Trouble in South Ossetia escalates

[atg]

Really? The British? Their lack of consistency in foreign policy was hardly long term thinking. Unless you consider a 10 year span long term. They lasted a long time, but their foreign policies were always shortsighted. Germany... I again disagree. Unless you're considering 10-20 years being long term. The Russians I don't know enough about to say one way or the other.

British foreign policy was essentially to oppose the strongest power on the continent for the simple reason it kept them safe. That primary aim stayed consistent for many, many years. Short term policies worked within that overall goal.

[Scottish Ninja]

An AP reporter saw dozens of Russian trucks and armored vehicles heading south from the central city of Gori in the direction of Tbilisi, but they later turned away.

About the alleged Russian units between Gori and Tbilisi, isn't Georgian Army equipment largely Russian-made? Wouldn't it be possible to see some retreating Georgian T-72s and say, "Hey, look, Russian tanks, and they're heading towards Tbilisi."

For that to happen would be consistent with the standards of journalism we've seen throughout this conflict.

[Straha]

The Shah of Iran wasn't long-term. And he was arguable badly-handled by the U.S. intelligence and policy community, which grew complacent and stopped worrying about whether or not he was reliable. Some of the signs were there; nobody was paying any attention to a "non-problem spot."

There were signs of tensions which were brought up in Defense and State. They were just either ignored or treated very badly. It didn't help that the Shah was sending mixed signals to the U.S. about pretty much everything, had completely misjudged the situation at home, had deliberately neutered his military commanders and thought that Carter was plotting to oust him and replace him with someone more suited to U.S. policy. Fun guy.



That being said there are examples of long term U.S. foreign policy alliances. South Korea, Saudi Arabia, our long term commitment in Germany, Tunisia, Turkey and Israel all spring to mind right away. But, really, you can't plan every foreign policy move to be long term because sometimes the shit hits the fan when there's an internal revolt, or when there's a change in administration or when the leader of the country you're allying yourself makes a string of boneheaded decisions all in a row.

The one things hampering American foreign policy of late is that we have no real goal. From 45 to 91 we had the clear cut goal of "stop communism and keep the west strong" and everything the government did foreign policy wise could be seen in that prism. In the 90s Communism was dead, and we had no goal. The only achievements the U.S. seemed to accomplish were the botched Gulf war, intervention in a Yugoslavian civil war, and some deal making with China and North Korea. People forget but we received a lot of criticism at home and abroad for not doing anything as the sole superpower of the world, including (irony of ironies) most vocally Jacques Chirac.

The Bush administration had a goal coming in, though. A large portion of the administration were Cold Warriors who saw China as the new threat and thought we had to streamline and update our military to maintain our lead over them. 9/11 changed that, and now our goal seems to be "Make the world safe by containing all of the undesirables, even if we have to use undesirable people to do it."

British foreign policy was essentially to oppose the strongest power on the continent for the simple reason it kept them safe. That primary aim stayed consistent for many, many years. Short term policies worked within that overall goal.

Yes, but how that policy was put into effect looks like American policy today. They switched allies and basic alliances so many times that without understanding the situation the Brits would seem schizophrenic.

[Vympel]

About the alleged Russian units between Gori and Tbilisi, isn't Georgian Army equipment largely Russian-made? Wouldn't it be possible to see some retreating Georgian T-72s and say, "Hey, look, Russian tanks, and they're heading towards Tbilisi."

For that to happen would be consistent with the standards of journalism we've seen throughout this conflict.

It's possible. The only way to tell them apart is looking at the crew, or the tactical markings on the mud guards - Georgian tanks have them, Russian tanks don't.

[Darth Wong]

That being said there are examples of long term U.S. foreign policy alliances. South Korea, Saudi Arabia, our long term commitment in Germany, Tunisia, Turkey and Israel all spring to mind right away. But, really, you can't plan every foreign policy move to be long term because sometimes the shit hits the fan when there's an internal revolt, or when there's a change in administration or when the leader of the country you're allying yourself makes a string of boneheaded decisions all in a row.

