Major overhaul in Pentagon spending

[Surlethe]

WSJ

Defense Secretary Robert Gates unveiled a sweeping overhaul of the Pentagon's top weapons priorities that he said will orient the U.S. military toward winning unconventional conflicts like the one in Afghanistan rather than focusing on war with major powers like China and Russia.

Couching the choices as tradeoffs that will help the Pentagon's support for its military personnel, Mr. Gates said that his plans match "virtue with necessity" and reflect "an opportunity to truly reform the way we do business."

The ambitious shake-up, a combination of defense contract cutbacks and policy changes, will stoke a smoldering debate in Congress about the importance of weapons manufacturing jobs and may mark an inflection point after the industry's record run during the Bush administration. "There's no doubt a lot of these decisions will be controversial," said Mr. Gates, hoping that lawmakers rise above "parochial interests." Politics plaid no part in his decisions, he said.

Among the major changes he is proposing in the Defense Department's 2010 budget are ending production of Lockheed Martin Corp.'s F-22 Raptor at 187 jets, effectively shutting the door on the Air Force's desire for more of the advanced jets. Mr. Gates said funding for another Lockheed program, the F-35 Lightning, or Joint Strike Fighter, will be increased in 2010 to $11.2 billion, which will now buy 30 jets, up from 14.

Another Air Force program, a $15 billion effort to replace search and rescue helicopters, is to be cancelled, he said.

Even the White House's own plans to replace the president's fleet of Marine One helicopters with a new model built by Lockheed should be terminated, according to Mr. Gates, for being too expensive and six years late.

The Army's $200 billion Future Combat Systems program led by Boeing Co. and SAIC Inc. is being shaken up as Mr. Gates calls for canceling the ground vehicle components.

By curtailing some of the most expensive and complex weapons systems, Mr. Gates is making lasting changes that he believes are needed given the dual imperative of near-term fights against insurgent groups and increasing economic pressure.

I'm not sure I entirely agree with this. On the one hand, it's a welcome dial-down of military spending in general. On the other, what about plans to reduce the size of our ground force in general as we pull out of Iraq so we don't have the boots to go gallivanting off to some second-world shithole again? You'd think we'd have learned from Vietnam ... .

[Cecelia5578]

I've always thought that the emphasis by liberal hawks on unconventional warfare was a way to cover their asses from the usual charge by conservatives that liberals are soft on defense. They get to claim that they are cutting "wasteful" big ticket items, while claiming to focus on what the "real" mission of the military is. At least that's my reaction, after reading various left of center blogs dealing with foreign policy issues.

I await Shep, Skimmer, etc to weigh in more fully on this, but I think you're right-over optimizing the military for unconventional warfare will only tempt future presidents to get involved in future fuck ups like Iraq.

[The Grim Squeaker]

I await Shep, Skimmer, etc to weigh in more fully on this, but I think you're right-over optimizing the military for unconventional warfare will only tempt future presidents to get involved in future fuck ups like Iraq.

Actually, it tempts enemy states or groups to fight with more conventional means. Guerilla forces are such a problem due to the fact that most conventional forces have been stopped (or had a stalemate I.E the USSR) in the current world situation. Focusing more on guerillas/terrorists/nonconventional warfare means (among many, many other things) a lot more feet on the ground, at the expense of mechanized capabilities/units for example.
Great for peacekeeping, crap for stopping a few battalions of enemy heavy armor from annexing nearby states. Probably harder to gear back up to as well (harder meaning, more expensive - you lose the time spent on certain types of training, not to mention the equipment, etc').

This might be what's needed in the current climate, but the current climate is affected by the current conditions (obviously).

EDIT: it, not "iy"

[phongn]

Here's Secretary Gates' full announcement:

Today, I am announcing the key decisions I will recommend to the president with respect to the fiscal year 2010 defense budget. The president agreed to this unorthodox approach – announcing the department’s request before the White House submits a budget to the Congress – because of the scope and significance of the changes. In addition, the president and I believe that the American people deserve to learn of these recommendations fully and in context, as the proposed changes are interconnected and cannot be properly communicated or understood in isolation from one another. Collectively, they represent a budget crafted to reshape the priorities of America’s defense establishment. If approved, these recommendations will profoundly reform how this department does business.

