Trouble in South Ossetia escalates

[That NOS Guy]

And what nation would think Australia would be stupid enough to go against Russia?

Possibly the same country stupid enough to get embroiled in a war with a vastly superior foe hoping for a quick victory?

[hongi]

Australia? Australia?! Why the hell would Georgia ask us?

[Mr Flibble]

Australia? Australia?! Why the hell would Georgia ask us?

Maybe they meant to ask Austria, to garner European support, but dialled the wrong number.

[Gandalf]

I'm glad that we're sending humanitarian aid.

Australia? Australia?! Why the hell would Georgia ask us?

We've been tied to the US for decades, and if the US helps Georgia, Australia must be worth a look in.

[weemadando]

Fucking hell - we get a notable international event and I'm stuck without computer/net and also without reliable news source (fuck you commute times and the olympics).

As for Georgia asking for Australian help - we're a Western "power". We mightn't be able to sweep the Russian's from the skies, but if they can get us to stand up in the UN and drag all of the Pacific votes (which we continue to pay handsomely for) with us, that certainly helps them.

[K. A. Pital]

Saakashvili meekly conceded and made himself look like a total fool with this whole mess he started.

What a fucking idiot. Start hostilities by killing ~2000 people in a 30,000 capital city, then lie, cry like a baby in front of all nations and finally expose himself as an idiot when he claimed Russia is aiming to conquer Georgia.

Of course, he gathered a lot of nationalist PR inside his nation - the BBC reported that even though people knew he was attacking S.Ossetia, they supported him since "he's our leader and he will restore Georgia" blah.

[CJvR]

Well thing seem to be quieting down now so soon we should be able to get some impartial estimates about what realy happened. One thing is certain it was a spectacular example of Poker politics where the Georgian bluff got check-raised by Moscow.

[Gandalf]

Of course, he gathered a lot of nationalist PR inside his nation - the BBC reported that even though people knew he was attacking S.Ossetia, they supported him since "he's our leader and he will restore Georgia" blah.

Gee, that sounds familiar.

[CJvR]

Seems like the Ruskis are in Gori afterall. (Auf Swedish natürlich)

http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article3090526.ab

Provided the reporter have made a correct ID that is.

[Broomstick]

Australia? Australia?! Why the hell would Georgia ask us?

Because they had asked everyone else first and finally got to Australia on the list? Sounds like an act of desperation from someone who had really miscalculated.

There's a part of me hoping that when the dust settles it will be become clear it was Georgia that started this and their accusations of "genocide" and atrocities on the part of the Russians will be revealed as pure fabrications. I don't like this portrayal of Georgia as some plucky, abused little nation when they started the shooting here.

[PeZook]

Right, so apparently Georgia is the poor opressed little country who got invaded for no reason at all according to 90% of all Polish media.

I'm getting pissed off with all that whining I'm seeing and hearing around here. The president doing a grand-stand for political points in Tblisi (conveniently, when most of the fighting is practically over) didn't help.

I'm no fan of Russian military interventions, but please. There wasn't a peep of how the poor Georgians shelled a fucking city full of civilians at the start of this whole thing.

[JointStrikeFighter]

JointStrikeFighter: If you were genuinely sorry, you wouldn't be so quick to leap in here with a big-time vendetta, now, would you?

26 pages of you being a cunt and i didn't jump in. CLEARLY I HAVE GIANT VENDETTA!!!111!!!

[Broomstick]

From the New York Times - it somewhat supports my idea that what was said publicly and what was said privately were two different things. The NY Times also seem to be the least biased of the US media sources for those of you looking for English-language news.

WASHINGTON — One month ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Tbilisi, Georgia, for a high-profile visit that was planned to accomplish two very different goals.

During a private dinner on July 9, Ms. Rice’s aides say, she warned President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia not to get into a military conflict with Russia that Georgia could not win. “She told him, in no uncertain terms, that he had to put a non-use of force pledge on the table,” according to a senior administration official who accompanied Ms. Rice to the Georgian capital.