It's not about the length of term, so much as the consistency with one's own rhetoric. No one says that Ancient Rome was hypocritical because they never pretended to be anything other than a conquering Empire. But when your rhetoric is as moralistic as America's foreign-policy rhetoric, then the gap between rhetoric and reality becomes huge, and glaring, and demands attention. Every time some dumbshit American politician stands up and makes declarations about what America "stands for", the rest of the world says "bullshit".

[atg]

British foreign policy was essentially to oppose the strongest power on the continent for the simple reason it kept them safe. That primary aim stayed consistent for many, many years. Short term policies worked within that overall goal.

Yes, but how that policy was put into effect looks like American policy today. They switched allies and basic alliances so many times that without understanding the situation the Brits would seem schizophrenic.

Switching allies and alliances was exactly the point. This is an incredibly simplified version: When Spain was the strongest they were against Spain. When France rose they eventually joined with Spain against France. They had Russia as an ally against Napoleon but fought against Russia with France as their allies in the crimea when needed. Ditto when Germany arose and Britain sided with France.

They did what was needed to keep the overall goal in mind, this policy only fell through as mentioned in the 1930s. Napoleon said that if could be master of the channel for a day he would be master of Europe. This was what the British had to avoid at all costs, a Europe under one strong power that would eventually be able to challenge their naval power and their sovereignty. So they sided with whomever they needed to accomplish that goal at a given time.

[Vympel]

The Times:

Vladimir Putin's Mastery Checkmates the West

Russia has been biding its time, but its victory in Georgia has been brutal - and brilliant

The Times
By Michael Binyon
August 14, 2008

The cartoon images have shown Russia as an angry bear, stretching out a claw to maul Georgia. Russia is certainly angry, and, like a beast provoked, has bared its teeth. But it is the wrong stereotype. What the world has seen last week is a brilliant and brutal display of Russia's national game, chess. And Moscow has just declared checkmate.

Chess is a slow game. One has to be ready to ignore provocations, lose a few pawns and turn the hubris of others into their own entrapment. For years there has been rising resentment within Russia. Some of this is inevitable: the loss of empire, a burning sense of grievance and the fear that in the 1990s, amid domestic chaos and economic collapse, Russia's views no longer mattered.

A generalised resentment, similar to the sour undercurrents of Weimar Germany, began to focus on specific issues: the nonchalance of the Clinton Administration about Russian sensitivities, especially over the Balkans and in opening Nato's door to former Warsaw Pact members; the neo-conservative agenda of the early Bush years that saw no role for Russia in its global agenda; and Washington's ingratitude after 9/11 for vital Kremlin support over terrorism, Afghanistan and intelligence on extremism.

More infuriating was Western encouragement of “freedom” in the former Soviet satellite states that gave carte blanche to forces long hostile to Russia. In the Baltic states, Soviet occupation could be portrayed as worse than the Nazis. EU commissioners from new member states could target Russian policies. Populists in Eastern Europe could ride to power on anti-Russian rhetoric emboldened by Western applause for their fluency in English.

Nowhere was such taunting more wounding than in Ukraine and Georgia, two countries long part of the Russian Empire, whose history, religion and culture were so intertwined with Russia's. Moscow tried, disastrously, to check Western, and particularly American, influence in Ukraine. The clumsy meddling led to the Orange Revolution.

Georgia was a different matter. Relations were always mercurial, but Eduard Shevardnadze, the wily former Soviet Foreign Minister, knew how to keep atavistic animosities in check. Not so his brash successor, Mikheil Saakashvili. From then on, hubris was Tbilisi's undoing.

It was not simply the dismissive rhetoric, the open door to US advisers or the economic illiteracy in forgetting dependence on Russian energy and remittance from across the border; it was the determined attempt to make Georgia a US regional ally and outpost of US influence.

Big powers do not like other big powers poaching. This may not be moral or fair but it is reality, and one that underpins the Security Council veto. The Monroe Doctrine - “hands off the Americas” - has been policy in Washington for 200 years. The US is ready to risk war to keep out not only other powers but hostile ideologies - in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Vladimir Putin lost several pawns on the chessboard - Kosovo, Iraq, Nato membership for the Baltic states, US renunciation of the ABM treaty, US missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. But he waited.

