Obama "Not Commited" To ABM site in Europe.

[Adrian Laguna]

The next 'conventional conflict' waged between superpowers will be fought with nuclear weapons anyway. For all the other conceivable wars - such as a possible intervention in Darfur, or any other number of third-world nations - a light army will suffice.

A light army would not have sufficed in Korea, it would not have sufficed in Desert Storm, and it will not suffice the next time the US feels like bitch slapping a backward power that steps out of line. The atom bomb has not eliminated war, it has only eliminated direct war between those that have it, only about a dozen countries in the whole world.

The War in Iraq was fine while we were fighting Saddam's forces. It was only afterwards, during the occupation, that problems incurred, because a nimble military isn't meant for pulling occupation duty (equally frankly, I'd feel fine pulling out immediately and letting Iraq descend into its natural state of civil war). What they are meant to do is to attack in blitzkrieg fashion and then pull out, letting the natural tendency towards instability in any decentralized state do its work and soften the enemy up. Had we not sent troops into Iraq after we destroyed its infrastructure, it woulds soon have devolved into pandemonium anyway, and we would have been able to go in during the aftermath to pick up the pieces, on the pretense of some humanitarian mission. That would have been a much more effective way of operating the war, rather than treating it like Vichy France.

There were many failures in the prosecution of the war that did not stem from the structure of the occupying forces but rather from lack of CI doctrine, cultural blindness, pride, and general stupidity. Had the occupation forces not disbanded the Iraqi army, destroyed the Iraqi civil service, pissed-off the Arabs by being insensitive to their cultural mores, and been more open to the sort of negotiation that has been par the course in Arabia for millenia (read: bribes) from the get go, then Iraq would be doing much better and we would still have a conventional war oriented force.

[thejester]

The next 'conventional conflict' waged between superpowers will be fought with nuclear weapons anyway. For all the other conceivable wars - such as a possible intervention in Darfur, or any other number of third-world nations - a light army will suffice.

I think the War in Iraq showcases perfectly the defects in opinion favoring "light" forces in small numbers as the appropriate solution to modern and future military conflict.

The War in Iraq was fine while we were fighting Saddam's forces. It was only afterwards, during the occupation, that problems incurred, because a nimble military isn't meant for pulling occupation duty (equally frankly, I'd feel fine pulling out immediately and letting Iraq descend into its natural state of civil war).

The only way it had anything to do with being 'nimble' was that that mindset induced politicians in Washington to think they would need fewer troops on the ground (presumably fighting 'smarter, not harder' or whatever other corporate bullshit they were thinking of). Being 'nimble' was at best a mindset; the assault on Baghdad was praised for the way in which the forces doing it were 'bubbled', but the reality is that 'bubbled' forces were still heavy, mechanised infantry, and the tools they brought with them (heavy armour etc) were crucial to success.

There's no evidence to suggest the Coaltion forces didn't do their job in 2003-4 because of failures in TO&E, or even doctrine. The overwhelming evidence is they failed because there weren't enough of them and the civilian side of reconstruction was hopelessly mismanaged.

What they are meant to do is to attack in blitzkrieg fashion and then pull out, letting the natural tendency towards instability in any decentralized state do its work and soften the enemy up. Had we not sent troops into Iraq after we destroyed its infrastructure, it woulds soon have devolved into pandemonium anyway, and we would have been able to go in during the aftermath to pick up the pieces, on the pretense of some humanitarian mission. That would have been a much more effective way of operating the war, rather than treating it like Vichy France.

That is such an utterly retarded proposition I'm not sure where you'd start in debunking it. That 'solution' would see every downside of the failed occupation up until the surge (massive civilian death and displacement, rise of a powerful al-Qaeda surrogate, expansion of Iranian influence etc) magnified, with virtually no upside - at some point the US military will have to go back in, which will result in deaths and masses of money spent.

[CmdrWilkens]

What they are meant to do is to attack in blitzkrieg fashion and then pull out, letting the natural tendency towards instability in any decentralized state do its work and soften the enemy up.

