The Victory Plan - 1941

[MKSheppard]

TAB A (Slightly edited for clarity in board format)

The Ground Forces estimated as necessary to provide for the security of the U.S. outlying possessions, the Western Hemisphere and to make available appropriate forces for projected military operations follow:

1. Units organized, fully equipped and trained as soon as practicable:

a. Military Bases and Outlying Possessions.

Newfoundland - 5,090 men
Greenland - 2,531 men
Caribbean Bases - 40,199 men
Puerto Rico - 34,757 men
Panama - 42,614 men
Hawaii - 61,337 men
Philippines - 25,397 men
Alaska - 28,823 men
Iceland - 28,709 men
Bases in British Isles - 73,160 men
TOTAL - 346,217 men

b. Potential Task Forces

Brazil
1 x Army Corps (1 Div. fot, 1 Div. Air-Borne) = 42,392 men
2 x Artillery Battalions Pack = 1,804 men
1 x Cavalry Regiment = 1,591 men
5 x Parachute Battalions = 2,590 men
1 x Antiaircraft Regiment and 2 Medium Battalions = 3,619 men
2 x Aircraft Warning Regiments = 2,600 men
2 x Tank Battalions (Light) = 1,086 men
3 x Anti-Tank Battalions = 2,100 men
Services = 28,364 men
Total = 86,646 men

Colombia-Eucador-Peru
1 x Division = 15,345 men
2 x Artillery Battalions = 1,400 men
3 x Parachute Battalions = 1,554 men
1 x Antiaircraft Regiment and 2 Medium Battalions = 3,619 men
2 x Tank Battalions (Light) = 1,086 men
1 x Aircraft Warning Regiment = 1,300 men
Services = 13,035 men
Total = 37,239 men

First Army
1 x Army consisting of 3 Corps of 3 Divisions ea. = 242,216 men
2 x Armored Corps consisting of 2 Armd Div. ea. = 53,556 men
8 x Divisions (4 Mtzd, 2 Mountain, 2 Air-borne) = 108,516 men
5 x Parachute Bns. = 2,590 men
13 x Artillery Bns. (4 heavy, 6 (105mm), 3 (75mm How Pk) = 9,906 men
20 x Antiaircraft Regts and 10 extra Bns. 37mm = 46,970 men
11 x Tank Battalions (3 Medium and 5 Light) = 4,839 men
12 x Aircraft Warning Regts = 15,600 men
10 x Tank Destroyer Bns; and 10 anti-tank Bn (Gun) = 14,000 men
Services (Ord., QM, Sig., Engr., Med.) = 278,069 men
Total = 776,262 Men

Third Army
1 x Army (3 Corps, 9 Divisions) = 242,216
1 x Armored Corps (2 Divisions) = 26,778
2 x Divisions Motorized = 32,258
6 x Artillery Battalions (Medium & Heavy) = 4,300
1 x Cavalry Corps and 2 H-Mecz. Regiments = 26,867
2 x Air-Borne Divisions = 20,000
3 x Parachute Battalions = 2,590
5 x Antiaircraft Regiments and three medium Bns. = 12,166
3 x Aircraft Warning Regiments = 3,900
15 x Tank Destroyers or Anti-Tank Battalions = 10,500
Services = 207,360 Men
Total = 589,435 Men

Fourth Army
1 x Army (3 Corps, 9 Divisions) = 242,216 men
1 x Armored Corps (2 Divisions) = 25,394 men
4 x Divisions, Motorized = 64,516 men
8 x Artillery Battalions (Medium or Heavy) = 8,800 men
4 x Divisions (2 Mountain, 2 Air-Borne) = 44,000 men
2 x Parachute Battalions = 1,036 men
15 x Antiaircraft Regiments and 10 Medium Bns. = 37,345 men
8 x Tank Battalions (Medium or Light) = 4,839 men
6 x Aircraft Warning Regiments = 7,800 men
25 x Tank Destroyers or Anti-Tank Battalions = 17,500 men
Services = 256,413 men
Total = 709,859 men

Total Task Forces = 2,199,441 men

c. The troops considered necessary in the ground forces, i.e. organized, fully equipped and trained, for current and future employment as security forces in military bases and outlying possessions, and as striking forces in any theater, follows :

Military Bases and Outlying Possessions = 346,217 men
Potential Task Forces = 2,199,441 men
Total = 2,545,658 men

2. Production capacity should be created to equip approximately 3 million for the reserve units indicated below. Activation. location and training of these units will depend upon the international situation.

a. Strategic Reserves.