But publicly, Ms. Rice struck a different tone, one of defiant support for Georgia in the face of Russian pressure. “I’m going to visit a friend and I don’t expect much comment about the United States going to visit a friend,” she told reporters just before arriving in Tbilisi, even as Russian jets were conducting intimidating maneuvers over South Ossetia.

In the five days since the simmering conflict between Russia and Georgia erupted into war, Bush administration officials have been adamant in asserting that they warned the government in Tbilisi not to let Moscow provoke it into a fight — and that they were surprised when their advice went unheeded. Right up until the hours before Georgia launched its attack late last week in South Ossetia, Washington’s top envoy for the region, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, and other administration officials were warning the Georgians not to allow the conflict to escalate.

But as Ms. Rice’s two-pronged visit to Tbilisi demonstrates, the accumulation of years of mixed messages may have made the American warnings fall on deaf ears.

The United States took a series of steps that emboldened Georgia: sending advisers to build up the Georgian military, including an exercise last month with more than 1,000 American troops; pressing hard to bring Georgia into the NATO orbit; championing Georgia’s fledgling democracy along Russia’s southern border; and loudly proclaiming its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity in the battle with Russia over Georgia’s separatist enclaves.

But interviews with officials at the State Department, Pentagon and the White House show that the Bush administration was never going to back Georgia militarily in a fight with Russia.

In recent years, the United States has also taken a series of steps that have alienated Russia — including recognizing an independent Kosovo and going ahead with efforts to construct a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. By last Thursday, when the years of simmering conflict exploded into war, Russia had a point to prove to the world, even some administration officials acknowledge, while Georgia may have been under the mistaken impression that in a one-on-one fight with Russia, Georgia would have more concrete American support.

After a meeting at the White House on Tuesday, Ms. Rice emphasized the urgency of bringing the fighting to a halt, rather than how and why it started. But around Washington, there are some rumblings already over whether the crisis might have somehow been headed off.

In a flurry of briefings intended to counter the critics and overcome the impression of having been caught flatfooted, senior Bush administration officials tried to paint a portrait of American reason and calm in the midst of hot tempers in what several called “a hot zone.”

Officials at the White House, State Department and the Pentagon said that President Saakashvili did not officially inform the Bush administration in advance of his offensive — let alone ask for support. “The Georgians figured it was better to ask forgiveness later, but not ask for permission first,” said one administration official. “It was a decision on their part. They knew we would say ‘no.’ ”

But critics say the United States may have given Georgia reason to hope.

Ms. Rice went to Tbilisi just as tensions between Russia and Georgia were escalating. Standing next to Mr. Saakashvili during a press conference, she said that Russia “needs to be a part of resolving the problem and solving the problems and not contributing to it.” Mr. Saakashvili, for his part, was clearly thrilled to host Ms. Rice.

“We are also very grateful for your support for our peace plan for the conflicts and for your unwavering support for Georgia’s territorial integrity,” he said.

Ms. Rice left Tbilisi, but the violence between the Georgians and the South Ossetian separatists continued to get worse, until 10 days ago, when it suddenly escalated. Each side accused the other of setting off the fighting, which began on Aug. 1 and involved mortars, grenade launchers and small-arms fire. Troops from Georgia battled separatist fighters, killing at least six people; the Georgians accuse the South Ossetians of firing at Georgian towns from behind Russian peacekeepers.

By Thursday night, Aug. 7, things had gotten out of hand, almost everyone agrees.

At the State Department in Washington, Mr. Fried, the top envoy for the region, received a phone call on Thursday from Georgia’s foreign minister, Eka Tkeshelashvili, who said the country was under attack. The foreign minister said Georgia had to protect its people.

“We told them they had to keep their unilateral cease-fire,” the official said. “We said, ‘Be smart about this, don’t go in and don’t fall for the Russian provocation. Do not do this.’ ”

Around the same time, members of the Georgia army unit assigned to a training program under American advisers did not show up for the day’s exercises. In retrospect, American officials said, it is obvious that they had been ordered to mobilize for the mission in South Ossetia by their commanders.

