Italy bribes Taliban, leaves; doesn't tell French soldiers

[Fire Fly]

and 10 French soldiers are killed in an ambush...

French troops were killed after Italy hushed up ‘bribes’ to Taleban

When ten French soldiers were killed last year in an ambush by Afghan insurgents in what had seemed a relatively peaceful area, the French public were horrified.

Their revulsion increased with the news that many of the dead soldiers had been mutilated — and with the publication of photographs showing the militants triumphantly sporting their victims’ flak jackets and weapons. The French had been in charge of the Sarobi area, east of Kabul, for only a month, taking over from the Italians; it was one of the biggest single losses of life by Nato forces in Afghanistan.

What the grieving nation did not know was that in the months before the French soldiers arrived in mid-2008, the Italian secret service had been paying tens of thousands of dollars to Taleban commanders and local warlords to keep the area quiet, The Times has learnt. The clandestine payments, whose existence was hidden from the incoming French forces, were disclosed by Western military officials.

US intelligence officials were flabbergasted when they found out through intercepted telephone conversations that the Italians had also been buying off militants, notably in Herat province in the far west. In June 2008, several weeks before the ambush, the US Ambassador in Rome made a démarche, or diplomatic protest, to the Berlusconi Government over allegations concerning the tactic.

However, a number of high-ranking officers in Nato have told The Times that payments were subsequently discovered to have been made in the Sarobi area as well.

Western officials say that because the French knew nothing of the payments they made a catastrophically incorrect threat assessment.

“One cannot be too doctrinaire about these things,” a senior Nato officer in Kabul said. “It might well make sense to buy off local groups and use non-violence to keep violence down. But it is madness to do so and not inform your allies.”

On August 18, a month after the Italian force departed, a lightly armed French patrol moved into the mountains north of Sarobi town, in the district of the same name, 65km (40 miles) east of Kabul. They had little reason to suspect that they were walking into the costliest battle for the French in a quarter of a century.

Operating in an arc of territory north and east of the Afghan capital, the French apparently believed that they were serving in a relatively benign district. The Italians they had replaced in July had suffered only one combat death in the previous year. For months the Nato headquarters in Kabul had praised Italian reconstruction projects under way around Sarobi. When an estimated 170 insurgents ambushed the force in the Uzbin Valley the upshot was a disaster. “They took us by surprise,” one French troop commander said after the attack.

A Nato post-operations assessment would sharply criticise the French force for its lack of preparation. “They went in with two platoons [approximately 60 men],” said one senior Nato officer. “They had no heavy weapons, no pre-arranged air support, no artillery support and not enough radios.”

Had it not been for the chance presence of some US special forces in the area who were able to call in air support for them, they would have been in an even worse situation. “The French were carrying just two medium machine guns and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. They were asking for trouble and the insurgents managed to get among them.”

A force from the 8th Marine Parachute Regiment took an hour and a half to reach the French over the mountains. “We couldn’t see the enemy and we didn’t know how many of them there were,” said another French officer. “After 20 minutes we started coming under fire from the rear. We were surrounded.”

The force was trapped until airstrikes forced the insurgents to retreat the next morning. By then ten French soldiers were dead and 21 injured.

The French public were appalled when it emerged that many of the dead had been mutilated by the insurgents— a mixed force including Taleban members and fighters from Hizb e-Islami.

A few weeks later French journalists photographed insurgents carrying French assault rifles and wearing French army flak jackets, helmets and, in one case, a dead soldier’s watch.

Two Western military officials in Kabul confirmed that intelligence briefings after the ambush said that the French troops had believed they were moving through a benign area — one which the Italian military had been keen to show off to the media as a successful example of a “hearts and minds” operation.

Another Nato source confirmed the allegations of Italian money going to insurgents. “The Italian intelligence service made the payments, it wasn’t the Italian Army,” he said. “It was payments of tens of thousands of dollars regularly to individual insurgent commanders. It was to stop Italian casualties that would cause political difficulties at home.”

When six Italian troops were killed in a bombing in Kabul last month it resulted in a national outpouring of grief and demands for troops to be withdrawn. The Nato source added that US intelligence became aware of the payments. “The Italians never acknowledged it, even though there was intercepted telephone traffic on the subject,” said the source. “The démarche was the result. It was not publicised because it would have caused a diplomatic nightmare. We found out about the Sarobi payments later.”