I honestly wonder if you understand what blizkrieg or, as practiced by the US, mobile warfare actually involves. You seem to be under some delusion that it involves surgical strikes with limited infantry or light forces commando style to disrupt the enemy.

That's honestly the most retarded idea I've yet seen.

What the US is built and desgined to do, and damn if it doesn't work, is utilize armored spearheads supported by lots of airpower and light troops on the flanks to smash through an enemies defenses then procede to operate in his rear areas, destroying supply depots, staging areas, and targeting the all important centers of gravity for an opponent whether those centers be political, economic, or military. The objective is to take strategic and operationally critical objectives while stranding helpless pockets of troops behind you to be cleaned up after you have secured victory.

Now obviously in the case of Iraq leavining those units behind turned out to be half the problem as the civil authority was never constituted in the wake of those untis being shattered and bypassed but in now way did the operation then, nor the doctrine still espoused now, resemble anything like what you seem to be advocating.

[MKSheppard]

You provided evidence that British decoys didn't work. That's it. I read nothing about decoys generally.

Except that Chevaline was actually a US Decoy program. The british bought into the ANTELOPE penaid program, and decided to continue the SUPER ANTELOPE penaid development long after the US had ceased active development of it; and renamed it from SUPER ANTELOPE to CHEVALINE to give the impression that it was a wholly British program, not one building off the corpse of a US program.

[Axis Kast]

From my total layman understanding a decoy is up against computational power which had been increasing at staggering rate. Not only must a decoy look same as a real warhead to a wide variety of sensors it must move like one as well. At some point to look like a convincing nuclear warhead you end up with a decoy just as massive and expensive as a real live nuclear warhead. Which kind of defeats the point of employing decoys.

Yet "fire-and-forget" nuclear weapons are still cheaper than "bullet-to-hit-a-bullet" interceptors. Let's go right ahead and assume that the Russians felt obligated to match us, one for one. It'd still be cheaper for Moscow to saturate than for the U.S. to defend.

The War in Iraq was fine while we were fighting Saddam's forces. It was only afterwards, during the occupation, that problems incurred, because a nimble military isn't meant for pulling occupation duty (equally frankly, I'd feel fine pulling out immediately and letting Iraq descend into its natural state of civil war). What they are meant to do is to attack in blitzkrieg fashion and then pull out, letting the natural tendency towards instability in any decentralized state do its work and soften the enemy up. Had we not sent troops into Iraq after we destroyed its infrastructure, it woulds soon have devolved into pandemonium anyway, and we would have been able to go in during the aftermath to pick up the pieces, on the pretense of some humanitarian mission. That would have been a much more effective way of operating the war, rather than treating it like Vichy France.

You're arguing that we should tailor our military to constrain policy, not to address a range of contingencies, which is its declared purpose. That doesn't fly.

The military has to be multi-role. Attempting to site the reasons for our invasion of Iraq in the structure of the military we had in 2003 is misplacing blame and creating risk.

Except that Chevaline was actually a US Decoy program. The british bought into the ANTELOPE penaid program, and decided to continue the SUPER ANTELOPE penaid development long after the US had ceased active development of it; and renamed it from SUPER ANTELOPE to CHEVALINE to give the impression that it was a wholly British program, not one building off the corpse of a US program.

Well and good. Except even if the Russians decided not to utilize decoys and instead decided only to build more missiles, they'd still be able to do it cheaper than we could.

I also find questionable those who contend that Russia's real fear is that it will one day wake up and discover tens of thousands of interceptors suddenly active on its western border. A missile system is bulky. It requires long lead-time and careful negotiation with foreign partners. Hard to miss, even if you're only using open-source info. The Russians would have plenty of early warning to restart the warhead production lines, if the U.S. were going for effective neutralization of their deterrent. The Russians implicitly admitted that the ABM technology wasn't really a threat when they offered joint basing in Azerbaijan, was it?

