Russia to quadruple ICBM output

[Patrick Degan]

Um, if we can prevent the Russians from interfering with military ship traffic, it follows they will have no ability to interfere with commerical ship traffic either, and we don't even need the entire U.S. Navy to do that. As for "hostile Cuba", the more likely result is that Cuba gets occupied and there's isn't dick their military could do to prevent that, and it would occur far faster than the Russians could ever get reinforcements out to protect Cuba.

How does that follow? Warships protecting themselves is not the same as protecting commercial ships. Secondly US occupation of Cuba would be a godsend for Russians since it would occupy US resources for years to come and decrease US options in Eurasia.

Warships protecting an operational theatre is protecting commercial shipping. They control the area. Period, end of sentence.

You also overestimate the strategic cost of occupying Cuba, and if the U.S. had to do that and fight a war in Europe, it could do so even if it meant resorting to the presently unpalatable option of resurrecting the draft. Controlling the Carribean makes this task easier, not harder, and we're talking about a territory that is in our backyard, literally.

Because you say so? The Russians have been able to dominate or intimidate their neighbours without having a blue-water navy, and the new NATO members don't have the force to stop any Russian effort to interdict them or even seize territory for buffer space. Meanwhile, the equation inside Russia proper still applies, and they've not only got a very large army but also a very large air force to back that equation up. Strategically, it makes more sense to make any attempt at conquest by land as costly and draining as possible. Russia's strategy is based on the fact that they have no significant overseas committments or necessary sources of import goods to have to protect. That is why a blue-water navy has never been a high priority for Russia and even the fleet the Soviet Union fielded was designed as a deterrent rather than for power-projection. Their form of global power-projection has been in the form of the threat carried by their strategic nuclear forces —which still exist and is another reason why no war with Russia is ever going to reach the stage of one power attempting to physically conquer the other. Which also obviates against the alleged pressing need for a U.S. style blue-water navy.

How have the Russians been able to dominate their neighbors when they have been suffering invasion after invasion? They pulled through but not without massive losses. Look at Mexico and Canada for examples of dominated and intimidated neighbors.

They've suffered three invasions in their history: both Hitler and Napoleon were defeated, and the one reason the Kaiser got as far as he did was because the Tsarist regime was on it's last legs, but even at that, they were nowhere near victory over Russia, which is why they readily agreed to Brest-Litovsk. In measures of long-term history, the last conquerors the Russians ever had to endure were the Mongols.

The usual road to power is to completely dominate all neighbors, like US did, and then develop a large navy for global dominance. Russia never managed this, it's land borders are still insecure so they can't concentrate completely on a large navy. But that also doesn't mean they should completely ignore it and leave US on the offensive.

I'm sure that argument would draw a grim laugh or two in Tblisi these days.

The fact that recent NATO members are not all that tough militarily is not the issue, that they are US allies which were formerly USSR allies or parts of USSR territory is.

And if you noticed from the news, both Ukraine and Belarus were rejected as NATO members, which means even the alliance recognises it's expanded into uncertain territory and decided not to risk pissing off Russia by pressing the issue.

The important thing to understand is that Russian "land buffer strategy" is used not because Russians find it optimal but because they couldn't come up with anything better due to geography and that it should be expanded upon when opportunity arises. After all US navy itself makes a buffer out of Atlantic and Pacific.

The U.S. Navy makes a buffer out of the oceans because that is our continent's natural defence. Military strategy is dictated by the ground, not the other way around.

Similarly you seem to be saying that Russian lack of overseas allies is actually some kind of clever Russian strategy as opposed a symptom of Russian weakness and US strength.

Strawman.

In the end you seem to come up with a very odd conclusion: that instead of reaching outwards and building an array of alliances similar to US Russia should actually bunker up inside it's own borders and wait for a completely secure US to come and keep poking at Ukraine and Georgia.

Everything Russia coud want is either inside it's own borders or within it's own region. Alliances are dictated by terms of ready advantage, not by experimentation, which is your particular weird argument.

[Axis Kast]

Secondly it takes much less of a military force to put an area under threat than it takes to provide protection to the shipping routes and oil platforms in the gulf. Both of these facts would necessitate that US increases it's attention in the Caribbean.

The United States and Russia will not go to war without much advance notice. During the preliminaries, the United States would enlarge its naval and air defenses in the Caribbean, if appropriate.

And I rather expect that the United States Navy would shadow the Russians and prevent dispersion of its Caribbean squadron if the situation were all that dire, reducing Russian chances to "break away" and cause serious havoc.