In Kabul a high-ranking Western intelligence source was scathing. “It’s an utter disgrace,” he said. “Nato in Afghanistan is a fragile enough construct without this lot working behind our backs. The Italians have a hell of a lot to answer for.”

Haji Abdul Rahman, a tribal elder from Sarobi, recalled how a benign environment became hostile overnight. “There were no attacks against the Italians. People said the Italians and Taleban had good relations between them.

“When the country [nationality of the forces] changed and the French came there was a big attack on them. We knew the Taleban came to the city and we knew that they didn’t carry out attacks on the Italian troops but we didn’t know why.”

The Italian Defence Ministry referred inquiries to the Prime Minister’s Office. A spokesman said: “The American Ambassador in Rome did not make any formal complaint. He merely asked for information, first from the previous Government and then from the current Government. The allegations were denied and they are totally unfounded.”

Silvio Berlusconi, the Prime Minister, defeated Romano Prodi at elections in April 2008.

The claims are not without precedent. In October 2007 two Italian agents were kidnapped in western Afghanistan; one was killed in a rescue by British special forces. It was later alleged in the Italian press that they had been kidnapped while making payments to the Taleban.

If the allegations are true, that's pretty damning.

[Sarevok]

Why do the Italians like to reinforce their stereotypes ?

[Lagmonster]

I've locked the other thread that reported this.

[[R_H]]

I've locked the other thread that reported this.

Thanks.

It's pretty outrageous that the Italians didn't bother informing the French. I doubt there would be any problem to continue paying the Taliban, but not bothering to inform the French that, by the way, the reason why it's been so quiet is because they've been paying off the Taliban.

[momochan]

This reminds me of the right-wing double standards with regards to the "surge" in Iraq. The surge did involve a few more troops, but experts pointed out that it was the US policy of "engaging" with Sunnis ( = giving them $) which made the real difference.
Now, if it had been a Democratic administration that had begun to do that, the right would have howled to the skies about how we were paying off the very people who until a few minutes ago had been killing our boys.

[Edward Yee]

Never doubted that it was both. "The surge" was just a damn slogan usable by both sides, although I can see the rationale for why "more troops"...

On the other hand, pretty dick move to not at least inform your successors of what was going on.

[Surlethe]

It's interesting that the Taliban are willing to respond to financial incentives just like most other people, so if they have opportunities to make (enough) money instead of fighting, they'll take them.

[Norseman]

It's interesting that the Taliban are willing to respond to financial incentives just like most other people, so if they have opportunities to make (enough) money instead of fighting, they'll take them.

Of course, everyone is like that. How do you think the British Empire was made?

[Fire Fly]

And the Times adds more fuel to the fire...

Italians bribed the Taleban all over Afghanistan, say officials

A Taleban commander and two senior Afghan officials confirmed yesterday that Italian forces paid protection money to prevent attacks on their troops.

After furious denials in Rome of a Times report that the Italian authorities had paid the bribes, the Afghans gave further details of the practice. Mohammed Ishmayel, a Taleban commander, said that a deal was struck last year so that Italian forces in the Sarobi area, east of Kabul, were not attacked by local insurgents.

The payment of protection money was revealed after the death of ten French soldiers in August 2008 at the hands of large Taleban force in Sarobi. French forces had taken over the district from Italian troops, but were unaware of secret Italian payments to local commanders to stop attacks on their forces and consequently misjudged local threat levels.

Mr Ishmayel said that under the deal it was agreed that “neither side should attack one another. That is why we were informed at that time, that we should not attack the Nato troops.” The insurgents were not informed when the Italian forces left the area and assumed they had broken the deal. Afghan officials also said they were aware of the practice by Italian forces in other areas of Afghanistan.

A senior Afghan government official told The Times that US special forces killed a Taleban leader in western Herat province a week ago. He was said to be one of the commanders who received money from the Italian Government. A senior Afghan army officer also repeated the allegation, adding that agreements had been made in both Sarobi and Herat.

The report prompted the French Opposition to demand an urgent explanation to parliament, describing the details as “very serious”. The Defence Ministry said that it was aware of “rumours” that linked bribery to the ambush but claimed that the reports had no basis.

In Rome, Ignazio La Russa, the Defence Minister, insisted the allegations were “absolute rubbish”. He said: “I had been minister for a short time [in the summer of 2008], I’ve never received news from the secret services of payment to the chiefs of the Taleban.”

The minister added that a benevolent attitude toward the Italians who serve in Afghanistan had nothing to do with alleged bribes, but was due, instead, to “the behaviour of our military, which is very different compared to that of other contingents”.

