On the failure of the Ottoman Empire to Industrialize

[Zor]

I was thinking about this in relation to an Islamic History class.

What is well established is that during the 19th century the Ottoman Empire, once the most powerful state in western Eurasia stagnated and was left in the dust in terms of industrial development by the European nations and latter the United States and the Japanese. The question here is simple, why was this the case? As far as i knew the Ottomans were willing to open up communications with other European nations to bring in new ideas, methods and technologies and observe military developments. At the same time, their were efforts (especially latter on) to reform and modernize the Empire. So why was the Ottoman empire left so far behind in the dust?

Zor

[Bilbo]

I was thinking about this in relation to an Islamic History class.

... and observe military developments.

Zor

Observing something and actually implementing it are two different things. Military innovation was quite difficult due to the entreached and politically powerful Jannisary class. The Jannisaries were afraid to lose their political power if they were supplanted on the battlefield.

[Sea Skimmer]

The Ottoman Empire stagnated and began its road to decline long before the 19th century. Its system of government sucked and failed to improve and it burned up all its resources in endless wars trying to preserve an unworkable Empire. It’s hard to industrialize when every little bit of foreign exchange you get, you rush out and immediately spend on new ironclads or more shore guns for the Dardanelles. Remember, while western Europe had long periods of peace, the Ottomans fought two wars just in the ten years before WW1. None the less, the Ottomans did have some industrialization, three steel mills total as I recall, and perhaps if WW1 hadn’t occurred they might have been able to make something of themselves.

[Akhlut]

Like Bilbo said, it was mostly the janissaries fault. It's been a while since I took my ME class, but, as I recall, the sultans had lost a lot of authority to the viziers and janissaries, and they wanted to keep the Ottoman state stagnant so they could maintain their power. It basically wasn't until Atatürk that there was industrialization, but, by then, the Ottoman state had been destroyed and replaced by Turkey.

[Sea Skimmer]

The janissaries were destroyed in 1826, right at the start of the industrial revolution, so one can hardly blame them for it all. The Ottomans did then attempt to industrialize, what they didn’t do is modernize government and education to go with it. Atatürk was the opposite, industry grew little, but he gave Turkey a modern secular government and education system that could provide the groundwork for a modern technology and manufacturing driven economy. By all rights the Ottomans should have collapsed much sooner because of the hopeless government system, but they had Britain playing protector throughout the 19th century so the empire was able to straggle on.

[Akhlut]

Damn, teaches me to go off of 2-3 year old memories of taking notes in class instead of going back and looking at them.

However, weren't the sultans then worried about rescinding their power after the fall of the janissaries precisely so they wouldn't have to deal with another situation like that? And wasn't their brand of monarchy the sort that would not educate anyone or otherwise work to help out anyone for fear of giving them more power that could then be wielded against the sultan? Or am I misremembering again?

[Sea Skimmer]

You’re remembering right. The sultans couldn’t improve anything in the government or education without undermining themselves… so they didn’t and only sought industry which could make them armaments to help them use raw force to hold the empire together. That just didn’t work in the long run, as Imperial Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary also found out. WW1 just accelerated the process.

[Bilbo]

The janissaries were destroyed in 1826, right at the start of the industrial revolution, so one can hardly blame them for it all.

For how long up to that point though were the Jannisaries obsolete yet stayed around due to their political power?

[Ma Deuce]

For how long up to that point though were the Jannisaries obsolete yet stayed around due to their political power?

It was a very slow process, so it's tricky to pin exact dates, however would say their slide into decadence began barely a century after their founding when they revolted against the sultan for the first time in 1449 (for better wages), and sometime in the same era as the Battle of Vienna is when they finally became a truly worthless parasite. So almost a century and a half before their destruction.

