RAR: 1939, France invades Germany?

[Vehrec]

So I've been reading Wages of Destruction this past week, and it seems to indicate that the Nazi war machine was in bad shape in November 1939. For the purposes of this thread and hypothetical attack, the French are aware of all the German weaknesses. Germany is expending powder and shells much faster than they can be replaced, was nearly out of bombs and its armaments industry is severely crippled by a lack of raw materials like copper. Furthermore, the German rail system is in poor repair, and may be vulnerable to attack. Not to mention the fact that much of the army is in Poland. Is it possible for the French to get their army in the field and moving into Germany to achieve the limited objective of capturing the Ruhr and it's industry? Can they go further, and defeat the German Army piecemeal while much of it is still deployed to the east?

[K. A. Pital]

No, that doesn't work that way. You can't just give the French omni-knowledge of "all the German weaknesses" - either the French know as much as their intelligence realistically permits them and execute the attack, or this thread will not last long here.

To be fair, it's also good tone to offer your own opinion, for example, on how capable the French Army would be in mobile offensive operations against the West German territories.

[Shinn Langley Soryu]

On the technical side, French tanks of the period were superior to anything the Germans fielded; in a straight shooting match, a SOMUA S35 or Char B1 would be more than a match for anything the Germans could throw at it, save for an 88mm gun. Morane-Saulnier M.S.406s would be more than adequate enough to pick off Stukas, though they'd still get raped by Messerschmitts; France better start producing more D.520s and VG-33s, then.

On the doctrinal side, however, France was a mess. Given that one of the centerpieces of their strategy was the Maginot Line, I doubt mobile offensives were on the minds of most French commanders. Worst comes to worst and an offensive assault to seize the Ruhr fails, though, the French could just fall back behind the Line and watch the Germans go splat against it...assuming they don't just go through the Ardennes and try to cut off the French retreat.

[PeZook]

How could a French assault fail against reserve divisions and light infantry manning the border?

It all depends on whether or not France commits early and commits fully, with a mobilized army. Even with doctrinal defficiencies, they have enough warm bodies to make up the difference, especially when the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht are fully comitted in Poland, eating up ammunition and fuel reserves.

Naturally, that would require a fundamental change in French will and an early mobilization - both unlikely possibilities.

They'd probably botch mobile warfare, to be honest. Their tanks lacked radios and had retarded crew setups (commander/gunner/loader rolled into one? Hell yeah!), but it's not like they'd need it all that badly.

[Vehrec]

No, that doesn't work that way. You can't just give the French omni-knowledge of "all the German weaknesses" - either the French know as much as their intelligence realistically permits them and execute the attack, or this thread will not last long here.

To be fair, it's also good tone to offer your own opinion, for example, on how capable the French Army would be in mobile offensive operations against the West German territories.

Well, you make a fair point. I oversimplified the situation out of a desire set up the rapid French offensive and see if it was possible for them to deal a major blow early on. Even with a major intelligence coup, the French wouldn't have any real reason to attack Germany since they couldn't see the sickle-cut of German armor that would arrive the next year, and on paper they were more than a match for the German army once Britain was in the field with them. Therefore, I'm at a bit of a loss to determine a reasonable explanation for why they would abandon their plans for a long term war in favor of a risky rapid attack.

I think that in mobile offensive oppertions, the French would have problems at the operational level and higher, but once they actually make contact with the enemy should fair well enough, given the superiority of their armor against the best the germans can field. The question is then one of what does Germany do in response, and how the French adapt and respond in kind.

[CaptHawkeye]

On the technical side, French tanks of the period were superior to anything the Germans fielded; in a straight shooting match, a SOMUA S35 or Char B1 would be more than a match for anything the Germans could throw at it, save for an 88mm gun. Morane-Saulnier M.S.406s would be more than adequate enough to pick off Stukas, though they'd still get raped by Messerschmitts; France better start producing more D.520s and VG-33s, then.

