Ted Kennedy and the ABM system

[Seggybop]

Sorry to throw in another random question, but could someone give a link or briefly explain why ABM means we replace all the missiles with bombers? My entirely ignorant expectation is that if you have the capability to shoot down tiny hypersonic targets in space, destroying relatively large, slow manned bombers would be trivial.

[Starglider]

Sorry to throw in another random question, but could someone give a link or briefly explain why ABM means we replace all the missiles with bombers? My entirely ignorant expectation is that if you have the capability to shoot down tiny hypersonic targets in space, destroying relatively large, slow manned bombers would be trivial.

The critical difference is that the RVs don't have significant maneuvering capability. Once you spot them on radar, you know their exact trajectory, and as long as you can get an interceptor to cross some point on that trajectory before they get too close to the target, you will most likely destroy them (you double up on missiles fired and deploy a second point defence layer if you want to be sure). If a bomber sees you shooting SAMs at it (which it will), they will alter course. So your missile has to alter course. So the bomber alters course again; your missile has to be continously powered and guided, and capable of fairly sharp terminal maneuvers. That greatly reduces its effective range (remember, it's flying down in the stratosphere, not going almost straight up into the exosphere like an ABM).

The range of ballistic trajectories between an ICBM launch site (or even practical SLBM launch sites) and any given target is quite limited, compared to all the routes a bomber could take. The combination of low missile range and lots of threat vectors means you need a lot more missile sites. The radar horizon for tracking even a high-altitude bomber is much shorter than for a suborbital RV, so you need a lot more radar sites too. Then the bombers start deploying active countermeasures; powerful jammers (vastly moreso than anything you could fit on an ICBM bus), bomber-defence missiles to shoot down your SAMs (which the B-70 was going to have) and anti-radiation missiles to kill your SAM sites. Finally they might go low-level, forcing you to rely on (vulnerable and limited) airborne radars to detect them, use cruise missiles or toss bombing to avoid getting within the range of point defences, or just rely on stealth to avoid detection entirely (or at least a fix good enough to send a SAM after them).

Stuart posted some good analysis of air defence network costs vs ABM costs in an old thread, sadly I can't recall which one, but comprehensive defence against B-70 class bombers was something like an order of magnitude more expensive than comprehensive ABM coverage. That was the 1970s situation - I'm sure that throwing in B-1s doing supersonic low level dashes and near-invisible B-2s skulking about nuking the command and control centers hasn't improved the situation in favor of the ICBMs.

[Anguirus]

He recommended some books (e.g. Shield of Faith, Wizards of Armageddon), I bought them and read them.

Thanks for the titles. I don't know when or if I'll have the time in the near future to bone up on it, but when I do I may shoot you a PM.

[Samuel]

This thread:
http://bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic.php?t=103338

It starts halfway down page 2 with Stas.

[D.Turtle]

Ah... this is not my understanding of events. Could you explain the argument to me, preferably with some numbers?

Basically, the reparations caused or were used as an excuse for the policies that lead to the hyperinflation of the early 1920s which pretty much demolished any trust most people had in the Weimar Republic.

In addition, the fact that most reparations had to be payed in foreign currency, made the german economy and state highly dependent on exports and foreign credits (especially from the US). The crash of 1929 and the financial crisis caused lots of short-term credits - which were made to pay for the reparations - to be called in, leading to the collapse of the german banking system and the severe depression of the 1930's. Ironically, this caused the annulling of pretty much all remaining reparations, but the damage to the german economy was done.

Hm, no numbers in there, but I think the general idea gets across.

[Simon_Jester]

A few questions:
-Was the Nazi Party politically irrelevant before the economy started to come apart in the '30s?
-What was the net rate of payments at various times during the interwar period? My understanding is that the net rate of payments was generally low or in Germany's favor for most of that time.
-Is there any way to determine how much of the damage done to the German economy was due to the reparations, and how much was due to other factors (the worldwide crash of 1929, the economic strain caused by fighting World War I)?

[Stark]

Don't forget that the whole reparations thing was stupid and basically the Allies would have lost nothing except French pride by ignoring it. It's very arguable whether it'd have any impact on the Nazis or WW2, but the idea of demanding piles of money from Germany that it then paid with loans from the Allies it could never pay back was retarded. After they destroyed the economy they waived the rest, so ...

[[R_H]]

What kind of an arms race would ABM restart, strategic bombers?

More nukes, bombers, conventional forces.

So, for example, if Europe has ABM, countries like Iran would bother expanding their conventional forces? I can only see conventional forces expanding (still talking about about Europe) if it's Russia, or some country that can project enough power or a country that can easily invade/attack Europe.

