McNamara, defense chief during Vietnam War, dies

[Thanas]

Well, we always have the PLO...and it hardly matters if the Soviet countries funded this or that terrorist group, what matters is that the communist bloc did fund terrorist groups and groups that wanted to destabalize western states.

[K. A. Pital]

That is true. But like I told Kast (and Starglider) earlier, funding paramilitaries and terrorists has been the business of everyone and his dog; so while the USSR was undeniable a typical empire in foreign policy, I haven't seen any decisive evidence that it's post-war ideology and official position was any more expansionist than that of any reasonably powerful nation.

[Thanas]

That is true. But like I told Kast (and Starglider) earlier, funding paramilitaries and terrorists has been the business of everyone and his dog; so while the USSR was undeniable a typical empire in foreign policy, I haven't seen any decisive evidence that it's post-war ideology and official position was any more expansionist than that of any reasonably powerful nation.

There is a fundamental difference to what the communists did - they funded terrorist organizations in western countries at a time when the west did not. The west "only" financed terrorists in countries outside the bloc. Come to think of it, did the west ever finance terrorist operations within the bloc? If they did, was it before or after the Communist did the same?

I think there is a crucial difference between funding organizations that seek to curtail the economic and political power of a state in other countries and organizations that seek to actively destroy those states.

So yes, I'd say that is a a crucial difference. Maybe not when it comes to the ideology and official position, but a hell of a lot when it comes to the actual day-to-day politics.

EDIT: Of course, whether that justified more nukes is a whole different matter entirely and I don't think it did.

[K. A. Pital]

There is a fundamental difference to what the communists did - they funded terrorist organizations in western countries at a time when the west did not.

How about the sponsorship of the Muj in socialist Afghanistan? As for the West "not sponsoring terrorist organizations", that clearly was not due to their policy but due to their inability to infiltrate the USSR proper. Client states of the USSR and other real and potential allies of the USSR, eg. Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Iran had active exparliamentary and paramilitary infiltration in their governments.

The USA in particular sponsored the paramilitary resistance to the USSR following World War II (eg. Forest Brothers, Ukrainian nationalists) who were active terrorist organizations in all meanings of the word.

I think there is a crucial difference between funding organizations that seek to curtail the economic and political power of a state in other countries and organizations that seek to actively destroy those states.

Those governments, you meant. I do not see any difference between funding an organization to annihilate the capitalist government of a nation versus the same of a Soviet client nation.

Moreover, it's the dictatorial nature of the USSR, antiterrorist campaigns of the mid-1950s as well as the Iron Curtain which prevented terrorism in the USSR proper, not benevolence of the "Western powers". I am inferring this because nations on that were socialist, Soviet-aligned or otherwise did enjoy Western-sponsored terrorism, infiltration and coups, if they were accessible to CIA infiltration.

From that I infer that if the West and primarily USA had the ability to actually infiltrate the USSR properly and set up a terrorist network, it would do so. Not only, but it's own intelligence actively sponsored such acts. There were limited facts of CIA, MOSSAD and other Western sponsored terrorism even in the USSR proper: the 15th June 1970 plane hijacking (MOSSAD), Kuzneztov-Dymsitsh plane hijacking March 1970 (CIA), Siberian pipeline bombing (CIA), 1972 explosions in Georgia (CIA). The KGB simply denied entry to all it could suspect of terrorism (for example in 1989, around 300+ men). This is why the "successes" of the CIA and similar agencies in instigating terrorist activities in the USSR were rather limited.

Same for the USA - the purges and the fact that getting there was hard meant that no large Soviet-sponsored terrorism was possible. On the other hand, W. Europe was more accessible.

[Thanas]

There is a fundamental difference to what the communists did - they funded terrorist organizations in western countries at a time when the west did not.

How about the sponsorship of the Muj in socialist Afghanistan?

Which actually only started decades after the soviets first sponsored terrorists.

As for the West "not sponsoring terrorist organizations", that clearly was not due to their policy but due to their inability to infiltrate the USSR proper.

That is a valid point.

Those governments, you meant. I do not see any difference between funding an organization to annihilate the capitalist government of a nation versus the same of a Soviet client nation.

I do. The one is well within the meaning of a proxy war, the other is not.

