US Naval Infantry

[MKSheppard]

Link

Found this very interesting page about Naval Infantry in the US Navy.

In 1929, the USS New Mexico's landing force consisted of no less than three companies of sailors, an artillery section, and a MG company, and this was after the reforms which eliminated training to repel boarders.

Likewise, in October 1944, teh SOP for 2,200 ton destroyers was to be able to contribute 2 ten man squads as naval infantry, each consisting of nine riflemen and one squad leader.

The USN was also very vigorious in Central America/Caribbean, much to the detriment of Marine Corps' propagandists, who try to claim (as always) that the Marines were our "fire brigade" in that period:

The Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America provided the backdrop for extensive use of bluejackets ashore in almost every conceivable type of infantry activity. In this region, there were at least 136 instances of individual groups of bluejackets operating ashore as infantry (from squad to brigade level) between 1901 and May 1929. Operations ranged from election security, pacification, peacekeeping, land convoy escort, protection of roads and railroads, occupation, and guard duty to large-scale major combat operations against regular Army forces. Ships landing parties or multiple landing parties organized into battalions, regiments, or brigades conducted almost all of this activity.

The fun thing about them, is that they didn't use Marine Doctrine, but rather Army doctrine, for joint-services interoperability, long before the term had been invented.

Despite the attempt by the USMC to grab the role for themselves, Naval Infantry continued to be in use until the 60s.

For example, by 1960, each ship, division, force and fleet was required to “maintain a permanently organized naval landing party consisting of headquarters, rifle, machine gun, and other units as prescribed by the force or fleet commander.”

Organizations were:

· BB, CVA, CVS, CVL, all cruiser classes…. One rifle company (6 officer, 195 enlisted)
· Amphibious ships………………………….. One rifle platoon (1 officer, 44 enlisted)
· Destroyer types…………………………….. One rifle squad (13 enlisted)
· Divisions of capital ships (battleships, cruisers)….. A battalion headquarters (8 officers, 48 enlisted)
· Destroyer squadrons……………………….. Two platoon and one company headquarters (Company headquarters: 2 officers, 9 enlisted)

A 1960s Naval Landing Party Battalion consisted of 28 officers and 636 men; a company 6 officers, 195 men; rifle platoon 1 officer, 44 men; machine gun platoon 1 officer, 55 men. A rifle squad had one petty officer squad leader and 12 men divided into three fire teams.

[FOG3]

I would point out Navy enlisted are in Iraq on the ground right now, and I'm not talking about Corpmen and SEALs.

[TheMuffinKing]

I would point out Navy enlisted are in Iraq on the ground right now, and I'm not talking about Corpmen and SEALs.

Are your referring to SeaBees and MA's? Many of my friends from those rates did ILO (In Lieu Of) tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, augmenting primarily Army units in addition to doing their own jobs when applicable.

OT The USAF contributes airmen from almost all AFSC's in a similar program.

[Lonestar]

Gunnersmates, Boatswainsmates, Firecontrolmen...(who do you think mans the C-RAM?). Anyone with an ASF NEC(Armed Security Force) is certainly up for grabs as well. Most of these guys are in force protection billets at bases to ease the pressure for Army and Marines, although I know of at least one CTA(Yeoman with a clearance) who ended up manning a .50 on a Humvee for convoy duty.

[Knife]

What's your overall point Shep? The fiction that rear echelon units are safe from combat and instead rear echelon units and even forward deployed support groups need security? Or just because you can?

[Sea Skimmer]

I would point out Navy enlisted are in Iraq on the ground right now, and I'm not talking about Corpmen and SEALs.

Are your referring to SeaBees and MA's? Many of my friends from those rates did ILO (In Lieu Of) tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, augmenting primarily Army units in addition to doing their own jobs when applicable.

OT The USAF contributes airmen from almost all AFSC's in a similar program.

Since 2006 the USN has had its Expeditionary Combat Command, which controls all its land forces including Seabees and some newly formed naval infantry security units, which replace the Marines we used to use guarding nukes and naval bases ect... It also has some newly formed brown water patrol squadrons being used on Iraqi rivers.

[MKSheppard]

What's your overall point Shep?

My point is, it destroys the myth of the US Marine Corps being awesome, innovative, and "America's Fire Brigade".

Historically, USMC apologists have pointed to the Marine Corps long tradition from 1900-1939 of "filibustering" in various Caribbean and Central American countries, as proof that they have the institutional knowledge and doctrine to execute the role of America's Fire Brigade, etc.

Sadly, that doesn't hold up to historical scrutiny; as shown above by the article; e.g. that in 136 separate instances, the US Navy landed groups of it's sailors ashore as literal naval infantry in actions ranging up to brigade level against major enemy forces. And this was done all without the special training that the US Marine Corps prides itself on.

