No missile shield in Eastern Europe

[Vympel]

Counted on to back them in issues relating to Russia.

What are you even talking about? You're acting like these interceptors /radar were placed in Poland or the Czech Republic because either country wanted them there to help deal with ... something ... vaguely .... involving ... Russia. That's just bullshit.

The fact of the matter is not placing this system in either country proves fuck all about the US' commitment to its Eastern European allies.

Relatively speaking the DoD budget isn't big right now, but a lot of it is wasted.

Relatively speaking in relation to ROW spending, it's positively obscene.

It is a vital intresst that the US be able to trade with Europe. That is why we have forces there.

US military units do absolutely nothing to facilitate trade with Europe. The only reason forces are there is either pure institutional inertia (post-WW2), peacekeeping / nation building (Balkans), or servicing major logistical hubs for US force elsewhere (i.e. bases).

Thus it is also in our interest to defend the assets we have in place in Europe. the fact that by placing a GBI site in eastern Europe, they are positioned to defend the Continental US against ICBMs launched from Iran is why we placed it there, and not in Western Europe.

Except that the system's ability to perform that job was both dubious and geopolitical asinine.

The fact of the matter is it's also clearly in the US' interests for Russia to cooperate with the United States - something Bush and his legion of idiots didn't comprehend (and Clinton before him) - they instead continued a reckless and foolish policy of needlessly antagonising Russia over issues of absolutely no real import to the US, culminating in the massive diplomatic humiliation of Georgia getting thoroughly walloped by Russia last year. I'll also go so far to say that America's relationship with any great power is more important to it than, hate-to-be-blunt, relatively podunk nations of little global import, like the Czech Republic.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

^ Tell me France and Great Britain aren't protesting a German and Italian axis of alliance. Oh No! WWII redux!

Just kidding, that's good news. Will MEADS be able to cover the entire NATO alliance when it's fielded, including Poland, Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic? If so, will the NATO member states contribute to MEADS development? I hope so, since that would allow us to concentrate our ABM defenses in the US and non-NATO allied countries with US basing/defense agreements.

MEADS will cover as much as anyone can afford to buy the system. All the EU countries are pretty strapped for cash, so probably not a lot.

[CmdrWilkens]

So we scrapped the idea of a permanent base subject to local opposition and Russian anger that would utilize an undetermined technology which billions had not yet been sunk in to. Oh and at the same time reaffirmed the use of the GBI and SM3 BMD systems as theater defense systems deployed as needed. Yup that is just a horrible diplomatic failure that will eliminate the US' ability to prosecute its goals while exposing it to a vastly higher threat profile.

[TimothyC]

So we scrapped the idea of a permanent base subject to local opposition and Russian anger that would utilize an undetermined technology which billions had not yet been sunk in to. Oh and at the same time reaffirmed the use of the GBI and SM3 BMD systems as theater defense systems deployed as needed. Yup that is just a horrible diplomatic failure that will eliminate the US' ability to prosecute its goals while exposing it to a vastly higher threat profile.

No, we backed out of deploying a tested and deployed technology [GBI] (which Zero refused to even fund the further deployment of in Alaska) to replace it with an as of yet undeveloped technology (the Block II SM-3), which he hasn't yet funded, and were I a betting man (I'm not) I would bet that whatever funding he does give it will be cut at the first sign of any trouble.

[Pelranius]

On the other hand, there's bound to be a foreign market for the SM-3 Block II. And historically, the Democrats have been pretty good to the Navy.

[Lonestar]

No, we backed out of deploying a tested and deployed technology [GBI] (which Zero refused to even fund the further deployment of in Alaska) to replace it with an as of yet undeveloped technology (the Block II SM-3), which he hasn't yet funded, and were I a betting man (I'm not) I would bet that whatever funding he does give it will be cut at the first sign of any trouble.

