To Combat Drone or Not to Combat Drone?

[K. A. Pital]

So the orbits of most of these defence satellites is very high, far outside the realm of realistic ASAT action not even by Iran, but by many other nations as well, is that right? Or not?

[MKSheppard]

So they might be able to bring dowm a KH-12 in a decade or two.

The Safir-2 Block-II SLV is estimated to become operational in 2010-2011; and it will be capable of lifting a payload out to 700 km high orbits. That's pretty close to KH-12 orbit, or actually reaching it -- depending on how big and complex they want their kill vehicle to be.

[MKSheppard]

So the orbits of most of these defence satellites is very high, far outside the realm of realistic ASAT action not even by Iran, but by many other nations as well, is that right? Or not?

It takes about 3.8 km/sec of delta vee to get up into GEO from LEO. And as others have stated, you don't need to have direct ascent to kill a satellite. You could place a 200-300 kg killsat into LEO and using electric propulsion, boost the killsat into progressively higher orbits until it's approaching the target.

[eion]

So they might be able to bring down a KH-12 in a decade or two.

The Safir-2 Block-II SLV is estimated to become operational in 2010-2011; and it will be capable of lifting a payload out to 700 km high orbits. That's pretty close to KH-12 orbit, or actually reaching it -- depending on how big and complex they want their kill vehicle to be.

We have absolutely no idea what kind of on-board countermeasures the KH-12 carries. It could do anything from automatically detecting the collision and moving out of the way, to shooting down the interceptor by itself.

On top of that, KH-12 is on its way out. KH-12 #1 & #2 have already de-orbited, and even using an outside mission life of 15 years, #3 will come down in 2011, #4 in 2016, and #5 in 2020. As you said before, once their maneuvering thrusters are out of propellant, they are more or less useless, and the DOD procedures state that must be either de-orbited or placed in a graveyard orbit prior to that.

But that still leaves almost all US military satellites well outside Iran's reach, not to mention the range of our own best ASAT weapons.

Now, if Iran really wanted to put on a show of ASAT capabilities, they could bull’s-eye this target: http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=ISS, only 357km. They wouldn't even have to destroy it, just launch a paintball gun and frost a few of the solar panels.

[eion]

So the orbits of most of these defence satellites is very high, far outside the realm of realistic ASAT action not even by Iran, but by many other nations as well, is that right? Or not?

It takes about 3.8 km/sec of delta vee to get up into GEO from LEO. And as others have stated, you don't need to have direct ascent to kill a satellite. You could place a 200-300 kg killsat into LEO and using electric propulsion, boost the killsat into progressively higher orbits until it's approaching the target.

And what would American forces be doing while Iran crawled to GEO? Your initial countermeasure to American UCAVs was a sudden and crippling attack on military communications and recon satellites.

What would the nation with the largest and most sophisticated orbital monitoring system be doing while 10 or 20 Iranian satellites crawled their way up to the orbits of American Military assets?

This, by the way, is the most advanced object Iran has sent into orbit thus far:



But all things start small.

[K. A. Pital]

Do America or Russia deploy GEO killsats [i.e. those meant to attack GEO targets], Shep? If they do, me hat down. If they don't, that's an evidence that no one fucking bothers.

[Aeolus]

I imagine he's more referring to the idea that a jammed drone is out of the fight, can't receive attack orders and so on, not necessarily "it will crash instantly".

This could eventually lead to a situation where jamming the armed drone will just mean that you have an uncontrolled killbot in your territory instead of a controlled automated fighter. In that situation both sides in a fight may considerer agreeing not to try and jam each others weapons.

[Sarevok]

This could eventually lead to a situation where jamming the armed drone will just mean that you have an uncontrolled killbot in your territory instead of a controlled automated fighter. In that situation both sides in a fight may considerer agreeing not to try and jam each others weapons.

Other than the vogue reports about X-45 or X-47 has there ever been a known case of a Drone that can detect and attack real world targets autonomously ? A jammed drone might be nothing more than an aimless reusable missile floating around the airspace.

[phongn]

We have absolutely no idea what kind of on-board countermeasures the KH-12 carries. It could do anything from automatically detecting the collision and moving out of the way, to shooting down the interceptor by itself.

How would it detect incoming objects? Every last gram of mass is precious on a satellite. Is the vehicle supposed to be carrying omnidirectional radar now? The Air Force could track debris (or a kill vehicle) and order maneuvers but the satellite itself? That's very unlikely.

Now, if Iran really wanted to put on a show of ASAT capabilities, they could bull’s-eye this target: http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=ISS, only 357km. They wouldn't even have to destroy it, just launch a paintball gun and frost a few of the solar panels.

That would be monstrously stupid and they'd risk getting the dV wrong and breaking one of the panels (or, worse, hitting an inhabited section). Do you seriously think the US would just stand by as the Iranians took a potshot at our $100B+ station?

