WTF? Where's Shep? Obama to reduce US nukes!

[Nephtys]

You also have B-83 nuclear bombs which apparently can go up to 1.2 megatons. (Keep in mind the Hiroshima bomb was only about 13 to 18 kilotons.) It doesn't actually take many nuclear weapons of this size to destroy cities and other key targets.

Just for shits and grins, I went to ye olde nuclear weapons effects calculator and plugged in 1MT. I discovered that I would survive a 1MT burst in Tampa, since I'm 45 miles away. In fact, it appears that the blast from that kind of detonation would not even reach Clearwater, across the bay from Tampa, although fallout would be a factor. The implication, to me, is that it would take hundreds of megaton detonations to cripple an opposing state's production capability, and that that ability would be severely impaired in any attack on the US, Russia, or China, which each have hundreds of defense-related manufacturing plants distributed across their rather large land masses. Hell, the Boeng plant all on its own would need at least a 500 kiloton warhead to destroy. Again, that would imply that we should have more nukes, not less, if mutual annihilation is our standing doctrine for a nuclear exchange.

You're wrong of course. Because one bomb landing in downtown (your city here) is going to destroy hundreds of thousands of people, which alone is enough for 'Bad End' in any post-war situation. Effectively gutting a country does not mean killing every single human being there.

If one SSBN can destroy 96 major cities, what the hell is that country going to do post-war? Add in a few hundred more for military and other government targets, and what kind of country do you exactly have left? A bunch of small, economically ruined townships in an area covered in destroyed urban wasteland is not a country.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

I'm just wondering how much ABM capability is built into the S-300 / S-400 series presently, and how many are installed in Russia with what radars. If we're only sending 500 ICBM/SLBMs at Russia in an exchange it may now be entirely possible for the Russians, between the Moscow ABM system and the S-300/S-400 series SAMs with ABM capability, to preserve large sections of Russia from the attack, since we're talking about less than 4 MIRVs per missile, or 4 on a lesser number + bombers with cruise missiles. It wouldn't surprise me at all if Russia, due to this agreement, has the capability to intercept at least 10% and as much as 20% of our incoming nuclear strike, which with such already reduced numbers and the extensive Russian civil defence network would allow Russia to ride out the attack with relatively limited effects.

[Omega18]

Just for shits and grins, I went to ye olde nuclear weapons effects calculator and plugged in 1MT. I discovered that I would survive a 1MT burst in Tampa, since I'm 45 miles away. In fact, it appears that the blast from that kind of detonation would not even reach Clearwater, across the bay from Tampa, although fallout would be a factor. The implication, to me, is that it would take hundreds of megaton detonations to cripple an opposing state's production capability, and that that ability would be severely impaired in any attack on the US, Russia, or China, which each have hundreds of defense-related manufacturing plants distributed across their rather large land masses. Hell, the Boeng plant all on its own would need at least a 500 kiloton warhead to destroy. Again, that would imply that we should have more nukes, not less, if mutual annihilation is our standing doctrine for a nuclear exchange.

You appear to be simply making all kinds of wrong assumptions.

In case there still is any confusion on this point, the US is realistically going to get away all its ICBMs because its going to have way too much warning before any sort of nuclear attack would hit them. If its not just a single missile or so but the sort of large salvo that's part of a full fledged nuclear exchange, the US has plenty of time to figure out its for real and order the missiles to be fired before they would actually be hit. The current US ICBMs can actually be launched in about a minute. (You have to have the orders given out and everything, but the actual launching sequence does not take that long.)

If we're talking about a realistic scenario where the US is anticipating the possibility of a nuclear exchange, it should also be possible to get nuclear armed bombers in the air and out of the blast range of any nukes before they would hit. If it turns out to be a false alarm the bombers can always be recalled. I already covered why the SSBNs at sea are safe.