2 x Armies (10 Army Corps, 27 Divisions)
14 x Armored Corps (53 Armored Divisions)
51 x Divisions Motorized
115 x Artillery Battalions, (Pack Medium or Heavy)
9 x Divisions (2 Cavalry, 6 Mountain, 3 Air-Borne)
22 x Parachute Battalions
129 x Antiaircraft Regiments and 133 Medium Bns.
86 x Tank Battalions (70 Medium, 6 Light, 10 Heavy)
29 x Aircraft Warning Regiments
290 x Tank Destroyer Battalions
262 x Anti-Tank Battalions (Gun)
Total - approximately 3,000,000 men

3. Ground troops required for the Zone of Interior and Fixed Defense Units 1,200,000

4. Recapitulation of Ground Forces

Military Bases and Outlying Possessions = 346,217 men
Potential Task Forces = 2,199,441 men
Zone of Interior - Fixed Defenses = 1,200,000 men
Total = 3,745,658 men men

Units in reserve to be activated when situation requires = 3,000,000 men

Total Army Ground Forces = 6,745,658 men

5. Air Force requirements (details submitted in a separated study) <--- Aka AWPD-1 - this constitutes the bulk, some 100~ pages of the VICTORY PLAN.

Air Force Combat x 1,100,000 men
Zone of Interior Service Units x 950,000 men
Total Air Force x 2,050,000 men

6. Army Ground Forces = 6,745,658 men
Army Air Forces = 2,050,000 men
TOTAL ARMY FORCES = 8,795,658 men

[Adrian Laguna]

Nothing for Venezuela and our oil? I'm hurt.

[MKSheppard]

We had plans to intervene in Latin America; I'll put those up eventually, along with the plan to seize Martinique from teh French.

[MKSheppard]

(slightly edited for clarity)

APPENDIX I. SECRET

DECISION ON PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF
MATERIALS RECOMMENDED BY THE NAVY

(A) NAVY PROGRAM, for completion by December 31, 1946.

1. U.S. Navy, including aviation. Provide naval forces and facilities for the United States capable of executing strong naval offensives in the Eastern Atlantic and the Central and Western Pacific Oceans. Major items of this program are :

a. Naval Personnel, including that required for manning merchant auxiliary tonnage --- 1,100,000 men

b. Marine Corps Personnel -- 150,000 men

c. Naval vessels -



Note: Additional auxiliary tonnage is included for estimate purposes in subparagraph (D) "Merchant Shipping Program".

d. Schedule of Naval Ship Deliveries.

Deliveries of large combatant naval vessels now under construction, authorized and proposed should be planned in accordance with this table:



e. Naval Aircraft.



Note: Overall replacement requirements, during war operations, and including active and inactive theaters, are estimated at approximately 100 per cent per year for combatant aircraft, and 40 per cent per year for all others.

f. Naval Shore Establishment.

See Appendix I and Appendix II for the permanent naval shore establishment program. To these total requirements should be added temporary overseas naval base constructions equivalent to 25% of the authorized permanent overseas construction. Emergency shipbuilding and manufacturing equivalents are to be computed under subparagraphs d, e, and g.

g. Naval Munitions Requirements for naval ships, aircraft and bases.

h. Marine Corps Munitions Requirements.

2. Foreign Navies. Provide Naval forces and facilities for Associated Powers as follows:

a. 300,000 tons of naval combatant vessels for the British Commonwealth.

b. 200,000 tons of naval combatant vessels for Latin-American countries.

c. Temporary facilities in the United States for the repair of 25% of British naval combatant vessels.

(B) ARMY PROGRAM, excluding aviation.

No estimates under this heading are submitted by the Navy.

(C) AVIATION PROGRAM, excluding U.S. Naval Aviation.

No estimates under this heading are submitted by the Navy.

(D) MERCHANT SHIPPING PROGRAM, for completion by December 31, 1944.