In many ways, my recommendations represent the cumulative outcome of a lifetime spent in the national security arena and, above all, questions asked, experience gained, and lessons learned from over two years of leading this department – and, in particular, from our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. I reached the final decisions after many hours of consultations with the military and civilian leadership of the department. I have also consulted closely with the president. But, I received no direction or guidance from outside this department on individual program decisions. The chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete accord with these recommendations. The chairman is traveling abroad but he has provided a statement that we will distribute at the end of the briefing.

My decisions have been almost exclusively influenced by factors other than simply finding a way to balance the books or fit under the “top line” – as is normally the case with most budget exercises. Instead, these recommendations are the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks and needs for the purpose of shifting this department in a different strategic direction. Let me be clear: I would have made virtually all of the decisions and recommendations announced today regardless of the department’s top line budget number.

The decisions have three principal objectives:

• First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view represents America’s greatest strategic asset;
• Second, we must rebalance this department’s programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.
• Third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.

With regard to the troops and their families, I will recommend that we:

1. Fully protect and properly fund the growth in military end strength in the base budget. This means completing the growth in the Army and Marines while halting reductions in the Air Force and the Navy. Accomplishing this will require a nearly $11 billion increase above the FY09 budget level.
2. Continue the steady growth in medical research and development by requesting $400 million more than last year.
3. Recognize the critical and permanent nature of wounded, ill and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health programs. This means institutionalizing and properly funding these efforts in the base budget and increasing overall spending by $300 million. The department will spend over $47 billion on healthcare in FY10.
4. Increase funding by $200 million for improvements in child care, spousal support, lodging, and education. Many of these programs have been funded in the past by supplementals. We must move away from ad hoc funding of long-term commitments. Thus, we have added money to each of these areas and all will be permanently and properly carried in the base defense budget. Together they represent an increase in base budget funding of $13 billion from last year.

As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America’s defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces. Programs to directly support, protect, and care for the man or woman at the front have been developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget. Put simply, until recently there has not been an institutional home in the Defense Department for today’s warfighter. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs. I intend to use the FY10 budget to begin this process.

1. First, we will increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter in the base budget by some $2 billion. This will include:
   • Fielding and sustaining 50 Predator-class unmanned aerial vehicle orbits by FY11 and maximizing their production. This capability, which has been in such high demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will represent a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago.
   • Increasing manned ISR capabilities such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of “Task Force Odin” in Iraq.
   • Initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today’s battlefield.
2. We will also spend $500 million more in the base budget than last year to increase our capacity to field and sustain more helicopters – a capability that is in urgent demand in Afghanistan. Today, the primary limitation on helicopter capacity is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots. So our focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.
3. To boost global partnership capacity efforts, we will increase funding by $500 million. These initiatives include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter terrorism and stability operations.
4. To grow our special operations capabilities, we will increase personnel by more than 2,800 or five percent and will buy more special forces-optimized lift, mobility, and refueling aircraft.
   We will increase the buy of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions – from two to three ships in FY 2010. Our goal is to eventually acquire 55 of these ships.
5. To improve our inter-theater lift capacity, we will increase the charter of Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) ships from two to four until our own production program begins deliveries in 2011.
6. We will stop the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) at 45 versus 48 while maintaining the planned increase in end strength of 547,000. This will ensure that we have better-manned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of stop loss. This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force.

Even as we begin to shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current wars and other potential irregular campaigns, the United States must still contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries – from those actively hostile to those at strategic crossroads. Last year’s National Defense Strategy concluded that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. This year’s budget deliberations focused on what programs are necessary to deter aggression, project power when necessary, and protect our interests and allies around the globe. To this end, I will recommend new or additional investments and shifts in several key areas:

1. To sustain U.S. air superiority, I am committed to building a fifth generation tactical fighter capability that can be produced in quantity at sustainable cost. Therefore, I will recommend increasing the buy of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from the 14 aircraft bought in FY09 to 30 in FY10, with corresponding funding increases from $6.8 billion to $11.2 billion. We would plan to buy 513 F-35s over the five-year defense plan, and, ultimately, plan to buy 2,443. For naval aviation, we will buy 31 FA-18s in FY10.
2. We will retire 250 of the oldest Air Force tactical fighter aircraft in FY10.
3. We will end production of the F-22 fighter at 187 – representing 183 planes plus four recommended for inclusion in the FY 2009 supplemental.
4. To better protect our forces and those of our allies in theater from ballistic missile attack, we will add $700 million to field more of our most capable theater missile defense systems, specifically the terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) programs.
5. We will also add $200 million to fund conversion of six additional Aegis ships to provide ballistic missile defense capabilities.
6. To improve cyberspace capabilities, we will increase the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year by FY11.
7. To replace the Air Force’s aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial re-fueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer.
8. With regard to our nuclear and strategic forces:
   • In FY10, we will begin the replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine program.
   • We will not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology.
   • We will examine all of our strategic requirements during the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and in light of Post-START arms control negotiations.
9. The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America’s existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several major surface combatants and other maritime programs.
   • We will shift the Navy Aircraft Carrier program to a five-year build cycle placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path. This will result in 10 carriers after 2040.
   • We will delay the Navy CG-X next generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy.
   • We will delay amphibious ship and sea-basing programs such as the 11th Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) SHIP to FY11 in order to assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the nation needs.
10. With regard to air lift, we will complete production of the C-17 airlifter program this fiscal year. Our analysis concludes that we have enough C-17s with the 205 already in the force and currently in production.

In today’s environment, maintaining our technological and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I believe this needed reform requires three fundamental steps.

First, this department must consistently demonstrate the commitment and leadership to stop programs that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars to buy more capability than the nation needs. Our conventional modernization goals should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries – not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources. I believe the decisions I am proposing accomplish this step.

Second, we must ensure that requirements are reasonable and technology is adequately mature to allow the department to successfully execute the programs. Again, my decisions act on this principle by terminating a number of programs where the requirements were truly in the “exquisite” category and the technologies required were not reasonably available to affordably meet the programs’ cost or schedule goals.

Third, realistically estimate program costs, provide budget stability for the programs we initiate, adequately staff the government acquisition team, and provide disciplined and constant oversight.

We must constantly guard against so-called “requirements creep,” validate the maturity of technology at milestones, fund programs to independent cost estimates, and demand stricter contract terms and conditions. I am confident that if we stick to these steps, we will significantly improve the performance of our defense acquisition programs. But it takes more than mere pronouncements or fancy studies or reports. It takes acting on these principles by making tough decisions and sticking to them going forward.

I welcome the legislative initiative of Senators Levin and McCain to help address some of these issues and look forward to working with the Congress in this regard.

This budget will support these goals by increasing the size of defense acquisition workforce, converting 11,000 contractors and hiring an additional 9,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015 – beginning with 4,100 in FY10.

Fully reforming defense acquisition also requires recognizing the challenges of today’s battlefield and constantly changing adversary. This requires an acquisition system that can perform with greater urgency and agility. We need greater funding flexibility and the ability to streamline our requirements and acquisition execution procedures.

The perennial procurement and contracting cycle – going back many decades – of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must come to an end. There is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and contracting reform in the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies. Enough hand-wringing. Enough rhetoric. Now is the time for action.

First, I recommend that we terminate the VH-71 presidential helicopter:

• This program was originally designed to provide 23 helicopters to support the president at a cost of $6.5 billion. Today, the program is estimated to cost over $13 billion, has fallen six years behind schedule, and runs the risk of not delivering the requested capability.
• Some have suggested that we should adjust the program by buying only the lower capability “increment one” option. I believe this is neither advisable nor affordable. Increment One helicopters do not meet requirements and are estimated to have only a five- to 10-year useful life. This compares to the current VH-3 presidential helicopters that are 30 to 40 years old.
• We will promptly develop options for an FY11 follow-on program.

Second, we will terminate the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) helicopter program. This program has a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution with single-purpose aircraft. We will take a fresh look at the requirement behind this program and develop a more sustainable approach.

Third, we will terminate the $26 billion Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program, and instead will purchase two more Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites as alternatives.