“This caught us totally by surprise,” said one military officer who tracks events in the region, including the American-Georgian training effort. “It really knocked us off our chairs.”

Ms. Rice did not get on the phone with her Georgian counterpart on Thursday, but left it to Mr. Fried to deliver the “don’t go in” message, a senior administration official said. “I don’t think it would have made any difference if she had,” the official said. “They knew the message was coming from the top.”

A few hours later, in the early morning hours of Friday, Aug. 8, Georgia launched its offensive in South Ossetia, and Russia responded with a tenfold show of force. Ms. Rice, the administration official said, “called Saakashvili on Friday morning, after their folks were in.”

[Broomstick]

Now, from CNN which has had a decidedly pro-Georgian stance in all this reporting that perhaps what the Georgians are saying and what's actually happening are not quite the same things:

TBILISI, Georgia (CNN) -- Georgia and Russia have accused each other of violating a cease-fire only 24 hours after it was agreed.

Really, not that uncommon - if there are disrupted communications there may be parties unaware of a cease-fire, plus the occasional group who think they can get away with scoring one more for their side.

The six-point deal was meant to end the fighting over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but both sides traded accusations Wednesday.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov used a Moscow press conference to urge Georgia to formally sign the deal.

Meanwhile Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, flanked by the leaders of Lithuania, Poland, Estonia and Latvia in a separate media briefing, said Russian tanks were attacking and "rampaging" through the Georgian town of Gori despite the cease-fire.

However journalists in Gori said they had seen no Russian tanks. Residents there told the journalists they had earlier seen "some" Russian tanks, but not in large numbers.

A Russian military official also disputed Georgia's claims.

"I tell you with full responsibility that there are no Russian tanks in Gori today and there is no reason to be," because Gori authorities have fled the city, said General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the Russian General Staff.

Nogovitsyn said the conflict had killed 74 Russian troops, wounded 171 and left 19 missing in action.

Saakashvili also accused Russia of carpet bombing Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital, and setting up internment camps for residents there and in Abkhazia.

A little proof, please, Georgia?

"Georgia has been sticking to its commitments, but I don't think there is much to stick to here," Saakashvili said.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy said Tuesday that Saakashvili and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had agreed to the deal, which called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal to the positions held before the fighting escalated

Sarkozy is the current president of the European Union, which mediated the six-point cease-fire.

The deal also allowed displaced civilians to return home safely and opens Georgia to humanitarian aid workers.

Sarkozy acknowledged that the plan was provisional but said a long-term solution was being sought.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner would present the plan to EU members and eventually make it the basis for a legal document to be reviewed by the U.N. Security Council, Sarkozy said.

Lavrov said it was important for Georgian armed forces to return to their barracks as part of the agreement.

"The Georgian side must immediately fulfill this key issue, to remove all dangers concerning relapses," Lavrov said.

He reiterated that Russian peacekeepers would remain in South Ossetia, where they were before the fighting erupted last week.

He also called for international observers to help ensure peace and "prevent any aggressive ambitions on the part of the Georgian leadership."

Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus said an international force would be the only way to stop violence and ensure Georgia's territorial integrity.

"Let the world finally wake up and take the action and provide the real security for the region," Adamkus said.

You mean - restrain the Georgians from starting something like this again?

Fighting has raged since Thursday when Georgia launched its crackdown on separatist fighters in autonomous South Ossetia, where most people have long supported independence.

You have to realize - just yesterday morning CNN was still saying Russia "invaded" Georgia on TV broadcast. This is really a 180 in the reporting.

Russian troops and tanks moved into South Ossetia on Friday and quickly pushed back the Georgian forces. Russian forces also moved into Abkhazia, another breakaway Georgian region.

Russia called a halt Tuesday to its military incursion, insisting it had been aimed at stopping Georgian military actions against its peacekeepers and citizens in the breakaway regions.

One Russian diplomat told CNN that as many as 2,000 people died after Georgia sent its military into South Ossetia.