1. Increase United States merchant shipping to a continuing total of 18,000,000 gross tons, including 600,000 gross tons for the U.S. Navy, additional to the present program. This merchant fleet is to be manned by the United States.

2. Supply the British Commonwealth with morchant shipping of a total of 6,000,000 gross tons.

Note: An analysis of shipping requirements is as follows:
a. For United States Industry and Latin-America, including sea-going and coastwise ships of over 1,000 gross tons -- 6,000,000 gross tons

b. For support of U.S. Army forces in Europe, Africa, and South America, estimated at 1,500,000 troops -- 2,400,000 gross tons

c. For transporting annually 12,000,000 tons of munitions for the support of Associated armed forces in Middle East, Russia and Asia, (estimated as the munitions requirements of 2,000,000 troops) -- 5,000,000 gross tons

d. For support of population, industry and armed forces in United Kingdom,(annual delivery of 15,000,000 tons) -- 4,000,000 gross tons

e. For transports for U.S. Navy for support of overseas naval forces and U.S. Army overseas garrisons -- 600,000 gross tons

Total required by 1944 -- 18,000,000 gross tons

Loss of U.S. Flag vessels expected by 1944 -- 3,000,000 gross tons

f. Ships to be supplied to the British Commonwealth by 1944 -- 6,000,000 gross tons

Thus the total tonnage that must be made available from United States sources by the end of 1944 is -- 27,000,000 gross tons

Of this there is now available --

g. U.S. Shipping -- 6,700,000 gross tons

h. Present merchant ship program due for completion in 1943 -- 10,700,000 gross tons

i. Total estimated as available by 1945 -- 17,400,000 gross tons

j. The additional program to meet requirements, and which should be built by the end of 1944 is -- 9,600,000 gross tons

Note: The Chairman of the Maritime Commission estimates this figure is the maximum that should be fixed for the United States shipbuilding industry.

(E) PROGRAM FOR CIVIL NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES.

Fabricated, processed, and raw materials, required by the population of the United States for civil purposes. (Requirements for this need should bo established by other than military agencies.)

(F) PROGRAM FOR CIVIL NEEDS OF FRIENDLY POWERS.

Fabricated, processed, and raw materials, required from the United States for the industrial and civil establishments of friendly Powers. Attention should be given to the importance of establishing raw material and industrial production facilities outside of the United States, in regions where the following conditions exist:

1. Raw materials are available, or their production is readily possible.

2. Man-power is available for industrial employment.

3. Proximity to a hostile front, with ample man-power available for military employment, (Requirements for this need should be established by civil agencies, in consultation with military authorities).

[MKSheppard]

ESTIMATE
ARMY REQUIREMENTS SUPPORTING STUDY
prepared by:
WAR PLANS DIVISION GENERAL STAFF
(SECTION II, PART II, APPENDIX II)

ULTIMATE REQUIREMENTS STUDY ESTIMATE OF ARMY GROUND FORCES

1. The specific operations necessary to accomplish the defeat of the Axis Powers cannot be predicted at this time. Irrespective of the nature and scope of these operations, we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat. Such requirement establishes the necessity for powerful ground elements, flexibly organized into task forces which are equipped and trained to do their respective jobs. The Germans and their associates with botween 11 and 12 million men under arms, now have approximately 300 divisions fully equipped and splendidly trained. It is estimated that they can have by 1943, a total of 400 divisions available in the European Theater.

2. The important influence of the air arm in modern combat has been irrefutably established. The degree of success attained by sea and ground forces will be determined by the effective and timely employment of air supporting units and the successful conduct of strategical missions. No major military operation in any theater will succeed without air superiority, or at least air superiority disputed. The necessity for a strong sea force, consisting principally of fast cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, torpedo boats and submarines, continues in spite of the increased fighting potential of the air arm. Employment of enemy air units has not yet deprived naval vessels of their vital role on the high seas, but has greatly accelerated methods and changed the technique in their employment. It appears that the success of naval operations, assuming air support, will still bo determined by sound strategic concepts and adroit leadership. A sea blockade will not accomplish an economic strangulation or military defeat of Germany. Nor will air operations alone bring victory. Air and sea forces will make important contributions but effective and adequate ground forces must be available to close with and destroy the enemy within his citadel.