A statement released by the office of Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister, also denied the claims. “The Berlusconi Government has never authorised nor has it allowed any form of payment toward members of the Taleban insurgency,” it said.

Neither, the statement continued, did it know of any such payment by the previous Government.

Mr Berlusconi was elected for a third non-consecutive term in April 2008, replacing the centre-left Government headed by Romano Prodi.

The statement pointed out that in the first half of last year the Italian contingent suffered “several attacks”, including in the Sarobi district where one soldier, Francesco Pezzulo, was killed in February 2008.

The US Embassy in Rome declined to confirm or to deny the report that US officials issued a démarche, an official complaint, to the Italian Government over alleged payments to insurgents in June 2008.

A spokesman said that the embassy “does not comment on internal diplomatic conversations that may or may not have occurred”.

The Italian Defence Ministry confirmed on Wednesday that the US Government had raised the issue of payments to insurgents, but said that it was not a formal protest, but rather an “informal request for information” about such payments.

Mr Prodi also denied knowledge of the alleged payments to local insurgents.

He told The Times: “This is the first time I have ever heard such accusations and I can say that there is no base for them. I know absolutely nothing of this.”

Fabio Evangelisti, of the opposition Italy of Values party, said: “The details of the case, charged by The Times, appear per se to be serious and worthy of maximum attention and assessment by our Government. The ready denials of Ministers La Russa and Rotondi are not sufficient to dissipate the doubts and insinuations about our military operations.”

and...

Taleban fighter tells of deal struck with Italian soldiers in Afghanistan

In July 2008, after many months of calm, Taleban militants operating around Sarobi, 40 miles (64km) to the east of Kabul, noticed a sudden change in the behaviour of the Nato forces they faced.

The local insurgent groups understood that their leaders had reached an agreement with the Italian forces who operated in their area. Under the terms of the deal, they would later complain, the Italians were not supposed to step on territory they controlled — and, in return, they would not attack.

Instead, Nato troops had begun aggressive patrolling operations. Their conclusion was that the Italians must have betrayed them.

Yesterday, a Taleban commander from the Sarobi region explained how the deal was reached — and how it came apart, leading to the fighting in which ten French soldiers died.

“We were told that our high-rank commanders met with the Italian soldiers and they agreed a deal that neither side should attack one another,” said Mohammad Ismayel, a mid-level local Taleban commander, known simply as Commander Ismayel. “We were informed at that time that we should not attack the Nato troops,” he told The Times by telephone.

Commander Ismayel said that he was not aware of the terms of the deal, or whether payments were made to the senior commanders who brokered it, but he stated that the agreement had held throughout the Italian posting in Sarobi.

“When the French soldiers came to Sarobi they started making attacks on us,” he said. “For a while we didn’t know that they were French soldiers and we thought that the Italians had broken the deal and started fighting. Later on we got information that they were not Italian soldiers; they were French. Then we started fighting with them.”

They struck on August 18, as the French forces pushed a lightly armed patrol into the Uzbeen Valley, about ten miles from Sarobi town.

Ten French soldiers were killed and 20 were wounded in the fighting. Nato forces hit back over the next few days, killing many of the leaders of the insurgency in the area. More were killed in subsequent revenge strikes carried out by French special forces.

Afghan government and military sources said that they were aware of the payments made in Sarobi and elsewhere by the Italians.

“We knew that Italian forces were paying the opposition [fighters] in Sarobi so they would not be attacked. We have information on similar agreements made in the western Herat province by Italian soldiers under Nato command there,” one senior Afghan army officer said.

A senior Afghan government official told The Times that Ghulam Yahya Akbari, an insurgent commander who was killed in Herat province a week ago by US Special Forces, was one of those who had received money from the Italian Government.

The official, who declined to be identified, said that Mr Akbari had been paid to refrain from attacks on Italian forces, who have overall command of Regional Command West.

“He was paid but he just used the money to recruit more fighters,” said the Afghan official.

“He received medical treatment from Italian citizens, some money and the Italian Government was in regular contact with him through its intelligence agents. It was a long process of engagement. There were other kinds of incentives.”

The official said that other Western nations were also responsible for payments to insurgents.

Ghulam Akbari led a group of about 600 fighters in Herat province. He was a government official before switching sides in 2008. He was aligned with the Taleban, but called his group The Mujahidin of Herat.

Non-governmental organisations and analysts in Afghanistan said that money had long been used to help to pacify the country, with payments to regional leaders sometimes reaching the hands of the Taleban.

