To Beowulf. Ran a cursory investigation.
1) Checked up the pompous statement about "most naval designers not using reactive mortars" and it turned out to be wrong. Utterly so.
Ahead-throwing weapons prognose
Fragment wrote:The Bofors ASW 375 mm rocket launcher system is typical of a generation of ahead-throwing launchers designed in the early 1950s. These include the British Mark 12 Limbo, the US Weapon Alpha, and the Russian RBU series. The concept went into eclipse with the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines, which had too high a maximum speed for engagements by such weapons. Limbo and Weapon Alpha are now virtually extinct; the Swedish navy and the Russians have pursued the concept.
More recently, however, it has become apparent that these weapons may once again become favored. The emphasis has now shifted from fighting nuclear-powered submarines in the ocean depths to engaging small, diesel-electric submarines in green and brown water. In this new environment, homing torpedoes are of limited use and, in any case, could not be afforded in sufficient numbers. Germany and Norway in particular require an inexpensive ASW weapon for use in brown water. In the case of Norway, this refers to the country's fjords; in that of Germany, it refers to the Baltic Sea theater of operations. Both areas are classic brown-water environments, and thus are very difficult for reliable sonar operation. This means contacts of targets are fleeting, ambiguous and very difficult to hit. Once lost, it is unlikely a contact would be easily re-acquired.
Since large numbers of weapons would have to be dropped on each contact, much like in the proven concept of depth charge attacks, the unit cost per drop would have to be very small. These conditions also apply to the Persian Gulf, the South China Sea, the Adriatic and numerous other areas where the political situation is fragile.
Such conditions would seem to create a favorable market for weapons such as the Bofors rocket launcher and its Russian rivals, the RBU-6000 and RBU-12000. Their individual rounds are inexpensive and thus can be afforded in quantities large enough to permit realistic training. The ship impact of the systems is low so they can even be retrofitted on existing platforms with ease. Modern sonars prove entirely adequate for their use, probably without significant modification. Finally, the advances in miniaturization that have dominated the rest of the military electronics field are of significant value. These permit the deployment of a guided round for weapons of this type. Although such rounds are more expensive than unguided weapons, Russian experience is that they are up to eight times more effective than unguided shots (the Russian navy already deploys such rounds for its RBU-6000 system). This suggests that the SAAB guidance package applied to the Bofors 375 mm may receive substantial acceptance.
Forecasting the rebirth of a system previously pronounced dead is usually not safe, but the Bofors 375 mm ASW rocket is likely well enough suited to the ASW environment of the 1990s to assume (with a fair amount of confidence) that the system has a promising future. The Bofors 375 mm ASW Rocket System is now reappearing on some bid proposals — albeit not as the only solution — which adds credence to this prediction.
By and large, the 375 ASW Rocket operates much like the depth charges, i.e., its main goal is to overwhelm the enemy with mass, while the shooting accuracy is less than that of a missile. Thanks to its low operating cost, the 375 is a good basic anti-submarine weapon that appears to be part of certain platforms and continues to remain in use by those navies. A new, lightweight launcher will probably be designed, but meanwhile, the proven, effective rockets will be retained. This new launcher may well be modified with the SAAB guidance package to provide an effective solution to the brown-water ASW problem.
Because of the said upgrade probability of the launcher, the following forecast refers to production of rockets themselves rather than the launching systems. It is likely that consumption will increase throughout the forecast period as the virtues of the system become more apparent and training with it becomes more intensive. The use of smaller craft for inshore ASW adds to the attractions of this equipment.
A major brown-water ASW conflict, possibly involving the loss of Western warships, could very well boost the consumption substantially. The only counter-factor could be the availability of the Russian RBU-6000 and RBU-12000. In today’s market conditions, however, that option is not threatening to the demand forecast of the Swedish product.
Basically, Sweden's stealth Visby's and Finnish Rauma class missile boats, all very modern, are all fitted with these ahead-throwing systems. I also recall reading that the Italians and the French have similar systems, for cotorp duties, either salvo missile launchers or bomb launchers, which are basically one and the same (most such systems are universal with the ability to shoot both missiles and bombs).
Moreover, I have gathered evidence about RBU-6000 and successor generation trials - they were trialled successfully against the homing
53-65 type torpedoes, at extreme angles, in the dead zone of other weapons.