Fourth, in the area of missile defense:

• We will restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat.
• We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska as had been planned. But we will continue to robustly fund continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats – a threat North Korea’s missile launch this past weekend reminds us is real.
• We will cancel the second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. We will keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant affordability and technology problems and the program’s proposed operational role is highly questionable.
• We will terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement.
• Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by $1.4 billion.

Fifth, in this request, we will include funds to complete the buy of two navy destroyers in FY10. These plans depend on being able to work out contracts to allow the Navy to efficiently build all three DDG-1000 class ships at Bath Iron Works in Maine and to smoothly restart the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. Even if these arrangements work out, the DDG-1000 program would end with the third ship and the DDG-51 would continue to be built in both yards.

If our efforts with industry are unsuccessful, the department will likely build only a single prototype DDG-1000 at Bath and then review our options for restarting production of the DDG-51. If the department is left to pursue this alternative, it would unfortunately reduce our overall procurement of ships and cut workload in both shipyards.

Sixth, and finally, we will significantly restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. We will retain and accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades. However, I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles – where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor – do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current vehicle program, developed nine years ago, does not include a role for our recent $25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today’s conflicts.

Further, I am troubled by the terms of the current contract, particularly its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS program is currently estimated to cost over $87 billion, I believe we must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and maturity of the technologies before proceeding further.

Accordingly, I will recommend that we cancel the vehicle component of the current FCS program, re-evaluate the requirements, technology, and approach – and then re-launch the Army’s vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process. An Army vehicle modernization program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential. But because of its size and importance, we must get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.

A final recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget request, we will reduce the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years.

So these are the principal recommendations I will make to the president. There are a number of others that I have not mentioned, including classified programs. This is a reform budget, reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future. I know that in the coming weeks we will hear a great deal about threats, and risk and danger – to our country and to our men and women in uniform – associated with different budget choices. Some will say I am too focused on the wars we are in and not enough on future threats. The allocation of dollars in this budget definitely belies that claim. But, it is important to remember that every defense dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk – or, in effect, to “run up the score” in a capability where the United States is already dominant – is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.

As I told the Congress in January, this budget presents an opportunity – one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity; to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements – those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead. An opportunity to truly reform the way we do business.

I will close by noting that it is one thing to speak generally about the need for budget discipline and acquisition and contract reform. It is quite another to make tough choices about specific systems and defense priorities based solely on the national interest and then stick to those decisions over time. To do this, the president and I look forward to working with the Congress, industry, and many others to accomplish what is in the best interest of our nation as a whole.

Thank you.

(EDIT: Copyediting)

[[R_H]]

I thought only 17 billion was originally budgeted for the MRAPs. And they've increase it by 8 billion, inspite of the Army and Marines announcing cuts.

[The Grim Squeaker]

1. Fully protect and properly fund the growth in military end strength in the base budget. This means completing the growth in the Army and Marines while halting reductions in the Air Force and the Navy. Accomplishing this will require a nearly $11 billion increase above the FY09 budget level.

Why do the marines need increased growth? (Shep, if you have an answer, then include it without a rant on the uselessness of the marines as a seperate branch ).

1. First, we will increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter in the base budget by some $2 billion. This will include:
• Fielding and sustaining 50 Predator-class unmanned aerial vehicle orbits by FY11 and maximizing their production. This capability, which has been in such high demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will represent a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago.
Initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today’s battlefield.

Good. 50 in total doesn't seem that much to me what with the design being relatively mature, unless they mean an additional 50 in total. (Still seems a bit small, but maybe it's just still relatively cheap to "upgrade" a fleet of UAV/MUAV in the future)

3. To boost global partnership capacity efforts, we will increase funding by $500 million. These initiatives include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter terrorism and stability operations.

Details would be interesting.

4. To grow our special operations capabilities, we will increase personnel by more than 2,800 or five percent and will buy more special forces-optimized lift, mobility, and refueling aircraft.

Does this mean the crappy VTOL transport?

We will increase the buy of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions – from two to three ships in FY 2010. Our goal is to eventually acquire 55 of these ships.

These are the infamous Little Crappy ships, right?