The trap was set in Georgia. When President Saakashvili blundered into South Ossetia, sending in an army to shell, kill and maim on a vicious scale (against US advice and his promised word), Russia was waiting.

It was not only Mr Saakashvili who thought that he had the distraction of the Olympics to cover him; the Kremlin also knew that Mr Bush was watching basketball, and, in the longer term, that the US army was fully engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the day that the Russian tank brigade raced through the tunnel into South Ossetia, Russia has not made one wrong move. Mr Bush's remarks yesterday notwithstanding, in five days it turned an overreaching blunder by a Western-backed opponent into a devastating exposure of Western impotence, dithering and double standards on respecting national sovereignty (viz Iraq).

The attack was short, sharp and deadly - enough to send the Georgians fleeing in humiliating panic, their rout captured by global television. The destruction was enough to hurt, but not so much that the world would be roused in fury. The timing of the ceasefire was precise: just hours before President Sarkozy could voice Western anger. Moscow made clear that it retained the initiative. And despite sporadic breaches - on both sides - Russia has blunted Georgian charges that this is a war of annihilation.

Moscow can also counter Georgian PR, the last weapon left to Tbilisi. Human rights? Look at what Georgia has done in South Ossetia (and also in Abkhazia). National sovereignty? Look at the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia. False pretexts? Look at Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada to “rescue” US medical students. Western outrage? Look at the confused cacophony.

There are lessons everywhere. To the former Soviet republics - remember your geography. To NATO - do you still want to incorporate Caucasian vendettas into your alliance? To Tbilisi - do you want to keep a President who brought this on you? To Washington - does Russia's voice still count for nothing? Like it or not, it counts for a lot.

There was a good article I read with the very simple statement - I have yet to hear anyone explain to me just why Ukraine and Georgia should be allowed to join NATO. The absurdity of Georgia joining NATO has already been soundly demonstrated, and it's the same thing for Ukraine - the Catholic West Ukraine trying to dominate the Russian East Ukraine. Ready-made civil strife, and yet they blithely ignore it.

[Adrian Laguna]

Really? The British? Their lack of consistency in foreign policy was hardly long term thinking. Unless you consider a 10 year span long term. They lasted a long time, but their foreign policies were always shortsighted. Germany... I again disagree. Unless you're considering 10-20 years being long term. The Russians I don't know enough about to say one way or the other.

Great Britain has been covered by atg. In terms of Germany, I'm being very specific to the nation under Bismark. After the Franco-Prussian war, the man set things up so Germany would enjoy stability both in the foreign and domestic spheres for quite a long time. Unfortunately, the next generation of leaders was rather less able than the Iron Chancellor, and shit blew-up in Germany's face after only four decades.

In terms of Russia, they have been pretty consistently following the same foreign policy strategy since Ivan the Terrible: trying to put as much land as possible between Muscovy and everybody else. They also played a major role in the re-ordering of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars, and the preservation of that order in the subsequent years. They did this with an eye toward long term stability, and had a measure of success at achieving that.

[Straha]

That being said there are examples of long term U.S. foreign policy alliances. South Korea, Saudi Arabia, our long term commitment in Germany, Tunisia, Turkey and Israel all spring to mind right away. But, really, you can't plan every foreign policy move to be long term because sometimes the shit hits the fan when there's an internal revolt, or when there's a change in administration or when the leader of the country you're allying yourself makes a string of boneheaded decisions all in a row.

It's not about the length of term, so much as the consistency with one's own rhetoric. No one says that Ancient Rome was hypocritical because they never pretended to be anything other than a conquering Empire. But when your rhetoric is as moralistic as America's foreign-policy rhetoric, then the gap between rhetoric and reality becomes huge, and glaring, and demands attention. Every time some dumbshit American politician stands up and makes declarations about what America "stands for", the rest of the world says "bullshit".

