Gates: Future Jet Supporters are Risking Today’s Troops

[SirNitram]

Link

At a speech today in Chicago, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates lashed out at members of Congress, at the “defense and aerospace industry,” and at the “institutional military itself” for trying to keep ultra-expensive, often-useless weapons programs in the Pentagon budget. It’s just not right, he said, while the country is fighting two wars in which such gear is clearly not required.

“The grim reality is that with regard to the budget we have entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar diverted to fund excess or unneeded capacity… is a dollar that will be unavailable to take care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk that I will not take and one that I cannot accept,” he said.

Gates took particular aim at proponents of the futuristic, $250 million-a-pop F-22 stealth dogfighter. Senior military leaders all say they have plenty of the planes, to ward off any potential foe. Congress keeps trying to force the Pentagon to pay for more — despite the threat of a Presidential veto of any defense bill which contains more F-22 cash. It’s typical, he observed, of a Beltway process that keeps defense programs going forever, regardless of their military value. It’s exactly why Gates’ largely common sense overhaul of the Pentagon’s arsenal is, in its own way, so radical.

“If we can’t bring ourselves to make this tough but straightforward decision – reflecting the judgment of two very different presidents, two different secretaries of defense, two chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff, and the current Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff, where do we draw the line? And if not now, when? If we can’t get this right – what on earth can we get right? It is time to draw the line on doing Defense business as usual. The President has drawn that line. And that red line with regard to a veto is real.”

“On a personal note,” Gates continued, “I joined CIA more than 40 years ago to help protect my country. For just about my entire professional career in government I have generally been known as a hawk on national security. One criticism of me when I was at CIA was that I overestimated threats to the security of the United States.

“Well, I haven’t changed. I did not molt from a hawk into a dove on January 20, 2009. I continue to believe, as I always have, that the world is, and always will be, a dangerous and hostile place for my country with many who would do America harm and who hate everything we are and stand for. But, the nature of the threats to us has changed. And so too should the way our military is organized and equipped to meet them.”

The full text of the speech, as prepared, after the jump.

Thank you, Secretary Daley, for that kind introduction.

It’s an honor to be at the Economic Club of Chicago. I certainly appreciate the special arrangements you made to have me here this afternoon.

I thank all the distinguished citizens of this great city who came here today – especially Mayor Daley and Secretary Daley. I am mindful I am speaking in the adopted hometown of my boss. President Obama sends his greetings, as do Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod and the rest of the Chicago crew. They are no doubt discovering that Washington is the true “Windy City” – and I am not referring to Mid-Atlantic weather patterns.

The issue that brings me here today is central to the security of all Americans: the future of the United States military: How it should be organized, equipped – and funded – in the years ahead, to win the wars we are in while being prepared for threats on or beyond the horizon. Earlier this year, I recommended to President Obama – and he enthusiastically agreed – that we needed to fundamentally reshape the priorities of America’s defense establishment and reform the way the Pentagon does business – in particular, the weapons we buy, and how we buy them. Above all, to prepare to wage future wars, rather than continuing the habit of rearming for previous ones.

I am here on relatively short notice to speak publicly about these matters because the Congress is, as we speak, debating the president’s defense budget request for the next fiscal year, a budget request that implements many needed reforms and changes. Most of the proposals – especially those that increase support for the troops, their families, and the war effort – have been widely embraced. However, some of the crucial reforms that deal with major weapons programs have met with a less than enthusiastic reaction in the Congress, among defense contractors, and within some quarters of the Pentagon itself. And so I thought it appropriate to address some of these controversial issues here – in a place that is, appropriately enough not only the home of our Commander-in-Chief, but also a symbol of America’s industrial might and economic power.

First, some context on how we got to this point. President Obama’s budget proposal is, I believe, the nation’s first truly 21st century defense budget. It explicitly recognizes that over the last two decades the nature of conflict has fundamentally changed – and that much of America’s defense establishment has yet to fully adapt to the security realities of the post-Cold War era and this complex and dangerous new century.

During the 1990s, the United States celebrated the demise of the Soviet Union and the so-called “end of history” by making deep cuts in the funding for, and above all, the size of the U.S. military, including a 40 percent drop in the size of the Active Army. This took place even as a post-Cold War world grew less stable, less predictable, and more turbulent. The U.S. military, with some advances in areas such as precision weaponry, essentially became a smaller version of the force that held off the Soviets in Germany for decades and expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. There was little appetite for, or interest in, preparing for what we call “irregular warfare” – campaigns against insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other non-state groups. This was the bipartisan reality both in the White House and in Congress.

Of course, after September 11th, some things did change. The base defense budget – not counting spending for the wars – increased by some 70 percent over the next eight years. During this period there were important changes in the way U.S. forces were organized, based and deployed, and investments were made in new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles. However, when all was said and done, the way the Pentagon selected, evaluated, developed, and paid for major new weapons systems and equipment did not fundamentally change – even after September 11th.

Indeed, the kinds of equipment, programs, and capabilities needed to protect our troops and defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not the highest priority of much of the Defense Department, even after several years of war.