Lorenzo Delesgues, director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, said that the reports were “credible and completely plausible. If the Italians did it, they are not the first”.

Private security companies paid insurgents for peace, he said, so it was logical that the armed forces did so, too.

“All the Nato nations in Afghanistan were making payments,” he told The Times. “They do not make the Taleban nicer. However, payments go to local commanders so that they stay quiet.”

Earlier this year, The Times reported on payments made to protect Western convoys which supply military bases. The convoys, contracted by Western governments to Western supply companies, are protected by Afghan security companies and it is these companies who routinely pay off local insurgent commanders to avoid attack.

One importer delivering aviation fuel to British and American bases told The Times that an estimated 25 per cent of the money given to security companies was paid on to Taleban commanders and local bandits.

Not being British, I can't vouch for the quality of the Times. Although interestingly, the second article says that all NATO nations were bribing off insurgent commanders.

[Einhander Sn0m4n]

How difficult would it be to nail these allegations directly onto Berlusconi's head? This looks just like the kind of thing a wingnut like him would do as well. I can understand the motivation behind using bribery in a warzone as a way to try keeping the peace in a "Cash for Kluxers" type role, but this looks like the Italians cut the Taliban off full-stop just so that French would get killed. Yup, this has Berlusconi written all over it!

I think it might be time for every nation to stop considering the Berlusconi regime as anything but an Enemy of Peace, and act accordingly.

[cosmicalstorm]

Rupert Murdoch bullshit story. The French rolled into a hostile area with too little ammunition, no machineguns, no airsupport and too few radios. This was detailed in a report that was leaked from NATO after the attack. They also didn't just get the responsibility of that area all of the sudden, instead the handover took place over a prolonged period of time, starting 2006 I believe, during which it would have been difficult to keep these bribes secret. Unless the Italian intelligence service was working behind the back of its own military that is...

The Italians in that region were bombed and shot at repeatedly, the reason they did not suffer anything like this is because they were a lot more careful.

It was mid-afternoon when a tribal elder invited a U.S. military commander for a quiet chat in a garden. His village was surrounded by foreign troops, hunting around the mountain valley in search of infiltrators from Pakistan rumoured to be lurking in the barren hills.

Thirty soldiers from a French airborne platoon wandered farthest from the village, exploring a steep slope covered with rocks and scrubby vegetation under a high ridge.

That hill would soon become a killing ground, scene of the deadliest ambush against international forces since 2001, and the latest troubling sign that the insurgents are mastering the art of guerrilla war.

A NATO report on the incident obtained by The Globe and Mail provides the most in-depth account so far of an attack on Aug. 18 that shook the countries involved in the increasingly bloody campaign. The NATO report, marked “secret,” reveals woefully unprepared French troops surprised by well-armed insurgents in a valley east of Kabul. Ten soldiers were killed, the report concludes, but the other soldiers were lucky to escape without more deaths.

The French did not have enough bullets, radios and other equipment, the report said. The troops were forced to abandon a counterattack when the weapons on their vehicles ran out of ammunition only 90 minutes into a battle that stretched over two days. One French platoon had only a single radio and it was quickly disabled, leaving them unable to call for help. Chillingly, in an indication that the French troopers may have been at the mercy of their attackers, the dead soldiers from that platoon “showed signs of being killed at close range,” the report said.

By contrast, the insurgents were dangerously well prepared. The investigation found evidence of well-trained snipers among the guerrillas – highly unusual, because the Taliban are frequently mocked for their poor marksmanship – and indications they were supplied with incendiary bullets designed to punch holes in armour.

Insurgents have spread rumours in recent weeks that they captured French soldiers during the ambush, perhaps even videotaping their executions. “Maybe I will make her my wife,” said Mullah Rahmatullah, a local commander, describing a captive female soldier in a boastful conversation with a researcher for The Globe and Mail. Other rumours described French soldiers dying of stab wounds.

But senior Western officials say this was a disinformation campaign by the Taliban, who notoriously exaggerate their victories. The classified military review concludes that all French dead were killed by insurgent fire, except one soldier who died in a vehicle accident.

The French military declined to comment for this article, but French officers have previously spoken about the ambush in fatalistic tones, as if the insurgents inevitably score an occasional success.

“Our comrades fell during an ambush. They couldn't have done anything. It's a tactic as old as Herod,” a French officer told Le Figaro, a daily newspaper in Paris.

