Goliath smacks David, slingshot missing wins points for hilarious title ...
1. Russia was ready for this. They had lots of equipment in place and ready to go. And the response was swift and decisive. Saakashvili was probably counting on the fact that a) Putin is out of the country; and b) Russian officialdom tends to vacate to their dachas for the month of August, with the idea that the Russian response would be slow and disorganized. This seems profoundly stupid, given the tit-for-tat provocations over the last several weeks and the recent war games Russia conducted in the region, but Saakashvili's intelligence has so far left me unimpressed.
2. Medvedev gets to look strong and in charge. Since Putin is out of the country, Medvedev is on his own in the Security Council and in making speeches (at least to the domestic audience). A convenient little war (2nd Chechnya War) did a lot to boost Putin's popularity when he first became president. Can they be hoping that this war will do the same for Medvedev? Medvedev's popularity has been slipping, and a substantial number of poll-respondents don't think he's really in charge (a number that has gone up over the last couple months). Throw a little war presidency into the mix, though, and the situation may look a bit different.
3. If Russia did indeed lay out bait for Georgia, they must be pleasantly surprised by the results--Georgia not only took the bait, but did so in a way that makes the Russian response look like it occurred on a not totally flimsy pretext. Georgia launched an organized, planned ground assault. Russia gets to respond not on the basis of the harassment or death of a couple of civilians with Russian citizenship, but to an all-out invasion.
4. This is not going to end well for Georgia. Russia has expanded its targets beyond the vicinity of South Ossetia, hitting not only military but also economic and communications targets throughout Georgia. It is unlikely, though, that Russia intends to set up a puppet government as they did in Chechnya--the local population is far too hostile, and I doubt that they have any reliable local elites that they can turn to. More likely, we will see a clear demand for independence for both Abkhazia and South Ossetia (though I suspect that shortly after obtaining independence, S. Ossetia would petition to rejoin the motherland, which Russia would, of course, graciously grant