Ted Kennedy and the ABM system

[Stuart]

IIRC the US ABM was scrapped mainly because the later generations of Soviet ICBM had enough MIRV capacity to drown it in targets. A 1:1 exchange ratio was OK but a 10:1 (or 50:1 when decoys and other countermeasures are factored in) made it to expensive.

Not so, that's a McNamara myth. In fact, the ABM shoots the inbound missile down before it starts to discharge its warheads. I've already posted the range data that shows how that's done. MIRVs are only effective in the absence of ABM and the fact that McNamara wanted MIRV (because ICBMs are actually a very expensive way of launching warheads and he wanted to cut costs) meant he had to kill ABM.

Decoys and countermeasures don't work. They don't now and never have.

Also the US ABM defence was deployed around one of the US ICBM sites to insure second strike capacity - something the expanding SSBN fleet also provided. Had the US deployed it's ABM defence around a major city rather than a military base it would have been politicaly harder to close the project down.

I'm afraid that's untrue. The original missile defense schemes envisaged defense for the whole country. It was scaled back to a single missile site as a compromise.

With the spread of nuke armed long range missiles the even a primitive ABM is of value, the Russians kept and still keep their old ABM defence of Moscow.

Agreed.

Were decoys and countermeasures effective back then?

No, they never have been effective and the people who promote the idea that decoys and countermeasures are effective know it. they are deliberately lying in the belief that their opponents can't prove otherwise without disclosing classified information. In fact, you can use this as a touchstone, if somebody starts telling you that decoys and countermeasures will vitiate the effectiveness of ABM systems, they are either utterly ignorant or deliberately lying.

As a simple example, the problems of seperating decoys from a RV have yet to be solved. It's very tough to do and most tests involving such efforts have failed. There has yet to be a decoy that cannot be very quickly and easily distinguised from a real RV. Countermeasures have also failed. Chaff doesn't work nothing does. The only decoy/countermeasure that might work is to have an RV that is exactly the same size, weight, weight distribution, shape, temperature and temperature distribution, flight path and flight path characteristics as a warhead. If you're going to so all that, why not just use another warhead? hello MIRV.

[phongn]

Except nukes are targeted. This is like saying being shot at by nuclear missiles is like falling down the stairs - it's something that happens by accident.

Such a system does buy more time for the powers that be if there is, for example, misidentification of a rocket (e.g. the 1995 Black Brant incident) or malfunction of early warning systems (e.g. the 1983 incident). The "is this prelude to an attack and do we launch right now?" impetus is lessened with defenses. In the worst case, it's certain possible (and hopefully improbable!) that a real launch could happen by accident.

[MKSheppard]

As a simple example, the problems of seperating decoys from a RV have yet to be solved. It's very tough to do and most tests involving such efforts have failed.

I assume you meant "reliably separating decoys from a missile bus" -- because the British did deploy Chevaline, which means that some of the problems releasing the decoys from the missile bus were solved -- but not all of them -- here's a diagram from Wikipedia -- I know I know I know, I shall face the mountain and say pennance.

Link to Chevaline Deployment Sequence

If you said "Gee, Shep, that looks horribly complicated", then you're right.

[Stuart]

I assume you meant "reliably separating decoys from a missile bus" -- because the British did deploy Chevaline, which means that some of the problems releasing the decoys from the missile bus were solved -- but not all of them. (SNIP) If you said "Gee, Shep, that looks horribly complicated", then you're right.

gee Shep, that looks horribly complicated

In fact, Chevaline didn't work at all well. There were several problems, one of them being that chaff clouds really don't work very well in space. The chaff clumps and sticks into agglomerates rather than dispersing smoothly. Baloons etc don't seperate from the bus and don't inflate right (or burst on the spot). The idea of using the rentry bus as a decoy was a complete failure. The basic problem was that the people who designed the system had no real idea of what target discrimination capabilities were available. Worse, they thought they could apply aircraft decoying and deception technologies to the space environment and that was a bad idea in itself, forgetting the fact that the aviation industry was already a long way behind the curve and drifting steadily further back. It's worth noting that none of these ideas were inserted into the British version of Trident.