I learned about this lack of bureaucratic priority for the wars we are in the hard way – during my first few months on the job as the Iraq surge was getting underway. The challenges I faced in getting what our troops needed in the field stood in stark contrast to the support provided conventional modernization programs – weapons designed to fight other modern armies, navies, and air forces – that had been in the pipeline for many years and had acquired a loyal and enthusiastic following in the Pentagon, in the Congress, and in industry. The most pressing needs of today’s warfighter – on the battlefield, in the hospital, or at home – simply lacked place and power at the table when priorities were being set and long-term budget decisions were being made.

So the most important shift in President Obama’s first defense budget was to increase and institutionalize funding for programs that directly support those fighting America’s wars and their families. Those initiatives included more helicopter support, air lift, armored vehicles, personnel protection equipment, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, we also increased funding for programs that provide long-term support to military families and treatment for the signature wounds of this conflict – such as traumatic brain injury and post traumatic stress.

But, while the world of terrorists and other violent extremists – of insurgents and IEDs – is with us for the long haul, we also recognize that another world has emerged. Growing numbers of countries and groups are employing the latest and increasingly accessible technologies to put the United States at risk in disruptive and unpredictable ways.

Other large nations – known in Pentagon lingo as “near-peer” competitors – are modernizing their militaries in ways that could, over time, pose a challenge to the United States. In some cases, their programs take the form of traditional weapons systems such as more advanced fighter jets, missiles, and submarines.

But other nations have learned from the experience of Saddam Hussein’s military in the first and second Iraq wars – that it is ill-advised, if not suicidal, to fight a conventional war head-to-head against the United States: fighter-to-fighter, ship-to-ship, tank-to-tank. They also learned from a bankrupted Soviet Union not to try to outspend us or match our overall capabilities. Instead, they are developing asymmetric means that take advantage of new technologies – and our vulnerabilities – to disrupt our lines of communication and our freedom of movement, to deny us access, and to narrow our military options and strategic choices.

At the same time, insurgents or militias are acquiring or seeking precision weapons, sophisticated communications, cyber capabilities, and even weapons of mass destruction. The Lebanese extremist group Hezbollah currently has more rockets and high-end munitions – many quite sophisticated and accurate – than all but a handful of countries.

In sum, the security challenges we now face, and will in the future, have changed, and our thinking must likewise change. The old paradigm of looking at potential conflict as either regular or irregular war, conventional or unconventional, high end or low – is no longer relevant. And as a result, the Defense Department needs to think about and prepare for war in a profoundly different way than what we have been accustomed to throughout the better part of the last century.

What is needed is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. As a result, we must change the way we think and the way we plan – and fundamentally reform – the way the Pentagon does business and buys weapons. It simply will not do to base our strategy solely on continuing to design and buy – as we have for the last 60 years – only the most technologically advanced versions of weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of another superpower adversary – especially one that imploded nearly a generation ago.

To get there we must break the old habit of adding layer upon layer of cost, complexity, and delay to systems that are so expensive and so elaborate that only a small number can be built, and that are then usable only in a narrow range of low-probability scenarios.

We must also get control of what is called “requirements creep” – where more features and capabilities are added to a given piece of equipment, often to the point of absurdity. The most flamboyant example of this phenomenon is the new presidential helicopter – what President Obama referred to as defense procurement “run amok.” Once the analysis and requirements were done, we ended up with choppers that cost nearly half a billion dollars each and enabled the president to, among other things, cook dinner while in flight under nuclear attack.

We also had to take a hard look at a number of weapons programs that were grotesquely over budget, were having major performance problems, were reliant on unproven technology, or were becoming increasingly detached from real world scenarios – as if September 11th and the wars that followed had never happened.

Those of you with experience in the technology or manufacturing sectors have at some point probably faced some combination of these challenges in your own businesses. But in the defense arena, we faced an additional, usually insurmountable obstacle to bring rationality to budget and acquisition decisions. Major weapons programs, irrespective of their problems or performance, have a habit of continuing long after they are wanted or needed, recalling Ronald Reagan’s old joke that a government program represents the closest thing we’ll ever see to eternal life on this earth.

First, there is the Congress, which is understandably concerned, especially in these tough economic times, about protecting jobs in certain states and congressional districts.

There is the defense and aerospace industry, which has an obvious financial stake in the survival and growth of these programs.

And there is the institutional military itself – within the Pentagon, and as expressed through an influential network of retired generals and admirals, some of whom are paid consultants to the defense industry, and some who often are quoted as experts in the news media.

As a result, plenty of past attempts by my predecessors to end failing or unnecessary programs went by the wayside. Nonetheless I determined, and the president agreed, that given the urgency of the wars we are in, the daunting global security environment we will inhabit for decades to come, and our country’s economic problems, we simply cannot afford to move ahead with business as usual.

To this end, the president’s budget request cut, curtailed, or ended a number of conventional modernization programs – satellites, ground vehicles, helicopters, fighters – that were either performing poorly or in excess to real-world needs. Conversely, future-oriented programs where the U.S. was relatively underinvested were accelerated or received more funding.