Estonian President Toomas Ilves, who spoke at the news conference with Saakashvili, said Russia's actions threatened the independence of former Soviet nations.

"This is the first time that we've actually seen an invasion, a unilateral invasion of a country," Ilves said. "I think we have to think about this long and hard and deeply in the EU [and] in NATO."

Up to 100,000 people are thought to have been displaced in South Ossetia and Georgia. The United States, U.N. agencies, religious groups, and non-governmental organizations have started drives for humanitarian relief.

[Coyote]

NBC last night did one of their little computer-animated "Risk"-game thingies explaining the conflict and clearly spelled out that "it started when Georgia launched an attack" into S. Ossetia...

[Anguirus]

Russians may be in Gori after all

TBILISI, Georgia - A Russian military convoy thrust deep into Georgia on Wednesday and Georgian officials said Russian troops bombed and looted the crossroads city of Gori, violating a freshly brokered truce intended to end the conflict.

In the west, Georgia's weakened military acknowledged its soldiers had pulled out entirely from Abkhazia, leaving both breakaway regions at the heart of the fighting in the hands of Russian-backed separatists.

Even as the Russian troops moved deep into Georgian territory from the separatist region of South Ossetia, a few dozen fighters from Abkhazia offered their own brazen challenge, planting their flag on a bridge over the Inguri River — outside the rebel territory.

"The border has been along this river for 1,000 years," separatist official Ruslan Kishmaria told AP on Wednesday. He said Georgia would have to accept the new border and taunted the departed Georgian forces by saying they had received "American training in running away."

An AP reporter saw several dozen Russian military trucks and armored vehicles speeding out of Gori and heading south, further from the breakaway province of South Ossetia.

Soldiers waved at journalists and one soldier shouted to a photographer takning shots of the convoy: "Come with us, beauty, we're going to Tbilisi." Gori is about a 90-minute drive from the Georgian capital.

The developments came less than 12 hours after Georgia's president said he accepted a cease-fire plan intended to end the fighting that bloodied and battered the U.S. ally and uprooted an estimated 100,000 people.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia was halting military action because Georgia had paid enough for its attack on South Ossetia, a separatist region along the Russian border with close ties to Moscow.

Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili had gambled on a surprise attack late Thursday to regain control over his country's pro-Russian breakaway province of South Ossetia. Instead, Georgia suffered a punishing beating from Russian tanks and aircraft that has left the country with even less control over territory than it had before.

Georgia's Security Council chief Alexander Lomaia said that Russia had moved 50 tanks into Gori, a strategic town 15 miles from the border with South Ossetia, violating the new accord.

"Russia has treacherously broken its word," Lomaia said.

Russia's deputy chief of General Staff Col.-Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn denied any tanks were in Gori. He said Russians went into the city to try to implement the truce with local Georgian officials but could not find any.

An APTN television crew in Gori saw some Russian armored vehicles Wednesday morning near a military base there. Puffs of smoke in the air indicated some military action.

Nogovitsyn said sporadic clashes continued in South Ossetia where Georgian snipers fired sporadically on Russian troops who returned fire. "We must respond to provocations," he said.

Georgian Interior Ministry spokesman Zurab Gvenetadze said that Russian forces seized a military base on the outskirts of Gori, situated on Georgia's only significant east-west road.

Lomaia said that Russian troops also held ground in western Georgia, maintaining control of the town of Zugdidi where they seized the central police station and government buildings and saddling the main highway in the region. He said there had been no fresh clashes since the truce.

Georgia insisted its troops were driven from Abkhazia by Russian forces. At first, Russia said separatists — not Russian forces — had done the job. But the claim rang hollow — an AP reporter saw 135 Russian military vehicles heading toward the gorge Tuesday and Russia is the military patron for the separatists.

Nogovitsyn said Wednesday that Russian peacekeepers had disarmed Georgian troops in Kodori — the very peacekeepers Georgia wants withdrawn. Still, the effect was clear. Abkhazia was out of Georgian hands and it would take more than an EU peace plan to get it back in.