It's not that simple. One thing Stuart isn't saying here, but which he's almost certainly thinking, is that ABM will force a whole series of second and third tier nations to give up on challenging the hegemon (that's the US).

I get that. What I was asking was, if Europe has ABM, would that trigger an arms race with say Iran? Would Iran start building strategic bombers and increasing the size (and capabilities) of its ground forces? For that matter, would Russia do so? The part of my post quoted above was clumsily worded, and at the time I was thinking (for what ever reason) more along the lines of "conventional forces = armoured vehicles" and "arms race = more and better armoured vehicles".

We're in this situation because ICBMs in the absence of ABM make excellent and relatively cheap blackmail tools. Even being able to say 'my big conventional army could invade your regional ally and destroy lots of infrastructure before you can push us out' - which is the best a conventional arms build-up is going to get you - that pales into insigificance, in poltical terms, compared to 'if you don't give in to my demands I will destroy your major cities'. Stuart and most of his colleagues are maximal realists, they believe that nations will only challenge the hegemon if it looks weak, and lack of ABM effectively gives the US a massive weak spot. Proliferation of missile technology means the tools for exploiting that are getting pretty cheap, so lots of little nations are deciding to 'challenge the hegemon'.

I understand that.

By contrast, developing intercontinental bombers and cruise missiles, capable of penetrating a modern air defence network, plus their logistics base and the trained personnel to operate them, is extremely expensive.

If things went back/more to bombers and cruise missiles, wouldn't the US have a disadvantage compared to Russia in the ground based portion of air defence?

It's on a par with developing a carrier strike force capable of constant presence in potential trouble spots - and only the US has managed that, with only a few of the biggest and richest powers with any hint of matching that capability (and most of those are US allies). ABM does in fact help to promote and maintain US dominance, even if everyone gets it and the US gets rid of all its ICBMs. Maximal realism predicts that if you take the affordable opportunities away, they'll give up and start co-operating instead (or at least avoid overt challenges).

I suppose some (on this board, and IRL) would have a problem with it promoting and maintaining American dominance.

All that said, even if you're dead set against the idea of US dominance, turning the world into a nuclear powder keg by letting tinpot dictators and religious nuts acquire ICBMs with no defence... any sane person should agree that that is far worse.

I agree.

[Simon_Jester]

Stuart, I had a thought about your comments on the ABM debate.

From what you're saying, ABM is an extremely good idea, and a major reason so many people don't realize it is because they don't have access to the classified information that would tell them what a good idea it is. You say that they don't realize that the systems can work at a reasonable price, and they don't realize how much more likely a nuclear attack is than they expect.

It occurs to me that there's another big weakness in the US's defenses here aside from the lack of ABM systems. When fundamental information about not only the US's strategic situation, but also the history of its strategic situation is classified, to the point where China could point missiles straight at us to threaten us away from Taiwan without the general public finding out for over a decade, it creates a problem. Intelligent people acting in good faith who don't have access to that information will make big mistakes, push for the wrong strategies, and often get those strategies enacted.

I think that's a major weakness of classifying certain kinds of information. I can easily see ways that we could suffer as a country from not having enough information to put together a clear picture of our own recent history. Or from not having a broadly realistic picture of the capabilities of our own weapons. To stretch a metaphor, not only does the right hand not know what the left hand is doing, but the body is deluded about what the hands are capable of, and either forces them to do much or fails to use them properly to do things well within their power.
_________

And sometimes it may not even be in our interest to keep that level of basic information from the enemy. For an example of why I say that, I'm going to mention the Cold War USSR. They were extremely secretive about their political system and their goals. On the one hand, that made it harder for us to affect the upper levels of their government, and harder to block their plans. But on the other, it left a big blank spot in the middle of our assessment of them, one that we tended to fill in with the worst possible scenario. So many powerful Americans were acting on the assumption that the Soviets of the '50s and '60s were a monstrous conspiracy bent on overthrowing the entire world for the glory of communism... whether they really were or not.

I think that level of profound strategic misinformation makes war more likely, not less.

[Surlethe]

For your information, it's a standing rule. One never, ever plans on enemy intentions, one always plans on the basis of their capabilities.

Question, Stuart (since you worked with Bruce-Riggs): Do we apply the same level of suspicion to our nuclear allies?

I'm willing to guess that we don't because of the reason they're our allies: their geopolitical interests largely align with ours. We're suspicious of them to the extent that their interests disagree with us, and count on them to the extent that their interests agree with us.

[D.Turtle]

A few questions:
-Was the Nazi Party politically irrelevant before the economy started to come apart in the '30s?