They literally just picked landing parties from ships' contigents and formed them into the required units of action and sent them ashore, using US Army training manuals and doctrine, which kind of destroys the Marine claim of superior training and doctrine, when a bunch of SAILORS can do just as good.

[Knife]

My point is, it destroys the myth of the US Marine Corps being awesome, innovative, and "America's Fire Brigade".

Historically, USMC apologists have pointed to the Marine Corps long tradition from 1900-1939 of "filibustering" in various Caribbean and Central American countries, as proof that they have the institutional knowledge and doctrine to execute the role of America's Fire Brigade, etc.

Sadly, that doesn't hold up to historical scrutiny; as shown above by the article; e.g. that in 136 separate instances, the US Navy landed groups of it's sailors ashore as literal naval infantry in actions ranging up to brigade level against major enemy forces. And this was done all without the special training that the US Marine Corps prides itself on.

They literally just picked landing parties from ships' contigents and formed them into the required units of action and sent them ashore, using US Army training manuals and doctrine, which kind of destroys the Marine claim of superior training and doctrine, when a bunch of SAILORS can do just as good.

Uhm, the success of other units destroys the need for a professional forced trained in a thing? Even assuming your argument held weigth a hundred years ago, it doesn't now. Or we can take your logic and do away with the army, since the Corps. is indeed bad ass.

December 03, 2008
Military.com|by Christian Lowe

It started out just like any other patrol in a war-ravaged Afghan province.

Hardened by months of combat, sneak attacks and roadside ambushes, the Marines were ready for a fight. Rolling through the hardscrabble village of Shewan in Afghanistan's Farah province on August 8, the leathernecks of the Twentynine Palms, Calif.-based 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment knew enemy eyes were upon them.

It was a village they'd had on their radar for months. Taliban insurgents and their al Qaeda helpers were constantly harassing the Marines charged with holding back the anti-coalition flood in their 37,000 square mile operational area -- and insurgents were using Shewan as an occasional base for attacks.

They knew the rows of mud compounds held bad guys. But on the tail end of the 10-mile patrol, they never could have expected the hornets nest they were destined to stir up.

"I was prepared for contact but I wasn't expecting any," a Marine unit leader told Military.com. "It turned out later that there was a big meeting of enemy leaders in the town that we had interrupted, and we inadvertently trapped them inside of their compound."

It all started with a rocket propelled grenade shot at around 1:00 pm, and it ended nearly eight hours later with more than 50 enemy killed and only one injured Marine. For months, 2/7 had absorbed ambush after ambush from their hit-and-run opponents, suffering one of the highest casualty rates of any Marine unit deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The unit would be a symbol of the festering conflict in Afghanistan, where few NATO allies are willing to pitch in when the fight turns nasty and the full-force of American might is distracted by the high-profile conflict in Iraq.

But on August 8, in what would be known as "the battle of Shewan," it was payback time.

In an exclusive email exchange with Military.com, the platoon commander who led the Marines on that ill-fated patrol described the pitched battle in vivid detail. His Marines preferred that their story be recounted anonymously, so Marine officials declined several requests to name the specific platoon and company involved in the hours-long battle.

What the story shows is a typically aggressive response to an enemy that for once decided to emerge from the shadows. And it also serves as an illuminating look at how, no matter the adversity and casualty count, U.S. forces continue to fight with the will and determination to win, no matter the odds.

"We didn't win the fight because of our superior firepower. We were severely outnumbered, and outgunned," the platoon commander told Military.com. "From that first counter ambush assault we gained the momentum and maintained it until the enemy finally fled from the battlefield eight hours later."

Ambush Unleashed

Less than two hours into the patrol one of the Marine Humvees took fire from an enemy RPG team about 150 yards away. The grenade sailed harmlessly by, but the platoon sergeant swung his rifle, fired and killed the shooter while another Marine dropped a second man, the platoon commander said. The unit continued to receive sporadic small arms fire for the next hour, but pressed on with their patrol.

Then all hell broke loose.

About 10 insurgents ambushed the Marines' vehicles from an irrigation ditch and more fired on the patrol from a nearby trench line. Though a group of Marines tried to push through the enemy position, they were rebuffed by heavy fire and another Humvee was rocked by a volley of RPG rounds.

As the Humvee burned with its vehicle commander still inside, the Marines pounded the insurgent positions with M249 fire while AK bullets ricocheted off their vehicles. The platoon commander rushed to the downed vehicle to pull the stricken Marine to safety.

"All of a sudden we took an intense amount of machine gun fire from the tree line and at this point numerous machine guns opened up on my vehicle and the dismounted crew trapped in the kill zone," the platoon commander wrote. "This began 20 minutes of intense fighting as the platoon battled to recover the Marines from the kill zone."