1. To sustain U.S. air superiority, I am committed to building a fifth generation tactical fighter capability that can be produced in quantity at sustainable cost. Therefore, I will recommend increasing the buy of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from the 14 aircraft bought in FY09 to 30 in FY10, with corresponding funding increases from $6.8 billion to $11.2 billion. We would plan to buy 513 F-35s over the five-year defense plan, and, ultimately, plan to buy 2,443. For naval aviation, we will buy 31 FA-18s in FY10.
3. We will end production of the F-22 fighter at 187 – representing 183 planes plus four recommended for inclusion in the FY 2009 supplemental.

Sustainable F-35 run - Very good. Pity about the F22, I understood that it was even better in some ways.

4. To better protect our forces and those of our allies in theater from ballistic missile attack, we will add $700 million to field more of our most capable theater missile defense systems, specifically the terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) programs.

Yay. Now, invest some R&D in your good Israeli partners .

[Mr Bean]

MRAP's are only useful in Iraq, outside of IRAQ unlike Styker they are essentially urban useful APCs. I should know I spent some down-time between assignments building the damn things. I suppose we could resell them to the police force. But they don't fit into our force structure outside of conflicts like Iraq and they are again half assased, not a purpose built urban IFV but just a up-armored up-armored knockoff of a South African.

The only reason we are still buying MRAPS at this point is pure job creation, I don't know of anyone who's in love with the things militarily.

And yay for increased funding on the USS Bondoggle ships. Stand by for the Stuart rant on them sooner or later.

[[R_H]]

MRAP's are only useful in Iraq, outside of IRAQ unlike Styker they are essentially urban useful APCs. I should know I spent some down-time between assignments building the damn things. I suppose we could resell them to the police force. But they don't fit into our force structure outside of conflicts like Iraq and they are again half assased, not a purpose built urban IFV but just a up-armored up-armored knockoff of a South African.

The only reason we are still buying MRAPS at this point is pure job creation, I don't know of anyone who's in love with the things militarily.

And yay for increased funding on the USS Bondoggle ships. Stand by for the Stuart rant on them sooner or later.

Do you know how many of the new MRAPs will be the new more maneuverable variant?

[Garibaldi]

Exactly what unconventional conflicts are we or should we be involved in in the future? Unlike conventional wars you generally get to pick which small wars you want to fight. If anything the military should be orienting itself towards a force that is smaller but packs a bigger punch. Fewer grunts, more F-22s.

[MKSheppard]

Let's review this budget:

-- Gates wants to spend $27.5 billion to buy 55 LCS -- a complete shithole of a ship that costs $500 billion for absolutely nothing. That same money would buy about 230~ F-22A.

--Termination of the F-22A; despite it's clear advantages over the F-35; it flies very much higher and faster; while F-35 has no supercruise.

--SM-3s and THAAD get money for more production.

--Money will be funded in FY10 for a SSBN replacement. Too bad SSBNs are obsolete.

--He won't fund the USAF bomber project until "we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology"; in effect, a McNamara Study to Death tactic.

--He won't fund CG(X) until we've "revisit[ed] both the requirements and acquisition strategy" -- again; a McNamara Study to Death tactic.

--He will increase build cycle of carriers to five years, which means that we'll fall to 10 CVNs in the foreseeable future.

--He'll terminate C-17 production this year. "Our analysis concludes that we have enough C-17s with the 205 already in the force and currently in production." WRONG. We've used up a lot of the airframe life on our in service C-17s over the last seven or so years. Those planes will have to be scrapped as they reach their design structural stress limits.

--Terminating VH-71 POTUS Chopper -- it was a total clusterfuck; so good call.

---Terminating CSAR-X (Combat Search and Rescue) program -- our aviators won't walk themselves out of enemy territory; and the -53 series of helicopters presently in service isn't getting any younger.

--He guts GBI -- we will not fill the empty silos or dig new ones at Fort Greely as we had planned.

--He guts ABL -- it's now a R&D Program instead of an operational one -- shades of McNamara's decision to turn YF-12 into a R&D program.

--He kills MKV -- which was going to MIRV GBI and make us capable of killing a lot more stuff, with multiple re-tries per missile.

--He wants to restart BURKESWARM -- which is slightly problematic -- DDG-51 right now is at it's weight and capacity growth limits.