What you're utterly missing is destroying most of the significant sized cities basically gets the job done by itself and it won't matter much if there are a bunch of industrial plants without the workforce or key manufactured components to support production. Even if big factory X is intact, it generally relies on things produced elsewhere which have likely been destroyed. There would be a certain number of key military and industrial targets hit, but in a MAD scenario the focus would be on killing people by hitting all the cities.

As I previously somewhat noted, on top of the general devastation, once enough of the two real potential US targets in question have been destroyed, they would have trouble holding onto many of the remaining areas of the country. For instance Siberia and any intact factories could fall to China if Russia is out of nukes and otherwise generally devastated enough. In the case of China, the US could leave a large portion of the Tibet Autonomous Region alone for instance on the assumption that China isn't going to be able to continue to hold it if devastated badly enough elsewhere in the country.

There also is simply the general point that enough damage will flat out cause the country to effectively break down as a nation which means its political leaders clearly lose as far as they are concerned.

[Omega18]

I'm just wondering how much ABM capability is built into the S-300 / S-400 series presently, and how many are installed in Russia with what radars. If we're only sending 500 ICBM/SLBMs at Russia in an exchange it may now be entirely possible for the Russians, between the Moscow ABM system and the S-300/S-400 series SAMs with ABM capability, to preserve large sections of Russia from the attack, since we're talking about less than 4 MIRVs per missile, or 4 on a lesser number + bombers with cruise missiles. It wouldn't surprise me at all if Russia, due to this agreement, has the capability to intercept at least 10% and as much as 20% of our incoming nuclear strike, which with such already reduced numbers and the extensive Russian civil defence network would allow Russia to ride out the attack with relatively limited effects.

Realistically speaking, not really to any measurable degree especially given what the initial nukes would do to the radars and weapons systems that really might be to any degree defending one of the tiny list of targets with any real degree of protection such as Moscow. (In fact I believe its basically just Moscow with any real ICBM defense at all.)

What you're missing is the even S-400 is not really capable of stopping an actual ICBM which is simply going too fast as it reaches its target and presenting a small target with the individual MIRV vehicles.

However, part of the issue is the US can have some of its SSBNs and bombers hold off their nuclear attacks until initial damage assessments regarding what was successfully hit are performed, so a low rate of interception is not really sufficient.

[Simon_Jester]

I'm just wondering how much ABM capability is built into the S-300 / S-400 series presently, and how many are installed in Russia with what radars. If we're only sending 500 ICBM/SLBMs at Russia in an exchange it may now be entirely possible for the Russians, between the Moscow ABM system and the S-300/S-400 series SAMs with ABM capability, to preserve large sections of Russia from the attack, since we're talking about less than 4 MIRVs per missile, or 4 on a lesser number + bombers with cruise missiles. It wouldn't surprise me at all if Russia, due to this agreement, has the capability to intercept at least 10% and as much as 20% of our incoming nuclear strike, which with such already reduced numbers and the extensive Russian civil defence network would allow Russia to ride out the attack with relatively limited effects.

Which is not to say that the Russians are going to think "what the hell, let's roll the dice!"

Russian civilization is not in great shape right now; their economy is unstable, their population is demographically unbalanced and riddled by alcoholism and disease, and their ecology is a mess. A nuclear war, even a "survivable" one that only manages to kill, say, twice as many Russians as the Second World War, would be the end of Russian power in the world for the foreseeable future.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

I'm just wondering how much ABM capability is built into the S-300 / S-400 series presently, and how many are installed in Russia with what radars. If we're only sending 500 ICBM/SLBMs at Russia in an exchange it may now be entirely possible for the Russians, between the Moscow ABM system and the S-300/S-400 series SAMs with ABM capability, to preserve large sections of Russia from the attack, since we're talking about less than 4 MIRVs per missile, or 4 on a lesser number + bombers with cruise missiles. It wouldn't surprise me at all if Russia, due to this agreement, has the capability to intercept at least 10% and as much as 20% of our incoming nuclear strike, which with such already reduced numbers and the extensive Russian civil defence network would allow Russia to ride out the attack with relatively limited effects.