Yeah, except Gates has been talking about a Navy-centric BMD for over a year. And, unlike some people on this board, I know folks in the MDA(as in "within the walls of the building" not "some random dude on the internet") who have chubbies for a sea-based BMD. I know Air Force Colonels who prefer it to the landbased option.

[TimothyC]

Yeah, except Gates has been talking about a Navy-centric BMD for over a year. And, unlike some people on this board, I know folks in the MDA(as in "within the walls of the building" not "some random dude on the internet") who have chubbies for a sea-based BMD. I know Air Force Colonels who prefer it to the landbased option.

I don't have an issue with Sea Basing. I have an issue with Sea Based BMD to the exclusion of Land-based BMD, and to the exclusion of other naval priorities.

[Lonestar]

I don't have an issue with Sea Basing. I have an issue with Sea Based BMD to the exclusion of Land-based BMD, and to the exclusion of other naval priorities.

Alright, let's put away those falsehoods right now.

(1)The new plan doesn't exclude land-based BMD at all.
(2)The confined areas of the AG and GOO means that AEGIS vessels will be able to perform escort duties for Strike groups in addition to ABM-patrol
(3)The USN is charging ahead with the LCS come Hell or highwater, which means that, as the lCS enters service, we can stop using AEGIS ships to chase around pirates and have training exercises with third world crapholes whose biggest naval vessels are 25ft RHIBs, and they can go do other "high end" stuff. Like BMD.

[MKSheppard]

So we scrapped the idea of a permanent base subject to local opposition and Russian anger that would utilize an undetermined technology which billions had not yet been sunk in to.

Wrong. The base would have used GBI; you know, the system we have had operational for the last few years in Fort Greely?

[MKSheppard]

(1)The new plan doesn't exclude land-based BMD at all.

Then why is all I'm hearing is "land based SM-3" system, instead of "we will fund x firing batteries of THAAD"; which has roughly the same kinematic capabilities as SM-3 and is actually operational in Hawaii and ready for production?

(2)The confined areas of the AG and GOO means that AEGIS vessels will be able to perform escort duties for Strike groups in addition to ABM-patrol

From what I've seen, the Navy in order to do it's sea based ABM mission, will have to have ships on station continuously at two to three different points off Europe. Figuring the standard 3 ships needed for one on station rule of thumb, that's 6 to 9 AEGIS ships that you'll have to allocate permanently to the ABM mission.

Figure in the fact that everyone else will want ABM protection; and that means, we'll have to allocate more ships to those ABM points around the world, like off the coast of North Korea; a station near japan (we can easily accomodate that, since we can just share that with the IJN JSMDF, who's funding SM-3 Block II development partially.

Just be glad that Fort Greely is online, Matt. I shudder to think of the ships needed to keep a continuous ABM patrol off the US coastline -- even the Billion Burke Swarm (TM) would get worn thin by that.

The navy's greatest asset is it's strategic and tactical mobility; a ship moving at 30 knots can be 720 nautical miles somewhere else in a day. SM-3 is a very weak missile when you compare it to other ABM solutions -- it's a tactical ABM system with a minimal theater level capability -- it's limited by the size and weight limits of having to fit into existing Mk 41 VLS cells -- (22” diameter, 257” length maximum allowable missile dimensions). DDG-1000 has slightly larger Mk 56 PVLS cells; I don't have the exact numbers on me yet. So it doesn't have the kinematics of the much much larger GBI; meaning you have to stay within a "basket" in order to perform the ABM mission; sacrificing your strategic and tactical mobility.

Any true Navy Sea Based Strategic BMD is going to have to center around a future notational CG(X) with nuclear power to run it's radars, and enough space to fit KEI or GBI sized missiles for the BMD mission. Developing such a warship and it's weapons is going to take a while.

(3)The USN is charging ahead with the LCS come Hell or highwater, which means that, as the lCS enters service, we can stop using AEGIS ships to chase around pirates and have training exercises with third world crapholes whose biggest naval vessels are 25ft RHIBs, and they can go do other "high end" stuff. Like BMD.

