood)?

You must be referring to the Common Support Aircraft concept that's been around for more than a decade. It was not "canceled", but it has never advanced beyond the study phase to begin with. No commitment has been made by the Navy and no real design work was ever begun, and I find it unlikely it ever will see the light of day.

[Sea Skimmer]

Common Support Aircraft is looking very increasingly irrelevant, I think we can say its dead now. The EF-18G Growler has already covered one of the roles CSA was supposed to fill, jamming, while the heavily upgraded E-2D Hawkeye covers the need for a new AEW plane.

Probably at some point we’ll get a new COD plane that can also carry buddy stores to act as a tanker, but I would not hold my breath for a new ASW plane. The ELINT role meanwhile, is pretty much UAV territory these days.

[Sidewinder]

Erm.. the current Secretary of Defence just got into a fight with his generals and had one of them ... fired?

I thought that was due to some fuckups the USAF had with nuclear weapons, i.e., a bomber taking off with some live nukes (w/out the crew's knowledge) and Taiwan getting nuclear missile fuses instead of the batteries the Taiwanese ordered?

[SVPD]

There was also a statement or speech or something where the SECDEF chastised the armed services at the Pentagon level for having "next-war-itis", and basically told them that anything they want to purchase will need to demonstrate at least some relevance to counterinsurgency. He also said something to the effect of "keep your eye on the ball" in regard to Iraq/Afghanistan.

This might be good in terms of curbing some of the more pie-in-the-sky programs, but then there's no shortage of pie-in-the-sky counterinsurgency gadgetry either. Based on what I saw in Iraq, I swear we could fight this war for half the cost if we stopped trying to solve everything with a better gadget.. but I digress.

I also found it ironic that it's taken as something of a historical axiom that nations and generals often make the mistake of preparing for the last war. In this case, the generals are trying (maybe a little too hard) to avoid that mistake, and are, in a sense, being explicitly told to go ahead and make it.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Erm.. the current Secretary of Defence just got into a fight with his generals and had one of them ... fired?

I thought that was due to some fuckups the USAF had with nuclear weapons, i.e., a bomber taking off with some live nukes (w/out the crew's knowledge) and Taiwan getting nuclear missile fuses instead of the batteries the Taiwanese ordered?

The Secretary of Defence got into a public fight with one of the generals who publicly said that the Air Force would buy more F-22s at some number. The nuclear issue is just one of many issues the SoD has with the Air Force.

[Beowulf]

Don't forget the failed inspection at Minot, which occurred shortly after the nuclear weapon incident.

[thejester]

Later the Soviets themselves saw the GIUK gap was a defensive choakpoint too, a first line of defence against the advance of NATO aircraft carriers and amphibious ships towards mother Russia.

So did the Soviets see the SSN/SSGN forces as primarily defensive?

[K. A. Pital]

Please explain to me why the US had to deploy submarines everywhere [into every ocean?] and fears the Chinese constructing subs? Because "Defense" in reality means "uphold global domination" as strategy and nothing else?

[K. A. Pital]

Wouldn't a massive war with China damage your economy to a great extent anyway? In case the conflict is local, why would China attempt to sink commerce liners from and to other nations? In case it's an all-out war between US and China (and possibly several other SCO members), wouldn't trade cease anyway?

[Stuart Mackey]

Please explain to me why the US had to deploy submarines everywhere [into every ocean?] and fears the Chinese constructing subs?

I think it has to do with protecting commerce. The US does trading with countries all over the world, so American ships can be found in waters all over the world. If an enemy were to have the power to disrupt that trade, such as submarines sinking unprotected ships on the other side of the world, it could damage our economy.

I imagine that's why the Chinese are building so many, as well as refitting the old Varyag as their training carrier(I hear they finally repainted the island structure). Of course they could just be forcing the US to cripple its economy, using US paranoia and greed as the leverage, via their seemingly uncontrollable spending habits.

[Stuart Mackey]

Wouldn't a massive war with China damage your economy to a great extent anyway?

Yes, and more economies besides, but what's that to to do with anything when pride, power, principle and ego are at stake?

In case the conflict is local, why would China attempt to sink commerce liners from and to other nations?

They would have ago at any trade that benefits their opponent.

In case it's an all-out war between US and China (and possibly several other SCO members), wouldn't trade cease anyway?

Between the combatant's it would.

[Sidewinder]

Wouldn't a massive war with China damage your economy to a great extent anyway? In case the conflict is local, why would China attempt to sink commerce liners from and to other nations? In case it's an all-out war between US and China (and possibly several other SCO members), wouldn't trade cease anyway?

It may be a case of "generals preparing to fight the last war," in this case, WWI and WWII, when the Germans conducted unrestricted submarine warfare.