Realistically speaking, not really to any measurable degree especially given what the initial nukes would do to the radars and weapons systems that really might be to any degree defending one of the tiny list of targets with any real degree of protection such as Moscow. (In fact I believe its basically just Moscow with any real ICBM defense at all.)

What you're missing is the even S-400 is not really capable of stopping an actual ICBM which is simply going too fast as it reaches its target and presenting a small target with the individual MIRV vehicles.

However, part of the issue is the US can have some of its SSBNs and bombers hold off their nuclear attacks until initial damage assessments regarding what was successfully hit are performed, so a low rate of interception is not really sufficient.

Not so fast. The original S-300 was already capable of making intercepts against SLBMs and there's no evidence that the radars will actually suffer that badly when suitably hardened and distributed. And anyway, attacking the ABM system rather than the Russian defences imposes stiff virtual attrition when the nuclear arsenal is so small that that level of attrition cannot be accepted when a rather large number of nukes are liable to malfunction anyway. Only Moscow may have proper ABM, but then Moscow is the beating heart of the country's administration, too. And the S-300/S-400 batteries provide no small defence, with at least 30 regiments of S-300s currently deployed and the number of S-400s rapidly increasing.

Also there's the fact that Russian industrial equipment in factories is shock-mounted to make nukes less effective the further away from the initiation the factory is, to improve the rate of industrial equipment survival, the railroad network has reserves stashed everywhere to ease recovery, and the population is very well protected. Russia also still maintains an IADS, which the USA does not, meaning that the bombers face a real chance of not being able to conduct their own attacks.

And, of course, with the ABM treaty lapsed and arsenals down to levels as small as what has now been agreed to, full-scale deployment of an ABM system capable of dealing with a major attack would now involve as little as 3,000 interceptors, which would not be a substantially greater commitment of resources than that required to deploy the S-400 in mass to the SAM batteries of the IADS.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Which is not to say that the Russians are going to think "what the hell, let's roll the dice!"

Russian civilization is not in great shape right now; their economy is unstable, their population is demographically unbalanced and riddled by alcoholism and disease, and their ecology is a mess. A nuclear war, even a "survivable" one that only manages to kill, say, twice as many Russians as the Second World War, would be the end of Russian power in the world for the foreseeable future.

Rather not, I am much more concerned with the future potential for someone like Huckafuck to blunder us into a nuclear exchange with Russia over some pissant loony-bin like Georgia than over any kind of possible reckless behaviour on the part of the Russians. I trust Putin more than I do most American politicians, which is saying something.

[K. A. Pital]

Oh god.

Of course the destruction of 50 (10, 20, 30 whatever number has two digits) of your population in the course of nuclear exchange is a complete disaster from a military and economic and political point of view.

No sane politician in either Russia or USA or any other nation whose government is reasonably secular (I'm not going to make a judgement on how religious governments would fare here), so as long as he positively knows that the devastation is going to be utter and complete, would risk his own nation and his own life for some vainglorious sake.

Also, the S-300/400 systems are well capable of stopping single head ICBMs and their RVs, but real exoatmospheric interceptors are only present in the A-135 Moscow silo-based ABM system. The endoatmospheric interception does have it's constraints quite obviously.

As for people ganging up on Chocula - he is right about redundancy. When your stockpile goes below a certain level, options which were previously unviable (decapitating first-strike, arsenal-annihilating first strike) become available to the military planners. If previously in case of escalation there would be positive knowledge that utter annihilation is down the road, a change in force levels, especially a drastic one like halving a nuclear arsenal, for example, can lead to dangerous consequences.

During the superpower days, at least the idiocy like SART and SALT was obligatory for both sides, so that the balance remained, more or less, there. But now Chocula correctly pointed out that the number of nuclear states, including small nations, is rapidly rising as is the proliferation of means of delivery. This means you need more redundancy not less.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Well, I think Huckabee qualifies as religious in the fanatic sense.