The problem is; LCS costs like $400 million, a Burke about $1~ billion; and you really don't get that much capability for the LCS' $400 million -- just a 57mm gun and some short ranged netfires missiles.

One of my friends on HPCA, Scott Brim raised a very good point about the Navy's new BMD mission:

Everyone should keep a close eye on the Navy's budget. If the Navy's current and future budgets aren't augmented to the extent necessary to adequately cover the huge expense of a sea-based strategic BMD mission, then some significant portion of the existing Navy force structure must be traded away to pay for it.

...

I suspect the Navy has been told to come up with a proposal for pursuing a serious BMD effort, and to do so without a major increase in Navy funding. The BMD effort will be a hugely expensive proposition. The money has to come from somewhere. If a truly serious effort is mounted, money will be stripped from fleet operations and from other Navy procurement programs.

Look for LCS to be constrained to somewhere between 10 and 15 hulls, and for serious debate to begin on dropping one of the F-35 models. My guess is that LCS-1 will be the winner of the downselect and that the F-35B variant will eventually be canceled as part of a broadscope move to downsize and constrain US power projection capabilities. In the near term, look for the production schedule of the Ford Class to be extended to deal with cost control issues and with technology management issues, and look for at least one CVBG to be eliminated.

[Lonestar]

From what I've seen, the Navy in order to do it's sea based ABM mission, will have to have ships on station continuously at two to three different points off Europe. Figuring the standard 3 ships needed for one on station rule of thumb, that's 6 to 9 AEGIS ships that you'll have to allocate permanently to the ABM mission.

In order to defend against an Iranian missile, it just needs to be in the GOO/AG and maybe(maybe) the Black Sea,

Figure in the fact that everyone else will want ABM protection; and that means, we'll have to allocate more ships to those ABM points around the world, like off the coast of North Korea; a station near japan (we can easily accomodate that, since we can just share that with the IJN JSMDF, who's funding SM-3 Block II development partially.

The DPRK BMD will almost certainly be a JMSDF show, but nwe also still ahve the sites in Alaska and Cali, so....

Just be glad that Fort Greely is online, Matt. I shudder to think of the ships needed to keep a continuous ABM patrol off the US coastline -- even the Billion Burke Swarm (TM) would get worn thin by that.

The navy's greatest asset is it's strategic and tactical mobility; a ship moving at 30 knots can be 720 nautical miles somewhere else in a day. SM-3 is a very weak missile when you compare it to other ABM solutions -- it's a tactical ABM system with a minimal theater level capability -- it's limited by the size and weight limits of having to fit into existing Mk 41 VLS cells -- (22” diameter, 257” length maximum allowable missile dimensions). DDG-1000 has slightly larger Mk 56 PVLS cells; I don't have the exact numbers on me yet. So it doesn't have the kinematics of the much much larger GBI; meaning you have to stay within a "basket" in order to perform the ABM mission; sacrificing your strategic and tactical mobility.

In the GOO and AG your basket is going to be limited anyway.

Any true Navy Sea Based Strategic BMD is going to have to center around a future notational CG(X) with nuclear power to run it's radars, and enough space to fit KEI or GBI sized missiles for the BMD mission. Developing such a warship and it's weapons is going to take a while.

True...but military operations and systems are not developed in a vacuum. The SM-3 may be "good enough" for Iran, and that may be good enough ftom a political standpoint.

The problem is; LCS costs like $400 million, a Burke about $1~ billion; and you really don't get that much capability for the LCS' $400 million -- just a 57mm gun and some short ranged netfires missiles.

So? This doesn't defeat my point: Having AEGIS ships train with the Goddamn Tanzanian Navy and chase pirates around is a waste of assets.

Everyone should keep a close eye on the Navy's budget. If the Navy's current and future budgets aren't augmented to the extent necessary to adequately cover the huge expense of a sea-based strategic BMD mission, then some significant portion of the existing Navy force structure must be traded away to pay for it.