--He killed FCS in all essence -- no more 20 ton lightweight vehicles -- and horray, NLOS-C is dead! This means that US Army has no choice but to buy PzH2000 or some foreign howitzer.

And he's calling for a huge bloat increase in the size of the Defense Department Bureaucracy by converting contractors etc into DoD employees. Where have we seen this before? Oh right; Robert S McNamara.

[erik_t]

And he's calling for a huge bloat increase in the size of the Defense Department Bureaucracy by converting contractors etc into DoD employees. Where have we seen this before? Oh right; Robert S McNamara.

You stupid shit. By all means, please explain how switching from contract labor to in-house labor turns jobs (that you are not attacking) into bureaucracy. Either the positions were already bureaucratic in nature, or they aren't now. Changing the source labor pool does not change this.

Changing jobs to "contract labor" is the biggest fake-accountant-savings-metric in all of Christendom.

[Guardsman Bass]

In any case, these are recommendations. I can see some of these not surviving Congress in their current form.

[Thanas]

Exactly what unconventional conflicts are we or should we be involved in in the future? Unlike conventional wars you generally get to pick which small wars you want to fight. If anything the military should be orienting itself towards a force that is smaller but packs a bigger punch. Fewer grunts, more F-22s.

I hear the strategy of fewer grunts worked so well in Iraq. If anything, you need more infantry to cover more ground in low-intensity wars. F22s will do jack in those scenarios.

[Questor]

In any case, these are recommendations. I can see some of these not surviving Congress in their current form.

Quite so, and I really doubt that Gates has the brass ones necessary to actually DO a McNamara style, "You can give me the money, but I don't have to use it." At least not publicly.

[Starglider]

And yay for increased funding on the USS Bondoggle ships. Stand by for the Stuart rant on them sooner or later.

We've already had several threads on that subject. The two things I'm not clear on are;
1) Which of the two designs (Lockheed vs GD) is less awful.
2) At what point in the proposed production run will the whole thing finally be cancelled due to blatant uselessness.

With regard to the F-22, I hope that the production capability will be maintained such that an upgraded version can be developed and production restarted at a later date.

[Garibaldi]

I hear the strategy of fewer grunts worked so well in Iraq. If anything, you need more infantry to cover more ground in low-intensity wars. F22s will do jack in those scenarios.

Yes...my point is that we shouldn't be in any more low-intensity conflicts. We have the luxury of choosing which countries we wish to occupy - the genesis of most low-intensity conflicts - and given recent history we shouldn't be doing any of that; thus orienting our force to fight those sorts of battles is self-defeating. This is a textbook case of preparing to fight the last war.

[Thanas]

I hear the strategy of fewer grunts worked so well in Iraq. If anything, you need more infantry to cover more ground in low-intensity wars. F22s will do jack in those scenarios.

Yes...my point is that we shouldn't be in any more low-intensity conflicts.

And when the need for intervention in another hole like Somalia or Iraq arises, you will do what exactly? The army needs to be prepared for those kind of conflicts.

We have the luxury of choosing which countries we wish to occupy

That is funny, I didn't recall the US having much choice in 9/11.

This is a textbook case of preparing to fight the last war.

That part is true, but considering that such a war is probably the most likely next war as well...

[Cecelia5578]

In any case, these are recommendations. I can see some of these not surviving Congress in their current form.

I don't see the Democrats being inclined towards such things at the F-22 and BMD, and I think it'd take at least a Republican majority in Congress for that to happen. Seeing as how the GOP is centered around rural Christian fundiegelicals and libertards, I wouldn't want to see that tradeoff.

[Cecelia5578]

I hear the strategy of fewer grunts worked so well in Iraq. If anything, you need more infantry to cover more ground in low-intensity wars. F22s will do jack in those scenarios.

Yes...my point is that we shouldn't be in any more low-intensity conflicts.

And when the need for intervention in another hole like Somalia or Iraq arises, you will do what exactly? The army needs to be prepared for those kind of conflicts.

We have the luxury of choosing which countries we wish to occupy

That is funny, I didn't recall the US having much choice in 9/11.

This is a textbook case of preparing to fight the last war.