Well, French tanks aren't exactly perfect. They ironically demonstrated some of the charateristics of late war German Wankzers. Things such as short parts lifespans, insufficient cross-country speeds, high fuel consumption including other early war niggles such as no radios for either recieving or transmitting. The only French Tank that did not suffer from these issues was the Somua. Which may very well have been one of the best Medium Tanks in the world at the time. Unfortunantly, the Somua was also prohibitly expensive and France was never able to build them in the numbers they wanted.

[Marcus Aurelius]

On the technical side, French tanks of the period were superior to anything the Germans fielded; in a straight shooting match, a SOMUA S35 or Char B1 would be more than a match for anything the Germans could throw at it, save for an 88mm gun. Morane-Saulnier M.S.406s would be more than adequate enough to pick off Stukas, though they'd still get raped by Messerschmitts; France better start producing more D.520s and VG-33s, then.

It would not have been possible for the French to produce more D.520s or VG-33s in the time frame under discussion, unless we assume that both aircraft and their engines are also designed earlier somehow. Aircraft quality was not the only shortfall of the Armée de l'Air, though. Its tactical doctrine and organization was not up to Luftwaffe standards, even if the
pilot quality was fairly good.

Well, French tanks aren't exactly perfect. They ironically demonstrated some of the charateristics of late war German Wankzers. Things such as short parts lifespans, insufficient cross-country speeds, high fuel consumption including other early war niggles such as no radios for either recieving or transmitting. The only French Tank that did not suffer from these issues was the Somua. Which may very well have been one of the best Medium Tanks in the world at the time. Unfortunantly, the Somua was also prohibitly expensive and France was never able to build them in the numbers they wanted.

French tanks had other problems as well: their numerically important light tanks (R35, H35, and FMC 36) had a WW1 37 mm infantry gun as their main armament. The thing was a pure anti-infantry weapon and it could not pierce the armor of any German tanks at typical combat ranges (historically a new armor piercing ammunition type was introduced in 1940, which gave it a chance against German light tanks, but it reached the units only in small quantities before the German offensive). Then of course there was the one man turret issue, which plagued nearly all French tanks. Its importance can not be overestimated: if the commander also had to load and operate the main gun, there was simply no chance of maintaining adequate situational awareness in maneuver warfare. Add the lack of radios to that and the Germans did not need tanks or 88s to counter most French tanks; their ubiqutous 37 mm AT gun deployed in flanking positions would have been enough in most situations.

By the way, it should be S35 or SOMUA S35. SOMUA is the name of the manufacturer and not a model designation.

[Big Orange]

The Flak 88 remained a very effective AT weapon until the end of the war, more or less a danger to the M26 Pershing, Konig Tiger, and IS-II tanks. And the Char B1 may have been roughly comparable to the KV-1 in terms of armour protection and firepower on paper, but in terms of actual design and crew space it was horribly conceived. The S35, despite its single turret defect, was the best designed French tank and overall slightly better than the earlier models of the Panzer III and IV, although its 40mm armour could be penetrated by the German 37mm AT gun at 200 meters.

The French squandered its ostensively impressive tank force by employing faulty tactics and strategy by attaching small numbers of tanks laboriously to many infantry battalions strung across a wide front and sending most of the tank heavy units Northeast into Belgium, while their crew were likely overall not as well trained and led as their German counterparts despite similar quality hardware.

The British tank forces mostly consisted of cheap and nasty cruiser tanks that were on the same scale of fail as the Panzer II, but without skilled crews and radios; in one engagement at Abbeville, 120 BEF tanks were lost within three hours (although mechanical faults would've been a factor), and British tank turrets could only accomodate two occupants. Britain's Matilda II gave a decent account of itself with its armour protection and respectable two pounder AT cannon, however its speed and mobility sucked ass, plus the Matilda II lacked HE shells to deal with Flak 88 positions.

[Big Orange]

Ghetto Edit: Also was France's logistics just as similarily faulty and full of holes as Germany's? Also the French military was not what is once was as a gigantic infantry force after the heavy male losses in WWI, with chronic demographic problems happening since then, hence why France invested into the Maginot Line defences (that worked on a tactical level, like their tanks) and mass recruited Africans to fill in the gaps.