...

I suspect the Navy has been told to come up with a proposal for pursuing a serious BMD effort, and to do so without a major increase in Navy funding. The BMD effort will be a hugely expensive proposition. The money has to come from somewhere. If a truly serious effort is mounted, money will be stripped from fleet operations and from other Navy procurement programs.

Look for LCS to be constrained to somewhere between 10 and 15 hulls, and for serious debate to begin on dropping one of the F-35 models. My guess is that LCS-1 will be the winner of the downselect and that the F-35B variant will eventually be canceled as part of a broadscope move to downsize and constrain US power projection capabilities. In the near term, look for the production schedule of the Ford Class to be extended to deal with cost control issues and with technology management issues, and look for at least one CVBG to be eliminated.

We haven't had a CVBG since the '90s. The anachronistic terminology your friend is using is making me suspect his qualifications on the issue. If the uSN can maintain shipbuilding funds at current level, independent of the BMD program, then it's good enough.

[Stark]

ITT we learn that 'backing our allies' means 'doing something many of our allies don't want, that annoys other possible allies, but fits in with my pre-conceived notions about what machoness'. It's pretty funny that people talk about the 'politics' of the 'foreign policy' of ABM without actually talking about European politics (and the role in which Bush used ABM) at all. 'I like it' = 'is realpolitik macho', or something?

[Thanas]

ITT we learn that 'backing our allies' means 'doing something many of our allies don't want, that annoys other possible allies, but fits in with my pre-conceived notions about what machoness'. It's pretty funny that people talk about the 'politics' of the 'foreign policy' of ABM without actually talking about European politics (and the role in which Bush used ABM) at all. 'I like it' = 'is realpolitik macho', or something?

Yeah. It is funny how people consistently defend Bush's policies as Realpolitik when they were anything but. Realpolitik is what Bismarck did. When most americans talk about realpolitik, it usually means the opposite - the pigheaded pursuit of interests to the detriment of everyone else.

But I guess it is in the same vein of freedom and democracy = scharia rule.

[Simon_Jester]

It is a vital intresst that the US be able to trade with Europe. That is why we have forces there. Thus it is also in our interest to defend the assets we have in place in Europe. the fact that by placing a GBI site in eastern Europe, they are positioned to defend the Continental US against ICBMs launched from Iran is why we placed it there, and not in Western Europe.

Do we need to place an army in Europe to trade with them? That makes no sense; we trade with China without having an army there, after all. And if we don't need an army in Europe to trade with them, we hardly need another army to defend the first army.

(3)The USN is charging ahead with the LCS come Hell or highwater, which means that, as the lCS enters service, we can stop using AEGIS ships to chase around pirates and have training exercises with third world crapholes whose biggest naval vessels are 25ft RHIBs, and they can go do other "high end" stuff. Like BMD.

The problem is; LCS costs like $400 million, a Burke about $1~ billion; and you really don't get that much capability for the LCS' $400 million -- just a 57mm gun and some short ranged netfires missiles.

For fighting random pirates and engaging in gunboat diplomacy (if only "teaching minor nations how to use their own gunboats properly" instead of the traditional form), do we really need the Burke's capability?

The US Navy has found itself the 'world navy' in many ways. The last 'world navy,' the British, responded by building a large number of relatively cheap gunboats that it could freely scatter across the globe with abandon, even if those gunboats could not individually crush well armed opponents. Perhaps this is not such a bad idea after all.

Yeah. It is funny how people consistently defend Bush's policies as Realpolitik when they were anything but. Realpolitik is what Bismarck did. When most americans talk about realpolitik, it usually means the opposite - the pigheaded pursuit of interests to the detriment of everyone else.

Many of us outside Germany are honestly confused on this point, possibly because Bismarck's reputation is more ambiguous outside Germany. I, for example, was under the impression that Bismarck pursued his own country's interests while at best being neutral towards and at worst actively harmful to others.