But only a swift rescue mission by other international forces prevented more serious losses, the report said, also crediting a heroic performance by a French intelligence officer who was wounded in the leg but did not stop leading his troops.

“This contact could have been much worse,” the report said.

Military forces routinely conduct so-called “after-action” reviews in the wake of major incidents; in keeping with the usual practice, the report on the French ambush examines only the battle itself, on Aug. 18 and 19, in the Uzbin valley about 40 kilometres east of Kabul.

But other analysts have looked at the incident in a broader context, speculating that trends in the Uzbin valley, and beyond, may have contributed to the deadly incident. Some observers connect the French ambush with attacks that killed nine American soldiers in July and another that killed three Canadians earlier this month, all of them examples of bold strikes against international forces by insurgents who seem increasingly skilled at guerrilla warfare.Unlike the crude tactics witnessed by Canadian troops in 2006, when the insurgents dug trenches and bunkers, camping out in groups of several hundred and making themselves easy targets for aerial bombing, insurgents in the recent high-profile attacks have gathered ad-hoc units by pulling together many small bands of fighters for specific missions.

A similar, temporary grouping of fighters assembled before the French ambush, two Western security officials said, adding that the attackers cannot be described as purely Taliban; they likely included fighters from the Taliban movement, but also from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami network, and perhaps from other groups.

Senior officials said they suspect the involvement of Hazrat Noor, an extremist leader from South Waziristan, in the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan. A report in the French magazine Paris Match suggested a local commander named Farouki may be responsible. Yet another insurgent leader, Mullah Rahmatullah, has also taken credit for the ambush. Originally a commander for Hizb-i-Islami in the Uzbin valley, Mr. Rahmatullah now reputedly gets funding for his activities from both the Taliban and Mr. Hekmatyar. All reports may be correct, observers say, assuming that many groups co-operated on the attack.

The appearance of well-trained marksmen among the insurgents may point toward the involvement of extremists trained in Pakistani territory, said Brigadier-General Richard Blanchette, a Canadian who serves as chief spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force.

“We do have hints that al-Qaeda provides training to some insurgents on the other side of the border,” Brig.-Gen. Blanchette said. “Because it's close, it would be very reasonable to believe that this could have been an influence of outside training.” He added: “The fact that they have more sophisticated arms is perhaps also a sign there's a connection to outsiders.”

By one account, the insurgents were preparing for a strike against the government headquarters in Surobi town, but found a ready target when a column of military vehicles snaked up the narrow road among the steeps hills of the valley. They were driving toward a small collection of mud houses known as Spur Kunday, in the valley east of Kabul, investigating reports of 40 Pakistanis sheltering in the village.

“This attack was most likely the result of two things,” the NATO report said. “Either, A) the ISAF forces picked a village that had a great deal of insurgents. The insurgents moved to defensive positions upon the ISAF approach and executed a rehearsed plan.

The report continued: “Or, B) the insurgents had intelligence indicating the route and destination.”

The village initially seemed quiet. A U.S. Special Forces commander and interpreter talked with locals, and got the usual answers supplied by ordinary Afghans when they find themselves surrounded by foreign troops. “All villagers said that they supported the government, there was no trouble here,” the report said.

A tribal elder asked to speak with the U.S. officer alone, and they arranged for a private meeting in a garden, but the elder broke off the conversation when he noticed a local police officer eavesdropping on the exchange. The elder was escorting the soldier back to his vehicle when shooting erupted from a ridge overlooking the village to the east.

In that direction, a French platoon was doing reconnaissance by climbing a hill that sloped upward several hundred metres. Many soldiers were holding positions in the valley, providing security for the meetings at the village, but the platoon of 30 French airborne troops had left their vehicles and hiked more than a kilometre away from the main group, spreading themselves out in an area roughly 300 metres by 300 metres. They were in a vulnerable position, looking up at rocky ridges to the north, south, and east, and that's where the insurgents struck most fiercely.

Soldiers' accounts in the French media say the fighting started at 3 p.m. and they endured four hours without reinforcements. The NATO report gives no timeline, but details a bloody struggle for survival as the foreign troops were incapable of retreating.

The stranded French platoon soon lost communication with the rest of the soldiers, making it impossible for them to call for air support. “This was probably due to the fact that the French platoon had only one radio,” the report said.

From high positions overlooking the foreign troops, the insurgents rained down devastatingly effective fire. All three U.S. Humvee jeeps had their windows struck with well-aimed bullets. Large sparks trailed out from the bullet impact sites, suggesting the insurgents were using incendiary rounds.

