SAC will be back!

[MKSheppard]

The AFP:

WASHINGTON (AFP) - A task force called Friday for the US Air Force to put its nuclear forces under a single command to halt a serious erosion in readiness that has undermined international confidence in the US nuclear deterrent.

Led by former defense secretary James Schlesinger, the task force found "an unambiguous, dramatic and unacceptable decline in the air force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission and, until very recently, little has been done to reverse it."

The outside panel conducted the review following two embarrassing mishaps: the mistaken shipment of nuclear weapons components to Taiwan in 2006 and the inadvertent transfer of nuclear armed cruise missiles on the wing of a B-52 bomber in 2007.

Schlesinger said those incidents had shaken the confidence of US allies in Europe, Asia, Australia and New Zealand that depend on the US nuclear umbrella, raising the risk that countries will seek their own nuclear weapons.

"Some have expressed increasing misgivings about whether or not they feel comfortable under the umbrella, and part of the task of the air force and of the Department of Defense will be to resuscitate their confidence," he said.

The panel recommended that the air force put all its nuclear capable forces -- strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles -- under a newly designated Air Force Strategic Command.

Strategic bombers currently are under the air force's Air Combat Command, which is responsible for all the service's US-based combat aircraft, while the missile force falls under the Air Force Space Command.

Combining those forces would involve moving less than 2,000 people and would cost 1.5 billion dollars in fiscal year 2010, Schlessinger said.

The panel also proposed putting all nuclear bombers under a single numbered air force whose only responsibility would be the nuclear mission.

US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he was concerned about that the lack of unity of command had contributed to the recent failings, and task force "makes a strong case in this respect for a new command."

"But the Air Force will be taking a look at that," he said.

Gates, who fired the air force's top civilian and military chiefs because of the nuclear mishaps, said the air force had begun to take steps "to provide the kind of confidence that we expect in terms of the handling of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials.

"I won't be completely assured until all of the corrective measures have been taken," he said.

Schlesinger said air force leaders were "saying the right things. The real question is whether they follow through on what they have said."

The review found that the nuclear mission had slipped in importance when those forces were put under commands with broader responsibilities for conventional forces.

The report said there had been a gradual decline in nuclear expertise, and a dramatic weakening in stewardship and focus on "policies, procedures, munitions handling processes, security, and operational exercise of nuclear weapons."

"As a result, the readiness of forces assigned the nuclear mission has seriously eroded," the panel's report said.

Schlesinger said the air force had underfunded the nuclear mission, which had resulted in a shrinking of billets and a failure to fill existing billets.

"There is a shortage of maintenance people, there is a shortage of those who supervise the nuclear establishment and there has been a very noticeable lack of nuclear expertise," he said.
-----------------------------------------

Air Force Times:

Advisers: Consolidate Air Force nuke command
By Michael Hoffman - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Sep 15, 2008 19:35:55 EDT

The Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended the Air Force put all its nuclear missions under Air Force Space Command and call the whole thing Air Force Strategic Command.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates organized the task force - which was headed by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger - after axing the Air Force's top two leaders last June due to its nuclear problems.

The recommendations Schlesinger announced Friday at the Pentagon also would mean that Air Combat Command would lose its nuclear bomber mission.

The task force recommended assigning a group of bombers to a numbered Air Force that would fall under AFSTRAT and have a sole nuclear mission.

After a tumultuous year in the Air Force's nuclear enterprise, Gates said he's confident the service "has begun to restore its nuclear mission, and is already tracking more than 180 corrective actions" the service is making.

Gates said his key concern remains the Air Force's "lack of unity of command, and not having one person or organization accountable for the [nuclear] mission."

Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and Secretary Michael Donley have had discussions about standing up a new strategic command or placing the nuclear mission under Space Command like the task force recommended, said an Air Force official.

Schlesinger's report also took aim at the Air Force's inspection process.

"Over the past 10 years, inspection pass rates point to anomalies that indicate a systemic problem in the inspection regime. Something is clearly wrong," the report read.

The passing rate for Nuclear Surety Inspections - inspections nuclear bases receive every 18 months - dropped to 50 percent Air Force-wide, then jumped to 100 percent three years later.

Schlesinger commended the Air Force Inspector General's recent move to make all nuclear inspections no-notice, saying it was a "positive step."

Like similar reports done into the nuclear incidents that plagued the Air Force last year, Schlesinger's team found an erosion of standards and capabilities within the service's handling of nuclear weapons. Schlesinger said he was "surprised," and that the erosion went beyond what he expected.

Those incidents include the mistaken shipment of four ballistic missile nose cones to Taiwan in 2006 that sat there until last March, and the unauthorized flight of six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from Minot Air Force Base, N.D., to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., in August 2007.