[MKSheppard]

Yet "fire-and-forget" nuclear weapons are still cheaper than "bullet-to-hit-a-bullet" interceptors.

Actually, it's one interceptor per missile. All you have to do is to increase the range on the interceptor and it's booster so you hit the missiles before they debuss. And we are developing MIRVed versions of the GBI, so that one booster can put into orbit multiple little homing kill vehicles.

Let's go right ahead and assume that the Russians felt obligated to match us, one for one. It'd still be cheaper for Moscow to saturate than for the U.S. to defend.

Actually, it isn't. With ABM you're no longer quite sure that your missile will hit it's target. Even a very thin screen presents innumerable problems for a targeteer.

Well and good. Except even if the Russians decided not to utilize decoys and instead decided only to build more missiles, they'd still be able to do it cheaper than we could.

The C3I for controlling those missiles isn't cheap. By contrast, C3I for an interceptor is pretty cheap, since they're non-nuclear now, and who cares if one accidentally fires?

[Illuminatus Primus]

The next 'conventional conflict' waged between superpowers will be fought with nuclear weapons anyway. For all the other conceivable wars - such as a possible intervention in Darfur, or any other number of third-world nations - a light army will suffice.

I think the War in Iraq showcases perfectly the defects in opinion favoring "light" forces in small numbers as the appropriate solution to modern and future military conflict. If that isn't enough, look at Somalia.

The problem in Darfur involves failures of intelligence, limitations on mobility, and lack of specialist troops. But the central crux is that, even at an authorized size in excess of 20,000, there simply are not enough troops to respond across an area the size of France.

Maybe we should not engage in foriegn, opposite-hemisphere occupation-level adventurism at all, so we can afford a light/strategic mix. The '50's style military was designed to deliberately avoid any sub-strategic confrontation by maiming the Army's conventional warmaking. A peacetime, expeditionary, conventionally-equipped large Army is a tool that will keep looking for a solution. McNamara gutted strategic warmaking to rebuild the Army and was promptly tempted into subsequently wrecking it and America's soft power in Vietnam. And a legacy Reagan Army allowed us to get into a pointless Iraq adventure. There is precisely NO evidence that any adventurism of the Iraq or Vietnam order of magnitude will be worth the risks and costs in the future.

[K. A. Pital]

Poland and the Czechs are part of NATO.

Yes, I just forgot about one more strategic adversary - NATO.

Right now, we have the capability to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles that are aimed at CONUS. Russia also has this capability for Western Russia (If you think the Russians suck so badly, that they can only defend the outskirts of Moscow with an interceptor noticeably larger than the GBI, you've got something coming).

The huge interceptors around Moscow are limited in number, but most SAM systems which are modern have a marginal ABM ability with ABM-geared missiles. So?

So why shouldn't we expand our ABM shield to protect our NATO allies? Face the facts; if we sited the system in Germany, Russia would still be bitching about it.

I never said you shouldn't... I said we should do everything to stop it, everything that we can After all, it's best for us if it stalls for years, while it's bad for you

The Russians implicitly admitted that the ABM technology wasn't really a threat when they offered joint basing in Azerbaijan, was it?

"Not a threat"? Do you even know how much it costed for Russia to construct the huge network of ABM radars, one of which we generously offered to jointly operate as means to cover freakin' "Iran" which is not a threat even in the most wankastic scenarios

The lower Daryal radar would anyway detect ICBMs and MRBMs coming from the Southern Hemisphere, which excludes Europe, continental US. The US can be allowed to jointly operate this OTH radar.

[Axis Kast]

Actually, it's one interceptor per missile. All you have to do is to increase the range on the interceptor and it's booster so you hit the missiles before they debuss. And we are developing MIRVed versions of the GBI, so that one booster can put into orbit multiple little homing kill vehicles.

That technology is still many years away.

Into the next decade, a single nuclear weapon will be cheaper than a single interceptor -- meaning that Russia could match, then exceed, American numbers.