For example, we must sustain and continually improve our specialized strategic deterrent to ensure that our – and our allies’ – security is always protected against nuclear-armed adversaries. In an initiative little noticed, the President’s program includes money to begin a new generation of ballistic missile submarines and nearly $700 million in additional funds to secure and assure America’s nuclear deterrent.

Some of our proposed reforms are meeting real resistance. They are called risky. Or not meeting a certain military requirement. Or lacking in study and analysis. Those three words – requirements, risk, and, analysis – are commonly invoked in defense matters. If applied correctly, they help us make sound decisions. I’ve found, however, that more often they have become the holy trinity of business as usual.

In truth, preparing for conflict in the 21st century means investing in truly new concepts and new technologies. It means taking into account all the assets and capabilities we can bring to the fight. It means measuring those capabilities against the real threats posed by real world adversaries with real limitations, not threats conjured up from enemies with unlimited time, resources, and technological acumen.

Air superiority and missile defense – two areas where the budget has attracted the most criticism – provide case studies. Let me start with the controversy over the F-22 fighter jet. We had to consider, when preparing for a future potential conventional state-on-state conflict, what is the right mix of the most advanced fighter aircraft and other weapons to deal with the known and projected threats to U.S. air supremacy? For example, we now have unmanned aerial vehicles that can simultaneously perform intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions as well as deliver precision-guided bombs and missiles. The president’s budget request would buy 48 of the most advanced UAVs – aircraft that have a greater range than some of our manned fighters, in addition to the ability to loiter for hours over a target.

We also took into consideration the capabilities of the newest manned combat aircraft program, the stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 is 10 to 15 years newer than the F-22, carries a much larger suite of weapons, and is superior in a number of areas – most importantly, air-to-ground missions such as destroying sophisticated enemy air defenses. It is a versatile aircraft, less than half the total cost of the F-22, and can be produced in quantity with all the advantages produced by economies of scale – some 500 will be bought over the next five years, more than 2,400 over the life of the program. It has had development problems to be sure, as has every advanced military aircraft ever fielded. But if properly supported, the F-35 will be the backbone of America’s tactical aviation fleet for decades to come if – and it is a big if – money is not drained away to spend on other aircraft that our military leadership considers of lower priority or excess to our needs.

Having said that, the F-22 is clearly a capability we do need – a niche, silver-bullet solution for one or two potential scenarios – specifically the defeat of a highly advanced enemy fighter fleet. The F-22, to be blunt, does not make much sense anyplace else in the spectrum of conflict. Nonetheless, supporters of the F-22 lately have promoted its use for an ever expanding list of potential missions. These range from protecting the homeland from seaborne cruise missiles to, as one retired general recommended on TV, using F-22s to go after Somali pirates who in many cases are teenagers with AK-47s – a job we know is better done by three Navy SEALs. These are examples of how far-fetched some of the arguments have become for a program that has cost $65 billion – and counting – to produce 187 aircraft, not to mention the thousands of uniformed Air Force positions that were sacrificed to help pay for it.

In light of all these factors, and with the support of the Air Force leadership, I concluded that 187 – the program of record since 2005, plus four more added in the FY 09 supplemental – was a sufficient number of F-22s and recommended as such to the president.

The reaction from parts of the Washington establishment has been predictable for many of the reasons I described before. The most substantive criticism is that completing the F-22 program means we are risking the future of U.S. air supremacy. To assess this risk, it is worth looking at real-world potential threats and assessing the capabilities that other countries have now or in the pipeline.

Consider that by 2020, the United States is projected to have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. Of those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese. Nonetheless, some have portrayed this scenario as a dire threat to America’s national security.

Correspondingly, the recent tests of a possible nuclear device and ballistic missiles by North Korea brought scrutiny to the changes in this budget that relate to missile defense. The risk to national security has again been invoked, mainly because the total missile defense budget was reduced from last year.

In fact, where the threat is real or growing – from rogue states or from short-to-medium range missiles that can hit our deployed troops – this budget sustains or increases funding. Most of the cuts in this area come from two programs that are designed to shoot down enemy missiles immediately after launch. This was a great idea, but the aspiration was overwhelmed by the escalating costs, operational problems, and technological challenges.

Consider the example of one of those programs – the Airborne Laser. This was supposed to put high-powered lasers on a fleet of 747s. After more than a decade of research and development, we have yet to achieve a laser with enough power to knock down a missile in boost phase more than 50 miles from the launch pad – thus requiring these huge planes to loiter deep in enemy air space to have a feasible chance at a direct hit. The 10 to 20 aircraft needed would cost about $1.5 billion apiece plus tens of millions of dollars each in annual operating costs. The program and operating concept were fatally flawed and it was time to face reality. So we curtailed the existing program while keeping the prototype aircraft for research and development.

Many of these decisions – like the one I just described – were more clear-cut than others. But all of them, insofar as they involved hundreds of billions of dollars and the security of the American people, were treated with the utmost seriousness by the senior civilian and military leadership of the Pentagon. An enormous amount of thought, study, assessment, and analysis underpins these budget recommendations – including the National Defense Strategy issued last summer.