Don't forget, either, that U.S. oil rigs are located in the Gulf of Mexico, which is convenient to Naval Air Stations in Texas and Louisiana.

Ortega and Chavez made it perfectly clear they're game for another round with US. Cuba is much less clear although recent Russian show of force couldn't have hurt.

Ortega and Chavez are currently having some trouble with their bankers. "We have no money!" they are being told.

They don't have all the reasons US does for building a navy but other reasons still exists: power projection, ally protection.

Projection where, and for what reason? Just because one could project power doesn't mean that one should, or must. For example, Canada.

Ally projection is equally ludicrous. One doesn't just build a fleet for the rainy day chance that a vital new government will sell itself on a silver platter. There aren't any viable allies for Russia.

You say Ortega's Nicaragua and Chavez's Venezuela, citing their rhetoric. But it's just that: rhetoric. Neither of those nations is powerful militarily, and the Venezuelans are facing certain economic disaster, with a budget pegged to $102 barrels of oil. Even worse for Chavez, the United States is the end-point for Venezuelan crude. The Russians can't offer realistically to match that.

Why have their cruisers rot in Archangelsk when they could be used to create uncertainty on US doorstep?

Because, greater than the opportunity cost of immobile cruisers is the opportunity cost of heavy naval expenditure on antiquated warships and hodge-podge squadrons when the naval establishment itself is in a shambles and Russia has no immediate need of that kind of fighting ship. "Scaring the United States," which they tried to do in Venezuela a short while back, is expensive dick-waving. A political stunt, not a shrewd move financially or strategically.

By demonstrating to US that they too can thinker in other peoples back yard. That helping Georgia might have consequences that involve the security of the Caribbean. US won't be as eager to push things it's way in Ukraine and Georgia if Russia has ships stationed a few hundred miles from it's oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.

But they can't afford to tinker, and, even if they tried, they'd be quickly out of luck. The United States is the better-prepared of the two to enter and win a dick-waving contest.

And the United States will not be deterred by the simple presence of Russian cruisers in Caribbean waters -- it will simply deploy a squadron of its own, and absorb that cost reluctantly but a lot more easily, if things get hairy.

No one said they should try to match the US navy or lose any sense of priorities but try and make it's navy useful instead of running around in White Sea.

To "make the Navy useful" entails sacrificing other priorities. Please do respond to that argument.

[lance]

How long do ICBMs actually last if properly maintained?

[Ma Deuce]

How long do ICBMs actually last if properly maintained?

Just look at the USAF's Minuteman IIIs: None of them are younger than 30 years, and they're still in serviceable condition ('course some components on many of the missiles, inculding the warheads and guidance modules, have been replaced over the years, as has the solid rocket propellant in a few cases). What's more, the Air Force now seems to think it can keep the missile in service till 2040!

[K. A. Pital]

To "make the Navy useful" entails sacrificing other priorities.

Increase your war budget then. After all, that's what Russia does.

Ortega and Chavez are currently having some trouble with their bankers.

Please. Every country in the world has a problem with bankers now, not least due to the USA's fault I'll see how you laugh if Obama guts your missile defense program out of "budgetary concerns".

"Scaring the United States," which they tried to do in Venezuela a short while back, is expensive dick-waving.

Any military act is expensive. You can't maintain parity with a millitary monster like the USA el cheapo, although Russia tried exactly that by developing cheap and reliable weapons - Kalashikov, ZSU, SA-5 etc - and relying on numbers and their spread around the world.

And the United States will not be deterred by the simple presence of Russian cruisers in Caribbean waters

Yeah? Will the US be deterred by anything at all, or is it just a nutty nation which goes to war no matter what? The latter option seems unlikely. A strong message that US involvement will not be tolerated will have consequences, whether you like it or not. Confronting Russia directly is not kiddy games with pathetic Middle Eastern nations.

[Axis Kast]

Increase your war budget then. After all, that's what Russia does.

Throughout this entire discussion, now in its second phase, at least, of total repetition, you've been challenged to justify spending on a navy as compared to spending on the army, spending on social services, and keeping the budget balanced. The ultimate point that Deegan and I have been driving relentlessly home is that Russia is not in any financial position to make anything more than preliminary investment in a blue-water navy at this time. It's laughable that you then turn around and suggest that more money should be spent on defense explicitly for the sake of big ships.

Please. Every country in the world has a problem with bankers now, not least due to the USA's fault

Nicaragua will never be able to afford a military that could deliver crucial support to the Russians in wartime the way that an Eastern European client like East Germany could. Russia will have to pay its way ever step -- and Nicaragua, too, because the United States holds a great many more cards in the Caribbean.

