Can we send this guy to Russia? (Wikileaks and WARLOCK)

[MKSheppard]

Link

Wikileaks Posts Secret Bomb-Stopper Report; Did They Go Too Far?
By Noah Shachtman December 18, 2008

In July, 2005, I asked a member of a Baghdad-based military bomb squad about the radio frequency jammers his team was using to cut off signals to Iraq's remotely-detonated explosives. His response: "I can't even begin to say the first fucking thing about 'em." A few days later, one of those jammers seemed to save me and him from getting blown up. Months after that, David Axe was thrown out of Iraq by the U.S. military, for a blog post which mentioned the Warlock family of jammers.

So I was more than a little surprised, when I saw that Wikileaks had posted a classified report, outlining how the Warlock Red and Warlock Green jammers work with -- and interfere with -- military communications systems. The report, dated 2004, gives specific information about how the jammers function, their radiated power, and which frequencies they stop. That Baghdad bomb tech would've put his fist through a wall, if he saw it out in public.

Today, the leak isn't quite so serious. Those Warlock Green and Warlock Red jammers have been largely -- but not completely -- superseded by newer models. And those newer models have largely wiped out the remotely-detonated bomb threat in Iraq.

But still, the leaked report raises important questions about what information -- if any -- is too sensitive to disclose.

Steven Aftergood, the Federation of American Scientists' long-time advocate for open government, believes the site has gone too far. "Wikileaks says that it publishes restricted documents that are 'of substantial political, diplomatic or ethical significance.' Its publication makes sense only from the perspective that all secrecy is wrong and should be resisted. It's not a perspective that I share."

Wikileaks co-founder Julian Assange, not surprisingly, has a completely different take. "Wikileaks represents whistleblowers in the way that lawyers represent their clients -- fairly and impartially. Our 'job' is to safely and impartially conduct the whistleblowers message to the public, not to inject our own nationality or beliefs," he tells Danger Room.

It's not the first time the site has posted secret material. And, as he makes clear, it won't be the last.

All disclosures come from a source with access and motivation, which won't go away if we didn't publish... When disclosures are driven underground, affected parties have no right of reply or ability to defend themselves...

As for this document, US Soldiers are not happy that literally billions have gone on these jammers, with apparently little thought going into how soldiers are going to communicate, after they have been turned on.

So who's right: Aftergood or Assange? Are there limits to what should be published? Or should all information be free, no matter what? Sound off in the comments.

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In Medevev's Russia; this scumbag would be tried with treason, along with his "source" and sent to a very dark hole. Or at worst shot at dawn. At times I wish we could adopt the Russian Penal Code regarding spies, and traitors.

[Ekiqa]

How useful are the jammers really if they jam all US communications at the same time?

[KrauserKrauser]

I would think that if they stop things from blowing up, they would be mighty useful in the land of stuff blowing up all the time ie Iraq.

[Medic]

Jesus christ, so a guy who gives out information about radio-jamming equipment to prevent his buddies from getting Blown-the-Fuck-Up (tm) is a whistleblower, and wikileaks according to Assange merely wants to "safely and impartially conduct the whistelblowers message to the public?"

My ass, Merriam-Webster broadly defines whistelblower as "one who reveals something covert or who informs against another" and under that definition, he's living up to his holier-than-thou charter, if I can abuse the word for a moment. In real terms, as in, reality-based reality, another definition is typically what everyone thinks of as whisteblowers: "One who reveals wrongdoing within an organization to the public or to those in positions of authority."

How is keeping that information secret a wrongdoing, what's wrong with railroading someone out of the service who gives it away, and what is Assange smoking? In that order, I'd like to know, because the only people wronged in this process are insurgents fighting the best-equipped Army in the world who don't have access goodies like Warlock or, in the past, appreciable, detailed knowledge of the system. Acting as a sort of whistleblower-lawyer, as he describes wikileaks, there's 2 services he thinks he's providing: protection for the whistleblower (in this case some guy in uniform) and information of wrongdoing. Since the latter doesn't apply (unless we are literally kowtowing to the idea that we should fighting fairly in war; in effect that's what Assange is doing) the former isn't justified.

So I was more than a little surprised, when I saw that Wikileaks had posted a classified report, outlining how the Warlock Red and Warlock Green jammers work with -- and interfere with -- military communications systems.

How useful are the jammers really if they jam all US communications at the same time?

TTP's (tactics, techniques, and procedures) can work around that. 1st-generation systems may not have been perfect (and I literally don't know enough to leak anything about newer jammers) and had teething problems but it is better than no solution. What's so hard to understand about that? Even given that it's a leak about defunct equipment, providing such information gives insurgents, the Russians, Chinese, whoever, an idea about the turn-around in RDT&E, production and fielding of 1st generation, then 2nd generation systems (and so on and so forth) of this singular piece of equipment. Intelligence gathering doesn't have to be and often enough isn't a bonafide mole, possessing reams of information, as reliable as having video-evidence of a murder in a court of law. Like a murder investigation, the intelligence-gathering services of any potential American OPFOR only need bits and pieces of evidence, a leaked report here, unclassified reports there, to get a good picture of what they are trying to ascertain.