They were severely weakened. In the 1928 elections, they got only 2.6% of the votes. 1930 they got 18.3% of the votes and were the second strongest party. This was mostly due to attacking the Young Plan and slightly toning down the antisemitism a bit.
July 31, 1932 they got 37.4% of the votes and were the strongest party.

What was the net rate of payments at various times during the interwar period? My understanding is that the net rate of payments was generally low or in Germany's favor for most of that time.

Well, the Versailles treaty first of all removed all colonial possessions, claimed most of the merchant marine, claimed some of Germany, and threatened to (and later did) occupy other parts of Germany. So there is lots of economic damage through those measures already.
In addition, the Versailles Treaty required a payment of 20 Billion Goldmarks (the equivalent of seven thousand tons of Gold) until 1921.
In 1920/21 additional payment of 226 Billion Goldmarks plus 12% of exports for 42 years was decided. This lead to the collapse of the government and the occupation of Duisburg and Düsseldorf.
Following that, the reparations were lowered to 132 Billion Goldmarks (the equivalent of 47 thousand tons of gold) over 66 years - 2 Billion Goldmarks a year - plus 26% of exports.
In 1923 they were a bit late in paying, and the Ruhr area was occupied.
In 1924 the Dawes Plan was implemented, which included a payment of 1 Billion Goldmarks in 1924, growing to 2.5 Billion Goldmarks in 1928, at which level it would stay. No end date was included. The payments were supposed to be 55% money, 45% in kind.
In 1929 the Young Plan was implemented, which included a total of 112 Billion Goldmark over 59 years.
In 1931 all payments were stopped for one year under the american Hoover administration.
In 1932 all state reparations were annulled for a final payment of 3 Billion Goldmarks (that was never payed).

Is there any way to determine how much of the damage done to the German economy was due to the reparations, and how much was due to other factors (the worldwide crash of 1929, the economic strain caused by fighting World War I)?

Not definitely.

[Simon_Jester]

A few questions:
-Was the Nazi Party politically irrelevant before the economy started to come apart in the '30s?

They were severely weakened. In the 1928 elections, they got only 2.6% of the votes. 1930 they got 18.3% of the votes and were the second strongest party. This was mostly due to attacking the Young Plan and slightly toning down the antisemitism a bit.
July 31, 1932 they got 37.4% of the votes and were the strongest party.

What I'm getting at is that even if the economy had stayed more or less steady, I can still imagine the Nazis having taken power. They had at least some support, and they had plenty of issues to push other than blaming the Weimar government for the state of the economy.

What was the net rate of payments at various times during the interwar period? My understanding is that the net rate of payments was generally low or in Germany's favor for most of that time.

I'm sorry, I didn't phrase my question clearly enough. "Net" payments does not just mean "how much money did I pay." It means "how much money did I pay, minus the money I received." How much of those payments were money actually leaving Germany, as opposed to money leaving Germany to be used by Britain and France to pay off American debtors who would then lend it back to Germany?

Is there any way to determine how much of the damage done to the German economy was due to the reparations, and how much was due to other factors (the worldwide crash of 1929, the economic strain caused by fighting World War I)?

Not definitely.

Well since those other factors managed to more or less gut the economies of other nations that weren't paying reparations, it wouldn't surprise me to learn that the German economy would have been in bad shape even if it weren't for the reparations.

I agree that the reparations demands were a truly bad idea. But I don't think they were damaging enough by themselves to be a good explanation for the war. There were a lot of other things going on.

[Thanas]

What I'm getting at is that even if the economy had stayed more or less steady, I can still imagine the Nazis having taken power. They had at least some support, and they had plenty of issues to push other than blaming the Weimar government for the state of the economy.

No way. It was massive unemployment that caused the populace to abandon Weimar in the first place, as well as destroying the credibility of the two major political parties.

Well since those other factors managed to more or less gut the economies of other nations that weren't paying reparations, it wouldn't surprise me to learn that the German economy would have been in bad shape even if it weren't for the reparations.

And your source on the state of the german economy is.....?

[CJvR]

...I can still imagine the Nazis having taken power. They had at least some support, and they had plenty of issues to push other than blaming the Weimar government for the state of the economy.

No I don't think so. Desperate times are needed for a larger segment of the population to go to the political radicals. Without the economic crisis the nazis would have been nothing more than a whiny gang of fringe lunatics. One cant help wonder if the Versailles powers had been willing to offer half the concessions in the 1920'ies to the Republic that they offered to the Nazis in the 1930'ies, would the the Weimar Republic have had enough prestige and support to weather the crisis - things were turning around in 33.