Moreover, it's the dictatorial nature of the USSR, antiterrorist campaigns of the mid-1950s as well as the Iron Curtain which prevented terrorism in the USSR proper, not benevolence of the "Western powers". I am inferring this because nations on that were socialist, Soviet-aligned or otherwise did enjoy Western-sponsored terrorism, infiltration and coups, if they were accessible to CIA infiltration.

I am not talking about benevolence and please don't think I ascribe any benevolence to any state when it comes to actions. That said, nations that were infiltrated were also nations in which the USA had an active stake in via commercial interests, I fail to see what West Germany had to do with that.

From that I infer that if the West and primarily USA had the ability to actually infiltrate the USSR properly and set up a terrorist network, it would do so. Not only, but it's own intelligence actively sponsored such acts. There were limited facts of CIA, MOSSAD and other Western sponsored terrorism even in the USSR proper: the 15th June 1970 plane hijacking (MOSSAD), Kuzneztov-Dymsitsh plane hijacking March 1970 (CIA), Siberian pipeline bombing (CIA), 1972 explosions in Georgia (CIA). The KGB simply denied entry to all it could suspect of terrorism (for example in 1989, around 300+ men). This is why the "successes" of the CIA and similar agencies in instigating terrorist activities in the USSR were rather limited.

What is your information about that linking those to the CIA? I am genuinely curious because I quite frankly did not hear about those before. Likewise, I think I better hold on discussing before I read about those.

[Axis Kast]

Listen very carefully Axis: "stated official policy" and "political practice" are two different entities. You want to completely shift the debate away from official doctrine to practice of foreign relations of the USSR. I see no reason to discuss it, because I never spoke about it in the first place. You may consider that "semantics", but they are not - you yourself just admitted that stated policy and practical policy differ a lot. Thanks for playing and wasting a lot of my time.

Stated official policy is platitude. What, really, were you arguing, then, except semantics?

The USSR sponsored foreign political parties? Are foreign donations to political forces prohibited by law? In that case any and all donations to politicians by the USA are a transgression of sovereignity. So are donations by Europe. Any and all people in a nation who hold a position in another nation's organizations are also a transgression of sovereignity. That is bullcrap, as I'm sure you understand. Stop grasping at straws - your point has been decisively defeated.

Think long and hard about the purpose of such donations, and then of the significance of "recruiting Soviet agents to serve on their administrative bodies." Moscow didn't just endorse certain foreign political parties - it tried to influence, very materially, their behavior. You will then have demonstrated that you do not just cherry-pick through the evidence.

Brezhnew ousted Khrushev after the CMC debacle. He partly repudiated his "softball" approach - but even then he never proclaimed a military destruction of "the Western governments". So please, would you stop grasping at straws?

Given Deegan's point, I will conceede that the Brehznev Doctrine is not an example of Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the West. However, Thanas makes some valuable points with respect to Soviet involvement in attempted violent overthrow of Western governments.

I'm not saying the CIA itself is either inerrant or not malevolent, moron. But I am well of the opinion that political hacks and treatment of pop mag articles as absolute fact in military planning are unacceptable. End of story.

Yes, it is unacceptable. Now prove that Symington did it. You haven't. Your articles, in fact, haven't.

I have already said that giving "same material" to unqualified hacks is meaningless. Did Team B include people with practical experience of satellite and aerial reconaissance data interpretation?

Why would Team B - or any intelligence administrator - be sifting through the raw intelligence, rather than the value-added analysis? Furthermore, Team B included just the sort of people to grapple with Soviet strategic culture, an abstract notion that has no real connection to technical and scientific intelligence.

He must have had the access to satellite and aerial reconaissance which the data implies (and which is said in the book I referred you to), since the entire US government received that data which finally put the "missile gap" myth to rest. However, despite the decisive refutation of the "gap", no changes to military doctrine initially justified by this bogus threat was made. This proves without any doubt that the military expansion proceeded regardless of the existence or nonexistence of the gap, and in fact strongly implies that it was the goal all along no matter what the USSR actually fielded.

He must have had nothing, unless you can substantiate it. The article provided by you explained that the CIA presented its conclusions as applying to the present day only, stating that the Soviet Union had previously been ahead (i.e., that there was a Gap), and that they had then dialed down the pace of their activities. Why wouldn't Symington have seized on that? Also, how do you know Symington wasn't suspicious of the CIA's credibility?

[K. A. Pital]

What, really, were you arguing, then, except semantics?