Actually, it isn't. With ABM you're no longer quite sure that your missile will hit it's target. Even a very thin screen presents innumerable problems for a targeteer.

As long as the Russians fire one missile for every interceptor, and then some, they will continue to have deterrence capability.

The C3I for controlling those missiles isn't cheap. By contrast, C3I for an interceptor is pretty cheap, since they're non-nuclear now, and who cares if one accidentally fires?

The electronics that guide a nuclear missile onto its target can afford less precision than those that guide a kinetic-kill device to a ballistic object.

A peacetime, expeditionary, conventionally-equipped large Army is a tool that will keep looking for a solution.

Like Mengsk, you wrongly situate motivate forces with the army, rather than with politicians. The key is not to create an Army that lacks certain capabilities in order to preclude certain outcomes; it is to elect better leaders and demand greater accountability.

The Eisenhower military was constructed to bolster a legitimate strategy: nuclear deterrence. What strategy does a "light" military enable?

The air war against Serbia in Kosovo was far less effective than originally touted. Even Desert Fox left a lot to be desired in 1991.

You are essentially telling us to abandon all ability to act as we did in, say, 1991, as a knee-jerk reaction to 2003. You claim there is no evidence that "adventurism" pays; what is your evidence that a "light" military works, or that isolationism will turn out to be a successful strategy? You don't have any, and you can't make any. We need a force that is prepared for all types of threats.

[Count Chocula]

Sheppard hit it right on the last page - Poland is a member of NATO. America's pact with NATO is one of mutual defense, with the ABM shield being part of it (whether it will work or not today). As part of that, since Europe is not up to the tech level (through lack of funding or desire) to have a chance of intercepting incoming ICBMs, the US has stepped up with its ABMs. Poland is right next door to Russia, therefore has the best chance of detecting hostile ICBMs in boost phase. More significantly, ABMs launched against boost-phase ICBMs have the best chance of obtaining a targeting solution to successfully intercept them. You can see this mindset at work on the US theoretical side with the Airborne Laser program, which IIRC is envisioned to ideally operate against ICBMs after initial launch.

Geographically, the ABMs themselves need to be sited somewhere in Europe. It's a short hop at hypersonic from Russia to Berlin, and ABMs launched from outside Europe would have a much harder time intercepting Euro-bound ICBMs; or if they did intercept, would do so at a much lower altitude due to their required flight time.

Of course Obama's "Not Commited" - he's the President-elect and too smart to make binding policy statements before inaguration, and I'm guessing his intel briefings may not have thoroughly covered this aspect of our NATO alliance yet.

[TimothyC]

As long as the Russians fire one missile for every interceptor, and then some, they will continue to have deterrence capability.

Not quite.

Say you have 3 targets (A, B, and C) each one needs to be hit with a nuclear device to kill it, and we need to kill those 3 targets. All three targets are far enough apart to make hitting them with MIRVs not possible. Site D is an ABM site with 20 interceptors, and is in the path from the missile field to the trio of targets. So now I need to launch 23 missiles (twenty get shot down, and 3 for the three kills that I need) right?

Wrong Because I can't re-target inflight, and I don't know which twenty missiles will be shot down, give a 100% guarantee that I can kill the 3 targets I need to use 63 missiles (21 per target). Note - this is a horrendous simplification, and is inaccurate, but it shows just how well ABM works.

NOTE: I also ignored all of the other things that can take an ICBM down - storms over either the launch field or target are just one possibility. Or Sleeping silo crews.

[Axis Kast]

Say you have 3 targets (A, B, and C) each one needs to be hit with a nuclear device to kill it, and we need to kill those 3 targets.

That is assuming 100% accuracy of interceptors; a pre-determined requirement to successfully eliminate more than one large target (whereas the threshold is probably just one large city), and that we're talking dozens of missiles, not thousands. Remember that, to begin with, Russia has an enormous stockpile.

It's also been pointed out previously that Russia's missiles go over the North Pole, not Eastern Europe.