[CaptHawkeye]

The ultimate reality was that France had spent the last 20 years completely obsessing over a defensive stance in the event of another war. Every strategy and doctrine that had in 1940 revolved around the concept of stopping the Germans. Not counter attacking them. Personally i've always found the "French Counter Invasion of Germany" theory to be really optimistic. Even if Germany had very little in the way of defenses on the Rhine, the French really just weren't prepared to project and support substantial military power much farther than Belgium. It's not as easy as just asking France to drive its tanks in the direction of Berlin. France had a hard enough time keeping its forces intact and supplied on its own turf. The total lack of anything resembling an Air Force and lots of obsolete, slow, short ranged, post WW1 armour was virtually gauranteed to undo or seriously hinder an offensive strategy.

[Big Orange]

Like the Germans the French were reliant on horses for most of their logistics as well, while their fuel logistics were horribly exposed to air and ground attacks, so their motorized infantry and armoured units that could make a difference against the Wehrmacht's Panzer units were cut off.

[frogcurry]

Does anyone actually have any rough information as to the strength and composition of german forces in the Ruhr area and nearby, the state of the Siegfried defenses and their degree of readiness at that point of construction, and the strength of the equivalent available french forces? Because otherwise this would be a pointless debate.

Also, the assumption appears to be that the French army is going to charge the german defenses head-on, which would be hard to persuade a French army to do just over 20 years after they last tried that very strategy repeatedly to little avail.

[PeZook]

All you people are forgetting that in October, all the Panzers were on the other side of the frickin' country, beat up from their campaign.

[frogcurry]

All you people are forgetting that in October, all the Panzers were on the other side of the frickin' country, beat up from their campaign.

Don't you think the French and British armies might have, you know, worked that out for themselves in real life? If it had been that easy to stop Germany, then we'd be talking about the "RAR: 1939, France doesn't invade Germany" thread instead right now. Where the bulk of the german army is meaningless if what was left on the western front was still adequate to potentially stop what portion of the French army was mobilised and ready to manouver in November (OPs suggested date, although that may not be the most realistic date to posit a French offensive).

[Big Orange]

Wasn't there the Siegfried Line? While it was not quite the Maginot Line it was more carefully designed than the Atlantic Wall. I agree with PeZook that the Panzer divisions were battled scarred and hadn't ironed out all their bugs in 1939 although they regrouped quickly enough for decisive victory in 1940.

[thejester]

Before people continue on they might want to read this and this.

[Big Orange]

I knew the French were hamstrung by a fragmented civilian government and that bled into the military with more aggressive generals such as Charles De Gaulle marginalized, rendering the French command staff less proactive and dynamic. They were such slackers one French general commanded his troops by having his underlings drive down the road from his HQ to a post office that had a telephone!

[Marcus Aurelius]

The Flak 88 remained a very effective AT weapon until the end of the war, more or less a danger to the M26 Pershing, Konig Tiger, and IS-II tanks. And the Char B1 may have been roughly comparable to the KV-1 in terms of armour protection and firepower on paper, but in terms of actual design and crew space it was horribly conceived. The S35, despite its single turret defect, was the best designed French tank and overall slightly better than the earlier models of the Panzer III and IV, although its 40mm armour could be penetrated by the German 37mm AT gun at 200 meters.

The B1 was not that bad. Like most French tanks it had a very short operating range and it did have one clear "Death Star I" like vulnerability (the infamous ventilating grill), but in its intended role as breakthrough tank it was OK and you could very well call it the best heavy tank of 1940. By the way, just its role as a breakthrough vehicle shows that the French did think about tactical counter attacks, even if they did not believe in strategic offensives.

On the other hand I don't believe the S35 was overall better than the Panzer III Ausf. E & F. It had more armor and a better gun, but the Panzer III had an optimal three man turret crew layout, which is still used today, a reliable two way radio and it was mechanically reliable; in fact more so than any other German-designed tank medium or heavy in WW2 and the only one that came even close to the American mediums in that regard. An S35 might win a hypothetical one on one encounter with a Panzer IIIe, but in real life tactical, let alone strategic, settings the German tank was better. One on one engagements are not exactly common in real armored warfare.