Semantics were the point, Kast. Starglider's post implied that the USSR held an official doctrine of pursuing violent destruction of all Western governments and in that it differed from other more mundane imperialists, like e.g. USA. You were right around a page ago when you said there seems to be no debate between us here. I'm really wondering why the hell are you still pursing discussion on a point which I never made.

Think long and hard about the purpose of such donations ... Moscow didn't just endorse certain foreign political parties - it tried to influence, very materially, their behavior

Same as U.S. donations to paramilitaries, terrorists and coupists in Soviet-affiliated and other nations. Same as all post-war "covert" imperialism. Advancing your political goals inside another nation, which may or may not include the toppling of current government, coercing it to a favourable agreement on something, or simply making the government's life harder. When US-funded government came to power in Georgia recently, it was a prime example of direct influence of a political party and political leader's behaviour.

However, Thanas makes some valuable points with respect to Soviet involvement in attempted violent overthrow of Western governments.

The support of paramilitaries and terrorism is not surprising. I have already postulated that this is common to all powerful governments (let's call them "powers" for simplicity) and in fact the presence or absence of anti-government terrorism in a nation is due to ease or lack of access into itself. For example, the USSR or other communist powers did not fund, or have any ties with a terrorist network in the USA or Australia, and the reverse is also true due to hard access. On the other hand, European nations with direct land borders were a more easy target. Same with US meddling in Middle Asia, Middle East, Latin America - Soviet satellites which did not have an "iron curtain" were subject to a relentless wave of US-sponsored terrorism, paramilitary operations and exparliamentary overthrows.

Yes, it is unacceptable. Now prove that Symington did it. You haven't.

The popular magazine article refers to the "bomber gap" and other cases of policy by decree, not Symington par se. But he is an example of it nonetheless, since it was said that he received the data from aerial reconaissance, just like other government bureaucrats.

Why would Team B - or any intelligence administrator - be sifting through the raw intelligence, rather than the value-added analysis? .. Furthermore, Team B included just the sort of people to grapple with Soviet strategic culture

So worse yet, you are saying Team B is an "administrator". That is all too bad. As for "grappling the Soviet strategic culture", it included the russophobe "historian" Pipes who made egregious false claims about Russia in all ages of it's existence. The piss poor understanding of the Russian mentality in people who never worked "in the field", ardent anti-Communism and Russophobia and exceptionally hard-line stance on all issues were trademark for all the candidates picked. That is not just selective bias, that's harmful selective bias.

He must have had nothing, unless you can substantiate it.

I will quote:

The reason the gap has dissappeared was because of revised US intelligence estimates of Soviet military strength, the system for intelligence has tremendously improved. (He did not mention the U-2 flights by name). Nevertheless, he warned, it was dangerous to underestimate Soviet capability.

He did not think that there was a gap but the US closed it. He clearly admitted there was no gap and it's the US estimates which were revised.
Source

[Pelranius]

There is a fundamental difference to what the communists did - they funded terrorist organizations in western countries at a time when the west did not.

How about the sponsorship of the Muj in socialist Afghanistan?

Which actually only started decades after the soviets first sponsored terrorists.

Didn't the CIA and MI6 support the Forest Brothers in the Baltics during the 1950s?

[Axis Kast]

Semantics were the point, Kast. Starglider's post implied that the USSR held an official doctrine of pursuing violent destruction of all Western governments and in that it differed from other more mundane imperialists, like e.g. USA. You were right around a page ago when you said there seems to be no debate between us here. I'm really wondering why the hell are you still pursing discussion on a point which I never made.

Fair enough.

Same as U.S. donations to paramilitaries, terrorists and coupists in Soviet-affiliated and other nations. Same as all post-war "covert" imperialism. Advancing your political goals inside another nation, which may or may not include the toppling of current government, coercing it to a favourable agreement on something, or simply making the government's life harder. When US-funded government came to power in Georgia recently, it was a prime example of direct influence of a political party and political leader's behaviour.

Okay. And...? What the Soviet Union did in France constituted a violation of French sovereignty. Others do it too, yes.

The support of paramilitaries and terrorism is not surprising. I have already postulated that this is common to all powerful governments (let's call them "powers" for simplicity) and in fact the presence or absence of anti-government terrorism in a nation is due to ease or lack of access into itself.

All right.

The popular magazine article refers to the "bomber gap" and other cases of policy by decree, not Symington par se. But he is an example of it nonetheless, since it was said that he received the data from aerial reconaissance, just like other government bureaucrats.