[thejester]

Maybe we should not engage in foriegn, opposite-hemisphere occupation-level adventurism at all, so we can afford a light/strategic mix. The '50's style military was designed to deliberately avoid any sub-strategic confrontation by maiming the Army's conventional warmaking. A peacetime, expeditionary, conventionally-equipped large Army is a tool that will keep looking for a solution. McNamara gutted strategic warmaking to rebuild the Army and was promptly tempted into subsequently wrecking it and America's soft power in Vietnam. And a legacy Reagan Army allowed us to get into a pointless Iraq adventure. There is precisely NO evidence that any adventurism of the Iraq or Vietnam order of magnitude will be worth the risks and costs in the future.

Rubbish. The Eisenhower Administration was on the verge of committing to a conflict in Laos against guerillas when Kennedy was elected, and it was only out of deference to the new President-elect that Eisenhower did not commit military action. Not having a military suited for such an expedition didn't deter him; it just meant that SEATO troops got substituted instead, and the US actively planned to use nukes because there was no other option available. Thankfully General Ridgeway, among others, recognised it for the lunacy that it was and lobbied succesfully against it.

The point being that, as Axis pointed out, structuring your military so that it isn't capable of executing policy is a fundamentally arse-backwards way of doing things. Eisenhower's actions in Laos demonstrate as much; he wasn't going to abandon a course of action simply because the military wasn't suited to it. He'd do it anyway, and if the plan sucked balls because the military couldn't do it, too bad.

[K. A. Pital]

Sheppard hit it right on the last page - Poland is a member of NATO. America's pact with NATO is one of mutual defense, with the ABM shield being part of it (whether it will work or not today).

No, there was a special part of the ABM treaty which denied one the ability to base ABM elements in (a) space (b) sea and (c) foreign nations.

You can see this mindset at work on the US theoretical side with the Airborne Laser program, which IIRC is envisioned to ideally operate against ICBMs after initial launch.

What does this have to do with the fact that Russia has rock-solid reasons to oppose an enemy program clearly aimed at neutralizing ICBM nuclear arsenals?

Geographically, the ABMs themselves need to be sited somewhere in Europe. It's a short hop at hypersonic from Russia to Berlin, and ABMs launched from outside Europe would have a much harder time intercepting Euro-bound ICBMs; or if they did intercept, would do so at a much lower altitude due to their required flight time.

So Europe will get crapped out no matter what; basically it should act as a giant missile sponge for the US. Sure, that works. Just stop spewing all the feelgood about "protecting our allies"

Of course Obama's "Not Commited" - he's the President-elect and too smart to make binding policy statements before inaguration, and I'm guessing his intel briefings may not have thoroughly covered this aspect of our NATO alliance yet.

I assume he's just far less hawkish than today's US administration. Which is good. Any erosion of US influence, and especially erosion of US military programs, is very beneficial to Russia

[Count Chocula]

Stas, on one point (since I'm not up to full speed on all this stuff): if Russian missiles are aimed at European cities (i.e. NATO), and the United States is sworn by treaty to defend its NATO allies, Europe would be more of a "missile sponge" if it were NOT defended against ICBMs sited only a few hundred miles from its borders.

Okay, two points: I'm happy to be part of the "enemy" that aims to neutralize Russia's "ICBM nuclear arsenals." I suppose Russian scientists and soldiers are equally happy to work on devices to neutralize America's nuclear arsenals.

[K. A. Pital]

Stas, on one point (since I'm not up to full speed on all this stuff): if Russian missiles are aimed at European cities (i.e. NATO), and the United States is sworn by treaty to defend its NATO allies, Europe would be more of a "missile sponge" if it were NOT defended against ICBMs sited only a few hundred miles from its borders.

Um... the more control nodes, radars and other stuff you install in Europe, the more nukes should we drop on Europe to neutralize what are essentially gigantic defense sponges for the United States and nothing else. It has been that way during the Cold War and frankly nothing has changed much at all.

