I hoped to make clear that i have reached the conclusion that the German 'Atlantic wall' ( it wasn't) can not sufficiently explain the lack of allied progress after they managed to deceive the Germans as to the target area of operation overlord and to smash trough the 'wall' defenses with significantly less casualties than even they believed. Obviously it should not be forgotten that the successfully deception played a large part in the light casualties but my point remains that after the initial success the allied schedule fell quickly and hopelessly behind schedule showing that either they significantly underestimated remaining German strength ( somewhat accurate) or overestimated their own capacity to fight. Since no one was surprised by how the countryside looked i must logically come to the conclusion that the allies made the same mistakes as in North Africa, Italy by expecting the Germans to fade away in the face of superior fire support.PainRack wrote:I believe the point was the Allies competence vis a vis the Germans, as opposed to the fortifications involved.
The Allies certainly faced a much more difficult operational task of assaulting the Atlatnic wall than the Germans did in attacking through the bocage country.
No it can not but in my reading and opinion that is the conclusion i have reached. The allies has significant and well supplied forces in Normandy and could not employ them in tactically or theater specific ways to gain anything but their immediate objectives.The Allies difficulties cannot be dismissed purely as a result of German tactical superority.
A secondary front where given the terrain they had to little chance to inflict significant German casualties without suffering many more of their own.Neither could the Germans. Kesselring success should not be denied, but the Italian front was always meant to be a secondary front.
Not in September 1943 it was not. Given the terrain nothing but a more warm bodies could have changed the situation and that's one thing the Allies ran short of shortly after the Normandy landings; the campaign in Italy surely aided the Russians somewhat ( and thus by extension the Allied chances for a successful Overlord) but it was done mostly to mollify the British and to keep Stalin from making ever more rude, but accurate, comments about how the west where not investing anywhere near the blood and resources Russia was. Depending on who you believe Stalin threatened them with coming to terms with Germany and there were secret ( well at the time) meetings between representatives before the campaign season of 1943Indeed, much of the success Kesselring had could be attributed to the bulk of Allied airpower being focused on France and the landing. Supplies, landing craft, POL was all redirected towards the Normandy buildup.
Not significantly no. What was needed in Italy and Normandy both were more actual soldiers ( not people milling aimlessly around the rear areas) and since the Allies organizational capabilities and force structures were comparatively inefficient and their manpower going to many fronts as well they just didn't have those to commit to the Italian theater in 1943. It can be argued that they always had limited aims with the limited resources they could commit but considering the timetable for reaching various objectives ( notably Rome) it's clear that German resistance and Italian cooperation were not accurately projecte or offensives capabilities once again overestimated.If more combat resources had been directed towards the Italian front, Kesselring defence would probably have been less successful, in particular, the use of airpower in interdicting the vulnerable supply routes of the German army.
Yes similar casualties but not gained by employing similar resources. Operation Shingle had the aim of capturing Rome and yet the would be attackers soon found themselves besieged and fighting to maintain the bridgehead which consumed truly vast volumes of resources ( i think The fact that the Germans managed to inflict similar casualties while managing to evacuate Tenth Army in good order fighting nominally better equipped and supported soldiers speaks to the point that i have tried to make so far. I am not arguing that the allies couldn't win but trying to point out that the Germans managed to hang on longer than both sides expected on their worse days.In what sense? Operation Shingle had 43 thousand casualties for the Allies, 40k casualties for the Axis forces involved. To make matters worse, the Allies have the manpower and medical resources to actually treat and rehab wounded, returning them to the front as effectives.
The Germans don't.
At this stage in the war, Allied medical care was superior to the Germans in every plausible sense, from plasma,blood, antibiotics to even hygiene and bed status. The Germans was so stretched for manpower that casualties were placed back on convalescent duty, and in 1944, back to the front before they have time to properly heal.
As for the casualties as far as i know the Germans managed to return a higher volume of soldiers to active service but admittedly they had little choice and plenty of defensive fighting/guard duties ( Norway, Greece, France etc ) where wounded soldiers could still be maintained while render good service. I can't say this is a area of particular interest to me but if you have a online source i would be most interested to look at the numbers.