I'll address this presently.

So worse yet, you are saying Team B is an "administrator". That is all too bad.

Clearly, Team B was making judgments about finished intelligence products, not processing raw intelligence. Higher-ranking officers coordinate and provide analytical toss-back. Specialists perform the technical side of photographic and signals analysis. You seem to labor under the delusion that Team B was sat in a room, given a set of earphones, and told to listen to the latest wiretaps.

As for "grappling the Soviet strategic culture", it included the russophobe "historian" Pipes who made egregious false claims about Russia in all ages of it's existence. The piss poor understanding of the Russian mentality in people who never worked "in the field", ardent anti-Communism and Russophobia and exceptionally hard-line stance on all issues were trademark for all the candidates picked. That is not just selective bias, that's harmful selective bias.

Team B included a historian, military men, and other area experts. Had they been impartial, that set of credentials would have been appropriate.

He did not think that there was a gap but the US closed it. He clearly admitted there was no gap and it's the US estimates which were revised.

Are you telling me that Symington then had no right to encourage military spending out of fear? The text provided here indicates that he believed the CIA (which was not the case as the earlier article presented it, per se), stated publicly that the "gap" was closed, but then said, "Listen, we're working on estimates here, and whenever we estimate, there's a chance of being wrong, so let's err on the side of caution and have a big old build-up." Agree with it or not, that's by no means dishonest.

[K. A. Pital]

Okay. And...? What the Soviet Union did in France constituted a violation of French sovereignty.

That is not a violation of sovereignity, unless you want to make the term meaningless. Also, I already noted that France is not a good example. The USSR did not support the French left-wing terrorists (and neither did other Warsaw Pact nations) for that matter. Supporting legitimate political forces and demanding allegiance in exchange for support is not a violation of sovereignity.

You seem to labor under the delusion that Team B was sat in a room, given a set of earphones, and told to listen to the latest wiretaps.

In that case it's even worse because Team B was given the same set of data, but came to totally different conclusions - which were later disproven in majority (despite the sore claims of it's members).

Had they been impartial, that set of credentials would have been appropriate.

Experience of working in the field and intelligence analysis is still necessary. One does not become a top intelligence analyst without first serving as the "listener to latest wiretaps", in my view - and only then he is given access to higher levels of planning, when he worked in the fundamentals of intel interpretation long enough.

Are you telling me that Symington then had no right to encourage military spending out of fear?

The "right" to fearmongering is just the same sort of "right" as the "right" to a sphere of influence. It's not codified by any means. Clearly it's a nations' internal matter and speaking of "rights" here is pointless, but I don't think there was any objective justification for it beyond the simple militarism of Cold Warriors, especially after the recon flights and Corona reconaissance.

[Axis Kast]

That is not a violation of sovereignity, unless you want to make the term meaningless. Also, I already noted that France is not a good example. The USSR did not support the French left-wing terrorists (and neither did other Warsaw Pact nations) for that matter. Supporting legitimate political forces and demanding allegiance in exchange for support is not a violation of sovereignity.

Do you read? The U.S.S.R. "recruited Soviet agents to serve on their administrative bodies." That is to say, it placed picked men in positions to dictate party outcomes. This wasn't just somebody writing cheques and looking for a little consideration.

In that case it's even worse because Team B was given the same set of data, but came to totally different conclusions - which were later disproven in majority (despite the sore claims of it's members).

There's nothing wrong with a minority thesis, done right.

Also, please do address, if you intend to, the fact that Team B was not convened to retreat raw intelligence data, which was previously part of your argument, to all appearances.

Experience of working in the field and intelligence analysis is still necessary. One does not become a top intelligence analyst without first serving as the "listener to latest wiretaps", in my view - and only then he is given access to higher levels of planning, when he worked in the fundamentals of intel interpretation long enough.

No, it isn't. Although Team B and like organizations can probably benefit from inclusion of persons with "classical" training in intelligence analysis, and should not, as a rule, include a significant number of personnel without deep knowledge of the subject matter at hand, combat "group think" and providing new perspectives is sometimes enhanced by the presence of those who stand outside the prevailing institutional culture.