[frogcurry]

Ottoman status as the most powerful nation in western Eurasia that you give them (post Constantinople I assume) is - in my opinion - disputable with the Hapsburg Empire until Lepanto, and after that the rise of the European colonial empires rapidly overtakes them. Philip somehow managed to fight wars with everyone in Europe (France, England, Ottomans, Dutch) in a near continuous sequence (with the Popes help admittedly, but nonetheless), I don't think the Ottoman resources for many-fronted war-making quite compared.

The ottomans had the consequence of their prior economic decline throughout the 1600's which they never really recovered from. That and the arrest to their successes from Malta, Lepanto and the prior Balkan campaigns of Suleiman, which don't seem to have achieved anything long term despite the vast promise and opportunity that would have come with success.

Factors in the economic decline as I understand it include the influx of silver from the new world causing damaging inflation (particularly with the Ottoman economy most reliant on silver), and the Europeans bypassing the old overland trade routes to Asia by sailing directly around Africa.

I think they were just too damaged by 1700 A.D. to recover, but too big and not damaged enough to lose the dead weight of their glory days. If they'd been completely crushed or damaged at some point, then they might have been re-built without the weight of the old insitutions and organisations. But they seemed to die a death of a thousand cuts instead.

[Thanas]

Do not forget their disastrous corfu campaign, which often gets overlooked when people look at the success of Prince Eugene of Savoy.

As for the status of most poweful nation, I would say that they had that power until Lepanto. Lepanto, of course is completely overrated in that it neither destroyed the Turkish fleet nor did it seriously damage the naval power of the Ottoman Empire, but the Spanish definitely take the crown as most powerful nation after 1525.

[Pablo Sanchez]

Ottoman status as the most powerful nation in western Eurasia that you give them (post Constantinople I assume) is - in my opinion - disputable with the Hapsburg Empire until Lepanto,

The difference is that the Habsburg "Empire" had the character of a league or alliance encompassing many different countries, while the Ottoman Empire was most certainly a single state under unified leadership. If you (erroneously) combine every state in the Habsburg orbit to compare it to the Ottomans alone, then you can arrive at the conclusion that they were stronger. Otherwise, no, the Ottoman Empire was the most powerful single state in that part of the world up through the 17th Century.

and after that the rise of the European colonial empires rapidly overtakes them.

Justify this statement. I disagree and instead suggest that Ottoman power continued to be considerable for another hundred years after Lepanto, with their decline not being caused by a single decisive battle but being demonstrated by one: the Battle of Vienna in 1683. The decline had already set in but their decisive defeat made it evident.

Philip somehow managed to fight wars with everyone in Europe (France, England, Ottomans, Dutch) in a near continuous sequence (with the Popes help admittedly, but nonetheless),

You cite four wars. He was defeated by England, the Netherlands, and France, which conflict incidentally bankrupted Spain, and he defeated the Ottomans. So that's 1-3, hardly a strong argument.

I don't think the Ottoman resources for many-fronted war-making quite compared.

In fact it's important to remember that one of the causes of Ottoman decline was the expense incurred by the geography of their Empire, which was strung out in a fashion that required them to maintain several different large military establishments against potential threats. At the same time as they were fighting wars in Europe they had large armies to discourage Persian aggression.

Lepanto, of course is completely overrated in that it neither destroyed the Turkish fleet nor did it seriously damage the naval power of the Ottoman Empire, but the Spanish definitely take the crown as most powerful nation after 1525.

The perception of Spanish power had a lot to do with the fact that they had a greater ability to project their might after Lepanto than did anyone else. In fact the Ottomans likely remained overall more powerful even after, but they could not concentrate their power or come to grips with their enemies as effectively as Spain.

[Thanas]

Lepanto, of course is completely overrated in that it neither destroyed the Turkish fleet nor did it seriously damage the naval power of the Ottoman Empire, but the Spanish definitely take the crown as most powerful nation after 1525.

The perception of Spanish power had a lot to do with the fact that they had a greater ability to project their might after Lepanto than did anyone else. In fact the Ottomans likely remained overall more powerful even after, but they could not concentrate their power or come to grips with their enemies as effectively as Spain.