Nogovitsyn said Wednesday that Russian peacekeepers had disarmed Georgian troops in Kodori — the very peacekeepers Georgia wants withdrawn. Still, the effect was clear. Abkhazia was out of Georgian hands and it would take more than an EU peace plan to get it back in.

One of two separatists areas trying to leave Georgia for Russia, Abkhazia lies close to the heart of many Russians. It's Black Sea coast was a favorite vacation spot for the Soviet elite, and the province is just down the coast from Sochi, the Russian resort that will host the 2014 Olympics.

Russia has handed out passports to most in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and stationed peacekeepers in the both regions since the early 1990s. Georgia wants the Russian peacekeepers out, but Medvedev insisted Tuesday they would stay.

Saakashvili said Russia's aim all along was not to gain control of two disputed provinces but to "destroy" the smaller nation, a former Soviet state and current U.S. ally.

Russia accused Georgia of killing more than 2,000 people, mostly civilians, in South Ossetia. The claim couldn't be independently confirmed, but witnesses who fled the area over the weekend said hundreds had died.

The overall death toll was expected to rise because large areas of Georgia were still too dangerous for journalists to enter and see the true scope of the damage.

Georgia's Health Minister Alexander Kvitashvili said Wednesday that 175 Georgians had died in five days of air and ground attacks that left homes in smoldering ruins. He said many died Tuesday in a Russian raid of Gori hours before Medvedev declared fighting halted.

An AP reporter also saw heavy damage inflicted to a Georgian village near Gori by a raid which the villagers said came only half-hour before Russian television broadcast Medvedev's statement. Two men and a woman in the village of Ruisi, in undisputed Georgian territory just outside South Ossetia, were killed and five were wounded.

"I always hide in the basement," said one villager, 70-year old Vakhtang Chkhekvadze, as he was picking away what was left of a window frame torn by an explosion. "But this time the explosion came so abruptly, I don't remember what happened afterward."

The first relief flight from the U.N. refugee agency arrived in Georgia as the number of people uprooted by the conflict neared 100,000. Thousands streamed into the capital.

Those left behind in devastated regions of Georgia cowered in rat-infested cellars or wandered nearly deserted cities.

Georgia, which is pushing for NATO membership, borders the Black Sea between Turkey and Russia and was ruled by Moscow for most of the two centuries preceding the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia have run their own affairs without international recognition since fighting to split from Georgia in the early 1990s. Both separatist provinces are backed by Russia, which appears open to absorbing them.

Medvedev said Georgia must allow the provinces to decide whether they want to remain part of Georgia. He said Russian peacekeepers would stay in both provinces, even as Saakashvili said his government will officially designate them as occupying forces.

Georgia sits on a strategic oil pipeline carrying Caspian crude to Western markets and bypassing Russia. The British oil company BP shut down one of three Georgian pipelines, saying it was a precaution.

___

Associated Press writers Christopher Torchia reported from Zugdidi, Georgia, and near the Kodori Gorge. Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili from Tbilisi, Georgia. David Nowak in Tbilisi; Sergei Grits in Ruisi, Georgia; Douglas Birch in Tskhinvali, Georgia; Jim Heintz, Vladimir Isachenkov, Lynn Berry and Angela Charlton in Moscow; Pauline Jelinek and Lolita C. Baldor in Washington and John Heilprin at the United Nations contributed to this report.

[Vympel]

"The border has been along this river for 1,000 years," separatist official Ruslan Kishmaria told AP on Wednesday. He said Georgia would have to accept the new border and taunted the departed Georgian forces by saying they had received "American training in running away."

Well, it does seem the only thing the Georgians absorbed from their American training was hand-me-down MARPAT uniforms. Certainly nothing useful for when you fight with Russia.

As the War Nerd noted, you're a fucking idiot if you think light infantry training is worth shit against an armored force like the 58th Army.