That part is true, but considering that such a war is probably the most likely next war as well...

Of course there was no need for either Iraq or Somalia, unless in 2001-2004 you were either a GOP whore or liberal hawk who got blinded by the propaganda. And in Somalia, we sure didn't need anywhere near the size of force we have in Iraq. Its apples and oranges.

And of course we had choice on 9/11, we had the choice not to go down the neo-con warpath. We had the choice not to invade Iraq after A-stan. Low intensity conflicts are not "inevitable."

[Coyote]

MRAP's are only useful in Iraq, outside of IRAQ unlike Styker they are essentially urban useful APCs. ... But they don't fit into our force structure outside of conflicts like Iraq and they are again half assased, not a purpose built urban IFV but just a up-armored up-armored knockoff of a South African..

Darfur!

[Coyote]

In any case, these are recommendations. I can see some of these not surviving Congress in their current form.

I think we'll end up taking NLOS-C, for example. It is actually a running, powered hull essentially ready for deployment. But the rest of it? Blah.

Of course, it'll be back. They'll let it simmer a couple years, then just say "hey, look! We've designed a whole new series of tanks and APCs based off the NLOS-C SP gun hull! WooHoo! Cost saver!

[Thanas]

Of course there was no need for either Iraq or Somalia, unless in 2001-2004 you were either a GOP whore or liberal hawk who got blinded by the propaganda. And in Somalia, we sure didn't need anywhere near the size of force we have in Iraq. Its apples and oranges.

I was unaware the USA has invaded Somalia in the last eight years, so please enlighten me how you know exactly what kind of force with what equipment would be needed there.

And of course we had choice on 9/11, we had the choice not to go down the neo-con warpath. We had the choice not to invade Iraq after A-stan. Low intensity conflicts are not "inevitable."

Do you see me talking about Iraq somewhere? Afghanistan is a low intensity conflict that was inevitable, so your assumption the USA will never, ever, get suckered into another one falls flat.

[Redleader34]

how is second strike ability obslete? Even if CHINA and RUSSIA spawn thousands of attack subs and advanced trans oceanic microphones, how will that make the abilty to destroy a nation after the first nukes are launched obslete? There are too many useless military programs that should be cut and the nation spends an insane ammount compared to every other nation on this planet. We need to fix our internal situation before America goes World Police.

[phongn]

how is second strike ability obslete? Even if CHINA and RUSSIA spawn thousands of attack subs and advanced trans oceanic microphones, how will that make the abilty to destroy a nation after the first nukes are launched obslete?

Shep is arguing that widespread proliferation of missile defense systems will render both ICBM and SLBM obsolete.

There are too many useless military programs that should be cut and the nation spends an insane ammount compared to every other nation on this planet. We need to fix our internal situation before America goes World Police.

Which ones?

[Garibaldi]

And when the need for intervention in another hole like Somalia or Iraq arises, you will do what exactly? The army needs to be prepared for those kind of conflicts.

We will do nothing. That is exactly my point. Those were both thoroughly optional conflicts that, in hindsight, should not have been entered into. Certainly, we should keep a portion of our force trained in low-intensity warfare, in only to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions, but deciding that counterinsurgency is the primary mission of the US military is insane.

That is funny, I didn't recall the US having much choice in 9/11.

Afghanistan is not going to be "winnable" no matter how many copies of How To Eat Soup With a Knife General Petraeus distributes to the officer corp. At this point our best bet is to keep the Taliban insurgency at bay by propping up some local warlord with conventional support or by splitting them through some political means. Any chance of implementing a long-term successful strategy was thrown away when the Administration made the foolish decision to continue Predator strikes into Pakistani territory. So downgrading our focus on counterinsurgency is not going to impact the outcome in Afghanistan one way or another. Frankly, we would have had roughly the same outcome had we simply flattened all the Taliban strongholds from the air and let the Northern Alliance warlords have the run of the country.

In the case of any future conflict; well, it is considerably easier to go from facing a conventional enemy to an unconventional enemy than it is to go the other way. My fear is twofold; one, that we will transform the military into an unconventional fighting force so thoroughly that it is unable to fight conventional wars effectively, and two (the one I worry about more) that having such a force, the government will be tempted to use it more often.