The Fleet That Has To Die

[[R_H]]

The Weekly Standard

The Russian Navy's "Irreversible Collapse."


Kiev
Last year at the annual 27 July celebrations of Naval Fleet Day, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, boasted that the Russian Navy would add six aircraft carrier battle groups to its complement of warships. Construction of these ships, he said, would begin in 2012 with three of the carriers to be assigned to the Northern Fleet and the other three to the Pacific Fleet.

At the time, Russian government officials were riding high on $150 or higher per-barrel oil prices that they were convinced--like most oil-rich kleptocracies around the world--would last forever. The picture is a bit different today with Russia suffering some of the worst effects of the world economic downturn and world oil prices less than half of what they were 12 months ago.

Whatever oil prices might have been at the time or how high they might have been sustained on the world market, the idea of Russia constructing this number of naval vessels in even the best of economic circumstances is inconceivable. The funds that would have to be expended in order to boost the navy to these levels would break the bank. Plus it would draw all funding away from the other branches of the armed services, which would be unlikely to sit by idly and watch while the navy vacuumed up every kopeck that they needed for fighter aircraft, tanks, new communications systems, air defense batteries, etc.

The reality now is that not only is the idea of Russia building and operating aircraft carrier battle groups an impossible dream, but just building enough new ships to replace those that are worn-out after decades of use is also not feasible. A recent analysis by the authoritative Moscow-based weekly, the Independent Military Review (NVO), entitled "BMF RF (Naval Military Fleet of the Russian Federation) on Foreign Warships" states that the Russian Navy is currently in a situation of irreversible collapse.

The analysis piece states the chief cause is the state of the Russian shipbuilding industry, which is incapable "of producing warships in either the quantity or at the level of quality that the navy customer requires" for the future. According to those interviewed, the Russian Navy's leadership "understands that this is a hopeless situation and are looking for a way out by considering the purchase of naval vessels from abroad."

The issue of how Russia would be able to keep its navy afloat was raised during the International Military Naval Exposition (MVMS) in the last week of June in St. Petersburg, Russia. The same Admiral Vysotsky who had declared such grandiose plans the year before was a bit more down to earth and honest about the navy's present dire situation.

"Our position is how to significantly improve the condition of our fleet without destroying the economic activity in the country," he said. "I also consider the idea of spending billions to repair and upgrade our old ships to be meaningless because they have only 10 years of service life remaining. We need new ships to be constructed that--it is estimated--would be need to be in service for a minimum of 40-50 years."

Many in the audience were aware of the conditions inside of Russia's shipbuilding industry and its inability to build naval vessels in any meaningful numbers, so Vysotsky was then asked if this meant that the Russian Navy would consider purchasing naval vessels from abroad. His response: "I will tell you plainly that we do not exclude that possibility."

Russian industry sources report that navy officials held talks with both Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS), who were exhibiting at the Russian naval expo for the first time, and Thales--the two major shipbuilding industrial enterprises in France. Not coincidentally, DCNS developed and built France's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, and the Thales Porte-Avions 2 is the basic design for both a new-generation of carriers for the French Navy and the UK/BMT configuration of the future British Queen Elizabeth class carriers for the Royal Navy.

Since Russian industry cannot build either the type or number of warships that the country needs, Vysotsky and his staff are considering cooperative agreements with France that would involve the joint production of a variant of the Mistral and Tonnerre BPC (bâtiment de projection et de commandement) amphibious assault ships. Also on the table is a French-Russian project to design and build a series of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers for both navies. It was also reported that the Russian Navy is interesting in procuring some models of submarines from Germany.

Only an appreciation of how long Russia has possessed a robust, full-spectrum shipbuilding industry, which in some instances can trace its roots all the way back to Peter the Great, would allow one to understand the depths to which that industry has deteriorated. One of the more famous enterprises, the Rubin submarine design bureau, was founded in 1901 and was responsible for the Project 941 Typhoon-class ballistic missile submarine made famous by the novel and film The Hunt for Red October.

A colleague of mine visited the Rubin design bureau in St. Petersburg a few years ago while on a trip from Moscow and was shocked at what he saw. "There are practically no personnel left in the design bureau's main engineering building still working on submarine designs," he told me. "Most of the offices have been rented out to private companies that are engaged in all manner of commercial businesses that have nothing to do with shipbuilding at all--and it is only the income from renting out this office space that allows Rubin to stay in business. They get nothing from the state budget."