Some have called for yet more analysis before making any of the decisions in this budget. But when dealing with programs that were clearly out of control, performing poorly, and excess to the military’s real requirements, we did not need more study, more debate, or more delay – in effect, paralysis through analysis. What was needed were three things – common sense, political will, and tough decisions. Qualities too often in short supply in Washington, D.C.

All of these decisions involved considering trade-offs, balancing risks, and setting priorities – separating nice-to-haves from have-to-haves, requirements from appetites. We cannot expect to eliminate risk and danger by simply spending more – especially if we’re spending on the wrong things. But more to the point, we all – the military, the Congress, and industry – have to face some iron fiscal realities. Here, some recent history is important.

Consider that the last defense budget submitted by President George W. Bush for Fiscal Year 2009 was $515 billion. In that budget the Bush administration proposed – at my recommendation – a Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget of $524 billion. The budget just submitted by President Obama for FY 2010 was $534 billion. Even after factoring inflation, and some of the war costs that were moved from supplemental appropriations, this defense request represents a modest but real increase over the last Bush budget. I know. I submitted both of them. In total, by one estimate, our budget adds up to about what the entire rest of the world combined – friend and foe alike – spends on defense. Only in the parallel universe that is Washington, D.C., would that be considered “gutting” defense.

The fact is that if the defense budget had been even higher, my recommendations to the president with respect to troubled programs would have been the same – for all the reasons I described earlier. There is a more fundamental point: If the Department of Defense can’t figure out a way to defend the United States on a budget of more than half a trillion dollars a year, then our problems are much bigger than anything that can be cured by a few more ships and planes.

What is important is to have a budget baseline with a steady, sustainable, and predictable rate of growth that avoids extreme peaks and valleys that are enormously harmful to sound budgeting and planning. From the very first defense budget I submitted for President Bush in January 2007, I have warned against doing what America has done multiple times over the last 90 years by slashing defense spending after a major conflict. The war in Iraq is winding down, and one day so too will the conflict in Afghanistan – whether in this administration, the next, or the next. When that day comes, the nation will again face pressure to cut back on defense spending, as we always have. It is simply the nature of the beast. And the higher our base budget is now, the harder it will be to sustain these necessary programs, and the more drastic and dangerous the drop-off will be later.

So where do we go from here? Authorization for more F-22s is in both versions of the defense bill working its way through the Congress. The president has indicated that he has real red lines in this budget, including the F-22. Some might ask: Why threaten a veto and risk a confrontation over a couple billion dollars for a dozen or so planes?

The grim reality is that with regard to the budget we have entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar diverted to fund excess or unneeded capacity – whether for more F-22s or anything else – is a dollar that will be unavailable to take care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk that I will not take and one that I cannot accept.

And, with regard to something like the F-22, irrespective of whether the number of aircraft at issue is 12 planes or 200, if we can’t bring ourselves to make this tough but straightforward decision – reflecting the judgment of two very different presidents, two different secretaries of defense, two chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff, and the current Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff, where do we draw the line? And if not now, when? If we can’t get this right – what on earth can we get right? It is time to draw the line on doing Defense business as usual. The President has drawn that line. And that red line with regard to a veto is real.

On a personal note, I joined CIA more than 40 years ago to help protect my country. For just about my entire professional career in government I have generally been known as a hawk on national security. One criticism of me when I was at CIA was that I overestimated threats to the security of the United States.

Well, I haven’t changed. I did not molt from a hawk into a dove on January 20, 2009. I continue to believe, as I always have, that the world is, and always will be, a dangerous and hostile place for my country with many who would do America harm and who hate everything we are and stand for. But, the nature of the threats to us has changed. And so too should the way our military is organized and equipped to meet them.

I believe – along with the senior military leadership of this nation – that the defense budget we proposed to President Obama and that he sent to Congress is the best we could design to protect the United States now and in the future. The best we could do to protect our men and women in uniform, to give them the tools they need to deter our enemies, and to win our wars today and tomorrow. We stand by this reform budget, and we are prepared to fight for it.

A final thought. I arrived in Washington 43 years ago this summer. Of all people, I am well aware of the realities of Washington and know that things do not change overnight. After all, the influence of politics and parochial interests in defense matters is as old as the Republic itself. Henry Knox, the first secretary of war, was charged with building the first American fleet. To get the support of Congress, Knox eventually ended up with six frigates being built in six different shipyards in six different states.

But the stakes today are very high – with the nation at war, and a security landscape steadily growing more dangerous and unpredictable. I am deeply concerned about the long-term challenges facing our defense establishment – and just as concerned that the political state of play does not reflect the reality that major reforms are needed, or that tough choices are necessary.

We stand at a crossroads. We simply cannot risk continuing down the same path – where our spending and program priorities are increasingly divorced from the very real threats of today and the growing ones of tomorrow. These threats demand that all of our nation’s leaders rise above the politics and parochialism that have too often plagued considerations of our nation’s defense – from industry to interest groups, from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. The time has come to draw a line and take a stand against the business-as-usual approach to national defense. We must all fulfill our obligation to the American people to ensure that the United States remains safe and strong. Just as our men and women in uniform are doing their duty to this end, we in Washington must now do ours.