"I think we have the attention of the Air Force. This is a very high priority, not just for the secretary and the chief of staff, but for all senior Air Force officers," Gates said.

----------------------

Washington Post:

Unified Nuclear Command Urged
By Ann Scott Tyson
Saturday, September 13, 2008; A08

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates yesterday called on the Air Force to establish clear and unified control over the nation's nuclear arsenal, after a new report by a Pentagon task force concluded that the service had neglected its stewardship of such weapons for more than a decade.

"Today no senior leader in the Air Force 'owns' the nuclear mission," concluded the eight-member task force, appointed by Gates and chaired by former defense secretary James R. Schlesinger. "The current organization is not properly structured."

The task force recommended yesterday that the Air Force designate a new Air Force Strategic Command, which would replace the current Air Force Space Command, and make it accountable for the nuclear mission. It also called for all Air Force bombers to be placed under a single command.

Gates, speaking at a Pentagon news conference where Schlesinger outlined the report, stressed that unity of command over nuclear weapons and materials is vital, adding that "the task force . . . makes a strong case in this respect for a new command." He said no decision had been made on the command proposal.

The push to centralize Air Force management of the nuclear force weapons follows two serious mishaps involving U.S. nuclear weapons -- an August 2007 incident when the Air Force unknowingly flew nuclear warheads between North Dakota and Louisiana, and the mistaken shipment in 2006 of ballistic missile fuses to Taiwan.

Subsequent investigations led Gates to fire the Air Force's two top civilian and military leaders in June. Gates also established the task force to examine nuclear weapons management in two reports -- the first focused on the Air Force and the second on the Defense Department.

Yesterday, Gates said he considers nuclear weapons management the military's "most sensitive mission" and one critical to maintaining the confidence of foreign allies in the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Schlesinger said some of the roughly 30 nations that rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella -- including NATO allies as well as Australia and New Zealand -- have "expressed misgivings about whether or not they feel comfortable under the umbrella." That could lead them to acquire their own nuclear weapons, he said. The Air Force and Pentagon must "resuscitate their confidence in the credibility of the nuclear umbrella," he said.

The Schlesinger task force found that the Air Force, the main steward of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, has neglected that mission, starting with the dissolution in 1991 of the Strategic Air Command.

"There has been an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air Force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission and, until very recently, little has been done to reverse it," the report said. Nuclear deterrence is no longer taught at the War College, it noted.

"There is a shortage of security personnel," Schlesinger said. "There is a shortage of maintenance people. There is a shortage of those who supervise the nuclear establishment."

To fill the voids in the short term, the Air Force should move 1,500 to 2,000 airmen into nuclear-related jobs, and it is budgeting roughly $1.5 billion for 2010 to shore up the mission, Schlesinger said.

But the report concluded that although the Air Force is currently tracking "more than 180 corrective actions" to fix immediate problems, "it will take a concerted and sustained commitment by the Air Force leadership at all levels to restore the culture and ethos of nuclear excellence."

Asked if other top Air Force officers would face reprimands, Gates said acting Air Force Secretary Michael B. Donley and Chief of Staff Gen. Norton A. Schwartz are "reviewing the recommendations" for disciplinary action.

[Sidewinder]

As nostalgic as SAC's return makes me, wouldn't the $1.5 billion cost of the reorganization be better spent on 10 more F-22s?

[phongn]

As nostalgic as SAC's return makes me, wouldn't the $1.5 billion cost of the reorganization be better spent on 10 more F-22s?

I think maintaining nuclear readiness is equally important.

[RedImperator]

As nostalgic as SAC's return makes me, wouldn't the $1.5 billion cost of the reorganization be better spent on 10 more F-22s?

I can't imagine anything more important than preventing people from accidentally loading nuclear weapons onto B-52s.

[MKSheppard]

Here's the report for the straight dope:

Link to PDF

Choicy tidbits:

• The Task Force notes that the bomber force plays a critical role in deterrence. Its readiness posture can be changed visibly, signaling to potential opponents a growing preparedness to act. This, combined with the inherent flexibility of bombers compared to missiles, merits renewed emphasis in our deterrence and war planning.
• Russia is reshaping its doctrine and improving its nuclear arsenal toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons. There is a substantial set of experiments being conducted at its nuclear test site and President, now Prime Minister, Putin has publically declared his intention to deploy new weapon types based on “new physical principles.”
• The Task Force therefore recommends that the Air Force redesignate Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) as Air Force Strategic Command (AFSTRAT) and vest it with appropriate authority and accountability. The missions of the new AFSTRAT should be aligned with those of USSTRATCOM.
• In addition to the creation of AFSTRAT, the Task Force also recommends the consolidation of all bombers in a single Numbered Air Force (NAF) that is divested of all other missions.
• The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) should provide the resources necessary for the initiatives required to upgrade and revitalize the nuclear mission. This should include all resources necessary to support the implementation of the Global Deterrent Force (GDF) concept for B-52s.