The French squandered its ostensively impressive tank force by employing faulty tactics and strategy by attaching small numbers of tanks laboriously to many infantry battalions strung across a wide front and sending most of the tank heavy units Northeast into Belgium, while their crew were likely overall not as well trained and led as their German counterparts despite similar quality hardware.

You are thinking it backwards: the French tanks, apart from the cavalry tanks and in particular the light tanks built in great numbers (R35 & H35), were designed to be infantry support vehicles. They were very ill suited for mobile warfare. Therefore they could not be wasted by faulty tactics: they were designed to support the tactics in question and could not really be used for the kind of mobile warfare the Germans were waging even if the French generals had wanted to do so.

The British tank forces mostly consisted of cheap and nasty cruiser tanks that were on the same scale of fail as the Panzer II, but without skilled crews and radios; in one engagement at Abbeville, 120 BEF tanks were lost within three hours (although mechanical faults would've been a factor), and British tank turrets could only accomodate two occupants. Britain's Matilda II gave a decent account of itself with its armour protection and respectable two pounder AT cannon, however its speed and mobility sucked ass, plus the Matilda II lacked HE shells to deal with Flak 88 positions.

The Panzer II was a training vehicle pushed to service as a light tank, so it was not really a failure. It also had a two man turret, but that was alleviated somewhat by the automatic main gun, which did not require reloading between every shot. As for the 2 pounder gun of the Matilda II (A12), the British cruisers had exactly the same gun. The only other gun armament used in British tanks at the time was the 3 pounder of the obsolete Vickers Medium Mark II, which was used only in North Africa as an immobile pill-box. British light tanks and the Matilda I (A11) had machine guns only.

The early British cruisers were not hopeless tanks by design despite light armor, but the British tactics left a lot to be desired. The cruisers frequently attacked without infantry support or proper recoinnaissance and ran into German anti-tank gun screens with predictable results. A better main gun with HE capability or more armor would have helped, but the primary problem was faulty tactics, which saw armored attacks as the modern equivalent of a cavalry charge.

[Ziggy Stardust]

The French DID invade Germany in 1939. Does nobody remember the Saar Offensive?

[Force Lord]

The Saar Offensive was nothing more than a quick raid by the French done too late to help Poland. The problem was that they attacked the Siegfried Line without proper preparation, lacking artillery, anti-mine devices, and the fact that the French Army simply wasn't suited for a fast offensive this early into the war. I believe someone else can explain it better, but in short France was still in the process of mobilizing in September 1939 and could not do much, even if they knew the Germans were in difficulties.

[PeZook]

And, of course, they did promise Poland a "full offensive" within 7 days from start of the war. I guess it serves us right for believing they could do that...

[Ziggy Stardust]

The Saar Offensive was nothing more than a quick raid by the French done too late to help Poland. The problem was that they attacked the Siegfried Line without proper preparation, lacking artillery, anti-mine devices, and the fact that the French Army simply wasn't suited for a fast offensive this early into the war. I believe someone else can explain it better, but in short France was still in the process of mobilizing in September 1939 and could not do much, even if they knew the Germans were in difficulties.

Indeed. Due to the organizational issues within the French military, the Saar Offensive was the closest thing to an invasion they could pull off. I mostly brought it up because I laughed when I read the OP.

[Force Lord]

I see. So what was really French strategy if it's not overly reliant on defense?

[CaptHawkeye]

I see. So what was really French strategy if it's not overly reliant on defense?

French Strategy was reliant on defense. Just not as totally reliant on the Maginot Line and fixed emplacements as everyone was taught in high school.

After World War 1 France was essentially broken in every way. Its economy was wrecked, its infrastructure ruined, a huge percentage of its youth was consumed by the war, and worst of all, France believed it had lost. It didn't matter that the Entente won, French citizens believed they had been defeated anyway. Because the victory over Imperial Germany was so incredibly Pyrrhic it might as well had been a defeat.