[Simon_Jester]

Well since those other factors managed to more or less gut the economies of other nations that weren't paying reparations, it wouldn't surprise me to learn that the German economy would have been in bad shape even if it weren't for the reparations.

And your source on the state of the german economy is.....?

Thanas, you may not have noticed, but I'm not making a positive statement here of the form "I know that the German economy was in state X for reason Y." I'm making a negative statement, of the form "I don't know that the German economy entered state X for reason Y."

It's definitely true that some broadly similar things happened to the economy of other places where "reason Y" does not apply; Germany isn't the only country whose economy fell apart in the 1930s. And that's about all I know. The sources I have and know where to look for are diffuse and very, very general, which is why I brought this up in the first place.

Now if you know that the German economy entered state X (economic collapse) for reason Y (reparations payments), I'd like to hear your analysis. But unless you intend to offer such an analysis or point me to someone else's, I must ask if you expect me to believe with absolute confidence that Y -> X just because a lot of people have said so, especially in light of the fact that a lot of people have also said it isn't so?

Much the same goes for the way the economic collapse promoted the Nazis. If you know with great certainty that the collapse was vital to the Nazis' success, and it sounds like you do, I'd like to hear the analysis on that in more depth.

[Thanas]

Well since those other factors managed to more or less gut the economies of other nations that weren't paying reparations, it wouldn't surprise me to learn that the German economy would have been in bad shape even if it weren't for the reparations.

And your source on the state of the german economy is.....?

Thanas, you may not have noticed, but I'm not making a positive statement here of the form "I know that the German economy was in state X for reason Y." I'm making a negative statement, of the form "I don't know that the German economy entered state X for reason Y."

You made an assumption about the state of the economy and how it was affected by war reparations. I asked you for the reasons for that assumption. Because clearly you must have had any idea about the state of the german economy and the impact of the reparations in order to make such an assumption in the first place, right? Or were you just pulling numbers out of thin air?

It's definitely true that some broadly similar things happened to the economy of other places where "reason Y" does not apply; Germany isn't the only country whose economy fell apart in the 1930s. And that's about all I know. The sources I have and know where to look for are diffuse and very, very general, which is why I brought this up in the first place.

So which sources do you have?

Now if you know that the German economy entered state X (economic collapse) for reason Y (reparations payments), I'd like to hear your analysis. But unless you intend to offer such an analysis or point me to someone else's, I must ask if you expect me to believe with absolute confidence that Y -> X just because a lot of people have said so, especially in light of the fact that a lot of people have also said it isn't so?

Which people? Just curious if you have read anything about the subject.

Much the same goes for the way the economic collapse promoted the Nazis. If you know with great certainty that the collapse was vital to the Nazis' success, and it sounds like you do, I'd like to hear the analysis on that in more depth.

Arbeitslosigkeit was the centerpiece of Nazi propaganda strategy. You can see it in this poster. The Nazis only came to power during the great depression. Seriously, anybody who has read any history on this should know that the Nazi rise was linked to the economical conditions.

[Simon_Jester]

You made an assumption about the state of the economy and how it was affected by war reparations. I asked you for the reasons for that assumption. Because clearly you must have had any idea about the state of the german economy and the impact of the reparations in order to make such an assumption in the first place, right? Or were you just pulling numbers out of thin air?

Here is what I actually know, represented as accurately as I can, based on what I remember from studying history texts that seemed well-researched. If you don't care to read through it, just skip to the first horizontal line.

I want to make a disclaimer: I do not have memorized statistics on the interwar German economy; I did not say I had. I am not a student of economics; I did not say I was. I have made inferences, based on secondary sources that I believe to be trustworthy, only some of which I still possess and can check. This limits my ability to give you titles and authors, let alone chapter and verse.

Based on my inferences, I have explicitly and repeatedly said that I am uncertain, that I do not know how important "this" was to "that," whether the same thing could have happened in some other way. This does not mean I do not know "this" was to some degree related to "that."

-The German economy went through a period of insane hyperinflation shortly after the First World War, in which the value of the mark dropped by something like 9 to 12 orders of magnitude, possibly more for all I know. From everything I've heard, this had a great deal to do with the first round of reparations payments.

-By means I do not know, the Weimar government managed to halt inflation and restore a sane currency by the mid-1920s. I can only assume that the hyperinflation did some lasting damage, because I know it would have the effect of destroying a lot of people's savings and disrupting lending practices. However, I have heard little to make me think the damage was crippling in and of itself, because:

-I know Germany's economy was, broadly speaking, functional by the late 1920s. I do not know how it compared to the economy of other European nations that fought hard in the First World War, and have never heard anything.