[RedImperator]

The howling from the right wing over here is getting deafening. My favorite was the guy who said on Chris Matthews that we should send troops to Georgia, though the writer on Politico comparing Putin to Hitler, Bush to Chamberlain, and McCain to Churchill was fun, too.

I think I should become a right-wing talking head. The pay is good, and all you have to do is act like a belligerent imbecile.

[Darth Wong]

The howling from the right wing over here is getting deafening. My favorite was the guy who said on Chris Matthews that we should send troops to Georgia, though the writer on Politico comparing Putin to Hitler, Bush to Chamberlain, and McCain to Churchill was fun, too.

I think I should become a right-wing talking head. The pay is good, and all you have to do is act like a belligerent imbecile.

Yeah, but you're a doughy white guy, and they already have a shitload of those guys in that industry. They'd probably have more use for a visible minority like me, whose appearance automatically deflates charges of racism. That's probably why Michelle Malkin and Dinesh D'Souza are big stars in that industry, even though they're among the dumbest human beings to ever draw breath.

But yeah, "us vs them" rhetoric is so easy to do.

[irishmick79]

The howling from the right wing over here is getting deafening. My favorite was the guy who said on Chris Matthews that we should send troops to Georgia, though the writer on Politico comparing Putin to Hitler, Bush to Chamberlain, and McCain to Churchill was fun, too.

I think I should become a right-wing talking head. The pay is good, and all you have to do is act like a belligerent imbecile.

Yeah, no kidding. I post on a few other political forums where the conservative voice is a little stronger than it is here, and they're already wanking off to US military superiority versus Russia and are figuring out amongst themselves how just how much the US military would kick Russia's ass in any kind of intervention. They are clearly of the opinion that the only thing keeping the US from triumphantly rescuing the little democracy that is Georgia from big bad Russia is weakness in the US martial will, (conveniently) brought on by the Democrats (aka Surrend-O-Crats). Fucking idiots.

[Vympel]

Stratfor gives its view on the causes and consequences of the war:-

Stratfor view:


The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power
August 12, 2008


By George Friedman

The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when to make this public. They did that Aug. 8.

Let’s begin simply by reviewing the last few days.

On the night of Thursday, Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia.

On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.


On Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it.

The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion
In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate.

The United States is Georgia’s closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that t he Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack?

It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion.

If this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them. Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for months, as we have discussed, and they struck.

The Western Encirclement of Russia
To understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet Union empire.

That promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.

The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia.

The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored.

From the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia.

Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more important.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China.

Resurrecting the Russian Sphere
Putin did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice.

By invading Georgia as Russia did (competently if not brilliantly), Putin re-established the credibility of the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their security.

The Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk.

The Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria.

Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan (even though Moscow’s interests there are currently aligned with those of Washington).

In other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they have demonstrated it.

The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public return to great power status. This is not something that just happened — it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and short on resources. As we have written, this conflict created a window of opportunity. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical foundations of the war have been building since 1992.

Russia has been an empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality, but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being rectified.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

So ceasefire violations have led to the occupation of Gori today? Well, that's not really a surprise, considering that Gori is within artillery range of Tskhanvali; to keep the city safe from the Georgians, it would be rational to occupy Gori.

[CJvR]

Well If I was the Prez in Georgia I would dump the stinking goat herders, the Russians are quite welcome to them, and hurry in under the NATO umbrella.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Well If I was the Prez in Georgia I would dump the stinking goat herders, the Russians are quite welcome to them, and hurry in under the NATO umbrella.

That would certainly not happen now at least in the next 5-10 years, unless Russia suddenly gets admitted into NATO, which is bloody unlikely.

[Darth Hoth]

Well If I was the Prez in Georgia I would dump the stinking goat herders, the Russians are quite welcome to them, and hurry in under the NATO umbrella.

The problem is that those are strategic border regions important to Georgia's defence against possible Russian aggression. Furthermore, it might not be wise to concede anything to an authoritarian, jingoistic great power on your border - if you give them a finger, they just might decide to take the rest of the arm as well.