[dragon]

I like how he complains about the current administration yet overlooks the crap he pull;ed with the troops and the armor for the Humvees at the beginning of the war.

[Edward Yee]

Wrong SECDEF, if you're thinking of Iraq...

[MKSheppard]

Hey martin, thanks for posting such a stupid thing. It makes my brain want to chainsaw it's way out of my skull and beat me to death for forcing it to comprehend this.

Gates took particular aim at proponents of the futuristic, $250 million-a-pop F-22 stealth dogfighter.

Wrong. $100-120 million. It only costs $250m if you factor in sunk development costs.

The challenges I faced in getting what our troops needed in the field stood in stark contrast to the support provided conventional modernization programs – weapons designed to fight other modern armies, navies, and air forces – that had been in the pipeline for many years and had acquired a loyal and enthusiastic following in the Pentagon, in the Congress, and in industry.

Except you can fight an insurgency with a military designed for huge conventional wars. You can't fight a huge conventional war with a military designed for fighting an insurgency.

Take for example, the huge MRAP fleet now floating around -- we've got like thousands of them now; and they're all but useless except in Iraq -- if we tried to send the MRAPs that work in Iraq to A-Stan, they'll roll over and cause fatalities -- we actually have had to put into service specific MRAP models to deal with the narrow roads and mountainous terrain in Afghanistan -- they have a much lower center of gravity than the Iraqi MRAPs, which stick to flat level paved roads.

And if you tried using these MRAPs in a conventional war; they'd die pretty fast, being essentially very high silhoulette, weakly protected vehicles, which are superoptimized to defeat explosions from below.

It simply will not do to base our strategy solely on continuing to design and buy – as we have for the last 60 years – only the most technologically advanced versions of weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of another superpower adversary – especially one that imploded nearly a generation ago.

So what's your solution, Mr Gates to the fact that other countries are buying advanced aircraft that are equals to our F-15/F-16 fleet; while our own F-15/F-16 fleet ages?

To get there we must break the old habit of adding layer upon layer of cost, complexity, and delay to systems that are so expensive and so elaborate that only a small number can be built, and that are then usable only in a narrow range of low-probability scenarios.

Or we could just you know, have stuck with the original plan for buying 750 F-22As, with procurement beginning in 1994.

MAR in 1996: 648 Aircraft

1994: 442 F-22 in service in 2003/04

1997: 339 F-22

2003: 227 F-22

2006: 186 F-22

Same thing happened to the B-2A; from 132 aircraft, then 75, and then Bush I says just 20.

The most flamboyant example of this phenomenon is the new presidential helicopter – what President Obama referred to as defense procurement “run amok.”

No, the problem was that because it was the presidental helicopter; and because it was from a foreign company; we quite literally could not tell the British why we needed this hole in the fuselage, why we needed this specific power bus requirement, etc...

Clearly not the way to do things.

In an initiative little noticed, the President’s program includes money to begin a new generation of ballistic missile submarines and nearly $700 million in additional funds to secure and assure America’s nuclear deterrent.

Great; more money poured down the rat-hole of ballistic missiles.

For example, we now have unmanned aerial vehicles that can simultaneously perform intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions as well as deliver precision-guided bombs and missiles. The president’s budget request would buy 48 of the most advanced UAVs – aircraft that have a greater range than some of our manned fighters, in addition to the ability to loiter for hours over a target.

Until someone jams our communications links and they become little more than reusable cruise missiles. Something the UAV crowd never mentiones is the need for large amounts of bandwidth to send data back and forth between the controller and the UAV; which multiplies with the more you deploy.

The F-35 is 10 to 15 years newer than the F-22, carries a much larger suite of weapons, and is superior in a number of areas – most importantly, air-to-ground missions such as destroying sophisticated enemy air defenses.

Except the F-22A flies much higher and faster; and can supercruise; while F-35 can't.

It is a versatile aircraft, less than half the total cost of the F-22, and can be produced in quantity with all the advantages produced by economies of scale – some 500 will be bought over the next five years, more than 2,400 over the life of the program.

HA HA HA HA HA HA.

F-22A has worked its way through development hell, and the costs will only drop the more we produce. By way of contrast; the F-35 is still working it's way through development hell.

Prediction: In the next year or so; major problems will arise with F-35's systems integration, causing huge cost overruns; which will cause Kongress to do what it does best; cut numbers procured.

Having said that, the F-22 is clearly a capability we do need – a niche, silver-bullet solution for one or two potential scenarios – specifically the defeat of a highly advanced enemy fighter fleet.

Because everyone is going remain at the level of the Iraqi Air Force in 1991 and 2003 in both equipment and competance?

Nonetheless, supporters of the F-22 lately have promoted its use for an ever expanding list of potential missions. These range from protecting the homeland from seaborne cruise missiles to, as one retired general recommended on TV, using F-22s to go after Somali pirates who in many cases are teenagers with AK-47s – a job we know is better done by three Navy SEALs.