3. It is therefore imperative that we create the productive capacity to provide equipment for the following:

a. Appropriate forces distributed for the defense of the United States, outlying possessions and bases selected to facilitate the defense of the country and the Western Hemisphere.

b. Task Forces which can effectively conduct military operations, primarily in the European Theater, as well as in the Western Hemisphere and in other strategically important areas.

c. The military forces of associates and friendly Powers committed to the policy of opposing Nazi aggression. Quantities to be limited only by our own strategic requirements and the ability of the friendly Powers to use the equipment effectively.

4. A sound approach to the problem of determining appropriate military means requires careful consideration of WHERE, HOW and WHEN, they will be employed to defeat our potential enemies and to assist our associates.

a. WHERE. Accepting the premise, that we must come to grips with the enemy ground forces, our principal theater of war is Central Europe. Possible subsidiary theaters include Africa, the Near East, the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Far East; however, the operations in those theaters must be so conducted as to facilitate the decisive employment of Allied forces in Central Europe.

b. HOW. The combined and carefully coordinated operations of our military forces, in collaboration with associated Powers, must accomplish the following:

(1) The surface and subsurface vessels of the Axis and associated Powers must be swept from the seas, particularly in the Atlantic and water areas contiguous to Europe

(2) Overwhelming air superiority must be accomplished.

(3) The economic and industrial life of Germany must be rendered ineffective through the continuous disruption and destruction of lines of communication, ports and industrial facilities, and by the interception of raw materials.

(4) The combat effectiveness of the German military forces must be greatly reduced by over-extension, dispersion, shortage of matériel, including fuel, and a deterioration of the Home Front. Popular support of the war effort, by the peoples of the Axis Powers must be weakened and their confidence shattered by subversive activities, propaganda, deprivation, the destruction wrought and chaos created.

(5) Existing military bases (the British Isles and the Near East) must be maintained. Additional bases, which encircle and close in on the Nazi citadel, must be established in order to facilitate air operations designed to shatter the German industrial and economic life. Such bases may also provide feasible points of departure for the combined operations of ground and air forces. In disposing of our forces, we must guard against dispersion of means in operations that do not make timely and effective contributions to the accomplishment of our main task, the defeat of Germany.

(6) The commitment of our forces must conform to our accepted broad strategic concept of active (offensive) operations in one theater (European), and concurrently, passive (defensive) operations in the other (Pacific).

d. WHEN. The following factors with regard to the time element are important in determining, the production capacity necessary to realize our national objectives:

(1) The lag between plan and execution is considerable. Past experience indicates that from eighteen months to two years are required.

(2) How many months will Germany require to defeat Russia, to reconstitute her forces subsequent to Russia's defeat and to exploit to any perceptible degree the vast resources of Russia?

It is believed that Germany will occupy Russian territory west of the general line; White Sea, Moscow, Volga River, (all inclusive) by July 1, 1942, and that militarily, Russia will be substantially impotent subsequent to that date. Thereafter, Germany will "Coventry" all industrial areas, lines of communications and sources of raw materials east of the line indicated, unless a drastic Nazi treaty is accepted by Russia. Germany will probably require a full year to bring order out of chaos in the conquered areas, so that it will be July 1, 1943, before she will largely profit economically by her "drive to the east." The maintenance of huge armies of occupation has become unnecessary. By totally disarming the conquered people, maintaining splendidly organized intelligence and communications nets, and employing strategically located, highly mobile forces (parachute, air-borne, mechanized and motorized), Germany may control the occupied areas with relatively small forces, thu3 releasing the bulk of the military for other tasks. Obviously, our war effort time-table covering the production of munitions, the creation of trained military forces and the increase of transportation facilities (air, ground and sea), is strongly influenced by events transpiring in the Russian theater.

(3) We are confronted by two possibilities; first, a rapidly accelerated all-out effort with a view to conducting decisive, offensive operations against the enemy before he can liquidate or recoup from his struggle with Russia; second, a long drawn-out war of attrition. Under our present production schedule, we will soon have adequate military means to defend our outlying possessions and bases and to provide for the security of the Western Hemisphere, but we will not be able to provide sufficient appropriate forces for timely offensive action in the principal theater of operations. The urgency for positive action exists, particularly while the enemy is contained militarily in Russia, It would strongly contribute to the early and decisive defeat of the Axis Powers, if the Allied forces could seize and firmly establish military bases from which immediate air and subsequent ground and air operations might be undertaken.