The combination of almost two decades of anaemic government funding for the shipbuilding industry and almost no procurement of new naval vessels has produced a navy that cannot maintain operations much longer and an industry that can no longer rescue it. Buying or cooperatively producing warships with France might stave off the inevitable, but modern western European-built ships in sufficient numbers are likely to have price tag that a Russia in an economic tailspin also cannot cope with.

The NVO report does not pull any punches: "The Russian Navy is on the verge of irreversible collapse. Within ten years there will be in the entire navy less than 50 vessels still capable of operations, which would be a number not even the size of one of our 'lesser fleets' like the Baltic Fleet or the Black Sea Fleet."

The report rates the navy's situation as the worst in almost a century and concludes "this present catastrophe is comparable to what happened in the course of the [post-1917 Bolshevik Revolution] Civil War years when the fleet was left in ruins. If during the oil and gas boom of the 2000s the Russian Navy received practically no funding, now today during a period of difficult [economic] crisis the fleet will--without a doubt--have to die within the next few years. This is not merely a possibility, it is a fact."

Those warships still left in useable condition have seen their level of operations scaled back in order to preserve their service life. This is particularly true in the case of the submarine fleet, which has seen its Cold War high tempo of patrols drop off to almost nothing. Last November's joint naval exercises with the Venezuelan Navy off the coast of South America amounted to a little more than symbolic participation by only four Russian vessels that made the trans-Atlantic crossing.

In 1994, Andrei Kozyrev, then the Russian Foreign Minister under President Boris Yeltsin declared "the Russian Armed Forces will be shaped to take account of the major changes in the world and the country's actual economic potential. This...can be illustrated by the Navy. It will fully retain its role as a factor determining Russia's might as a great power...The decommissioning of obsolete ships will be combined with efforts to equip the Navy with modern hardware. The ships flying the St. Andrew's ensign should embody the most advanced achievements of Russian science and technology."

A decade and a half later is it clear that these objectives failed to be met in a manner worse than the non-fulfillment of any of the Soviet Union's famous pyatiletki, or five-year plans. The Russian fleet, barring some unforeseen miracle, is one that has no future and will eventually die. The only question is which one of the twin-headed Russian leadership, President Dmitri Medvedev or PM Vladimir Putin, will be held responsible.

Reuben F. Johnson is a frequent contributor to THE WEEKLY STANDARD Online.

[Thanas]

It should be worth to note that russian investors recently attempted to buy some yards in germany...only to have the first one of these go bankrupt.

[Vympel]

Reeks of overstated alarmism on the strength of one report and one silly antecdote from years ago. The fleet won't "die", what will most likely occur is that it's going to be smaller than it is now for a period of time in the 'null' period between the current ship classes exceed their service life and the shipyards (which are all still working, either completing foreign orders - of which there are a considerable number - or ever increasing domestic numbers) rebuild their old capacity and are able to meet the Navy's need for new ships in considerable volume (as economics allow).

But there are new ship classes for pretty much every type of ship the Russian Navy (with the exception of destroyers) currently under construction.

I fail to see how a smaller fleet is supposed to be some sort of disaster or 'death'. Russia's navy is the least important part of its military, and the nuclear deterrent which forms (its most important) part of it is secure for the foreseeable future thanks to the Delta IV force + Sineva and the Borey + Bulava (despite its numerous failures, it's too important to fail so they'll keep doing it until getting it right, and have plenty of time to do so).

[Pelranius]

Reeks of overstated alarmism on the strength of one report and one silly antecdote from years ago. The fleet won't "die", what will most likely occur is that it's going to be smaller than it is now for a period of time in the 'null' period between the current ship classes exceed their service life and the shipyards (which are all still working, either completing foreign orders - of which there are a considerable number - or ever increasing domestic numbers) rebuild their old capacity and are able to meet the Navy's need for new ships in considerable volume (as economics allow).

But there are new ship classes for pretty much every type of ship the Russian Navy (with the exception of destroyers) currently under construction.