The F-22 can do both missions quite well, thanks to it's high altitude, supercruise capabilities. From it's perch at 50,000 feet; with it's modern radar, it can pick up low observable cruise missiles at sea level.

And defeating somalian pirates -- well, combine the F-22's capability to rapidly traverse areas cruising at 1,000 MPH, and it's soon to come capability of carrying SDBs internally, just show up and sink the pirates or bomb their base. F-35 by contrast, will take about twice as long to get there.

Consider that by 2020, the United States is projected to have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. Of those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth generation F-35s and F-22s.

Wrong. It'll be:

160 F-22A (due to attrition and losses).
250 F-35 (due to massive cost increases and overruns during development, causing congress to do what it does best and cut numbers).

China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020.

Except China is cranking out J-10s, a 4.0/4.5 generation fighter out like hotcakes, and by 2020 will have a fleet of at least a thousand or so fighter aircraft with at least late 1980s F-16/F-15E capability -- a significant modernization of a force which until recently was quite a lot of MiG-21 clones.

Oh, and the Chinese will have significantly shorter internal lines of communication, while we'll be forced to deploy at the end of a very long logistics chain; limiting the number of front line fighters we could then deploy to the far east in the event of a major conflict.

In fact, where the threat is real or growing – from rogue states or from short-to-medium range missiles that can hit our deployed troops – this budget sustains or increases funding. Most of the cuts in this area come from two programs that are designed to shoot down enemy missiles immediately after launch. This was a great idea, but the aspiration was overwhelmed by the escalating costs, operational problems, and technological challenges.

BULLSHIT

What do you call capping production of the GBI and not filling the silos we've dug at Fort Greely, and terminating the MKV, which would have allowed for multiple target engagement capability for a whole clutch of ABM systems; and extending the engagement envelope of other systems -- for example; putting a single MKV onto a SM-3 (it's lighter than the present kill vehicle), would increase it's delta vee and it's capabilities of intercepting higher performance missiles.

Consider the example of one of those programs – the Airborne Laser. This was supposed to put high-powered lasers on a fleet of 747s. After more than a decade of research and development, we have yet to achieve a laser with enough power to knock down a missile in boost phase more than 50 miles from the launch pad – thus requiring these huge planes to loiter deep in enemy air space to have a feasible chance at a direct hit.

Maybe because you know, the laser is still being integrated into the airframe; and has only just achieved first light in it's mounting?

I'm sure in Gates-world, he expects weapons programs to operate at 200% efficiency in their development phases.

Some have called for yet more analysis before making any of the decisions in this budget. But when dealing with programs that were clearly out of control, performing poorly, and excess to the military’s real requirements, we did not need more study, more debate, or more delay – in effect, paralysis through analysis.

No, instead you kill them, like Robert S. McNamara in favor of vague nebulous "future" platforms, which have yet to be developed.

In total, by one estimate, our budget adds up to about what the entire rest of the world combined – friend and foe alike – spends on defense. Only in the parallel universe that is Washington, D.C., would that be considered “gutting” defense.

Damn right you are. You've gutted programs which are only just achieving fruition after decades of work; in favor of future programs which have yet to move into detail design work.

There is a more fundamental point: If the Department of Defense can’t figure out a way to defend the United States on a budget of more than half a trillion dollars a year, then our problems are much bigger than anything that can be cured by a few more ships and planes.

Or you could just adopt Eisenhowerian Defense Policies. But they're evil because they revolve around blowing away whole countries.

[PainRack]

Isn't part of the problem with the US military budget the fact that its facing immense costs and wear and tear from Iraq and Afghanistan?

One would imagine the greater usuage, losses, and expenditure of ammunition would cripple the availability of current military hardware.

Factor in the costs of the two wars and medical expenses. Is it thus arguable that the US military is now overstretched and faces the dilenma of either building and developing its next generation of military equipment, filling up and replacing its current military arsenal or spending all available cash on the troops now, and damn the equipment later?

To me, it seems that out of the three options above, Gates is backstopping the first and the last.

[dragon]

Wrong SECDEF, if you're thinking of Iraq...

Yup wrong Secdef. NM that rant then.

[SirNitram]

Hey martin, thanks for posting such a stupid thing. It makes my brain want to chainsaw it's way out of my skull and beat me to death for forcing it to comprehend this.

Not surprisingly it's laborous for you to comprehend, this being someone with rather more real-world experience with the military than you and their not agreeing mindlessly with you. Still, I think I'll trust the judgement of a SecDef over an internet screenname on what's stupid or not for foreign policy. Ta.

[Nieztchean Uber-Amoeba]

And Bush had a lot more real-world experience as an executive and politician than anyone on this board is ever likely to have, so surely we can't criticize his opinions and actions as president.

[erik_t]

Hey martin, thanks for posting such a stupid thing. It makes my brain want to chainsaw it's way out of my skull and beat me to death for forcing it to comprehend this.

Not surprisingly it's laborous for you to comprehend, this being someone with rather more real-world experience with the military than you and their not agreeing mindlessly with you. Still, I think I'll trust the judgement of a SecDef over an internet screenname on what's stupid or not for foreign policy. Ta.