Woooo!

Organization Recommendations:

1. The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and CSAF should redesignate Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) as Air Force Strategic Command (AFSTRAT). This should be completed by September 2009.

2. SECAF and CSAF should direct the assignment of all Air Force bombers to 8th Air Force. This should be completed by September 2009.

3. SECAF and CSAF should direct the removal of all non-bomber-related missions from 8th Air Force (e.g., Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance [ISR] and cyberrelated organizations) and their reallocation to other Air Force commands. This should be completed by September 2009.

4. SECAF and CSAF should direct the reassignment of the reconstituted 8th Air Force from Air Combat Command (ACC) to AFSTRAT. This should be completed by September 2009.

Hum Hey look, McPeak!

The Air Force’s decision to dissolve SAC was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. It grew out of both the collapse of the Soviet Union and experiences during Desert Storm, which generated new thinking within the Air Force about future warfare. This revised thinking was reflected in then Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak’s statement in 1991 that the triad was “overinsurance . . . one leg of the triad could inflict such massive damage on any potential opponent that it alone would suffice to deter any rational person.”

and

ACC’s culture became centered on the employment of conventional munitions using fighter aircraft. In 1993, Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak described the B-52 as a “sunset system.”

Isn't McPeak an Obama advisor now?

In 1992, each crew flew 12 training missions: 10 of these were nuclear-training missions and two were used to teach the employment of conventional weapons. By 2006, bomber crews commonly reported to their new commands with conventional-only combat certification.

...

The Task Force observed a widely held perception among nuclear-experienced officers that they are disadvantaged in comparison to their nonnuclear peers in selection for promotion. This perception is evidently long-standing and was documented as early as 1998.9 We learned, as an example, that promotion rates between the years 2000 and 2007 for nuclear-experienced bomber navigators are 4 to 14 percent below Line Air Force (nonmedical and nonlegal professions) averages for majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels and 1 to 14 percent below their nonnuclear counterparts. This clearly sends a signal to the officer corps that maintaining nuclear-trained officers has not been an Air Force priority.

...

An essential part of leadership is inspiring people to believe they are doing important work and are valued for it. It is essential that leaders restore discipline and pride among the Airmen who perform the Air Force’s nuclear mission. A question has been raised whether SAC should be re-created. No. However, it is essential that the necessary elements of the mission be drawn again in a coherent whole—and the esprit de corps for those who serve the nuclear mission be resuscitated.

We'll see about THAT.

Even so-called “no-notice” inspections do not begin until 72 hours after the unit is notified. In contrast, during the Cold War, SAC conducted inspections with less than an hour’s warning and typically combined nuclear surety, operational readiness, and unit effectiveness components in a single inspection period. Some in the Air Force assert that little can be done to prepare for an inspection in 72 hours. But a nuclear crisis may not give us even that much warning.

Jeebus...

Manpower authorizations supporting the nuclear mission have decreased below long-term sustainable levels. As an example, an Air Force munitions flight once had 94 manpower authorizations for nuclear weapons maintenance personnel. The authorizations were reduced to 33 because of a weapon system retirement and personnel reductions.

In recent years, the Air Force has made an individual’s deployment history visible to promotion boards by creating a field for contingency deployments in promotion folders. The intent of including this information in promotion records was to emphasize the expeditionary nature of Air Force operations and encourage full participation in contingency deployments by Air Force personnel. However, the unintended consequence of this action was the creation of a perception that overseas deployments in support of contingency operations made one more competitive for promotion. Personnel performing key nuclear duties in nondeployed locations are actively encouraged by Air Force leaders to seek deployment opportunities in order to increase their “value” to the Air Force and “set themselves apart” from their nondeployed peers. This perception has further contributed to the devaluation of both the nuclear mission and those responsible for its execution.