At any rate, I'd prefer to have 15,000 - 20,000 ABM interceptors carpeting both Russia and the USA each as well as fully equiped IADS capable of both intercepting stealth and high altitude bombers and cruise missiles, and relatively small nuclear arsenals to be used for wiping out rogue states, with any serious, major nuclear attacks rendered impossible by the sheer scale of the interception capabilities, which also make any kind of conventional attack on the other state's homeland impossible, thereby guaranteeing that any war would be a WW1-style meatgrinder at the tactical level between soldiers, without any involvement of substantial civilian suffering, and with its own strong incentives against coming about, but also guaranteeing that even if it does that there can be no large-scale civilian megadeath.

[Thanas]

3. They'd sooner surrender to a slice of German chocolate cake than launch a single Mirage

You're either a spectacular failure at humour or a spectacular idiot.

[Shroom Man 777]

Cheese-eating surrender monkeys generally do not make statements like these:

Within ten years, we shall have the means to kill 80 million Russians. I truly believe that one does not light-heartedly attack people who are able to kill 80 million Russians, even if one can kill 800 million French, that is if there were 800 million French. - Charles De Gaulle

[Kane Starkiller]

Even more significantly, the two leaders have pledged to cut their nuclear delivery systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers for example) to just 500-1,100 units, a move that works greatly to Russia’s advantage as its force projection is far weaker than the U.S. in this area.

US has, what, 530 Minutemans, 14 SSBNs with 24 D5 each, 85 B-52H, 70 B-1B, 20 B-2 which adds up to 1041 delivery vehicles. Decreasing that to "just" 500-1100 doesn't really sound like a huge decrease.

No, I meant only an arsenal that would decidedly annihilate the industrial centers of another nation (no matter be it Russia or the USA) in a nuclear strike is enough.

This is why all the SALT, SART and all that are just idiocy from my point of view. The balance is only there when you positively know in case of war your nation is destroyed. That way Russia or US will never go to war with each other period.

You seem pretty certain about large nuclear arsenals lowering the threat of war to 0%. US nuclear arsenal, however, did not prevent China from throwing 500,000 troops at US during the Korean War. Of course people like to point out that there hasn't been a war between major powers for 50 years but then again we had two world wars in the first half of 20th century which settled many issues and destroyed the European powers that instigated those wars. Is it reasonable to expect yet another major conflict in the next 50 years with or without nukes?
The problem with your argument is that you assume the countries go to war only if one side feels that it can easily win. The trouble is countries go to war more often because one country feels insecure and threatened. And with hypothetical huge amounts of nukes countries will feel insecure indeed and will observe even minor movement of the other country with dread and with one finger on the button. If one country gets the idea that the other is about to launch then all that is left is to launch first no matter how many nukes there are. In that case it's better that there are 100 nukes on both sides than 10,000.

[Axis Kast]

And with hypothetical huge amounts of nukes countries will feel insecure indeed and will observe even minor movement of the other country with dread and with one finger on the button. If one country gets the idea that the other is about to launch then all that is left is to launch first no matter how many nukes there are. In that case it's better that there are 100 nukes on both sides than 10,000.

It depends on what portion of any number is second-strike capable (i.e., survivable).

A nation with an overwhelming advantage in numbers will probably not initiate nuclear war if there are good odds that some of the enemy's strategic arsenal will escape destruction after that first round. However, a nation with an acutely vulnerable arsenal (read: Pakistan) may elect to launch first even when it does not enjoy parity - just to avoid being "snuffed" by a superior power.

[Simon_Jester]

Rather not, I am much more concerned with the future potential for someone like Huckafuck to blunder us into a nuclear exchange with Russia over some pissant loony-bin like Georgia than over any kind of possible reckless behaviour on the part of the Russians. I trust Putin more than I do most American politicians, which is saying something.

It says a great deal about your definition of trust.