Okay, two points: I'm happy to be part of the "enemy" that aims to neutralize Russia's "ICBM nuclear arsenals." I suppose Russian scientists and soldiers are equally happy to work on devices to neutralize America's nuclear arsenals.

Yeah, but in that case, don't spew the feelgood tripe about now Russia is totally "irrational" in opposing an enemy plan against it's nuclear arsenal I'm really tired of hearing "yeah, the ABM is kewl, but Russia shouldn't oppose it and just let it roll" like we should just give it to you freely on a plate when for marginal effort we can stir up political brawls to last for years, and your program will simply stall due to interference.

[TimothyC]

That is assuming 100% accuracy of interceptors;

As the attacker, I have to assume that, or risk not taking out the target.

a pre-determined requirement to successfully eliminate more than one large target (whereas the threshold is probably just one large city),

What? That doesn't even make sense. EI: I have to take out Cheyenne Mt, Offutt AFB, and Elseworth AFB. Three big targets that could be covered by a single ABM site

and that we're talking dozens of missiles, not thousands.

True, be in a full on war, we are also looking at hundreds of point targets (ICBM Silos).

Remember that, to begin with, Russia has an enormous stockpile.

But is it big enough to have a 20X overkill?

It's also been pointed out previously that Russia's missiles go over the North Pole, not Eastern Europe.

Yes, but that doesn't change the fact that making the opposition's life harder isn't a noble goal.

[Count Chocula]

Stas, this is a game played for very high stakes, not least of which are the 300+ million members of NATO with Russian bullseyes painted on their cities. Europe is the cradle from which American culture sprang (even if we're divergent from it) and the idea of NATO is to protect Europe, not sacrifice it. That notion has been absurd since the 1960s.

As far as the "Russia shouldn't oppose it" statement goes: we're not asking for Russia's permission. Neither is NATO. And don't put words in my mouth by inferring I spewed any "feelgood tripe about now Russia is totally 'irrational'" etc. The placement of ABM sites, along with ICBM sites, military bases, etc etc ON BOTH SIDES is a cold-blooded preparation for the worst-case; the political brawls are non-nuclear ways to attempt to acheive dominance.

[TimothyC]

Ghetto Edit: A Better example of three close sites would be Dayton/Wright-Patt/Cincinnati [Machine tool shops and auto factories, big Air base, and Railroad yards/bridges respectively). To kill all three of them you need to ground-burst with multiple warheads.

[Illuminatus Primus]

The C3I for controlling those missiles isn't cheap. By contrast, C3I for an interceptor is pretty cheap, since they're non-nuclear now, and who cares if one accidentally fires?

The electronics that guide a nuclear missile onto its target can afford less precision than those that guide a kinetic-kill device to a ballistic object.

You misunderstand. Missiles must be very well secured and coordinated with national command authorities because accidental launches (and failures to launch in the event of exchanges) are completely unacceptable. The birds CAN NEVER FLY unless they ABSOLUTELY MUST. Contrariwise, an KE ABM launch at worst means you maybe shotdown someone's satellite or something, and demonstrated your real-world ABM performance to enemies. You didn't accidentally cause a nuclear war, so the security against false positives which is so extensive with ballistic missiles does not need to exist with KE ABM.

A peacetime, expeditionary, conventionally-equipped large Army is a tool that will keep looking for a solution.

Like Mengsk, you wrongly situate motivate forces with the army, rather than with politicians. The key is not to create an Army that lacks certain capabilities in order to preclude certain outcomes; it is to elect better leaders and demand greater accountability.

Why? If the cost/benefit ratio of all likely Vietnam/Iraq scenarios is as bad as the original articles, why have the very costly temptation to indulge them available at all?

The Eisenhower military was constructed to bolster a legitimate strategy: nuclear deterrence. What strategy does a "light" military enable?

The Afghan scenario. If a real Iraq was on the verge of deploying weapons-of-mass-destruction to terrorists for deployment against the United States, we would completely justified in destroying their industrial and military infrastructure. And deterrence works against would-be supposed Iraq's too. We'll nuclear-ly immolate a state which deploys weapons of mass destruction against the United States, conventionally or by proxy.