They were copying the Germans, to the best of their abilities, and not doing it very well given the disparity in means and the disparity in resources expended. Again these are all too be expected given German recent experiences in the first world war and their titanic struggle in the East were mistakes were exposed relatively quickly and at cost. Logistical superiority is a function of resource capacity much the same as medical care is and given the very effective German defensive fighting as well as their earlier successes against European and Russian forces it wasn't logistics or a failure of doctrine that led to defeat but Hitlers strategic decisions. The irony of it all is that Hitler could have won his war had he trusted his generals to fight the wars after he so often made the decisive political decisions that allowed them a fighting chance.There are problems with Allied doctrine, such as US tank doctrine but to suggest that it was the single biggest allied failing when one considers how effective the Allies coordinated artillery and airpower with their ground forces, the logistic superiority, the medical care....
Mid 1944 i would not consider that too surprising given a country under constant air attack and pilot training and production pretty badly matched in Germany fighting on so many fronts and being under air attack that constantly leads to logistical, parts&fuel supply disruptions. That the Luftwaffe managed to keep inflicting such high attrition rates on so many fronts is again in my opinion the surprising thing. Measuring combat capabilities in terms of readiness rates and sorties mounted is a great peacetime measure ( and a good measure in wartime when you achieve objectives) but in war you can only measure success and without having read enough about the state of both air forces in mid 1944 ( at which point the bomber effort were shifted to France and the transportation network to it) i can only make those objections. Notably the Germans still failed to win the battle of Britain despite achieving it's best readiness and sortie rates? Perhaps there is a lesson in this after all?Except that US airpower at this time was generating more sorties than the Germans did, with higher readiness rates and etc even when the Germans were at their height during the Battle of Britain.
Again any specific online sources, with those numbers would gain my undivided attention.
Perhaps i can correct myself by suggesting that doctrine is as much about how you train and intend to fight as it is about what you have already brought to the fight in terms of human resources and fighting systems? What i am suggesting is that the Germans efforts in this combination were superior and that with the same volume of human resources and war materials their operational and tactical capabilities would have been , or as i see it, remained, greaterThe US would also better air support via Ninth Airforce during the subsequent breakout.
If anything, comparing Operation Goodwood friendly fire casualties, when the Bombers actually violated their own doctrine and orders and not to mention their respective commanders refusal to actually train said squadrons in tactical support is........ misleading.
It's a question of emphasis ( the allies lost twenty two thousand bombers against Germany) and even in that i am not sure how you arrived at this statement of allied technical superiority in radio at this time. Could you elaborate as to why exactly you mean by 'superior'?Ninth airforce had perfected other means of designating targets other than just laying out panels to mark out to Luffwaffe bombers. Part of the reason is Allied technical superiority in terms of radio at this time.
Why? Why must those who have greater resources necessarily use it more efficiently or for it result in proportionally significant combat capabilities?It is IMPOSSIBLE to seperate the Allies vast resources from any discussion of their doctrine.
Which superior electronics, superior metals and which aircraft with better performance? What does all those possibilities have to do with doctrine? Why do you see a logical connection between greater resources and a efficient employment of it? Why could Russia create so many more tanks out of a hundred tons of steel than the Germans could and why did that not directly translate into those larger numbers of tanks actually defeating the more inefficiently built German models? Why didn't the more numerous and superior British and French tanks have a more telling effect on the course of the battle of France? How did you arrive at the conclusion that greater allied resources, and thus potential, meant that they were destined to win and why do discard the notion that one can still defeat a enemy with higher resources capacity trough superior doctrine and strategic choices?It is the Allies access to superior metals and electronics that allowed them to have aircraft of better performance, which translates to being able to exploit tactics that the Germans could not use.
All of which still nearly resulted in the suspension of the bomber offensive against Germany in October 1943 because of the flawed doctrine that unescorted bombers could strike at vital German targets. Bombers could not defend themselves and churning out bombers by the hundreds, at tremendous cost ( few understand that the bomber offensive cost the allies 160 000 lost in action and tremendous expenditure in resources) could not and did not change this fact. Even with Germans having to divert aircraft to East as well as three other significant fronts the bomber campaign were not sustainable and superior manpower and resources pools merely allowed the allies to absorb the punishment and change their doctrine accordingly; it never meant that they would or must have changed their doctrine.Ditto to their access to greater fuel and automobile industry, which translates to increased mobility and supplies which then translates to how the US could sustain airpower and ground battles longer.
Stellar