I was responding to Broomstick's statement (in response to Fingolfin) that "That's consistent with US foreign policy always being short-term." Which is, as I said, wrong. And to point out that we had alliance with unpleasant countries doesn't change the fact that American foreign policy has been framed with long term goals. I wasn't touching the moralistic aspects of American foreign policy because, frankly, there can be no defense of American post-cold war foreign policy on its moral aspect. It has been such a mish-mash of jumbled ideas (dual containment of Iran and Iraq) and Wilsonian hypocritical principles (most recently Kosovo, but before that Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, etc.) that to try and defend it from the moral high ground that politicians here try to claim is just plain wrong.

Switching allies and alliances was exactly the point. This is an incredibly simplified version: When Spain was the strongest they were against Spain. When France rose they eventually joined with Spain against France. They had Russia as an ally against Napoleon but fought against Russia with France as their allies in the crimea when needed. Ditto when Germany arose and Britain sided with France.

I'm agreeing with you, and I'm making the point that just because America has had an ulmost unending string of short term alliances with small powers (like Fingolfin and Broomstick pointed out) does not mean that American foreign policy goals have always been short term. Throughout the cold war we made repeated alliances with a number of unsavory groups and powers that only lasted for a short time, but all with the definite goal of maintaining western stability and containing the spread of Communism. I'll agree that in the 90s we had almost no goal, but that was a problem of both world circumstances and the Clinton White House, but before and after that any criticisms saying that America set its goals only in the short term are all invalid.

[[R_H]]

Caucasus foes fight cyber war (BBC)

Armed with computers, unseen ranks of hackers are fanning conflict in the Caucasus.

Internet users in Russia and Georgia have attacked vital websites in each other's countries, in a virtual echo of battles being fought on the ground by troops and tanks.

Several Georgian government portals have been defaced or forced offline by hackers allegedly based in Russia.

Visitors to Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili's website were recently routed to a page portraying him as a modern-day Hitler.

Georgia's parliament and foreign ministry sites have also repeatedly been disabled, allegedly by attacks from networks of hijacked computers.

Hackers from Georgia have meanwhile been blamed for targeting the websites of Russian news outlets and the separatist government of South Ossetia, which Russia supports.

Internet security experts say it was inevitable that a conflict fired by separatism in the Caucasus should spill into cyberspace.

The republics of the former Soviet Union are, along with China and Brazil, major centres of cyber-crime, according to Alex Shipp of the email security firm, MessageLabs.

While the Chinese specialise in industrial espionage and the Brazilians are adept at online financial fraud, Mr Shipp says Russian criminals dominate the market in online tools tailored for amateur hackers.

"Several Russian sites specialise in selling software that would-be cyber-criminals can download," he says.

'Dark side'

Russia's association with cyber-crime dates back to the demise of the former Soviet Union - an event that roughly coincided with the dawn of the internet era in the early 1990s.

For thousands of youths who came of age as communism collapsed, computers symbolised the new spirit of enterprise.

Treating programming as a tool for self-empowerment, these eager amateurs eventually became skilled software engineers.

They learnt their expertise, in part, from a brilliant earlier generation of Soviet-era developers, says the BBC News website's technology correspondent, Mark Ward.

These older programmers had devised clever software to sidestep the shortcomings of the clunky communist computers they had been forced to use.

Although Russia's new engineers had skills to match the brightest minds of Silicon Valley, they earned far smaller sums than their peers in the West.

Bored and underpaid, many turned their talents to hacking.

Gradually, they attracted new paymasters from the thriving post-Soviet underworld. As the gangsters harnessed the hackers' skills, the profits from cyber-crime grew.

The result, according to technology critic Bill Thompson, is a business that today resembles the "dark side of Silicon Valley".

Hacking made easy

The people accused of attacking government websites in Georgia's war with Russia are using many methods pioneered by the cyber-criminals.

However, it is far harder to trace hackers who are driven by patriotism rather than profit.

"Where extortion or fraud is involved, you can follow the money trail," Bill Thompson says. "But politically-motivated attacks are almost impossible to police."