[erik_t]

Well, to toss my own hat into the ring, any decoy of any worth must withstand radar tracking. Any real RV is going to be coated in a carbon phenolic ablative material, which I suspect has some interesting reflectivity characteristics depending on the interrogating radar's wavelength. Assuming an intelligent defender will make use of this and have two or three radar systems of different wavelength (presumably a single large search system and some kind of discriminating searchlights), you essentially need to use actual ablative material to coat your decoy*. To match the overall RCS, you now need to have your decoy be the same size as the real thing. Creating a folding decoy made of carbon-phenolic ablator would be possible in principle but a nightmare in practice. Even for a decoy that will 100% fail as it hits the fringes of atmosphere, you've used the bus volume of a real RV.

I don't have any good sources for nuke RV cost vs cost of the launch vehicle, but I doubt that launching a 1n+7d ICBM would be massively cheaper than a 8n+0d one.



* Life gets vastly worse as additional functional colors are added, like several bands of IR. Even the blackbody glow of an RV in hard vacuum should allow material discrimination with a multicolored instrument.

[Questor]

I'm afraid that's untrue. The original missile defense schemes envisaged defense for the whole country. It was scaled back to a single missile site as a compromise.

I'm curious, are there any good books about this event? I can see a number of reasons why (politically) congresscritters might have wanted the compromise, but am curious which ones were actually the case. I'm assuming (as I do below) that there was actually some kind of thought behind it, of course.

No, they never have been effective and the people who promote the idea that decoys and countermeasures are effective know it. they are deliberately lying in the belief that their opponents can't prove otherwise without disclosing classified information.

I'm curious, what are their motivations? Do they have some kind of rational thought process, or is it just a case of "I'm against it because they are for it" the way a lot of policy seems to be made these days?

[D.Turtle]

Well, here in Germany most of the opposition to ABM-Systems come from a viewpoint of not changing something that has worked for 50 years.

So they want to stop ABM, because it will be a massive change in the status quo. At that point its simply looking for reasons to do so.

[Uraniun235]

I would guess that they're afraid of the perception of nuclear warfare changing - afraid that if civilian leaders don't think they have to worry about escalation being instant and fatal, they might be willing to act more aggressively and thereby increase the threat of war breaking out.

Alternately, they may also fear (rationally or not) that an effective ABM system would invite new arms races, wherein each side attempts to outstrip the other's defensive capacity.

[MKSheppard]

Baloons etc don't seperate from the bus and don't inflate right (or burst on the spot).

Let me guess:

1.) Separation Problems -- The decoys don't have enough toughness in order to be separated reliably from the bus -- e,g you can't just literally kick them off the bus like you can with a warhead, due to the decoys having to be lightweight or small in size to stuff as many into the missile bus carriage volume, what would cause a RV to separate from the bus would tear a decoy in half. You could probably solve this problem by making it an inflatable balloon with a metallic base; but that would increase weight of the decoys, and reduce the number you could carry.

2.) Don't inflate right/Burst on the Spot -- This is probably related to two things:

a.) huge pressure differential -- you're trying to inflate a balloon with a massive differential between space and inside the balloon.

b.) speed of inflation -- you have to inflate the balloon fast enough so that it can quickly take the shape of a re-entry vehicle -- because otherwise, the defender's radars, etc will see a slowly growing target and go "aha, this is a decoy"; so they have to "snap" into shape in very very short times; thus they burst. This could be solved by using thicker balloon wall material, but we come back to that argument again -- increased weight -- less decoys carried.

[Simon_Jester]

No, they never have been effective and the people who promote the idea that decoys and countermeasures are effective know it. they are deliberately lying in the belief that their opponents can't prove otherwise without disclosing classified information.

I'm curious, what are their motivations? Do they have some kind of rational thought process, or is it just a case of "I'm against it because they are for it" the way a lot of policy seems to be made these days?

I second this question.

I'd also very much like to know what the boundaries of the unclassified information are here; if knowing most of the unclassified information about ABM and most of the unclassified information about countermeasures should logically lead people to support ABM systems.

For myself, I've been cautiously in favor of ABM systems for a long time if they work, and I have no freaking clue whether or not they work because I don't know where to start digging for information other than taking the word of whoever sounds authoritative on it.

I would guess that they're afraid of the perception of nuclear warfare changing - afraid that if civilian leaders don't think they have to worry about escalation being instant and fatal, they might be willing to act more aggressively and thereby increase the threat of war breaking out.

Alternately, they may also fear (rationally or not) that an effective ABM system would invite new arms races, wherein each side attempts to outstrip the other's defensive capacity.

I think those are legitimate worries- not necessarily all-encompassing worries that trump everything else, but sane things to care about.

[Samuel]

Alternately, they may also fear (rationally or not) that an effective ABM system would invite new arms races, wherein each side attempts to outstrip the other's defensive capacity.