(4) The United States is approaching its task in a logical manner, but the production of matériel must be greatly accelerated to permit its accomplishment. At present, the bulk of our production has to be devoted to the support of Great Britain and associates, rendering it impracticable for us to undertake offensive commitments. But time is of the essence and the longer we delay effective offensive operations against the Axis, the more difficult will become the attainment of victory. It is mandatory that we reach an early appreciation of our stupendous task, and gain the whole-hearted support of the entire country in the production of trained men, ships, munitions, and ample reserves. Otherwise, we will be confronted in the not distant future by a Germany strongly entrenched economically, supported by newly acquired sources of vital supplies and industries, with her military forces operating on interior lines, and in a position of hegemony in Europe which will be comparatively easy to defend and maintain.

(5) The time by which production can reach the levels defined by our national objectives is highly speculative, July 1, 1943, has been established as the earliest date on which the equipment necessary to initiate and sustain our projected operations can be provided. The ability of industry to meet this requirement is contingent upon many intangibles; however, the program can be definitely accomplished, in fact, greatly exceeded, if the industrial potential of the country is fully exploited. The urgency of speed and the desirability of employing our present great economic and industrial advantage over our potential enemies cannot be overemphasized.

4. Strategic Employment of Ground Forces.

a. The future alignment of Powers and their respective combat capacities cannot be accurately predicted. In order to arrive at a plausible basis from which to determine our future requirements, the following assumptions pertaining to the world situation as of July 1, 1943, are made:

(1) Russia is substantially impotent militarily in Europe. Resistance in Siberia, to include the Maritime Provinces, probably continuing.

(2) The Axis military strength is materially weakened through economic blockade; by losses in the Russian campaign, by British air and sea operations; by the inability to exploit quickly the extensively sabotaged Russian industries and raw materials; by lowered morale of the people.

(3) The military forces of Japan are fully involved with or contained by campaigns against a somewhat strengthened China, by the Russian forces in the Far East Maritime Provinces, or by the threat of United States - British military and economic reprisals,

(4) Great Britain and associates have increased their fighting forces by creating and equipping additional combat units.

(5) The French will probably continue their passive collaboration with Germany.

(6) Control of the Mediterranean Theater, including North Africa and the Near 2ast, remains disputed.

(7) The United States is an active belligerent and is collaborating in an all-out effort to defeat Germany.

b. If these assumptions are correct, or even reasonably sound, on July 1, 1943, there will be no military bases remaining in Allied hands, other than the United Kingdom, possibly the northern coast of Africa and the Near East. The establishment of additional bases, for example, in the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula and Northwest Africa will be bitterly contested by the Axis. However, to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany, those bases and others even more difficult to establish, must be available to the Allies. Obviously, carefully planned action, involving appropriate sea, air and ground units must be undertaken. Allied success is directly contingent upon the coordinated employment of overwhelming forces, surprise and mobility, supported by sufficient reserves in materiel and manpower to insure a succession of effective impulses throughout the operations.

c. Latest information pertaining to the potential industrial capacities and military strengths of the opposing Powers, (excluding the U. S.) as of July 1, 1943, indicates that the Axis Powers will have about 400 divisions available in the European-Near East Theater and the Allied Powers approximately 100 divisions. To accomplish the numerical superiority, about 2 to 1, usually considered necessary before undertaking offensive operations, the Allies would have to raise about 700 divisions. A force of 700 divisions with appropriate supporting and service troops would approximate 22 million men. If Great Britain and the United States should induct so many men for military service, added to the tremendous numbers already under arms, the economic and industrial effort, necessary to conduct the war, would be definitely imperiled.