Much of Shep's response is statements of fact which flatly contradict the posted article. Whether or not it has an impressive name in it is immaterial.

At least I think that's how it works here.

[Starglider]

Still, I think I'll trust the judgement of a SecDef over an internet screenname on what's stupid or not for foreign policy.

A good grasp of foreign policy qualifies you to make a guess at the kind of threats the US might face and the kind of wars the US might be engaging in. Not a very good guess mind you, because history is hardly predictable. Procuring systems that overcome those threats is an entirely different skill set - and frankly I don't see why Gates should be considered an expert in either, though he's better qualified to tackle the former than the later. He joined the CIA straight out of university and spent thirty years immersed in agency politics and participating in such genius schemes as the Iran-Contra operation. He then spent a decade lecturing students on international politics. Most of what he knows about weapon systems probably comes from Powerpoint presentations at the Pentagon, and I would not be surprised if Shep knows more about radar ranges and kill probabilities and missile engagement envelopes and all the other minutiae of weapon system performance than he does. That doesn't mean Shep is qualified to do the job of secretary of defence, but it does mean an appeal to authority is worthless as an attempt to dismiss his arguments regarding weapon capabilities.

[SirNitram]

And Bush had a lot more real-world experience as an executive and politician than anyone on this board is ever likely to have, so surely we can't criticize his opinions and actions as president.

Are there any signs, besides opposition to the F-22 and similar, that Gates is a goddamn dumbass, unsavable even by the fact he's advised far beyond those who study the subjects as a hobby?

[Coyote]

That may be so, but still... just a direct exit on the 'appeal to authority' off-ramp is... um, surprising.

[SirNitram]

I'm not going to challenge Shep on weapon capabilities. I'm certain he has an encylopedic knowledge of such on projects that he is interested in. But the question is whether those capabilities fit the present situation, and I do imagine someone with experience in foreign policy, and who receives requests from those in the two wars we're in now, might have a better grasp of what capabilities are needed. The F-22 is, no doubt, the predominant air-superiority fighter in the world. Not gonna challenge that. However, when you're in two war, and neither require a bleeding-edge air-superiority fighter, it is perhaps wise to shift production(Not R&D; having a plan ready to produce is wise and logical) away from this unneeded capability.

Or, in other words, if you're needing to replace your porchlight, is it logical to instead go and buy a new car?

[Guardsman Bass]

edited for irrelevance.

[Nieztchean Uber-Amoeba]

I think the problem many people have with Gates lies in the fact that he's making big changes to military development & procurement programs (changes that will affect the military for a long time coming) in order to make them better at fighting small bushfire wars that, by all accounts, the U.S. shouldn't be fighting.

[SirNitram]

I think the problem many people have with Gates lies in the fact that he's making big changes to military development & procurement programs (changes that will affect the military for a long time coming) in order to make them better at fighting small bushfire wars that, by all accounts, the U.S. shouldn't be fighting.

I'd imagine that's part of it, but let's wake up and smell the pigshit: The US predominantly DOES fight those little brushfire wars. We're not gonna change this by making a big noise about F-22s. Changing it will require alot of shit changing, and more sensible allocation of funds.

On the other fork of the tongue, alot of people IN POWER are upset with Gates because he's not buying the ever-so-carefully divvied up F-22, constructed in 48 states. Now, why would you ever spread out a production line so much.. Oh yea! Political favor!

[Coyote]

Part of what makes this problematic is that the F-22 is actually a good plane; if this were another "Divaad" it'd be easier to cut the BS out.

[Shroom Man 777]

Nit, maybe they spread out a production line so much so that a single strike won't destroy the entire manufacturing base. Which might happen if the Russkies or the ChiComs start paratrooping down on (y)our highschools!

But the question is whether those capabilities fit the present situation, and I do imagine someone with experience in foreign policy, and who receives requests from those in the two wars we're in now, might have a better grasp of what capabilities are needed.

But these two wars aren't eternal wars, eventually they'll end and new wars will pop up in the future. New wars that might have different needs.

[SirNitram]

Nit, maybe they spread out a production line so much so that a single strike won't destroy the entire manufacturing base. Which might happen if the Russkies or the ChiComs start paratrooping down on (y)our highschools!

But the question is whether those capabilities fit the present situation, and I do imagine someone with experience in foreign policy, and who receives requests from those in the two wars we're in now, might have a better grasp of what capabilities are needed.

But these two wars aren't eternal wars, eventually they'll end and new wars will pop up in the future. New wars that might have different needs.

Which is why I emphasised R&D in an earlier post. But when the majority of the wars you fight are not ones with lots of air superiority, why make a big deal over seven jets? Yes, let's get back to reality here: Gates is railing against seven additional jets. Seven jets do not save the war, not outside of Tom Clancy and movies. Don't care if they're trainers, on sorties, or maintenence parts.

So no, those wars will not go on for perputuality. But neither will seven jets change the balance of power hugely.