Hacking technology is also becoming increasingly accessible.

The most common form of attack uses networks of hijacked computers, or botnets, that besiege a site with more traffic than it can handle, eventually forcing it offline.

Such "denial of service" attacks are often the work of amateurs, following instructions downloaded from the internet.

Experts are more commonly responsible for "deface hacking" - attacks that manipulate the content on a secure website or divert traffic from it.

Lawless space

According to Anton Nosik, a Russian businessman and internet pioneer, most hackers tend to be teenagers with broadband internet and limitless time on their hands.

He says websites hosted in countries with relatively small, under-developed networks are often most vulnerable to attack.

The Georgian government, he says, ought to consider moving its websites to providers in the US or Western Europe if it hopes to reduce its exposure to attack.

In doing so, it would follow an example set by websites that support separatists from the Russian republic of Chechnya - also frequently targeted by hackers.

"Websites run by Chechen militants are hosted in western European countries with relatively large, secure networks - capable of handling larger volumes and less easily taken off air," Mr Nosik says.

But, he warns, there is no foolproof defence against the most determined hackers, for whom Russia remains a haven.

"The very notion of crime only exists in places where you have the law and the law is applied," he says.

Global laws governing cyberspace are still being devised. In nations waging war, they are least likely to be applied.

CNN's report about the cyberwarfare/defacing of websites only mentioned this happening to Georgian websites, of course.

[Chardok]

I heard something on NPR that bears mentioning. If Georgia were allowed into NATO, and were attacked by Russia, we may end up with WWI Mk.II. That is, tripping a series of automatic alliances that embroil the entire world in total war.

Thoughts?

[PeZook]

I heard something on NPR that bears mentioning. If Georgia were allowed into NATO, and were attacked by Russia, we may end up with WWI Mk.II. That is, tripping a series of automatic alliances that embroil the entire world in total war.

Thoughts?

I doubt it. Nobody's stupid enough to go to war with Russia over Georgian asshattery, even if they allowed the shithole into NATO. People fear war nowadays (as they should), rather than gleefully anticipating it like in 1914.

On the hacker issue: I remember a dumbshit reporter woman here commenting that: "Russia was very well prepared - just see how quickly they blocked Georgian websites! I tried to reach the georgian foreign ministry site today and it was difficult!"

Yeah, evil Russia even blocked Georgian FM site!

It couldn't possibly have been the result of tens of thousands of journalists constantly searching the site for info

[Darth Wong]

It would, however, cause chaos within NATO because it would force member nations to essentially renounce their treaty obligations, thus casting the viability of NATO itself into doubt. The whole concept of NATO is a defensive alliance, where an attack on any party would draw a response from the entire group.

Even if NATO had admitted NATO and then refused to go to war with Russia, it would mean that NATO is effectively shattered. Every nation would be in violation of its own treaty obligations, and no nation could expect the treaty to have any force in future.

[[R_H]]

On the hacker issue: I remember a dumbshit reporter woman here commenting that: "Russia was very well prepared - just see how quickly they blocked Georgian websites! I tried to reach the georgian foreign ministry site today and it was difficult!"

Yeah, evil Russia even blocked Georgian FM site!

It couldn't possibly have been the result of tens of thousands of journalists constantly searching the site for info

Was it...a CNN reporter? IMO, CNN's reporting on the conflict has been atrocious at best.

[Admiral Valdemar]

But not as bad as FAUX News'.

[Adrian Laguna]

It would, however, cause chaos within NATO because it would force member nations to essentially renounce their treaty obligations, thus casting the viability of NATO itself into doubt. The whole concept of NATO is a defensive alliance, where an attack on any party would draw a response from the entire group..

That's probably why several NATO members, most prominently France, strongly opposed Georgian membership. They knew that if anything happened, nobody was going to risk their necks for Georgia, and that the Russians would be quite aware of that fact. I can surmise from Bush's enthusiastic cheer leading that he didn't think past, "More allies!".

[[R_H]]

But not as bad as FAUX News'.