d. It is believed that the enemy can be defeated without creating the numerical superiority indicated. Effective employment of modern air and ground fighting machines and a tight economic blockade may create conditions that will make the realization of the Allied War Aims perfectly feasible with numerically less fighting men. Another million men in Flanders would not have turned the tide of battle for France. If the French army had had sufficient tanks and planes, and quantities of antitank and antiaircraft materiel, France might have remained a dominant power in Europe. In June, 1941, when the Germans launched their invasion of Russia, they know that their adversary was numerically superior and could maintain that superiority in spite of tremendous losses. They probably also knew that Stalin was creating a military force of great power, consisting primarily of effective

modern fighting machines, and that if they delayed their "drive to the east" another year, Russia would possess armadas of air and ground machines which would not only render an offensive campaign impossible, but would make large demands upon the German military to secure her eastern frontier. The Crete campaign also presents illuminating evidence in favor of modern fighting means when opposed by superior numbers that are equipped with inappropriate means and are operating under World War I static tactical concepts. Approximately 17,000 Germans attacked and conquered the island which was defended by about 30,000 British.

e. Our broad concept, of encircling and advancing stop-by-stop, with a view to closing-in on Germany, will remain sound regardless of future developments in the European situation, for it envisages the only practical way in which military and economic pressure may be brought to bear effectively against Germany. The loss of potential bases of operation, presently available, would render the accomplishment of our strategic plans extremely difficult and costly. It is important, therefore, that the Allies take effective measures to hold the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and North African areas. Also the islands off the northwestern coast of Africa should be denied to the enemy. Before undertaking operations in connection with the establishment of additional military bases, for example, in the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, Africa and the Low Countries,

a careful survey of the areas of projected operations and a thorough examination of the enemy capabilities are mandatory. The unfortunate Norway campaign of 1940 is a glaring example of a total lack of appreciation of such realities on the part of those responsible for the British expedition. The Germans employed approximately 175,000 men, strongly supported by the Air Force, to conquer and secure their lodgement in Norway. Special Task Forces, including two Mountain divisions and numerous parachute units made effective contributions to the success of the operation. Having gained a foothold, the Germans quickly established themselves in order to hold their bases and to facilitate exploitation. The British Forces despatched against Norway totalled about 24,000 men, with no mountain troops and with inadequate air supporting units. The failure of the British expedition is directly attributable to insufficient and inappropriate means. If and when the situation indicates the feasibility of an Allied expedition, against Norway for example, powerful and appropriate means, especially trained and equipped for the task, must be provided.

Large and effective reserves must be readily available to preclude disloge-ment of the initial forces and to facilitate subsequent exploitation. A careful study of Norway, including the terrain and communications net, and a survey of possible enemy capabilities, indicate the necessity for mountain, infantry foot and motorized divisions, numerous parachute, tank, antitank, antiaircraft and air-borne units. The force required for the entire operation may total several hundred thousand men. The execution of the plan would be predicated on sea and local air superiority. The size of this force may appear large. However, even though our enemy may not be strong initially in the area of projected operations, the mobility of modern fighting means will enable him to concentrate destructive forces against us with unprecedented speed and surprise effect. The foregoing considerations apply with equal emphasis to proposed forces for other theaters of operations. Careful studies, concerning the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, the Near East and Africa, have been made by the War Plans Division of the General Staff, and these studies made important contributions in the determination of the estimated Ground Forces (See Tab A).

The enemy capabilities in those theaters in 1943 would obviously be conjecture. Task Forces consisting principally of armored and motorized divisions, must be created for possible operations in North Africa, the Middle East, France and the Low Countries. The exact strength and the composition of the Task Forces, necessary to seize and maintain military bases, will be determined immediately prior to the operation. We can avoid the unfortunate disasters experienced by our potential allies in Norway, France, the Balkans and in Crete by planning now and creating quickly the production capacity necessary to equip the ground forces recommended (Tab A).

We must not suffer ignominious defeat and be expelled from the bases that we elect to establish. If the premises and assumptions made earlier in this study are appropriate and sound, additional strategically located bases are vital to the splendidly conceived plans of the Air Force and finally may serve as areas of departure Tor the combined operations of air and ground forces. The seizure, retention, and effective utilisation of these bases is predicated on the successful operations of adequate sea, air and ground forces.