All this was too much for one of the platoon's designated marksmen, who crawled to the top of a berm -- exposing himself to enemy fire -- and began to plink off the insurgent gunners firing at the burning Humvee.

"The enemy fired over 40 RPGs from the tree line but were unable to effectively engage the Marines trapped in the kill zone because of the high amount of accurate fire being directed at them," the platoon commander said. "The enemy was reinforcing the tree line and replacing fighters as quickly as we were killing them."

So the designated marksman kept his cool and continued to fire.

"The designated marksman merely adjusted [his sights] and sighted in on targets as they revealed their positions by engaging him," the platoon commander added. "He rapidly acquired and prosecuted these targets again and again, firing his rifle with exceptional accuracy ... until all of the Marines were recovered from the kill zone."

In all, the designated marksmen fired 20 shots, racking up 20 dead fighters.

Finally the Marines were able to roll in an MRAP vehicle to recover the wounded Marines, and the platoon pulled back out of the enemy's range to "redistribute ammunition and [come] up with a quick game plan," the platoon commander said.

Went back for more

The fighters never expected the Marines to return and were surprised to see leathernecks swarming through their trenches and targeting two strongholds with close air support.

"We took another 60 or so RPGs, some rockets and mortars ... but as we attempted to assault we started taking more fire from another compound," the platoon commander wrote. "The enemy had established a defense with mutually supporting positions."

Unable to continue the assault because of the intensity of fire, and with enemy trucks pulling into the compounds and disgorging insurgent fighters, two Marines crawled through a hail of machine gun fire to get more precise coordinates for an aerial bombing run. From only 75 meters away -- well within "danger close" restrictions -- the two Marines called in air strikes until the enemy eventually withdrew from the area.

In all, what started as an ambush by 30 insurgent fighters swelled to a full-fledged assault by an estimated 250 enemy militants. The 30 or so Marines of 2/7's platoon killed more than 50 insurgents in the eight-hour battle, the Corps says.

"It turned out later that there was a big meeting of enemy leaders in the town that we had interrupted and we inadvertently trapped them inside of their compound," the platoon commander wrote. "They must have thought that if they ambushed us we would cut and run. This was not the case."

We can now get rid of the army, since obviously a smaller organization of the USMC can more than serve the needs of land combat for the USA, if I follow your logic.

[CmdrWilkens]

What's your overall point Shep?

My point is, it destroys the myth of the US Marine Corps being awesome, innovative, and "America's Fire Brigade".

Historically, USMC apologists have pointed to the Marine Corps long tradition from 1900-1939 of "filibustering" in various Caribbean and Central American countries, as proof that they have the institutional knowledge and doctrine to execute the role of America's Fire Brigade, etc.

I'd like to know if any of these apologists ever pointed out that the Marines literally wrote the book on such actions?

Sadly, that doesn't hold up to historical scrutiny; as shown above by the article; e.g. that in 136 separate instances, the US Navy landed groups of it's sailors ashore as literal naval infantry in actions ranging up to brigade level against major enemy forces. And this was done all without the special training that the US Marine Corps prides itself on.

They literally just picked landing parties from ships' contigents and formed them into the required units of action and sent them ashore, using US Army training manuals and doctrine, which kind of destroys the Marine claim of superior training and doctrine, when a bunch of SAILORS can do just as good.

I hardly think so. The article you quoted specifically mentions "In this region, there were at least 136 instances of individual groups of bluejackets operating ashore as infantry (from squad to brigade level) between 1901 and May 1929. Operations ranged from election security, pacification, peacekeeping, land convoy escort, protection of roads and railroads, occupation, and guard duty to large-scale major combat operations against regular Army forces."


Problem one is this:

This count includes instances of landing parties relieving each other during the same operation

So the count is already inflated to a degree .


Second is that the actions specified, if you went to the footnote and then to the link show this nifty chart:

Killed in Action Died of Wounds Wounded in Action Totals
Marine Corps Officers 7 2 14 23
Naval Officers - - 3 3
Bluejackets 17 2 51 70
Marine Corps Enlisted Men 47 12 139 198
Totals 71 16 207 294

This total also does not include casualties from service with the Haitian Constabulary in which a significant number of Marines participated but I've never seen any evidence that Naval Infantry was employed for this.

Overall this chart would seem to indicate that the Marines were either a) Bad at their job (which given the were considered the only fighting ready formation of AMerican troops at the commencement of American involvement in WWI is hard to think) or b) Represented the contingent which had the largest share and most dangerous naval landing missions


So in other words...the Marines were still the ones kicking in the door and the Naval Infantry backed them up more often than not.