... it does do that. If you make ICBMs obsolete, people will concentrate more on methods that can get through. Of course the benefit of this is the US has more money.

[Simon_Jester]

What if it encourages them to try sneaking the bombs in and delivering them by hand? If that can be done at all it's going to be fairly cheap, and we're not going to be especially good at stopping it.

Doesn't do much to knock down our second strike capability, but not a great improvement if it's civilian megadeaths you're worried about.

[FedRebel]

What if it encourages them to try sneaking the bombs in and delivering them by hand? If that can be done at all it's going to be fairly cheap, and we're not going to be especially good at stopping it.

'sneaking' a nuke into a country is extremely difficult, that pesky radiation is relatively easy to spot

If missiles are effectively obsolete, the logical alternative platform is the Bomber

Bombers are relatively stressful on an air defense system as they can maneuver and deploy countermeasures, furthermore future bomber platforms would fly higher and faster, requiring totally new air defense systems built from scratch to be capable of coping with the new threat

[[R_H]]

Well, here in Germany most of the opposition to ABM-Systems come from a viewpoint of not changing something that has worked for 50 years.

So they want to stop ABM, because it will be a massive change in the status quo. At that point its simply looking for reasons to do so.

But I thought Germans loved hope and change. I guess proponents of ABM systems could point out that people don't oppose everything that changes the status quo, so why single out ABM? Is this opposition against Germany developing it's own ABM, or against the America?

[Simon_Jester]

'sneaking' a nuke into a country is extremely difficult, that pesky radiation is relatively easy to spot

I'd hope so, but the track record of US customs does not give me great confidence on the subject.

[Stuart]

I'm curious, are there any good books about this event? I can see a number of reasons why (politically) congresscritters might have wanted the compromise, but am curious which ones were actually the case. I'm assuming (as I do below) that there was actually some kind of thought behind it, of course.

The best book on this subject is "Shield of Faith" by B Bruce-Briggs. It's a very good opening primer and goes into the motivations of the anti-defense crowd quite well. I used to work with Briggsy, we disagree on a lot but his book is still a very useful volume.

I'm curious, what are their motivations? Do they have some kind of rational thought process, or is it just a case of "I'm against it because they are for it" the way a lot of policy seems to be made these days?

It's a whole mix of things. Some people wanted the deployment of ABM stopped so they could use the money for other things that they regarded as being more important. Others were opposed to anything nuclear and wanted them stopped regardless of what they were (essentially such people didn't distinguise between offensive and defensive systems). Others didn't understand the technologies used so they simply assumed new = bad. More just blindly opposed every new weapons program regardless of facts or needs. Others realized that the deployment of ABM would give the United States a major strategic advantage over the USSR and they didn't want that to happen. The one common factor to them all is that they treat technological objections to ABM as tools to be made up when needed. The truth is that there is not one technological objection to ABM that holds up under close inspection

[Stuart]

What if it encourages them to try sneaking the bombs in and delivering them by hand? If that can be done at all it's going to be fairly cheap, and we're not going to be especially good at stopping it.

Give you an example. In December 2001, New York was throwing its annual New Year's party but they were afraid somebody would smuggle a nuclear device into New York and initiate it during said party. So, the NYPD asked for help. Border Control turned up with 7,000 radiation detectors.

Just a thought for you. Do you know what happens to every merchant ship that approaches U.S. waters?

Border interception is actually pretty good. The comparison people use in this subject is usually drugs or illegal immigrants with the argument 'if they can't stop those how aan they stop that.'. This argument is completely illogical. Drugs and illegals are high-volume commodities, it doesn't matter if a certain proportion get caught because the rest get through. There are few serious consequences to finding supplies, sure a few mules go to jail but the value of the lost goods is simply made up by increasing the price of the rest.

A nuclear device is a single, ultra-high value object that, if it is found, will immediately identify the people who supplied it. That country will promptly cease to exist. SO, the probability of detection is high and the consequences of detection are nightmarish. To get an idea, imagine the narco-state of Coluelador. That country produces cocaine. How willing will the people in that state be to try and smuggle cocaine to the United States if every gram is immediately traceable back to the source and the discovery of as much as a single gram of that cocaine will result in the immediate nuclear destruction of Coluelador? No if, buts or maybes. One border control agent finds one gram of cocaine and WHAM Coluelador ceases to exist.