This creates a disconnect: the German "Realpolitik" may not mean quite the same thing to Germans that the loan word "realpolitik" does to English speakers. To me, it always had overtones of ruthlessness, of ignoring ideological and 'honor of the state' concerns in favor of taking advantage of the immediate situation as efficiently as possible. Sometimes this brings good results; other times not so much, especially in the long term, because realpolitik-as-most-Americans-understand-it is a short term optimization strategy.

[CmdrWilkens]

So since nobody has bothered to quote it I'll add the formal White House press release available here:

President Obama has approved the recommendation of Secretary of Defense Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. This approach is based on an assessment of the Iranian missile threat, and a commitment to deploy technology that is proven, cost-effective, and adaptable to an evolving security environment.

Starting around 2011, this missile defense architecture will feature deployments of increasingly-capable sea- and land-based missile interceptors, primarily upgraded versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), and a range of sensors in Europe to defend against the growing ballistic missile threat from Iran. This phased approach develops the capability to augment our current protection of the U.S. homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats, and to offer more effective defenses against more near-term ballistic missile threats. The plan provides for the defense of U.S. deployed forces, their families, and our Allies in Europe sooner and more comprehensively than the previous program, and involves more flexible and survivable systems.

The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the President that he revise the previous Administration’s 2007 plan for missile defense in Europe as part of an ongoing comprehensive review of our missile defenses mandated by Congress. Two major developments led to this unanimous recommended change:

• New Threat Assessment: The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to develop than previously estimated. In the near-term, the greatest missile threats from Iran will be to U.S. Allies and partners, as well as to U.S. deployed personnel – military and civilian –and their accompanying families in the Middle East and in Europe.
• Advances in Capabilities and Technologies: Over the past several years, U.S. missile defense capabilities and technologies have advanced significantly. We expect this trend to continue. Improved interceptor capabilities, such as advanced versions of the SM-3, offer a more flexible, capable, and cost-effective architecture. Improved sensor technologies offer a variety of options to detect and track enemy missiles.

These changes in the threat as well as our capabilities and technologies underscore the need for an adaptable architecture. This architecture is responsive to the current threat, but could also incorporate relevant technologies quickly and cost-effectively to respond to evolving threats. Accordingly, the Department of Defense has developed a four-phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe. While further advances of technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of later phases, current plans call for the following:

• Phase One (in the 2011 timeframe) – Deploy current and proven missile defense systems available in the next two years, including the sea-based Aegis Weapon System, the SM-3 interceptor (Block IA), and sensors such as the forward-based Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2), to address regional ballistic missile threats to Europe and our deployed personnel and their families;
• Phase Two (in the 2015 timeframe) – After appropriate testing, deploy a more capable version of the SM-3 interceptor (Block IB) in both sea- and land-based configurations, and more advanced sensors, to expand the defended area against short- and medium-range missile threats;
• Phase Three (in the 2018 timeframe) – After development and testing are complete, deploy the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA variant currently under development, to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats; and
• Phase Four (in the 2020 timeframe) – After development and testing are complete, deploy the SM-3 Block IIB to help better cope with medium- and intermediate-range missiles and the potential future ICBM threat to the United States.

Throughout all four phases, the United States also will be testing and updating a range of approaches for improving our sensors for missile defense. The new distributed interceptor and sensor architecture also does not require a single, large, fixed European radar that was to be located in the Czech Republic; this approach also uses different interceptor technology than the previous program, removing the need for a single field of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense recommended that the United States no longer plan to move forward with that architecture.

The Czech Republic and Poland, as close, strategic and steadfast Allies of the United States, will be central to our continued consultations with NATO Allies on our defense against the growing ballistic missile threat.

The phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe:

• Sustains U.S. homeland defense against long-range ballistic missile threats. The deployment of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor in Phase Four of the approach would augment existing ground-based interceptors located in Alaska and California, which provide for the defense of the homeland against a potential ICBM threat.
• Speeds protection of U.S. deployed forces, civilian personnel, and their accompanying families against the near-term missile threat from Iran. We would deploy current and proven technology by roughly 2011 – about six or seven years earlier than the previous plan – to help defend the regions in Europe most vulnerable to the Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat.
• Ensures and enhances the protection of the territory and populations of all NATO Allies, in concert with their missile defense capabilities, against the current and growing ballistic missile threat. Starting in 2011, the phased, adaptive approach would systematically increase the defended area as the threat is expected to grow. In the 2018 timeframe, all of Europe could be protected by our collective missile defense architecture.
• Deploys proven capabilities and technologies to meet current threats. SM-3 (Block 1A) interceptors are deployed on Aegis ships today, and more advanced versions are in various stages of development. Over the past four years, we have conducted a number of tests of the SM-3 IA, and it was the interceptor used in the successful engagement of a decaying satellite in February 2008. Testing in 2008 showed that sensors we plan to field bring significant capabilities to the architecture, and additional, planned research and development over the next few years offers the potential for more diverse and more capable sensors.
• Provides flexibility to upgrade and adjust the architecture, and to do so in a cost-effective manner, as the threat evolves. Because of the lower per-interceptor costs and mobility of key elements of the architecture, we will be better postured to adapt this set of defenses to any changes in threat.

We will work with our Allies to integrate this architecture with NATO members’ missile defense capabilities, as well as with the emerging NATO command and control network that is under development. One benefit of the phased, adaptive approach is that there is a high degree of flexibility – in addition to sea-based assets, there are many potential locations for the architecture’s land-based elements, some of which will be re-locatable. We plan to deploy elements in northern and southern Europe and will be consulting closely at NATO with Allies on the specific deployment options.

We also welcome Russian cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests. We have repeatedly made clear to Russia that missile defense in Europe poses no threat to its strategic deterrent. Rather, the purpose is to strengthen defenses against the growing Iranian missile threat. There is no substitute for Iran complying with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. But ballistic missile defenses will address the threat from Iran’s ballistic missile programs, and diminish the coercive influence that Iran hopes to gain by continuing to develop these destabilizing capabilities.

Through the ongoing Department of Defense ballistic missile defense review, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to provide recommendations to the President that address other aspects of our ballistic missile defense capabilities and posture around the world.

So to summarize: We are still going to put missile defense in Europe, it will be based on continuous upgrades to the SM-3 BMD system including land based models, and says nothing about GBI in terms of the US defense at home.

[Starglider]

The obvious solution would be to rename the proposed upgrade of GBI to 'SM-3 block III Advanced Capability', so that funding can be restored.

[Stark]

Lying to civilian government = great idea.

Only when it's for military pet projects I agree with, though.

Civilian control of the what? INTERNET TOUGH GUYS DEMAND GUNS!

[Starglider]

Lying to civilian government = great idea.

What? It's not like they really know or care what's going on anyway (as evidenced by the utterly idiotic and outdated technical arguments against ABM). They are looking for things that look good on press releases and/or shunt money to the currently favored service, contractor and/or congressional districts. Unfortunately slapping an 'SM-3' sticker on new GBI missiles is a bit too blatant to actually work, but in some parallel reality where it could, I'd say go for it. Gates would still gets to feel like he made a significant decision, Obama would get the appearance of money saved and political distance from Bush etc.

[TimothyC]

Lying to civilian government = great idea.

Just like how the Super Hornet is an updated version of the Hornet-A/B/C/D! The technique works, but instead of the the GBI being redesignated SM-3 Block3 ADCAP, we should redesignate the KEI, the "SM-8 Advanced Medium Range Threat Interceptor"

[K. A. Pital]

What? It's not like they really know or care what's going on anyway (as evidenced by the utterly idiotic and outdated technical arguments against ABM).