-In 1929, the economy of practically the entire developed world went through a crash. It was quite bad here in the US, with inflation statistics of something like 15%, a very deep and extended collapse in stock prices even worse than the one we're having today in 2008-9, and a lot of bank failures. I know the same economic crisis affected much of the rest of the world. I know it was very bad in Germany, though I do not know if it was significantly worse than in the US. I do not know exactly how bad it was in any other developed nation, though I infer that it was not dramatically better anywhere else than in the US or Germany. I infer this because I expect that one or two countries that weathered the Depression unscathed would most likely wind up mentioned in the kind of history books I've read.

-I know that the reparations demanded of Germany in the Treaty of Versailles were very large, that they were many times the size of its foreign currency reserves, at least several times the size of its national gold reserves, and that they were also large compared to the amount of material goods it could realistically export in any short period of time.

-I know that in addition to these reparations, Germany lost territory of significant industrial value, most notably coal and steel production in the west (not only did the French occupy the Ruhr, but as I recall, Alsace-Lorraine has considerable resource value in its own right). They may have suffered further losses in the East from the creation of Poland; I am not sure how valuable the lost territory was in the East relative to the overall German economy.

-I know that the Germans borrowed much of the money they paid the reparations with from the US, that they refinanced and renegotiated the payment plan several times during the 1920s and early '30s, and that they did not get round to paying the full amount demanded of them before Hitler cut off payments, though I do not know what fraction of the full amount they paid.
________

I have virtually no memorized numbers for any of this, which is why I give order of magnitude estimates and qualitative statements so much. If I had the inclination I could go digging for the numbers, and I am fairly confident that everything I just said would be substantially supported by the numbers. I know that I have seen such numbers; it's just that I don't have them memorized the way I have, say, pi or Planck's constant memorized.

That is what I know. Because of the limits of what I know, I do not know whether reparations were a primary cause of the collapse of the German economy in the 1930s. Nor do I know how critical that collapse was to the Nazis' success, if they could have succeeded in a smaller economic crisis or in reasonably comfortable times.

If you know more than I do, and it sure sounds like you do, I'd appreciate it if you would deign to actually tell me what you know, rather than berate me for not knowing it already. Or, failing that, if you would recommend a viable source that I can use to learn (some of?) what you know relatively quickly- a good book on the subject, for instance. I have not claimed knowledge I do not possess, and have made only inferential statements from knowledge that I do believe I possess, from sources I would be surprised to see proven wrong*.

*But not infinitely surprised. I have been surprised before and will be again.

Now if you know that the German economy entered state X (economic collapse) for reason Y (reparations payments), I'd like to hear your analysis. But unless you intend to offer such an analysis or point me to someone else's, I must ask if you expect me to believe with absolute confidence that Y -> X just because a lot of people have said so, especially in light of the fact that a lot of people have also said it isn't so?

Which people? Just curious if you have read anything about the subject.

I will have to go digging through the books I own on the history of the Second World War, those of such books that I've read which cover the runup to the war are my main source on this issue. It will take some time; hopefully I will remember and get back to you on it soon.

Since I do NOT remember precisely which book I'm referring to, I'm going to hazard a guess that it was a history textbook by Michael Lyons... let's see... "World War II: A Short History." As I recall, he dedicated roughly a chapter to the question, but I don't have the book handy right now.

And to reemphasize, I don't remember. I've read a lot of things and forgotten where, precisely, I read them; I'm sure you've been through the same experience. There are some books I know it wasn't, but that's no use. Churchill, for instance, would have been highly unlikely to give an accurate assessment of how the Nazis came to power, for several reasons.

Arbeitslosigkeit was the centerpiece of Nazi propaganda strategy... The Nazis only came to power during the great depression. Seriously, anybody who has read any history on this should know that the Nazi rise was linked to the economical conditions.

I am well aware that it was linked. However, I do not know that the economic collapse was a necessary condition for the Nazi rise, or that the reparations were a necessary condition for the economic collapse (and therefore for the Nazi rise). They certainly didn't help, but I'm not sure it's intellectually honest to say "The reparations demands caused the Nazis and therefore caused the war."

[phongn]

Simon, a good book on the economy of Germany from the post-WW1 era to WW2 would be Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze.

[Simon_Jester]

Hmm. Thank you.

Though the reviews make it sound like that book is more about the Third Reich-era economy than the Weimar economy; I assume Tooze talks about that in the opening chapters?

[phongn]

Though the reviews make it sound like that book is more about the Third Reich-era economy than the Weimar economy; I assume Tooze talks about that in the opening chapters?

Yes.