I fail to see how a smaller fleet is supposed to be some sort of disaster or 'death'. Russia's navy is the least important part of its military, and the nuclear deterrent which forms (its most important) part of it is secure for the foreseeable future thanks to the Delta IV force + Sineva and the Borey + Bulava (despite its numerous failures, it's too important to fail so they'll keep doing it until getting it right, and have plenty of time to do so).

I wasn't aware of any plans for new cruisers.

[Patrick Degan]

So basically, the Russian Navy, due to loss of both shipbuilding facilities and experience, is going to be scaling back to a NATO-style smaller, defence-oriented fleet with a nuclear deterrence componnent.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Reeks of overstated alarmism on the strength of one report and one silly antecdote from years ago. The fleet won't "die", what will most likely occur is that it's going to be smaller than it is now for a period of time in the 'null' period between the current ship classes exceed their service life and the shipyards (which are all still working, either completing foreign orders - of which there are a considerable number - or ever increasing domestic numbers) rebuild their old capacity and are able to meet the Navy's need for new ships in considerable volume (as economics allow).

But there are new ship classes for pretty much every type of ship the Russian Navy (with the exception of destroyers) currently under construction.

I fail to see how a smaller fleet is supposed to be some sort of disaster or 'death'. Russia's navy is the least important part of its military, and the nuclear deterrent which forms (its most important) part of it is secure for the foreseeable future thanks to the Delta IV force + Sineva and the Borey + Bulava (despite its numerous failures, it's too important to fail so they'll keep doing it until getting it right, and have plenty of time to do so).

I wasn't aware of any plans for new cruisers.

The cruiser fleet is quite secure for the short term at least, seeing as, rather than losing Pyotr Velikiy, they're about to see two more Kirovs join the fleet, one this year and one next if the schedule holds. And all there really are is the Kirovs and the Slavas; there are only two cruisers from an older class in service and those cruisers are the size of some US destroyers anyway, so they could be easily replaced in their effective roles by a new destroyer design.

[Sea Skimmer]

But there are new ship classes for pretty much every type of ship the Russian Navy (with the exception of destroyers) currently under construction.

No carriers, no cruisers, no destroyers, no amphibious warfare ships. In other words all the assets of a major surface fleet are missing. Instead Russia is building frigates and small corvettes, which are fine, but they need to lay down at least one frigate and two corvettes per year to sustain the numbers required for even a basic capability in each of the four fleets. So far they have barely even begun to fund that level of construction.

[Vympel]

No carriers, no cruisers, no destroyers, no amphibious warfare ships. In other words all the assets of a major surface fleet are missing. Instead Russia is building frigates and small corvettes, which are fine, but they need to lay down at least one frigate and two corvettes per year to sustain the numbers required for even a basic capability in each of the four fleets. So far they have barely even begun to fund that level of construction.

I don't consider cruisers or carriers to be a noteworthy omission. The USSR only ever had a handful of cruisers before the end, and the majority of them are still in service with a secure future past the short term (especially the Kirovs). As for amphibious warfare, the Yantar shipyard is building the first Project 11711 Ivan Gren LST for commission by 2012, so there's that.

[Pelranius]

Where are the plans to build a dedicated anti aircraft destroyer?

If the Chinese can cobble together the 051C DDG, it shouldn't that hard for Russia to at least produce something similar.

[Pelranius]

And what about a replacement for the Ivan Rogov class (Project 1174)? It's nearly three times as large as the 11711 and there's only one left now.

[Vympel]

Where are the plans to build a dedicated anti aircraft destroyer?

Plenty of draft designs, none funded at this stage. The shipyards aren't exactly idle, they're all busy anyway.

I'm not aware of any plans for a new LSD class, at this time. They only ever had 3 anyway, and only two are still in existence, doing Not Much. They're also building a new class of small, fast landing ships (Project 21820). See here for a relatively recent look at what the shipyards are doing:-

Link

Note:-

*Yuri Dolgoruki is finished and is doing sea trials;
*Sankt Petersburg is finished and in service;
*Steregushcy is finished and in service;
*Yaroslav Mudry is finished;
*Dagestan is finished; and
*Nerpa is finished (suffered a fire during sea trials, went back to dock, has since returned to sea trials).