I do agree with you, that the Battle of Vienna (and the siege of Corfu, which propably was as important but is largely ignored nowadays) was more a display of the decline of the Ottoman Empire rather than a decisive defeat.

I think a lot of that has to do with how you define the most powerful state. For example, when it comes to sheer military might, I do not think anyone can beat the Spanish and their superior infantry formations, though the Ottoman empire may very well field more soldiers overall. Likewise, the Spanish fleet is (and despite setbacks) the most powerful one. People often cite the defeat of the Spanish Armada, but overlook that after this defeat the Spanish reorganized and were able to make sure that english privateering remained largely ineffective.

In the end, it comes down which state is the more powerful - the one with the larger forces overall or the one who can concentrate the forces more effectively.

[frogcurry]

and after that the rise of the European colonial empires rapidly overtakes them.

Justify this statement. I disagree and instead suggest that Ottoman power continued to be considerable for another hundred years after Lepanto, with their decline not being caused by a single decisive battle but being demonstrated by one: the Battle of Vienna in 1683. The decline had already set in but their decisive defeat made it evident.

The colonial empires weren't participating in any of the conflicts post Lepanto between European and Ottoman powers so their relatively greater power doesn't stop the Ottomans being a force. They overtake the Ottomans in effective power probably prior to Vienna, in the case of Spain by or soon after Lepanto. Lepanto doesn't directly cause the decline, but it does stop the previous upwards progress and cause a lull during which other events start to overtake the Ottomans. It also seems to mark the end-point of the previously significant naval wars and any likelihood of an Ottoman invasion of Italy.

Philip somehow managed to fight wars with everyone in Europe (France, England, Ottomans, Dutch) in a near continuous sequence (with the Popes help admittedly, but nonetheless),

You cite four wars. He was defeated by England, the Netherlands, and France, which conflict incidentally bankrupted Spain, and he defeated the Ottomans. So that's 1-3, hardly a strong argument.

Agreed, but; He still managed to pull the resources and money / debt to fight and lose all those conflicts. When you consider all those disasters, and the fact that they were still a huge power afterwards (if declining relative to other european states) it shows a lot of robustness and military power.

I'd also say that Philip only stalemated the Ottomans not defeated them, given the loss of Spains power in north africa in the same period.

In fact it's important to remember that one of the causes of Ottoman decline was the expense incurred by the geography of their Empire, which was strung out in a fashion that required them to maintain several different large military establishments against potential threats. At the same time as they were fighting wars in Europe they had large armies to discourage Persian aggression.

This is a good point in terms of the OP topic - the problem of long and distant borders to be defended isn't something that will have gone away at any point in their history.

I'm not familiar with the Corfu campaign, but a quick wikipedia check suggests that it is a bit like the 1st Cretan war or Malta all over again - lots of Ottoman losses against strong, then-modern designs of defenses for little or no gain.

However I don't agree that Lepanto wasn't important, Ottoman jokes about it only "shaving their beard" aside. The replacement troops and ships were nothing like as good as the old ones - a green wood and farmers sons sort of thing. They don't seem to have the same quality of naval commander either by that point. An Ottoman victory or even just the absense of a big set piece engagement like Lepanto (i.e. if Andrea Doria had retained Spanish naval command) might have given the Ottoman fleet the chance to make another strike at Malta or worse the following year when the holy alliance collapsed, but they become pretty inactive instead.

[Thanas]

I'm not familiar with the Corfu campaign, but a quick wikipedia check suggests that it is a bit like the 1st Cretan war or Malta all over again - lots of Ottoman losses against strong, then-modern designs of defenses for little or no gain.

Actually, it was more like a case of elite Ottoman troops against the last of Venice's troops, who were held together only by the skill of their commander (who, coincidentally was not even a Venetian).