I trust Putin as far as I can throw him.* This is because I define "trust" as a state where I can rely on someone to pursue goals I approve of. And I can't depend on Putin to do things I approve of, for obvious reasons. Were I a Russian, I'd probably trust Putin at least a little more.

Whereas I'm guessing that you define "trust" as "I can rely on someone," where what you can rely on them to do is unspecified. By this definition, Putin is very trustworthy, since almost everything he does is a rational act aimed at one or two specific goals. You can rely on it that no matter what happens, Putin will act in a way that maximizes his own power and the power of Russia as he defines it.

*And since he is an expert in unarmed combat and I am not, it's a safe bet that I can't throw him in the first place, so "as far as I can throw him" is "zero," if not a negative number.
_______

Well, I think Huckabee qualifies as religious in the fanatic sense.

I don't think he's crazy enough to start a nuclear war, though. I don't think...

At any rate, I'd prefer to have 15,000 - 20,000 ABM interceptors carpeting both Russia and the USA each as well as fully equiped IADS capable of both intercepting stealth and high altitude bombers and cruise missiles, and relatively small nuclear arsenals to be used for wiping out rogue states, with any serious, major nuclear attacks rendered impossible by the sheer scale of the interception capabilities, which also make any kind of conventional attack on the other state's homeland impossible, thereby guaranteeing that any war would be a WW1-style meatgrinder at the tactical level between soldiers, without any involvement of substantial civilian suffering, and with its own strong incentives against coming about, but also guaranteeing that even if it does that there can be no large-scale civilian megadeath.

Would this make wars less likely, given historical experience? Hopefully it would make wars less damaging. But I suspect people would also be less afraid to start such a war. The tradeoff might not be worth it; cutting the death toll per war to 1/3 its former value and making wars four times as common would be a losing game.

[Kane Starkiller]

It depends on what portion of any number is second-strike capable (i.e., survivable).

A nation with an overwhelming advantage in numbers will probably not initiate nuclear war if there are good odds that some of the enemy's strategic arsenal will escape destruction after that first round. However, a nation with an acutely vulnerable arsenal (read: Pakistan) may elect to launch first even when it does not enjoy parity - just to avoid being "snuffed" by a superior power.

Suppose that there is a crisis over Taiwan and China fears that US will take out it's nukes in a preemptive strike. So it orders the missiles to be fueled and readied. US officer walks into the presidents office and states "the Chinese are fueling their missiles". At this point does US president confidently say "the Chinese are reasonable people they will never shoot at us" or does he think "holy shit San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles could be radioactive ash in a few hours"? At this point it's anybodies guess whether US will launch.
In any case my point is that countries are driven more by their fears and insecurities rather than overconfidence as Stas Bush seems to think so it's more important to make an agreement that deals with their fears rather than creating a situation that reduces their confidence (and increases fear).

[Axis Kast]

I agree that fear seems more likely to lead to employment of nuclear weapons more than could overconfidence, particularly because nuclear weapons are not very useful offensive weapons (they guarantee, for example, that the user squanders all future credibility and makes himself a whole raft of enemies).

Elsewhere, I have gone into lengthy discussion of why proliferation always reduces international security, and how well-meaning institutions can in fact take actions that make nuclear war more likely. There is also the question of whether nations ever elect men willing to use nuclear weapons or take enormous gambles. When the Japanese contemplated war with the United States during the 1940s, it was projected that Tokyo would be completely destroyed some three or four times by firebombing campaigns, which were, on the whole, more deadly than nuclear attack at the time.

[K. A. Pital]

US nuclear arsenal, however, did not prevent China from throwing 500,000 troops at US during the Korean War.

It was a proxy war. If it were a direct attack against the US, I doubt anything like that could have happened.

I am a firm believer, if you want (not in the "religious" sense) in deterrence, because it did work. Of course proxy wars are an inevitability that arises between great powers. But dozens of proxy wars have not resulted in a nuclear war in 60 years.

I am of the opinion that nuclear weapons were the deciding factor, because prior to that, proxy wars and small wars did spiral out of hand routinely.