Venezuela isn't just dependent on oil wealth, but will suffer catastrophically if it cannot have access to American refineries.

Neither Nicaragua or Venezuela make good allies precisely for the reason that, unlike in, say, Angola or Poland, the Americans have so many screws to turn at every step of the way.

Any military act is expensive. You can't maintain parity with a millitary monster like the USA el cheapo, although Russia tried exactly that by developing cheap and reliable weapons - Kalashikov, ZSU, SA-5 etc - and relying on numbers and their spread around the world.

You haven't even addressed my argument. What did you gain from the expensive junket to Venezuela?

Yeah? Will the US be deterred by anything at all, or is it just a nutty nation which goes to war no matter what? The latter option seems unlikely. A strong message that US involvement will not be tolerated will have consequences, whether you like it or not. Confronting Russia directly is not kiddy games with pathetic Middle Eastern nations.

Right now, Russia can't afford to play those kinds of instructive games with the United States. Even if we move ahead thirty years and imagine a Russia with four carrier battle groups, one stationed in the Caribbean, the United States will probably be able to absorb the costs of sending a squadron down to "keep an eye" on your ships more easily than Russia will be able to afford placing them there in the first place, the costs of convincing and subsidizing a regional ally included.

[K. A. Pital]

Even if we move ahead thirty years and imagine a Russia with four carrier battle groups, one stationed in the Caribbean, the United States will probably be able to absorb the costs of sending a squadron down to "keep an eye" on your ships more easily than Russia will be able to afford placing them there in the first place, the costs of convincing and subsidizing a regional ally included.

Yes, but involving in any kind of proxy war would be looking far less favourable now. Moreover, if the US decides to "clean out the backyard" by couping/crushing Russia's presumable allies to deny it a foothold in LA, Russia will have the ability to intervene and, say, in a civil war, bomb the crap out of US-supported insurgents (something the USSR needed to do in Nicaragua waaay back in the 1980s).

You are saying we're "not in position" to make anything but a preliminary investment. But isn't that what we're making?

Consider the fact that without shipbuilding programs, we will lose the last remains of the expertise to build true carriers and large vessels, including nuclear submarines, countless auxillaries, and SIGINT ships - for all of which we had large programs. Re-invigorating shipbuilding at some later point in history would cost proportionately more money, and would require another set of "trial ships" being built to sort out design problems.

[Axis Kast]

Moreover, if the US decides to "clean out the backyard" by couping/crushing Russia's presumable allies to deny it a foothold in LA, Russia will have the ability to intervene and, say, in a civil war, bomb the crap out of US-supported insurgents (something the USSR needed to do in Nicaragua waaay back in the 1980s).

The U.S. needn't decide to do anything; Russia's glorious "prospects" are dependent on a pair of specific leaders, both of whom have probably seen the last of their golden days.

What, exactly, do you envision that Russia could gain from allies in Nicaragua or Venezuela? It has already been explained to you that the "upside" for Russia would be forcing the U.S. to deploy a fleet to the region -- and that the U.S. could absorb the cost of that response more easily than the Russians could the cost of brinkmanship in the first place.

You are saying we're "not in position" to make anything but a preliminary investment. But isn't that what we're making?

I suggested starting with the boomer fleet, if anything is to be spent on the navy at this point in time. I also understand that shipbuilding is a prudent activity. I think Russia would be foolish to begin building very large surface combatants at this time, or within the next few years, however.

[K. A. Pital]

The U.S. needn't decide to do anything; Russia's glorious "prospects" are dependent on a pair of specific leaders, both of whom have probably seen the last of their golden days.

Castro, Chavez, Morales and Ortega are all more or less Russia-friendly. You would be implying all those leaders, and their respective nations, would suddenly do a 180 degree turn in the nearest future?

What, exactly, do you envision that Russia could gain from allies in Nicaragua or Venezuela?

Military bases in the Americas. Possibility to form natural resources cartels with LA nations. Investment opportunities. Arms markets. Need more?

It has already been explained to you that the "upside" for Russia would be forcing the U.S. to deploy a fleet to the region -- and that the U.S. could absorb the cost of that response more easily than the Russians could the cost of brinkmanship in the first place.

Well, nice move. But it's a reaction to an action. Of course the US will "absorb the costs" more easily, after all it has always been that way. Does that mean no challenges to the USA should be presented, or what?

I suggested starting with the boomer fleet, if anything is to be spent on the navy at this point in time.