[Sea Skimmer]

I think the problem many people have with Gates lies in the fact that he's making big changes to military development & procurement programs (changes that will affect the military for a long time coming) in order to make them better at fighting small bushfire wars that, by all accounts, the U.S. shouldn't be fighting.

Exactly. Preparing the fight the insurgencies of tomorrow is fucking retarded. We cannot go blow a trillion dollars on such wars every damn decade, and if we are not going to do so then it makes no sense at all to base our long term planning and development around the light absurdly specialist weapon systems we would only need for such warfare. As Shep said, a conventional military force can fight COIN; it just won’t be optimal for it. A lightweight military aimed at COIN will just be decimated in conventional warfare, even against a technology weak opponent like North Korea. Also of course lightweight COIN forces are inherently more deployable, which means all the greatest ease of slipping into another grinding pointless war.

Gates is overall being a sickening textbook example of a militaryplanning to fight the last war. Except this time for once the uniformed military doesn’t want to do that but it being forced into it by its singular civilian leader. It is quite insane.

So no, those wars will not go on for perputuality. But neither will seven jets change the balance of power hugely.

That is true. But if this was just about 7 jets, it wouldn’t be the huge deal it is. Those seven jets are just the biggest face of a much more sweeping set of policies and project cancellations. Also at issue is Gates decision to make a 80,000 man increase in the ground strength of the Army and Marines permanent even after the end of both current wars. That increase alone will cost 100 billion dollars every 5 years just to maintain in peacetime conditions. That same 100 billion dollars would literally fulfill every US military wish list weapon and R&D project with margin to spare for things like new barracks buildings for existing troops (lots of guys are still living in 1950s facilities) and more money for the VA.

[Starglider]

Also at issue is Gates decision to make a 80,000 man increase in the ground strength of the Army and Marines permanent even after the end of both current wars. That increase alone will cost 100 billion dollars every 5 years just to maintain in peacetime conditions.

Do you have a source for that figure? I'd be interested to see how it breaks down. That's $250K per infantryman per year, which is about a factor of two above what my uneducated guess would be even if you include training, basing (on US soil) and support staff. Are you including the cost of unavoidable equipment replacements, or indirect costs such as having to maintain a larger airlift/sealift capacity?

[TheKwas]

. A lightweight military aimed at COIN will just be decimated in conventional warfare, even against a technology weak opponent like North Korea. Also of course lightweight COIN forces are inherently more deployable, which means all the greatest ease of slipping into another grinding pointless war.

Of course, but is America actually approaching the point where they can challenged by anyone in conventional warfare? As the article notes, there's a huge gap in conventional power between American and even growing powers like China, and on both nation's current paths the gap doesn't even shrink. Your hypothetical conflict with North Korea is only valid if we retool the entire military for counter-insurgency.

It seems to me that America is still in a league of its own when it comes to conventional warfare, but you'll still take heavy losses whenever you trying to play the COIN game. While even with Gate's putting more emphasis on COIN, I don't see the American military losing it's massive advantage in the conventional league anytime soon. The marginal benefit of COIN funding outweights the marginal benefit of more conventional spending.

[Steve]

I think Shep has some points in things like the fact that the F-22 is a fully-readied design. We've already paid billions of dollars to develop the damned thing, it's a mostly-known quantity, and we're continually cutting its production so that it can't actually replace the aging F-15 fleet because Gates is insistent upon focusing on insurgency threats for future police actions and such and is looking to pay for that by slashing into projects that have already been badly slashed to the point of wasting what we've already spent on them.

That said, even the best debaters can sometimes cut corners, so let's not ride Nitram too much for that appeal to authority.

As for the issue of COIN versus unlikely "conventional wars", I'll admit I'm rather intrigued with Dr. Thomas Barnett's proposal to create a "System Administrator" force that performs post-war reconstruction and counter-insurgency operations after the conventional force, the "Leviathan", smashes up the other guy's military and permits occupation.

[Batman]

I think Shep has some points in things like the fact that the F-22 is a fully-readied design. We've already paid billions of dollars to develop the damned thing, it's a mostly-known quantity, and we're continually cutting its production so that it can't actually replace the aging F-15 fleet because Gates is insistent upon focusing on insurgency threats for future police actions and such and is looking to pay for that by slashing into projects that have already been badly slashed to the point of wasting what we've already spent on them.

That would indeed be a compelling point...if there were any intention of keeping the Raptor in production. There's NOT. It's another 7 airframes and then the operation is supposed to shut down ANYWAY.

[Steve]

I think Shep has some points in things like the fact that the F-22 is a fully-readied design. We've already paid billions of dollars to develop the damned thing, it's a mostly-known quantity, and we're continually cutting its production so that it can't actually replace the aging F-15 fleet because Gates is insistent upon focusing on insurgency threats for future police actions and such and is looking to pay for that by slashing into projects that have already been badly slashed to the point of wasting what we've already spent on them.

That would indeed be a compelling point...if there were any intention of keeping the Raptor in production. There's NOT. It's another 7 airframes and then the operation is supposed to shut down ANYWAY.

IIRC Shep is arguing against that as well, I was presuming that POV in my remarks.