A top intelligence analyst will probably have experience dealing with something close(r) to raw intelligence. However, he may be someone who reads material collected by others, having been brought on for issue/area expertise, rather than skills in, say, photographic analysis. I need to identify that that long, dark object is a Soviet missile, but that is merely a first step. I then need somebody to tell me about the culture that plans to employ those missiles, either as offensive or defensive tools. Such analysis does not turn on prior understanding of how to make sense of grainy black-and-white snapshots. Intelligence analysts may also collect only a certain kind of material. An analyst of open source material requires the same skills as those who deal in information obtained by super spies; he just happens to get his information from newspapers.

You also need to understand that intelligence analysts are frequently challenged as to the validity of their conclusions. Different agencies may arrive at different conclusions. There may be a persuasive "minority report" that disagrees with prevailing opinion. A politician may confront a relatively junior analyst with the fact that he has actually been to the country in question, and knows the personalities in play. Which is the superior expertise? One who has read about Putin, or one who has met Putin? It appears as if you want me to say - purely for the sake of this specific argument - that anytime a politician disbelieved a report from an intelligence operator, or anytime an intelligence operator did not deal in raw intelligence, that was very wrong. I disagree completely. I've explained why. You've not provided compelling justification of your points; you've made only assertions.

The "right" to fearmongering is just the same sort of "right" as the "right" to a sphere of influence. It's not codified by any means. Clearly it's a nations' internal matter and speaking of "rights" here is pointless, but I don't think there was any objective justification for it beyond the simple militarism of Cold Warriors, especially after the recon flights and Corona reconaissance.

Why "fearmongering?" Is it so impossible to believe that some people were genuinely afraid of the U.S.S.R.? You accuse me of looking to give politicians a way out. I accuse you of jumping too quickly to the conclusion that somebody must have been doing something manipulative.

[K. A. Pital]

The U.S.S.R. "recruited Soviet agents to serve on their administrative bodies." ... That is to say, it placed picked men in positions to dictate party outcomes.

And so... what?

There's nothing wrong with a minority thesis, done right.

Treating it as absolute fact thereafter.

Which is the superior expertise? One who has read about Putin, or one who has met Putin?

Meeting Putin gives little in the way of experience. Relying on personal impression is piss poor way of making politics; and yet poorer way of making intelligence deductions.

Is it so impossible to believe that some people were genuinely afraid of the U.S.S.R.?

Some - yes. Those who stood at the helm and had the access to proper intelligence? Maybe. In that case I'll lower my charges from "liars" to "paranoics". Hope you're satisfied.

[Axis Kast]

And so... what?

You have suggested that the U.S.S.R. provided "support" to favored clients. That is only a half-truth. They also tried to dictate what those clients did, and how.

Treating it as absolute fact thereafter.

You've missed the point. Intelligence can rarely be embraced as absolute fact. However, the question here is how politicians can leave briefings unconvinced of the CIA's findings. One answer is that they might find a minority thesis more persuasive than the majority opinion.

Meeting Putin gives little in the way of experience. Relying on personal impression is piss poor way of making politics; and yet poorer way of making intelligence deductions.

It depends on the situation. Starting from the same set of facts, the individual who has met Putin, especially a number of times, or who has access to insights of others with that experience, may have a considerable wealth of knowledge to offer. During the last days of the Shah of Iran, the United States dispatched a top general to liaise with the palace, hoping to get a better understanding of what was going on. His job, of course, was the collection and production of raw human intelligence, but he was no intelligence analyst; instead, he was somebody's "man in Tehran." Politicians may have their own "men in Tehran."

Nonetheless, my intention was never to make an argument that politicians should flout intelligence products and rely on "gut instinct" and personal perception along. Instead, I have been emphasizing that the CIA sometimes faces a credibility gap. Notice that the original example specified "a relatively junior analyst" - somebody whom a skeptical politician could rattle. Once again, we need only incompetence (or, in certain cases, justifiable skepticism) to explain why a politician may ignore the CIA, not desire to mislead the nation on any point. Sometimes, the CIA is to blame, as when analysts receive insufficient institutional support to conduct convincing briefings.

Finally, you cherrypicked a single phrase from amidst several paragraphs of material. I take it that you conceede my overall point?

Some - yes. Those who stood at the helm and had the access to proper intelligence? Maybe. In that case I'll lower my charges from "liars" to "paranoics". Hope you're satisfied.

Of course, because nobody ever had reason to fear that the CIA was underestimating Soviet strength, or what a loss of deterrence capability, conventional or nuclear, might do to this nation.