5. Shipping was a bottleneck in the last war and again increased demands will be placed on all transportation facilities, particularly water, by constant troop movements and the expanded war industrial and economic effort. In order to transport and maintain effective forces in European areas, several million tons of shipping and adequate port facilities must be made available essentially for military service. To transport five million men with their modern air and mechanized equipment to European ports over a period of approximately one year would require about seven million tons of shipping or 1,000 ships. To maintain such a force in the theater of operations would require about ten million tons of shipping or 1,500 ships. But it is highly improbable that the situation in Europe will develop in such manner as to permit or to require operations involving the movement of so large a force across the Atlantic within the limited time of one year, even if the ship tonnage were available. The progressive building-up of large military forces in the theater will probably extend over a period of at least two years. This progressive movement would greatly reduce the demands upon maritime shipping for essentially military purposes and further would extend the period of time for the augmentation of maritime shipping now available. The realization of our present national policies may require operations in distant theaters by military forces of unprecedented strength.

It would be folly to create strong fighting forces without providing the transportation to move and maintain them in the contemplated theaters of operations. The maximum possible shipbuilding capacity of our country, coordinated of course with other essential demands upon industry and raw materials, must be exploited and continued in operation for the next several years.

6. The foregoing considerations clearly indicate the importance of creating a productive capacity in this country, that will provide the most modern equipment designed to give mobility and destructive power to our striking forces. The forces that we now estimate as necessary to realize our national objectives and for which production capacity must be provided, may not be adequate or appropriate. No one can predict the situation that will confront the United States in July, 1943. We may require much larger forces than those indicated below, and correspondingly greatly increased quantities of equipment. Emphasis has been placed on destructive power and mobility, with a view to offensive maneuvers in our principal theater of operations (Europe).

The forces deemed necessary to accomplish the role of ground units in the supreme effort to defeat our potential enemies, total 5 Field Armies consisting of approximately 215 divisions (infantry, armored, motorized, air-borne, mountain and cavalry) with appropriate supporting and service elements. The strategic concept outlined in this paper contemplates distribution of U. S. ground forces approximately as follows: (More specific data will be found in Tab A).

Iceland
29,000

Scotland
11,000

England
41,000

Ireland
25,000

Hawaii
61,000

Puerto Rico
34,000

Panama
42,000

Alaska
29,000

Philippine Islands
25,000

Smaller Outlying Bases
32,000

Potential Task Forces

First Army
775,500

Third Army
590,000

Fourth Army
710,000

Brazil
86,000

Colombia - Ecuador — Peru
37,000

Total
2,500,000

Strategic Reserves for which production capacity must be established but whose activation, location and training will be determined by developments in the international situation.
3,000,000

Troops in the Zone of the Interior and Fixed Defense Units (Ground)
1,200,000

TOTAL GROUND FORCES
6,700,000

[K. A. Pital]

It is believed that Germany will occupy Russian territory west of the general line; White Sea, Moscow, Volga River, (all inclusive) by July 1, 1942, and that militarily, Russia will be substantially impotent subsequent to that date. Thereafter, Germany will "Coventry" all industrial areas, lines of communications and sources of raw materials east of the line indicated, unless a drastic Nazi treaty is accepted by Russia. Germany will probably require a full year to bring order out of chaos in the conquered areas, so that it will be July 1, 1943, before she will largely profit economically by her "drive to the east." The maintenance of huge armies of occupation has become unnecessary. By totally disarming the conquered people, maintaining splendidly organized intelligence and communications nets, and employing strategically located, highly mobile forces (parachute, air-borne, mechanized and motorized), Germany may control the occupied areas with relatively small forces, thu3 releasing the bulk of the military for other tasks. Obviously, our war effort time-table covering the production of munitions, the creation of trained military forces and the increase of transportation facilities (air, ground and sea), is strongly influenced by events transpiring in the Russian theater.

The part about "huge armies of occupation" and "easy maintenance" was of course false, but I doubt the planners had even a small idea of what kind of policy Germany really pursued in the east.

[MKSheppard]

To put this into it's proper perspective, comrade Stas; FDR instructed the US to begin planning for a possibul war in July 1941; and they spent August putting together the plan, with it being finalized and presented on September 11th 1941.

At that time, it did look to the west that the USSR would fall soon; given the huge gains the germans were making in the summer of 1941...