There are several hulls under construction, and the shipyards and joined plants which provide components could probably not churn out more hulls in a given time. The submarine capacity of Russia's current shipbuilding is probably fully exploited now. Investments into expanding it are also made, as well as important steps towards unification - the Soviet fleet was plagued by dozens of classes operating together and requiring various service for each type of boat. The RN plans to reduce the main SSN class numbers down to four (save for an occasional freak submarine), and have one new class of SSBNs and one new class of SSGNs, concentrating resources and thus abilities, kinda like the US concentrates on Virginias.

I also understand that shipbuilding is a prudent activity. I think Russia would be foolish to begin building very large surface combatants at this time, or within the next few years, however.

What is foolish, building or waiting until your tech base becomes so decrepit that you aren't able to build anything? Ships can last for years until their hulls are finally commissioned, so in any case it's a long-time venture. Do you really think Russia could not absorb the costs of an Ulyanovsk-class carrier or something similar (which is being proposed by the Nevskoe PKB)? Why?

Do you realize that we need at least a few CVNs to simply replace our current remains of the Soviet CVS fleet, one of which (Gorshkov) is under refit to go to India, and the other (Kuznetzov) due to very harsh years in the 1990s is in a bad state and will probably end it's lifeterm before the new one is built, unless there's a capital overhaul?

[mr friendly guy]

So if Russia is wasting its money on the navy, wouldn't it be in America's interest for it to continue wasting it? Therefore shouldn't Axis and Stas agree to Russia building up its navy, albeit for different reasons?

[Axis Kast]

Castro, Chavez, Morales and Ortega are all more or less Russia-friendly. You would be implying all those leaders, and their respective nations, would suddenly do a 180 degree turn in the nearest future?

You've changed the goal-posts. We're talking about nations that need to be Russia-pliant, given what they'd doom themselves to, economically and politically speaking, not just "Russia-friendly." For a nation like Venezuela, which must have access to American refineries, there are hard limits to adventures in nose-thumbing.

And yes; it's pretty obvious that Chavez, Morales, Ortega, and Castro have idiosyncratic reasons for taking a dim view of the United States. Especially Castro. Cubans have a generally positive view of the United States. In effect, we are the agents of their policies as much as they themselves.

Military bases in the Americas. Possibility to form natural resources cartels with LA nations. Investment opportunities. Arms markets. Need more?

Military bases that the Soviets would have to pay for themselves. Military bases with a high "rent," because of American and allied pressures on the host governments.

Russia cannot offer the sort of inducements required to coax anybody in Latin America into a strategic partnership that would set them against the United States. Even Castro turned to the Russians only because he was convinced that the United States planned to eliminate him. If he hadn't felt threatened, the big partnership would have been only a friendship. Not even the Venezuelans realistically expect that Washington will subjugate them.

A natural resource cartel is out of the question with Venezuela, which requires American refineries. Investment opportunities with Russia will be less appealing for Cuba than those with the United States. And neither Nicaragua nor Cuba really have need of new arms, while Venezuela has about shot its load.

Well, nice move. But it's a reaction to an action. Of course the US will "absorb the costs" more easily, after all it has always been that way. Does that mean no challenges to the USA should be presented, or what?

You're no longer making sense. You have just argued that Russia should orient its military strategy around what feels good, rather than what is good; that the appearance or effort of action is more important than its practical consequence.

Only in the event of severe deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations would it make sense for the Russians to deploy a squadron to the Caribbean, and then less as an economic lure to induce higher defense spending, and more as a potential threat to the coast.

If war is not pending, there may be insufficient urgency in the United States. Certainly, there should be, if leadership is smart. Your claim is that the United States might not have acted as it did toward Georgia were there a Russian fleet presence so close to home. But what has the United States done that is so significant? What reckless act might a Russian fleet have prevented? And couldn't the plan backfire, tending to convince lawmakers that there was something more than just a particular issue in the Caucasus at stake, next time?

There are several hulls under construction, and the shipyards and joined plants which provide components could probably not churn out more hulls in a given time. The submarine capacity of Russia's current shipbuilding is probably fully exploited now. Investments into expanding it are also made, as well as important steps towards unification - the Soviet fleet was plagued by dozens of classes operating together and requiring various service for each type of boat. The RN plans to reduce the main SSN class numbers down to four (save for an occasional freak submarine), and have one new class of SSBNs and one new class of SSGNs, concentrating resources and thus abilities, kinda like the US concentrates on Virginias.

Rehabilitating the submarine fleet is a priority, because Russia's nuclear deterrent capability in large part stems from those boats.

What is foolish, building or waiting until your tech base becomes so decrepit that you aren't able to build anything? Ships can last for years until their hulls are finally commissioned, so in any case it's a long-time venture. Do you really think Russia could not absorb the costs of an Ulyanovsk-class carrier or something similar (which is being proposed by the Nevskoe PKB)? Why?