This left France in a nasty post-war situation. Its armed forces were virtually annihilated and its economy was crashed. Anybody could stroll in and steam roll them in the immediete post war enviornment. And as it was any potential enemies France may have had would almost certainly come from the East. So France commit to a huge building program constructing elaborate physical, and political, overlapping defenses. The Maginot Line was intended to make an attack on France through the region of Alsace-Loraine a non option. Thus, France had that much less of its border it had to watch with the forces it had.

Now this may come as a surprise to what you've been taught, but the Maginot Line was a success. The purpose of a defensive emplacement is to make an attack through the terrain it is covering unfavorable to the attacker. So the defender does not need to spread his resources thinly over a huge area where attack can come from any direction. It was the French Army's job, in combination with the BEF, to watch over the northern approach to France through Belgium.

Now contrast to the myths, the French Army was generally superior to the German Army. France's equipment was well suited to the "aggressive defense" it had intended to wage in the north. Modern French Tanks were designed with excellent protection and heavy firepower, at the cost of range and parts lifespans. Ironically not unlike late war German Armour. Tanks like the Char 1B were designed to sacrifice land speed and range for obscenely heavy protection and good firepower. (For the time.) The S-35 was a paticularly good design, featuring excellent land speed, excellent protection, and good firepower.

The problem was in French policy. Indeed in Allied warmaking policy. As it was, the French Army was mostly run by veterans of the First World War, experienced, but not very creative. Many of them were strongly convinced that a future war would become prolonged, where attrition would favor the numerically superior allies. Also, the French Army was strongly infused with civilian infrastructure. Their wasn't really a clear way to tell where French Citizens ended and the French Army began.

Communication and organization in all of the allies was poor. Many tanks lacked radios, and forwards outposts often had their telephone lines cut by artillery or air attack. Civilian evacuations frequently clogged up roadways, and the Luftwaffe often bombed forward supply bases and straffed convoys while they were on the roads. Because of the hold ups in communication and movement, the Wehrmacht always ended up one step ahead of the allies.

The British strongly believed that armoured vehicles were the modern equivalent of cavalry, or, like the French, pillboxes on treads. Little emphasis was placed on the relationship between Armour and Infantry.

British Armour was designed to take advantage of a hole punched in an enemy line by infantry, quickly riding into it and then attacking the enemy's rear. The problem was, the enemy's defensive line was always WAAAAY thicker than the British believed it was. Sea Skimmer mentioned somewhere that the British always anticipated a German defense line to be only about 1km thick when they were ALWAYS 20km or so thick. So what happened was British armour would pour through a gap only to get savaged by line after line of well concealed anti tank guns. One of which being the famous 88.

French Armour was generally too slow and short ranged to perform encirclements. Moreover, it was often spread very thinly, negating its advantage in quality. Since this meant that the Germans could isolate and eliminate sections of French Armour in piecemeal. Worst of all, French tanks had abysmally poor crew layouts. It was one man's job to look for enemy targets, aim at them, and load the gun. Resulting in an immense workload. The French were aware of this design deficiency, but again, owing to post war funds exhaustion they couldn't really afford to build big, expensive 3-4 man turrets like the Germans were doing.

Finally, the French Air Force was very small. While it did have some fairly good aircraft, they were not available in sufficient numbers. No doctrine for ground attack or close air support existed either, the Army and Air Force had no relationship with one another. The Royal Air Force was both well equipped and well led, but the British never fully commit it to the theatre, fearing the possibility of German success in Europe. The destruction of the RAF in France would cost Britian its first and best line of defense. This was not a risk worth taking.

So it wasn't "lol silly frenchies" like conventional history lessons said. It was always way more complex than "teh shitz wallls". You have to understand that ultimately, the allies just weren't prepared to fight an opponent whom had basically spent the last 10 years completely obsessing and preparing for war. It turns out the western allies had better things to do than obsess over old grudges and dreams of vengeance. The Nazis on the other hand, could only ever think of such things.

[Ziggy Stardust]

<snip long post>

In addition to the factors you mentioned, wasn't there a strained/dysfunctional relationship between the different Allied commands? I don't remember too much about it, it's been a long time since I've read anything on the subject, but weren't the British and the French not cooperating as well as they should have? Not to mention their relationships with Belgium and the Netherlands?