[Bounty]

So... what would these ships be useful for? Threatening the US so they have an excuse to build more ships? Why does Russia need to spend money on giant floating penis compensators that rust in the harbours when the economy is in the shits as it is?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

So... what would these ships be useful for? Threatening the US so they have an excuse to build more ships? Why does Russia need to spend money on giant floating penis compensators that rust in the harbours when the economy is in the shits as it is?

Aside from ensuring the yard workers have jobs as well as the designers and keeping technical knowhow maintained, it helps make sure the US doesn't get bright ideas of its own, like during the 90s. Defence is about deterrence, in case you have forgotten. Unlike say the UK which is more than happy to allow its technical knowhow decay over the decades.

[Bounty]

Deterrence is all nice and well but you have to be able to afford it first. The Russian Navy, from what I recall, is pretty much broke as-is, and the country itself isn't doing all that hot either. If you're going to spend money, wouldn't it be better spent on, I don't know, infrastructure? That creates just as many jobs and you end up with something that's actually useful - rather than, as today, ships rusting in port and unpaid sailors.

Keeping technical know-how maintained doesn't require you to build oodles of giant ships, does it?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Deterrence is all nice and well but you have to be able to afford it first.

That doesn't work in the real world and you damn well know it. If that were true, the Chinese wouldn't bother to boost their arms spending to protect their own lines of communication, since it has plenty of infrastructure projects to dabble with as it is. The United States continues to compete for influence at all quarters, and what do you expect people to do? Sit down and play dumb?

The Russian Navy, from what I recall, is pretty much broke as-is, and the country itself isn't doing all that hot either. If you're going to spend money, wouldn't it be better spent on, I don't know, infrastructure? That creates just as many jobs and you end up with something that's actually useful - rather than, as today, ships rusting in port and unpaid sailors.

It works both ways.

Keeping technical know-how maintained doesn't require you to build oodles of giant ships, does it?

Russia's main defence capability is its nukes, so obviously it must retain the technical know-how to build the delivery systems.

[K. A. Pital]

Vympel, to be fair the Ivan Gren is a rather small LST; Rogov's were almost proper LPDs, pretty huge.

I don't think it's cool that destroyers and cruisers are not built. These combatants are important for survivability of the fleet groups, and the rest.

[Vympel]

Vympel, to be fair the Ivan Gren is a rather small LST; Rogov's were almost proper LPDs, pretty huge.

Yeah, they're entirely different roles, but they still fall under amphibious warfare is all I was saying. I'm not convinced Russia really needs LPDs though. The Project 775 LSTs get the biggest workout and they're the ones that need replacement first, I think. The USSR had 28 of them as opposed to merely 3 LPDs, after all.

I don't think it's cool that destroyers and cruisers are not built. These combatants are important for survivability of the fleet groups, and the rest.

They'll get around to it, I'm sure. Given the progression of ship building the most important thing they can do now is focus on re-building their small combatant forces. The new Project 22350 frigates they're building now are much more capable than the 'Krivak' types that made up the bulk of the late Soviet fleet, and those old things need urgent replacement. Their firepower in all departments is just leagues ahead.

Besides, the Peter the Great and Admiral Nakhimov virtually alone make up a huge part of the survivability of the fleet (in the North, anyway) - especially the latter given the extensive modernization it's going through. Hopefully Admiral Lazarev gets the same treatment, or alternately the Admiral Nakhimov is moved to the Pacific.

A little run down of new design ships Russia has in the works at the moment AFAIK (feel free to add):-

SSBN

Project 955 (1x completed, 2x under construction, additional units planned)

SSGN

None. Project 949A to remain the sole pure-SSGN for the foreseeable future.

SSN /SSGN

Project 855 (1x under construction, at least 6x units planned)

SSK

Project 677 (1x completed, 2x under construction, additional units planned)

Carriers

None.

Cruisers

None. Kirovs + Slavas to remain sole cruisers for foreseeable future.

Destroyers

None.

Frigates

Project 22350 (1x under construction, additional units planned)

Corvettes/ Patrol Ships

Project 20380 (1x completed, 4x under construction)

Patrol Craft

Project 21630 (at least 1x completed, 2x under construction/ almost completed, additional units planned)

Project 12300? (unknown)

LST

Project 11711 (1x under construction, additional units planned)