Smuggling a nuclear weapon into the United States isn't a realistic possibility. It might happen (it's quite possible although very unlikely somebody tried and they and their weapon vanished. If so, we'll almost certainly never find out about it.) What is a realistic possibility is that somebody might build a nuclear device in this country from things that are relatively easily available. That's a much greater concern.

[erik_t]

Getting a device in from Canada would be trivially easy; for this reason I consider the Canadian border, from a defense perspective, more critical than our own northern border. Toss a SADM or two into a canoe and bounce through the no-shit wildernesses of the Boundary Waters. Border enforcement and customs are, no shit, on an honor system.

I am sure there are a dozen other easy spots to sneak across that border, but that frontier is certainly one of them.

[D.Turtle]

But I thought Germans loved hope and change. I guess proponents of ABM systems could point out that people don't oppose everything that changes the status quo, so why single out ABM? Is this opposition against Germany developing it's own ABM, or against the America?

Its opposition against anybody employing ABM anywhere. ABM is a game changer.

So far the game has worked, so a game changer is BAD.

[[R_H]]

Its opposition against anybody employing ABM anywhere. ABM is a game changer.

So far the game has worked, so a game changer is BAD.

That's, IMO, pretty close minded and, well stupid, almost as dumb as "disproportionate" force. Who does this opposition come from? And are they unaware that ABM is already employed, and was the subject of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which was signed in 1972? Besides, Patriot, SM-3, S-300/400, Arrow and in the near future THAAD and MEADS all have ABM capability.

[Stuart]

Its opposition against anybody employing ABM anywhere. ABM is a game changer. So far the game has worked, so a game changer is BAD.

Do the people involved realize how narrow the margin between us and a nuclear war was? On occasion it boiled down to one person making the right decision (or the right person being drunk and incapable so he couldn't make the wrong decision). On at least one occasion the presence of an ABM system around Moscow provided the necessary rational to preventa nuclear exchange (it's one missile, ABM Moscow can handle it, we can afford to wait).

Do these people also realize that the game has changed? In the Cold War, the people on both sides were cold-hearted, rational professionals who didn't want to start a war and went to great lengths not to. Despite that we came close on more occasions than you'll ever know about (and if you think being nuked is bad, try being nuked because of a misunderstanding over a Canada Goose). Now, the people on teh other side are irrational and a goodly proportion of them are part of a death-cult. They don't mind dying as long as they take us with them. The game has changed, ABM is a reaction to that change.

So, ABM would have made the world a lot safer in the Cold War and it would make it much safer again in the years to come.

[Serafina]

If anything, now is the best time to build ABM.

During the Cold War, it could have unsettled the balance by removing MAD.
But right know, a nuclear war between any major powers is out of the question anyway.
That leaves any major power to get their own ABM-coverage.

And you can hardly argue that the avaibility of ABM will provoke nuclear wars if both sides have them.
But it certainly reduces the danger of errors and the threath of rogue-entitiy- controlled nukes.

[Anguirus]

If anything, now is the best time to build ABM.

Financial chaos notwithstanding?

Look, I am pretty ignorant when it comes to ballistic missile technology, and I certainly cede to Stuart's expertise. But at this very moment there are many expensive things that I prize more than ABM, such as UHC, fixing the broken economy, improving our infrastructure, fighting our massive deficit, foreign relief efforts, improving American education, going to the Moon and Mars, building nuclear/alternative energy plants, or even a few more F-22s if there's still somehow money around.

From this liberal's perspective, it's not that ABM is bad, evil, or not likely to work. It's just that there are far more important things out there to spend money on. Especially since, frankly, I don't buy that the "death cultists" of Iran are going to toss a nuke our way anytime soon when they can't even manage to get one of their cronies elected president without massive social unrest. North Korea is in even worse shape.

[Samuel]

going to the Moon and Mars,

I'm pretty sure ABM is a higher priority than a manned mission to Mars.

Getting a device in from Canada would be trivially easy; for this reason I consider the Canadian border, from a defense perspective, more critical than our own northern border. Toss a SADM or two into a canoe and bounce through the no-shit wildernesses of the Boundary Waters. Border enforcement and customs are, no shit, on an honor system.

I am sure there are a dozen other easy spots to sneak across that border, but that frontier is certainly one of them.

Yeah, but how big are we talking?

[Serafina]

If anything, now is the best time to build ABM.

Financial chaos notwithstanding?

No, of course not - spending tremendous amouns of money on ABM would be a very bad idea.

However, my points are still valid - there hardly would be a political crisis for buidling ABMs now, or at least they would be way smaller than during the cold war.