Is moral relativism self-refuting?

[TheManWithNoName]

The topic of moral relativism came up in a discussion I was having with my friends the other day. I was against it, but most of my friends were for it - even going as far to think that I was nearly insane for my stance. I was doing some reading on the subject, and came across this article from Daylight Atheism, "The Roots of Morality I: Refuting Relativism". One argument he uses against moral relativism is that it is self-refuting in a sense.

So far, I have argued that the existence of disagreement does not prove that there is no objective resolution to that disagreement. But I intend to go further, by showing that there is and must be such a resolution, at least in the case of morality. To see why, consider the "liar's paradox" argument against moral relativism. A consistent moral relativist would claim that no moral opinion is more or less valid than any other, that any opinion which you hold is "true for you" and no one can gainsay it. But now imagine that relativist meets a moral objectivist, whose moral opinion is that some moral statements are more valid than others, and that some principles of morality are absolute and do not depend on human opinion.

In this situation, the relativist finds himself in a logical trap. If he grants that this view is true for the holder, then by definition it is true for everyone, and moral relativism is false. On the other hand, if he denies that this view is true, he is contradicting his own beliefs and betraying a belief in objective moral statements. Either way, moral relativism is false. There is no other way out of this dilemma, no third option that has been overlooked. The same principle cannot both apply and not apply to others; this is basic logic, the principle of non-contradiction.

Indeed, moral relativism is in a sense self-refuting. The moral relativist claims that people should agree with him when he asserts that morality has no objective existence. And yet, by the terms of his own beliefs, he must acknowledge that this claim is itself a matter of mere personal taste which can have no authority over other agents! If it is true that moral statements are just non-binding opinions, then moral relativism is one of those non-binding opinions, and we are free to disregard it. A moral relativist, if he is consistent, literally can give no reason whatsoever why we should agree with him. And what is the proper response to a view that is unsupportable by reasons, other than to reject it?

I have been asked why this liar's paradox argument does not apply to other fields of thought, for example, aesthetics. Why could one not say that, for example, red is the best color and this is objectively true?

The answer is that I, unlike moral relativists, am not required by my philosophy to treat all aesthetic - or moral - opinions as equally valid, and so I can dismiss such claims as erroneous. The person who asserts that red is objectively the best color to prefer is simply wrong. However, the moral relativist is bound by his own beliefs never to make such an assertion, and therefore cannot give the parallel response to moral objectivists. If there is even one universal moral principle, moral relativism contradicts itself and is therefore false.

Another ill-founded objection is that moral relativism can be supported as a matter of logic - that is, the assertion that one person's moral beliefs are not binding on another is not itself a moral belief, but a factual assertion that one can objectively prove to be right or wrong, and therefore a moral relativist can deny it and remain consistent.

This argument is easily shown to be false. By definition, morality is precisely that system of thought which states how intelligent beings should act. Therefore, claims about how we should make moral decisions are themselves moral claims. Meta-morality is morality, and again the moral relativist cannot escape logical paradox. What is a moral relativist really saying, other than "It is universally morally true that universal moral beliefs are not true"? This belief is plainly self-contradictory and therefore must be thrown out.

Moral relativism cannot be stated in a consistent and non-self-contradictory way, and so - unless we deny the rules of logic altogether - it inevitably collapses in paradox and must be discarded. The only remaining possibility, one that does not suffer from similar self-contradiction, is moral objectivism. In other words, there are universally valid and binding moral principles that are not reducible to mere preference or opinion. The remainder of this series will explore what those principles are.

What do you think of that argument?

http://www.daylightatheism.org/2006/08/ ... ity-i.html

[Darth Wong]

Frankly, it seems like one of those smart-ass "trick" arguments that people use as more of a joke than a serious argument, like "Could God microwave a burrito so hot that he can't eat it."

The better argument against moral relativism is that it is ignorant of the entire purpose of a morality system. Moral codes are social conduct codes, intended to promote the prosperity and security of the society. We can derive this from the origins of moral codes (conduct codes in primitive tribal societies) and the universality of certain moral codes (specifically, those which just happen to be extremely useful for the prosperity and security of primitive tribal societies).

Given that fact, moral relativism is refuted by the simple fact that a social conduct code must, by definition, be imposed upon all members of that society. They proceed from the assumption that morality is individual. I would submit that the entire concept of morality is social, and therefore it cannot be treated in an individual relativist way.

Moreover, we can even compare different societies to see how well their moral codes perform: moral codes which impede progress and lead to widespread misery can be objectively said to underperform moral codes which encourage progress and prosperity, once one admits that a moral code has an external purpose.

When people say "what is right and what is wrong", you must answer "right or wrong for what purpose?" Getting people to acknowledge that a moral code must have some kind of purpose is the first part of the battle. Without a purpose to be measured against, any moral statement takes the form of a self-justifying axiom: pure circular logic. That's why people tend to justify moral codes by simply referencing their principles, as if they are self-evident. So many moral arguments can be stymied by repeatedly asking "why", and cutting people off when they start to become circular.

[aimless]

What do you think of that argument?

It made my eyes glaze over :p You spring that one someone and they're just going to go "huh"?

I think I'll stick with "moral relativism is fucking retarded. You know why I'm right? Because FUCK YOU BUDDY"

..or what Darth Wong said. That's good too.

[Kuroneko]

Of course it isn't--not even the extreme form of moral relativism described there. It's wrong, but not self-refuting. The author of that argument is conflating moral statements with statements about morality.

[Kuroneko]

I should add:

By definition, morality is precisely that system of thought which states how intelligent beings should act. Therefore, claims about how we should make moral decisions are themselves moral claims. Meta-morality is morality, and again the moral relativist cannot escape logical paradox.

It's perfectly consistent for an extreme moral relativist to say that how an intelligent being should act is relative to the entirely personal values of that being and that those values are subjective. For any set of values, or a goal in general, an intelligent being can intelligently seek to carry out that goal.

I think the mistake begins with in an overly broad interpretation of this statement:

A consistent moral relativist would claim that no moral opinion is more or less valid than any other, that any opinion which you hold is "true for you" and no one can gainsay it.

Close, but not quite. An extreme moral relativist is only obliged to agree that your moral opinion is "true for you" if your personal values are consistent with it. Now, although that's almost the same thing from a pragmatic point of view (as your values may change), it does not introduce a logical inconsistency.

[Akkleptos]

Not meanining to brown-nose, but I think Lord Wong hit the nail in the head. Purpose is what defines this:

The better argument against moral relativism is that it is ignorant of the entire purpose of a morality system. Moral codes are social conduct codes, intended to promote the prosperity and security of the society. We can derive this from the origins of moral codes (conduct codes in primitive tribal societies) and the universality of certain moral codes (specifically, those which just happen to be extremely useful for the prosperity and security of primitive tribal societies).

We could even get darwinian on this one: a good behaviour code is that which improves a society's chance at survival. That would get the definition closer to a measurable, absolute value, where good=improves chances of survival and bad=decreases chances of survival.

Also, good and bad are social conventions. Thus, moral codes are either social values, or personal quirks.

[Samuel]

We could even get darwinian on this one: a good behaviour code is that which improves a society's chance at survival.

Good is a moral statement. Effective would be a better description.

[Akkleptos]

We could even get darwinian on this one: a good behaviour code is that which improves a society's chance at survival.

Good is a moral statement. Effective would be a better description.

You're right. That's what I meant when I said

where good=improves chances of survival and bad=decreases chances of survival.

I should have included the word "effective" in there somewhere. Thanks.