The "crazy rogue state might maybe develop WMDs without anyone noticing and give them away to terrorists regardless of the consequences" is a theoretical proposition which is hardly substantiated in reality. Furthermore, maintaining an expeditionary "heavy" force of the type needed to carry out "Desert Storm" and OIF esque operations just in case, just maybe, that the above contingency happens, is stupid. Why can't deterrence work against the same states?

You are essentially telling us to abandon all ability to act as we did in, say, 1991, as a knee-jerk reaction to 2003. You claim there is no evidence that "adventurism" pays; what is your evidence that a "light" military works, or that isolationism will turn out to be a successful strategy? You don't have any, and you can't make any. We need a force that is prepared for all types of threats.

So opportunity cost has NO RELEVENCE to any discussion? We must build-up an armed force of unlimited cost to all possible threat profiles of any kind? You have offered not a shred of evidence that we will need to launch 1991 conflicts (why couldn't we have simply armed KSA, Iran, etc. and played them off each other; we didn't intervene in Iraq-Iran with heavy ground forces because we needed to maintain the balance of power that bad). Or that future Iraqs and Vietnams are reasonable possibilities and would work out better than last time. The burden of proof is on you to justify continuing growth in the defense expenditure while America faced enormous systemic financial, economic, energy, social, and general welfare crises. I feel like this is the kind of reasoning a conservative probably used while arguing to bankrupt the British Empire because that extra battleship squadron will really, honestly make the difference in the trend of history, screw the finances.

[K. A. Pital]

Stas, this is a game played for very high stakes, not least of which are the 300+ million members of NATO with Russian bullseyes painted on their cities. Europe is the cradle from which American culture sprang (even if we're divergent from it) and the idea of NATO is to protect Europe, not sacrifice it. That notion has been absurd since the 1960s.

The idea isn't to "protect" Europe, but to sacrifice Europe for the maximum amount of Russian strategic weapons expended on it's destruction, since protecting Europe from depressed-trajectory semiballistic SRBMs and MRBMs with a very limited flight time is hardly possible at all. Ask Shep or Stuart "Cradle" and "cultural blah blah" is just bollocks and another round of feelgood tripe.

As far as the "Russia shouldn't oppose it" statement goes: we're not asking for Russia's permission. Neither is NATO. And don't put words in my mouth by inferring I spewed any "feelgood tripe about now Russia is totally 'irrational'" etc. The placement of ABM sites, along with ICBM sites, military bases, etc etc ON BOTH SIDES is a cold-blooded preparation for the worst-case; the political brawls are non-nuclear ways to attempt to acheive dominance.

If you didn't spew the "feelgood tripe", fine. A lot of people in this thread did, saying Russia is "irrational" in opposing the ABM.

[That NOS Guy]

If you didn't spew the "feelgood tripe", fine. A lot of people in this thread did, saying Russia is "irrational" in opposing the ABM.

When I noted Russia was being "irrational" it's for the reason that their stated objection of fearing that the ABM site in Poland would be detremental to their arsenal, which is as we both know certifiable bullshit. Though perhaps Darth Raptor said it better when he compared Russia's reaction to "BAAAAAWWWWWWW".

[CmdrWilkens]

Maybe we should not engage in foriegn, opposite-hemisphere occupation-level adventurism at all, so we can afford a light/strategic mix. The '50's style military was designed to deliberately avoid any sub-strategic confrontation by maiming the Army's conventional warmaking. A peacetime, expeditionary, conventionally-equipped large Army is a tool that will keep looking for a solution. McNamara gutted strategic warmaking to rebuild the Army and was promptly tempted into subsequently wrecking it and America's soft power in Vietnam.