Do you realize that we need at least a few CVNs to simply replace our current remains of the Soviet CVS fleet, one of which (Gorshkov) is under refit to go to India, and the other (Kuznetzov) due to very harsh years in the 1990s is in a bad state and will probably end it's lifeterm before the new one is built, unless there's a capital overhaul?

First of all, it would be pointless to restore the helicopter- and small carriers: they would be sitting ducks against the American fleet, and much less useful for power projection than large carriers, funds for which they would diminish merely by existing.

Second, while I understand maintaining shipyards and expertise by maintaining a minimum of orders, I do not see the reasons that Russia should focus on a navy before its army or domestic economy, which are at least as valuable.

[K. A. Pital]

We're talking about nations that need to be Russia-pliant, given what they'd doom themselves to, economically and politically speaking, not just "Russia-friendly."

I don't see the US stopping purchases of Russian or Venezuelan oil. "Doom" themselves indeed. To what? Irrelevant political blah blah from the USA? There's no actual economic consequences. None whatsoever.

A natural resource cartel is out of the question with Venezuela, which requires American refineries

Why? It still sells raw oils. Yes, to America, but price gouging works with America. Russia is also selling gas to Europe and America. Who cares?

What reckless act might a Russian fleet have prevented?

My "civil war in Venezuela" scenario is not valid? Securing a nation with an arms market and joint ventures for Rosneft and Gazprom is not a valid case for proxy war?

Rehabilitating the submarine fleet is a priority, because Russia's nuclear deterrent capability in large part stems from those boats.

And it's already acted upon, the funds are not being cut from submarine construction to make surface ships.

I do not see the reasons that Russia should focus on a navy before its army or domestic economy, which are at least as valuable

Because repeat: other parts are not in danger of immediate deterioration. Tank building is reinvigorated with T-90 orders for both the Army and India, aircraft building likewise in no danger of losing production orders, it's main problem is incapability to execute those orders and expand production timely, not a lack of financing (it has enough for the immediate future).

But shipbuilding is in danger, because it has not seen large enough projects in years and years. Starting something is required to at least give the experts in the field a task and money, else the entire field of surface ship, which costed Russia a lot to accumulate and develop, building might go under.

[Axis Kast]

I don't see the US stopping purchases of Russian or Venezuelan oil. "Doom" themselves indeed. To what? Irrelevant political blah blah from the USA? There's no actual economic consequences. None whatsoever.

Try retarding Venezuelan trade. The United States is Venezuela's largest trading partner, and could easily inflict enormous penalties on Venezuelan goods. About forty-three percent of Venezuelan exports are destined for the United States. Even more important are the nearly thirty percent of import requirements it meets by turning to American companies, which could be cut off. Replacements obtained from Russian or European markets would be considerably more expensive, calculating for distance.

If you think the loss of commercial access to, and deals with, the United States is no big problem for oil economies with previously excellent ties, see Iran.

My "civil war in Venezuela" scenario is not valid? Securing a nation with an arms market and joint ventures for Rosneft and Gazprom is not a valid case for proxy war?

What civil war in Venezuela?

And how is Russia to "secure" opportunities from a nation that nationalized its oil industry to keep profits inside the country? The entire purpose of "Twenty-first Century Socialism" is to avoid foreign domination of Venezuela's energy sector.

Meanwhile, you've won the long-term contracts for a handful of advanced fighters which Venezuela will never use. Even in the event that Russia successfully negotiated basing rights, a larger Venezuelan military would be no more effective than those of Egypt or Syria during the 1960s and '70s.

And it's already acted upon, the funds are not being cut from submarine construction to make surface ships.

But they are being taken, by definition, from other programs -- as opportunity costs. Like keeping a balanced budget; providing social security for an aging population; and driving further natural resource development and pipeline construction.

Because repeat: other parts are not in danger of immediate deterioration. Tank building is reinvigorated with T-90 orders for both the Army and India, aircraft building likewise in no danger of losing production orders, it's main problem is incapability to execute those orders and expand production timely, not a lack of financing (it has enough for the immediate future).

How about the status of the military as an institution riddled by personnel liabilities stemming from widespread draft-dodging?

But shipbuilding is in danger, because it has not seen large enough projects in years and years. Starting something is required to at least give the experts in the field a task and money, else the entire field of surface ship, which costed Russia a lot to accumulate and develop, building might go under.

Destroyers and frigates make sense; building long-range fleet carriers at this point in time, when money is tight, does not.