If it were a leaked report about a piece of equipment which demonstrably cost American lives, and the Army tried to bury it, that's something else. That is also an egregious example, the "black" end of the spectrum. The "white" end of the spectrum would be what the Army does release to the public, the good, the bad, the ugly and downright embarassing. The stuff of this article is a definite "gray;" the system was good-enough, keeping the article secret didn't harm anyone or keep any skeletons in a closet but leaking it has unknown negative consequences but WHAT positive ones? The only positive is that, on principle, he's sticking his thumb in the eye of the Army by leaking something, anything. Assange's views on secret information don't appreciate shades of gray, this was classified secret and it had to be aired out to the public, open-shut case. Fuck him and fuck his source; he's not protecting some noble principle, just his sacred-cow.

[CaptainZoidberg]

Hmmm...

I wonder if there's some mathematical way to go around this, i.e. transmit signals in such a way that they can filter out the jamming. (I'm just sort of throwing this out, I don't have much of a background in signal analysis).

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Does the US have an equivalent of the Official Secrets Act that is found in Britain and other countries? After all these leaks, I will be surprised if there was any.

[MKSheppard]

We do. It's just not enforced very well. Or when we DO enforce it, we don't execute the perpetrators; SEE Walker Spy Ring

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

We do. It's just not enforced very well. Or when we DO enforce it, we don't execute the perpetrators; SEE Walker Spy Ring

Why isn't it strongly enforced? I've always been curious about the rampant leaks. With the media screaming "free speech" or "my sources are secret" from time to time, it's almost as if the prosecutor is afraid of kicking up a shitstorm. But on the other hand, when the prosecutors did prosecute over the ambassador's wife being revealed as a spy, they were darn forceful on it, going as far as charging a journalist for obstruction of justice. Seems like either the prosecutors are sleeping, or plain lazy.

[Wicked Pilot]

How useful are the jammers really if they jam all US communications at the same time?

Just because a frequency is being jammed that doesn't necessarily make it unusable. They used to be a royal pain in the ass up into about a year or two ago, but it's a lot quieter now.

[Wicked Pilot]

Hmmm...

I wonder if there's some mathematical way to go around this,

You could start with the inverse square law.

[MKSheppard]

You could start with the inverse square law.

Or tie them into digital communications, the jammer goes off for a second every so often, and it downloads "emails" or text messages via Blue Force tracker during that downtime.

[K. A. Pital]

Wow, that's really abysmal.

The guy should be held for "disclosure of national security secrets" (the Article next to "Treason" in USSR/Russia) and put into jail for 5 years with denial of all and any government service in the future (that's what we do in Russia to most people who "talk" about state secrets openly).

He's not quite eligible for "treason" article (requires a deliberate intent to help the enemy by giving that information to enemy agents), but still...

[Sea Skimmer]

Or tie them into digital communications, the jammer goes off for a second every so often, and it downloads "emails" or text messages via Blue Force tracker during that downtime.

Warlock was the jammer modified from the Shortstop VT fuse jammer; neither version was all that powerful, so I suspect to an extent our radios could simply overpower them, if you turned off the jammer at the head of the convoy, used the radio at the back of the convoy. Certainly latter insurgent innovations in IED triggers were able to over power the jammers (they had electrical engineers designing the things at one point), but the newer jammers that can select frequencies also just put out more power. No doubt exists that insurgents had the capability to directly exploit the technical information that was disclosed. I can only hope we can keep up secrecy on the latter jammers and the more exotic countermeasures concocted to deal with infrared triggered bombs (the simple counter is in plain sight on every vehicle now, a glow plug in an ammo can) up to higher standards.

[Count Chocula]

Assange=Asshat. Whistleblowing that gets your fellow countrymen killed, no matter which country, is just wrong. My cousin spent four years in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was in "forward operations," not in Baghdad, but I'd equate this to publishing the commo frequencies the Rangers were using on the Iraq/Syria border.

[MKSheppard]

I think you can prosecute under OSA; because while it says UNCLASSIFIED in it, it also says SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, AND NZL//X1

So does this fall under OSA?

[Shroom Man 777]

What kind of whistleblowing is leaking vital technical information on life-saving equipment? What are they going to do? Find the Warlock bomb-jamming machines guilty of negligence or abuse or inappropriate behavior or embezzlement or fraud?

Those wikileak people should be the ones who should have the whistle blown on them. Who watches the watchers, who squeals on the squealers, indeed. Why on earth should they tell everyone the frequencies used by the Warlock machines? Who needs to know? The only ones who want to know are the ones who want to make their bombs un-jammable.

They're not doing whistleblowing, they're not reporting inappropriate things. They're actively engaging in something that's practically sabotage and are knowingly trying to get people killed.

[sketerpot]

I took a look at this document, and if I were an angry Iraqi I would be frustrated by the lack of any useful information. They've determined the following (summarized):

1. The jammers can handle a vast range of radio signal types. Hell, they can even mess up spread spectrum military radios designed to be resistant to jamming. Badass!

2. The jammers also mess with most of the military systems they tested. Dang!

3. This can be fixed through several methods. Two of the systems use frequency hopping, and by coordinating the hopping between the radios and the jammer, they could probably fix the issues -- after all, the military controls the software. For these systems, putting some more distance between the radio and the jammer could also be effective. For two of the radio systems they tested, the only methods for fixing the problems are to either coordinate the radio and jammer frequencies, or to switch the radios to send signals outside the jammers' frequency bands.

Also, the jammers have been modified since 2004 to cover more frequencies. This report is obsolete, and even if it weren't, it doesn't tell the insurgents jack shit that they could actually use. I'm not sure why anybody even bothered to leak it.