However I don't agree that Lepanto wasn't important,

Nobody is saying that it was not important.

Ottoman jokes about it only "shaving their beard" aside. The replacement troops and ships were nothing like as good as the old ones - a green wood and farmers sons sort of thing. They don't seem to have the same quality of naval commander either by that point. An Ottoman victory or even just the absense of a big set piece engagement like Lepanto (i.e. if Andrea Doria had retained Spanish naval command) might have given the Ottoman fleet the chance to make another strike at Malta or worse the following year when the holy alliance collapsed, but they become pretty inactive instead.

The Ottoman fleet continued to be a very effective thread against the western powers for over 200 years after Lepanto. That is why Lepanto is not that much of a decisive battle. Nobody is saying that the tactical implications were nonexistent, but in the long run Lepanto was not as ruinous to the Ottoman Navy as, say, the Battle of Midway was to the Japanese.

[Sea Skimmer]

The Ottoman Navy was really defeated by mere existence of cast iron cannon. Galley warfare was only practicable so long as cannon remained expensive bronze pieces that were few in number and not very rapidly firing. Iron cannon allowed for full broadsides of guns, by the time of Lepanto the Spanish already fielded a couple dozen early broadside ships and by all accounts they played a pivotal role. By 1637 Europe had already escalated 100 gun ships like HMS Sovereign of The Seas.

The Ottomans never had the wood, iron or heavy timber (galleys are lightly built) to compete with ships of the line, the start of industrial failure. They remained a threat over short ranges after Lepanto and galleys remained useful for harbor defence but they really did cease to have a strategic naval advantage in Mediterranean after being defeated at Malta and Lepanto. Europeans just pulled further and further ahead, while the Ottomans actively grew weaker.

[CmdrWilkens]

The Ottomans never had the wood, iron or heavy timber (galleys are lightly built) to compete with ships of the line, the start of industrial failure. They remained a threat over short ranges after Lepanto and galleys remained useful for harbor defence but they really did cease to have a strategic naval advantage in Mediterranean after being defeated at Malta and Lepanto. Europeans just pulled further and further ahead, while the Ottomans actively grew weaker.

Which brings up the thought of whether or not there is any realistic way for the Ottomans to obtain those resources. I don't paticularly know much in terms of resoruce geography but I'd rather susepct simply on a glance that the Caucusus should hold most of the iron they would need. The flip side being I'm just not certain where they would be able to secure ready access to heavy timber. So as sort of a half what if and half what was the strategic resource situation like: is there a reasonable scenario for the ottoman Empire to obtain the critical supplies to build a modern navy in the Age of Sail?

[Thanas]

With respect to Sea Skimmer, his view of the Ottoman Navy is simply not true. The Ottoman Navy build many ships of the line in the Imperial Naval Arsenal on the Golden Horn, including the biggest ship of the line of the world at the time of its launch, the Mahmudiye (1829), a true beauty, designed by turkish designers and built by the Imperial Arsenal.

In the corfu campaign in 1711, the Ottoman empire fielded several three-deckers and all together about 80 ships, including several dozen state-of-the-art ships of the line, far more than the Venetians could field in comparison. Granted, they were badly led, but the statement that the Ottoman Navy was unable to build any ship of the lines is not really supported by sources.

[Sea Skimmer]

With respect to Sea Skimmer, his view of the Ottoman Navy is simply not true. The Ottoman Navy build many ships of the line in the Imperial Naval Arsenal on the Golden Horn, including the biggest ship of the line of the world at the time of its launch, the Mahmudiye (1829), a true beauty, designed by turkish designers and built by the Imperial Arsenal.

Well maybe I wasn’t being clear, sure, they built some, but the scale of the fleets and the strategic relevance enormously reduced. This was directly a result of economic inferiority. Your Corfu example sums it up nicely. The Ottomans were reduced to attacking Corfu with there fleet, an island less then two miles from the coast of Greece, while in the 16th century they had sent galley fleets to attack targets as far abroad as Toulon and the Spanish coast. Despite facing only Venice, and not a whole alliance of Christian States, the Ottomans still failed to take the place.