So here's the new recommended organization:

8th Air Force: Bombers
20th Air Force: ICBMs
14th Air Force: Space Forces

Some tidbits from appendix C:

• ACC’s most senior officer dedicated to nuclear issues is an O-6.
• “The 20th Air Force commander (ICBMs) is a two star; the 8th Air Force (bombers) and 14th Air Force (space) are three stars. That tells you Air Force priorities.”
• Nuclear deterrence is no longer taught at the War Colleges.
• No one explains to junior Air Force personnel why ICBMs are important.
• Funds to address B-52 electrical systems have been #1 below the cut line on ACC’s unfunded priority list over the past eight years.
• One unit relayed they were so short in PRP personnel that they could not be inspection ready without advanced notice.
• The Emergency Action Message billet at USSTRATCOM has been vacant for 15 months

Promotability

• Standing alert duty in missile silos, for example, is not viewed as “deployed.”
• If you are not a “deployer,” you do not get promoted.
• If you are not expeditionary, you are not deemed important to the Air Force

B-52 Wing Problems

• One wing commander said he was short 300 maintenance personnel; another wing commander was short 100.
• One wing cannot generate all its aircraft due to maintenance crew shortages.
• One wing only has 66 percent of assigned crew chiefs; Wing is 130 personnel below its authorized manning level (in part due to overseas deployers).
• One wing is unable to fully execute its annual training sortie requirement due to significant aircraft maintenance manpower shortfalls.
• Bomb-wing cruise-missile training shapes for nuclear weapons are in such poor condition that they are not useful for training.

Jeebus, one little nuclear sneeze from a Soviet SSBN in the Gulf of Mexico can take out the majority of our B-52 force.....and the B-52 force is our primary bomber nuclear force; we only have like 12-17~ B-2s Combat coded; all the B-1s are conventional....ugh.

[tim31]

3 Buffs at Edwards? Why even bother??

[Shroom Man 777]

As nostalgic as SAC's return makes me, wouldn't the $1.5 billion cost of the reorganization be better spent on 10 more F-22s?

Ten F-22s won't make a damned difference in the strategic state of the American military. From the look of things, that billion dollars plus will be better spent in reshaping the USA's strategic forces and buying them their balls back.

[phongn]

3 Buffs at Edwards? Why even bother??

You know, the image itself tells you precisely what they are there for.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

3 Buffs at Edwards? Why even bother??

You know, the image itself tells you precisely what they are there for.

Actually, in that case, why not Guam?

[phongn]

Actually, in that case, why not Guam?

What do you mean "why not Guam?"

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Actually, in that case, why not Guam?

What do you mean "why not Guam?"

I meant, why not base them in Guam?

[tim31]

3 Buffs at Edwards? Why even bother??

You know, the image itself tells you precisely what they are there for.

Lazy me. So test coded... What does that mean exactly? They're not secretly being transformed into EB-52s at Groom Lake?

[Beowulf]

3 Buffs at Edwards? Why even bother??

They're used for testing integration of new stuff. So we develop a new cruise missile. We use those airframes to test seperation of it from the bomber and stuff like that. Similar reason is why there's a B-2 located there.

[phongn]

I meant, why not base them in Guam?

That's a forward basing thing as needed, not exactly a permanent base.

[Sea Skimmer]

I don’t see how this proposal can work, USAF planning is depending on having our heavy bombers available for conventional weapons and we don’t have nearly enough of them to split the fleet into dedicated conventional and nuclear segments.

[FedRebel]

I don’t see how this proposal can work, USAF planning is depending on having our heavy bombers available for conventional weapons and we don’t have nearly enough of them to split the fleet into dedicated conventional and nuclear segments.

When SAC started in 1946 it only had a small number of B-29's, a decade later the Soviet military was wetting it's panties on a regular basis as SAC now had hundreds of bombers and an endless stream of newer, better ones coming out of the production lines every day.

Hopefully the AFS(trategic)C (I was concerned they'd arrange the letters that way) fully recognizes the invaluably of our bombers and puts proper investment into them and doesn't abuse them like TAC (ACC) did.

[Stormbringer]

When SAC started in 1946 it only had a small number of B-29's, a decade later the Soviet military was wetting it's panties on a regular basis as SAC now had hundreds of bombers and an endless stream of newer, better ones coming out of the production lines every day.

That's a pipe dream and a half. They're looking at a possible B-3 but the procurement date on that is going to be a good ways in the future. Even if there's a more strategically oriented service, it's going to take a lot of work to change procurement priorities. With the plans for keeping the B-52s in service for decades yet I doubt any one is really planning on changing them soon.

Hopefully the AFS(trategic)C (I was concerned they'd arrange the letters that way) fully recognizes the invaluably of our bombers and puts proper investment into them and doesn't abuse them like TAC (ACC) did.

Abuse or not, as Sea Skimmer points out there's almost no way to radically re-orient Air Force priorities. The bombers are going to have to be doing what they've been doing, at least to an extent.

[Stuart Mackey]

Schlesinger said those incidents had shaken the confidence of US allies in Europe, Asia, Australia and New Zealand that depend on the US nuclear umbrella, raising the risk that countries will seek their own nuclear weapons.

I think NZ and the US parted ways on this 84-87.