I heard Sky News was pretty bad too. Was their coverage as bad, or worse than CNN's?

[Admiral Valdemar]

No idea. Never watch that channel. I just catch the Beeb and ITV's news, but mostly Channel 4's.

[Coyote]

Technically, since Georgia started the shooting, and launched an aggressive war, they violate the terms of the treaty and are left on their own.

[Scottish Ninja]

The problem with that, as someone brought up earlier, is that legally, Georgia was operating within its own borders and then Russia attacked them. No one with any sense disputes that Georgia started this whole mess, or that Russia had plenty of legitimate reasons to move forces into South Ossetia, but Georgia could legally claim that they were the ones attacked, and could thus invoke Article 5.

It would be a big steaming pile of bullshit, which is why the rest of NATO wasn't dumb enough to let Georgia in.

[Saxtonite]

No one with any sense disputes that Georgia started this whole mess,

weren't the Ossetian separitists shelling Georgian villages heavily for several days before that, and the Russians were provoking Georgia as mentioned in the earlier articles posted in the thread?

Caucasus foes fight cyber war (BBC)

I find that interesting, what happened with the Russian hackers was similar to what happened with many American hackers

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

weren't the Ossetian separitists shelling Georgian villages heavily for several days before that, and the Russians were provoking Georgia as mentioned in the earlier articles posted in the thread?

India and Pakistan have traded shelling for ages until somewhat recently lessened, but they have never entered war per se.

[Adrian Laguna]

I should have brought this up a lot earlier, but I've been thinking and it occurs to me that we can't really condemn the Georgians for shelling Tskhinvali without better information, or at least I can't do it. It's said that the whole place was destroyed, but it's a town, the entire province of South Ossetia has 70,000 inhabitants, Tskhinvali must be pretty small, destroying by it accident shouldn't be that hard. I seriously doubt Georgian artillery, especially rocket artillery, is particularly accurate, we're probably talking CEPs of a few kilometres. Thus, the Georgian Army could very well have been aiming for military targets, and the destruction of the town was merely a side-effect. Sucks for the towns people, but it's not Georgia's fault they were living next a legitimate target.

NOTE: I still condemn them for attacking South Ossetia, however the attack itself seems to have been conducted in manner that is consistent with American standards during the 40s and 50s, which are the ones I tend to hold nations to.

[anybody_mcc]

I should have brought this up a lot earlier, but I've been thinking and it occurs to me that we can't really condemn the Georgians for shelling Tskhinvali without better information, or at least I can't do it. It's said that the whole place was destroyed, but it's a town, the entire province of South Ossetia has 70,000 inhabitants, Tskhinvali must be pretty small, destroying by it accident shouldn't be that hard. I seriously doubt Georgian artillery, especially rocket artillery, is particularly accurate, we're probably talking CEPs of a few kilometres. Thus, the Georgian Army could very well have been aiming for military targets, and the destruction of the town was merely a side-effect. Sucks for the towns people, but it's not Georgia's fault they were living next a legitimate target.

NOTE: I still condemn them for attacking South Ossetia, however the attack itself seems to have been conducted in manner that is consistent with American standards during the 40s and 50s, which are the ones I tend to hold nations to.

It has(d) about 30000 people so not that small. And they not only shelled it , they did send the troops in.

[AniThyng]

I seriously doubt Georgian artillery, especially rocket artillery, is particularly accurate, we're probably talking CEPs of a few kilometres. Thus, the Georgian Army could very well have been aiming for military targets, and the destruction of the town was merely a side-effect. Sucks for the towns people, but it's not Georgia's fault they were living next a legitimate target.
.

All well and good, but I suppose that really doesn't do georgia any favours since they can't complain if Russian artillery does the same thing to them. And it's not like Rocket Arty's inaccuracy is some sort of startling news, as Gorbechev pointed out, if you use rocket arty on a city or any target near a city, you've pretty much lost any moral high ground.

That being said, I am dissapointed, though unsurprised, that 3rd world leaders who spend half their time ranting about western war mongering have seen fit to not chastise russia, much like how they remained strangely silent on checnya.