Being able to out build Venice is not very meaningful, its not exactly a big place even with its various coastal possessions. It was also was suffering its own great decline ever since a direct sea route to India was discovered. Venice couldn’t ever combat the Ottomans alone on equal terms, they usually lost unless they had other Christian fleets in support and even then the Ottomans still usually won before 1571. At Lepanto it took Venice, Spain and the Papal States to field a fleet roughly equal to the Ottomans.

In the corfu campaign in 1711, the Ottoman empire fielded several three-deckers and all together about 80 ships, including several dozen state-of-the-art ships of the line, far more than the Venetians could field in comparison. Granted, they were badly led, but the statement that the Ottoman Navy was unable to build any ship of the lines is not really supported by sources.

Several dozen isn’t saying much at the time, a couple of the Anglo Dutch battles, which took place even earlier saw as many as 100 ships of the line fielded by one side. Also I forgot to mention the other reasons the Ottomans got screwed, not only did cannon proliferate at sea, they proliferated on land. After all navy warfare in the Mediterranean was all about seizing strings of fortified harbors in a manner not unlike WW2 Island hopping. The Ottomans did really well in the bronze cannon age because they could bring up overwhelming batteries of very heavy siege cannon, something they pioneered to a large degree. By About 1600 fortress design had greatly improved to repel cannons, and the forts themselves now started getting major gun armaments as well. This made sieges much more protracted and costly.

[Thanas]

With respect to Sea Skimmer, his view of the Ottoman Navy is simply not true. The Ottoman Navy build many ships of the line in the Imperial Naval Arsenal on the Golden Horn, including the biggest ship of the line of the world at the time of its launch, the Mahmudiye (1829), a true beauty, designed by turkish designers and built by the Imperial Arsenal.

Well maybe I wasn’t being clear, sure, they built some, but the scale of the fleets and the strategic relevance enormously reduced. This was directly a result of economic inferiority. Your Corfu example sums it up nicely. The Ottomans were reduced to attacking Corfu with there fleet, an island less then two miles from the coast of Greece, while in the 16th century they had sent galley fleets to attack targets as far abroad as Toulon and the Spanish coast. Despite facing only Venice, and not a whole alliance of Christian States, the Ottomans still failed to take the place.

Actually, I believe this has more to do with venetians fortifications in Morea and the Venetian defence strategy around Corfu, which together with the Knights of Malta and the Spanish in Sicily formed a kind of deadlock which only the barbary pirates were able to break from time to time. So it probably has more to do with strategic reasons, though economic inferiority certainly plays a part.

Several dozen isn’t saying much at the time, a couple of the Anglo Dutch battles, which took place even earlier saw as many as 100 ships of the line fielded by one side.

Those were not purpose-built warships in the anglo-dutch battles, they were for the most part upgraded merchantmen and are certainly not comparable to a SOL of the 18th century. Several dozens are not much per se, but certainly enough to keep venice and the Spanish in check. And I think several dozen is probably an above-average fleet size for the time period.

Of course, that does not mean that they would have been a match against the huge french or spanish fleets in direct combat.

Also I forgot to mention the other reasons the Ottomans got screwed, not only did cannon proliferate at sea, they proliferated on land. After all navy warfare in the Mediterranean was all about seizing strings of fortified harbors in a manner not unlike WW2 Island hopping. The Ottomans did really well in the bronze cannon age because they could bring up overwhelming batteries of very heavy siege cannon, something they pioneered to a large degree. By About 1600 fortress design had greatly improved to repel cannons, and the forts themselves now started getting major gun armaments as well. This made sieges much more protracted and costly.

That part I certainly agree with, of course there is the emerging Russian empire as well.