“The enemy's accuracy was very good,” the document said.

While praising the performance of U.S. and French troops under the onslaught, the report singled out the Afghan soldiers for criticism.

Fifteen troops from the Afghan National Army had accompanied the patrol in three Ford Ranger pickup trucks, but two of the vehicles were disabled under what the report described as “withering machinegun fire.” Four Afghan soldiers were wounded. Eventually the ANA troops decided to run away on foot.

“The ANA performed very poorly,” the report said. “The ANA force spent much of the time lounging on the battlefield. When they finally dispersed, most left their military equipment [including] weapons ID cards, and other items for the enemy.”

Reinforcements from nearby military bases eventually forced the insurgents to retreat, but some fighting continued through the night and into the next morning. The final tally was 10 French killed and 18 French wounded, with estimates of 15 insurgents killed and 18 wounded.

The French dead were not recovered from the battlefield until midday on Aug. 19, the report said. Some had been stripped of their equipment by the ambushers.

The final sentence of the NATO report suggests the military forces should return to the valley, prepared for another fight.

“Further presence in this denied area is crucial to disrupt the insurgent freedom of movement in what is a long-held and uninterrupted safe haven.”

[[R_H]]

'NATO troops paying for peace in Afghanistan'

KABUL (AFP) – NATO officially denies that any of its members pay insurgents in Afghanistan for peace, but military sources said Thursday that the practice is widespread among foreign forces fighting the Taliban.

The Times newspaper said 10 French troops killed in Sarobi, near Kabul, last year had not properly assessed the risks, because their Italian predecessors never told them they paid the Taliban not to attack them.

The Italian government described the British daily's report as "totally baseless" and said it had "never authorised any kind of money payment to members of the Taliban insurrection in Afghanistan".

But a senior Afghan official suggested otherwise.

"I certainly can confirm that we were aware that the Italian forces were paying the opposition in Sarobi not to attack them," he told AFP on condition of anonymity.

"We have reports of similar deals in (western) Herat province by Italian troops based there under NATO umbrella.

"It's a deal: you don't attack me, I don't attack you," he said, adding that the practice was passed on between foreign forces and it was likely that senior commanders were either involved or turned a blind eye to it.

"It is simply a matter of buying time and surviving," he added.

A French Army spokesman in Kabul, Lieutenant Colonel Jackie Fouquereau, told AFP: "The French do not give money to insurgents."

NATO spokesman in Afghanistan General Eric Tremblay said he was "not aware" of such practices and had no information about the Italian case.

"It's not a counter-insurgency tactic. But the Afghan government can sometimes make local arrangements. If it's done, it's more by the Afghan government than the international forces," he added.

But according to a number of Western and Afghan officers, all speaking on condition of anonymity, the politically sensitive practice is fairly widespread among NATO forces in Afghanistan.

One Western military source told of payments made by Canadian soldiers stationed in the violent southern province of Kandahar, while another officer spoke of similar practices by the German army in northern Kunduz.

"I can tell you that lots of countries under the NATO umbrella operating out in rural parts of Afghanistan do pay the militants for not attacking them," the senior Afghan official said.

He added that it "seems to be the practice with military forces from some NATO countries, excluding the US forces under NATO, the British forces and the whole coalition forces" under the US-led "Operation Enduring Freedom".

"I think more than 50 percent of NATO forces deployed in rural Afghanistan have such deals or at least have struck such deals" to ensure peace, the official said.

He said he did not want to say precisely how many but one Western officer said: "As it's not very positive and not officially recognised, it's never spoken about openly. It's a bit shameful.

"Consequently, it's sometimes not communicated properly between the old unit and the new unit that comes in to relieve them," which may have happened between the Italians and the French.

According to The Times, the Italian secret service gave tens of thousands of dollars to Taliban commanders and local warlords to keep the peace in the Sarobi region.

The French soldiers had been deployed there for less than a month when 10 of them were killed and 21 others injured on August 18, 2008 in one of the deadliest ambushes by insurgents against foreign forces.

[Rochey]

Does anyone by any chance have an idea as to why Italy failed to tell anyone else what was going on? Was it some sense of pride, a sort of feeling that they shouldn't be dealing with the enemy? The denials over the bribery that was posted eariler in this thread means that it's highly unlikely that the Italians simply forgot to tell the French troops why it was so quiet, so there must have been some motivation behind keeping it quiet.