By whom? By internet fanboys? Or did Obama or members of his administration personally speak "outdated technical arguments" against ABM and bring them as grounds for cancellation? Who and where spoke of any technical arguments against ABM by this administration? So far the arguments seem to be political, not technical.

Prove your statement, or shut it.

[Vympel]

By whom? By internet fanboys? Or did Obama or members of his administration personally speak "outdated technical arguments" against ABM and bring them as grounds for cancellation? Who and where spoke of any technical arguments against ABM by this administration? So far the arguments seem to be political, not technical.

Prove your statement, or shut it.

Actually the argument is largely a technical one - specifically that SM-3 is a superior solution to a Czech Republic / Poland based GBI solution- a report was supposed to have been prepared (released yet? unknown) saying tha the Czech/Polish concept was in actual fact - shit. Political factors are probably in the background. It's quite correct however to say that technical arugments against the concept of ABM per se have nothing to do with this.

[K. A. Pital]

The argument about the superiority of one modern ABM technology against another modern ABM technology is a far cry from "outdated technical argument against ABM" indeed.

[MKSheppard]

So to summarize: We are still going to put missile defense in Europe, it will be based on continuous upgrades to the SM-3 BMD system including land based models, and says nothing about GBI in terms of the US defense at home.

So to summarize: there is no such thing as land-based SM-3. It's all notational at this point; and there's a lot of work involved in converting something from a seabased system to a land based one -- here's a hint -- on a warship C3I is pretty easy, since everything -- command/control, sensors, and the weapon are in fixed locations relative to each other and within close proximity of each other.

On the other hand, THAAD is ready to be mass produced and deployed, and it was designed from the start as a land based system; and it has a record of proven intercepts. So why was a notational "land based" SM-3 picked over this?

Hey, I just noticed that in BHO's press release; all of the SM-3 blocks are for SRBMs/MRBMs/IRBMs; and it's not until Phase 4 in 2020; that we get SM-3 Block IIB which can defeat ICBMs over a reasonable area.

So yeah, we go from a system that can go online in a few years, to one that's eleven years away vs the ICBM threat

And basically; Greg, Obama killed ground based ABM, with his termination of GBI production -- here's a hint, we're not going to fill the empty silos we dug at Fort Greely with GBI; the cancellation of MKV -- here's another hint, the new lighter kill vehicle would also have made a great fit with the SM-3; it's lighter than the SM-3's present kill vehicle; and the termination of KEI; which would have astonishing kinetic performance, while being relatively ground mobile.

[Stark]

What? It's not like they really know or care what's going on anyway (as evidenced by the utterly idiotic and outdated technical arguments against ABM). They are looking for things that look good on press releases and/or shunt money to the currently favored service, contractor and/or congressional districts. Unfortunately slapping an 'SM-3' sticker on new GBI missiles is a bit too blatant to actually work, but in some parallel reality where it could, I'd say go for it. Gates would still gets to feel like he made a significant decision, Obama would get the appearance of money saved and political distance from Bush etc.

You're right; the military should get what it wants through trickery instead of being subordinate to the civilian government, who are after all just ignorant elected representatives. The general staff knows what's best!

Just like how the Super Hornet is an updated version of the Hornet-A/B/C/D! The technique works, but instead of the the GBI being redesignated SM-3 Block3 ADCAP, we should redesignate the KEI, the "SM-8 Advanced Medium Range Threat Interceptor"

What's your point? It works = fraud is ok? I've got to spread the word!

Oh you mean its only okay when it gets results you like for people you like? Gotcha.

[MKSheppard]

Or did Obama or members of his administration personally speak "outdated technical arguments" against ABM and bring them as grounds for cancellation? Who and where spoke of any technical arguments against ABM by this administration? So far the arguments seem to be political, not technical.

Prove your statement, or shut it.

Do I have to link you to the video last year where Obama said he'd “cut investments in unproven missile defense systems” -- which is basically code word to gut any program that has experienced any kind of technical delays.