The RBU-6000 actually failed counter-submarine role against atomic submarines (as noted above) and it was considered to be primarily a counter-torpedo weapon from the trials of 1143.3 air carrying cruisers. I don't think the Swedes, Russians, Finns and Indians as well (who demanded RBU installation on their Russian-ordered ships) are collectively being stupid. Neither do I think torpedoes are markedly more stealthy vis sonar compared to the 53-65. SaaB Bofors also ran the trials of it's ALECTO/ELMA systems and found them adequate for counter-torpedo duties.
Most problems concerning these weapons were the recoil force and deck damage they do when firing by the recoil and by fire from the rack, which burns off the color and such. Reaction times for angle turning have also been cited as lacking in one of the trials on Soviet B.P.Ks, but it was back in the 1960s with the first RBU generations, and more of a problem of the servo-motors which have been likewise extensively upgraded on RBU-6000 Modernized and RBU-12000 Udav-1M (Modernized). New proposed systems (PAKET-NK) are yet faster in reaction.
In short, I haven't seen conclusive evidence that such systems are ineffective. The demise of US Alfa and British Limbo were probably more connected to the fact that the aerial patrols of US Navy would never allow a submarine to firing distance, and if it were, using nuclear-armed ASROCs in open seas is yet more efficient. After 1989 the situation changed. I won't be surprised in the slightest if such systems resurge in some fashion in the USN (miniaturized cotorp duty ASROCs, for example), and I'm with Shep here - nothing suggests ahead-throwing weapons in salvo mode, are ineffective against torpedoes. Against deep-going submarines - that's a wholly different issue.
2) I read reports on losses in Iraq and Yugoslavia, and frankly there's nothing suggesting it's possible to inflict 80% casualties on invading ground forces within mere days even with
complete aerial supremacy, when these had aerial campaigns going for week with complete supremacy and did not inflict such large losses - mostly the damage came in the form of disrupted communications. Therefore, these estimates also bite the dust. The 10% losses are relatively plausible, although in my view too high as well. Ground forces shouldn't be suffering massive casualties like that, even when advancing - aren't the Costas undergoing a revolution? How did they put up efficient ground resistance? How would they defend their airspace after the first battle which raises up all of their pilots and aircraft, which would then require lots of post-operation service? The Baernes still have the MiGs to control airspace over their advancing forces, maintaining a healthy sortie rates of 2-3 squadrons always on patrol above the army men.
3) As I understand the carrier is a conventional Kitty Hawk class. Sinking a conventional ship of that tonnage with one or two torpedo detonations when the crew would be fighting for survival is harder than a nuclear powered one (the problem for a nuclear equivalent like Nimitz would be reactors, and structural damage to their hold would cause enough destruction to move the ship out of combat for months or years, or maybe forever if the reactors break through and the contours continue leaking despite the emergency measures). Damage to a gas-turbine conventional power plant is not likely to be that critical and cause the ship to die, sink or turn into a ghost ship due to contamination.
4) Mechanical scan radars will be capping the meager multi-tasking abilities of the F-106 fitted with AN/AWG-9. A brief radar comparison yields an unwelcome fact: the MiG-31's baseline radar offers 140 degree horizontal engagement angle and vertical +70/-60 degree engagement angle, while the AN/AWG-9 only offers +20/-20 on vertical and 65 degrees on horizontal. In the end, the radar difference results in the following disparity: the AN/AWG-9 mechanically scanned array offers a ~420 square degrees zone for launching several missiles against multiple targets, while the MiG-31's zone in which it can launch multiple rockets and guide them is ~18200 square degrees, or 43 times greater due to the use of ESA.
Considering that MiGs would be operating at ceiling higher than their enemies most likely, they would have a large edge in the fight. The enemy would be always in their angle of fire, while they would be constantly leaving the narrow vertical +/-20 degree angle of fire of the AN/AWG-9, which would force the enemy to conduct lots of maneuvers to be able to engage multiple MiGs. Hence, it's unlikely that they'd be getting a grip on them.
The F-14 was created to down multiple bombers flying in tight formations. Of course, for these tasks the AN/AWG-9 is more than sufficient - bombers won't leave the angle due to their low speed. But against MiGs - not so. Jamming the mechanical array on the F-106 (or F-14 for that matter) would be possible, like the jamming against MiG-25s mechanical array was used to great effect against the craft. Jamming in the lower hemisphere against MiG-31s PESA has no chances, or they are so slim that it wouldn't save the F-106s.
To be brutally honest, what
else did you expect when pitting ESA against a mechanical array? That I'd just say it's "irrelevant" when the degree, track/scan timing and the ability to run several functions at once is so remarkably different between mechanical and ESA radars that
most world nations shifted to xESA for all their modern fighter planes, bomber planes and so on and so forth? Not funny.
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- PeZook