I wanted to address just this point. McNamara's gutting of strategic forces had no impact relative to the use of American power in Vietnam. That was a conflict we started down the road towards in 1949 and the lack of focus on it until well into the Johnson administration meant that our oppoennts, who were focusing single mindedly on the problem, were better able to set themselves up for long term success. The US was already in a place by the end of the 1950s where it would either take a huge hit to its prestige by surrendering South Vietnam or it would be dragged into a conflict with an entrenched guerilla and conventional force fighting on its home territory. There is virtually no scernario after about 1958 which doesn't see the US losing a significant chunk of its soft power either in the short or logn term. Mcnamara's meddling have little impact save to maybe influence the change from short to long.

[K. A. Pital]

When I noted Russia was being "irrational" it's for the reason that their stated objection of fearing that the ABM site in Poland would be detremental to their arsenal, which is as we both know certifiable bullshit.

"Bullshit"? We would have to expend more missiles for each interceptor placed in Europe, and the OTH radars placed there would offer a handy early warning to the US about a Russian missile strike. So not only did you force us to expend yet more missiles to surpess US defense network elements in Europe, you will also be warned in advance since supressing OTH radars is the first thing one should do when proceeding with the attack.

[Guardsman Bass]

The next 'conventional conflict' waged between superpowers will be fought with nuclear weapons anyway. For all the other conceivable wars - such as a possible intervention in Darfur, or any other number of third-world nations - a light army will suffice.

A light army would not have sufficed in Korea, it would not have sufficed in Desert Storm, and it will not suffice the next time the US feels like bitch slapping a backward power that steps out of line. The atom bomb has not eliminated war, it has only eliminated direct war between those that have it, only about a dozen countries in the whole world.

Exactly.

One other thing, too - keep in mind that the "Nuclear Stand-off" that keeps the Big Powers from lurching into conventional warfare may not hold forever, particularly if you aren't constantly at the forefront of weaponry that can be used for strategic purposes (like having the best missiles, the best bombers, the best forces). Unless you want to retreat to the stance Illuminatus Primus is talking about - where you would basically be sitting on your butt with your nukes, largely ignoring any shit that goes down elsewhere unless it either directly affects your interests or creeps into your neighborhood (at which point you nuke/bomb the shit out of them), then you need a good conventional army.

The War in Iraq was fine while we were fighting Saddam's forces. It was only afterwards, during the occupation, that problems incurred, because a nimble military isn't meant for pulling occupation duty (equally frankly, I'd feel fine pulling out immediately and letting Iraq descend into its natural state of civil war). What they are meant to do is to attack in blitzkrieg fashion and then pull out, letting the natural tendency towards instability in any decentralized state do its work and soften the enemy up. Had we not sent troops into Iraq after we destroyed its infrastructure, it woulds soon have devolved into pandemonium anyway, and we would have been able to go in during the aftermath to pick up the pieces, on the pretense of some humanitarian mission. That would have been a much more effective way of operating the war, rather than treating it like Vichy France.

There were many failures in the prosecution of the war that did not stem from the structure of the occupying forces but rather from lack of CI doctrine, cultural blindness, pride, and general stupidity. Had the occupation forces not disbanded the Iraqi army, destroyed the Iraqi civil service, pissed-off the Arabs by being insensitive to their cultural mores, and been more open to the sort of negotiation that has been par the course in Arabia for millenia (read: bribes) from the get go, then Iraq would be doing much better and we would still have a conventional war oriented force.

One thing, too - would it have even been politically possible for the US to simply go in, smash the Iraqi government, and pull out quickly? We could theoretically do it, but then there's the pesky matter of those Sunni Arab allies (like Saudi Arabia), who would be very, very angry since in their view you've basically just toppled a sunni state and bulwark against Iran (a bad bulwark that was a threat to its sunni neighbors, but a bulwark nonetheless) in favor of a weak, chaotic mess that is going to generate a lot of refugees, probably a lot of angry jihadists, and above all an area dominated by divided shi'ites who are going to be very susceptible to Iranian influence (meaning that suddenly Iran might effectively be on the doorstep of all the sunni arab states in the region except Egypt).