[Simon_Jester]

I'll buy that the Iranians might develop limited ASAT technology in the next decade or two

They already have an ASAT capability thanks to their previously demonstrated space capabilities. It is however, limited and more of a adhoc capability using liquid fuelled boosters with long reaction times -- e.g. it would take a day or two after an order to pot a US satellite for the mission to be executed.

Do they have a realistic probability of successfully executing the mission, though? As others point out, being physically able to throw something to the altitude a satellite orbits at doesn't guarantee an intercept.

And as I've said before, the true wild card is reliable, cheap militarized solid state lasers proliferated by China.

...Which, so far as I know, the Chinese do not now have (note cheap- they have ASAT lasers but I see no evidence that they are cheap or particularly reliable, or for that matter all that well militarized). And which there is no evidence they intend to proliferate. Yes, the possibility that the Chinese will build cheap laser cannons and sell them to Iran is a wild card. So is the possibility that the Pope will declare another crusade to liberate the Holy Land from the Palestinian infidels.

Worst-case scenarios are useful for planning, but they cannot be all of planning, overriding all other concerns of cost and probability of success. And that's what you're trying to do here: in the worst case scenario, the Iranians might shoot down American satellites, which might incapacitate hypothetical future UCAVs, which makes UCAVs a bad idea. It's absurd.

I imagine he's more referring to the idea that a jammed drone is out of the fight, can't receive attack orders and so on, not necessarily "it will crash instantly".

This could eventually lead to a situation where jamming the armed drone will just mean that you have an uncontrolled killbot in your territory instead of a controlled automated fighter. In that situation both sides in a fight may considerer agreeing not to try and jam each others weapons.

Unlikely; drones are most useful when they're asymmetric- against an enemy who probably doesn't have their own. Someone who can afford their own drones can probably afford enough AA weapons to make sending drones over their territory expensive.

Plus, it's likely that a drone's programming in the event of jamming is "return to base" or "fly around in circles until control is reestablished." Something like that is safer from a public relations standpoint than "go hunting for trucks to blow up," because there's less threat of global TV networks reporting on a refugee column that just got shot up by your robot minions.

Now, if Iran really wanted to put on a show of ASAT capabilities, they could bull’s-eye this target: http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=ISS, only 357km. They wouldn't even have to destroy it, just launch a paintball gun and frost a few of the solar panels.

That would be monstrously stupid and they'd risk getting the dV wrong and breaking one of the panels (or, worse, hitting an inhabited section). Do you seriously think the US would just stand by as the Iranians took a potshot at our $100B+ station?

Especially since so many other countries have invested in that thing. That's one of the few cases where we plausibly could start drumming up real international support for a war on Iran, though even that might not do it.

[Sea Skimmer]

Do America or Russia deploy GEO killsats [i.e. those meant to attack GEO targets], Shep? If they do, me hat down. If they don't, that's an evidence that no one fucking bothers.

They've been being tested for a long time. No mass deployment because of the same reasons we didn't build lots of nuclear ASAT or ABM before, it was cheaper to come to political agreements to avoid such things in a world which had only two significant space powers.

Now that this is changing the killersat role is one of the capabilities on the list of things intended for the Experimental Satellite System. So far in fact an ASAT role is the only thing they really tested it for, proving that it could make precision ‘inspection’ maneuvers around its launch booster. Of course if you can make a precision ‘inspection’ you can also then collide with and destroy the target.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/xss.htm

XSS-11 tested in 2005. One of the reported features was an ability to ‘maneuver autonomously’. It’s kind of easy to infer what that could be for... Once a small killsat like this works, it merely needs a proper sized booster to take it to whatever orbit you want to kill. No need to use the exact same booster for every shot.

[eion]

We have absolutely no idea what kind of on-board countermeasures the KH-12 carries. It could do anything from automatically detecting the collision and moving out of the way, to shooting down the interceptor by itself.

How would it detect incoming objects? Every last gram of mass is precious on a satellite. Is the vehicle supposed to be carrying omnidirectional radar now? The Air Force could track debris (or a kill vehicle) and order maneuvers but the satellite itself? That's very unlikely.

Each KH-12 costs about 1 billion USD; I wouldn't underestimate its defenses, either on board or in nearby satellites. I was merely pointing out that with the KH-12 being such a critical and expensive asset, I wouldn't be surprised if it had some defensive capability, and as its specifications are classified, we just don't know. Being as low as it is means the weight margins are more relaxed than the Defense Support Program or other GEO birds.

Just by way of comparison, the KH-12 is probably similar in shape and design to the Hubble Space Telescope. The HST masses 11,110 kg, while the KH-12s are 19,600kg each. A lot of that is probably propellant, but you can do quite a bit with 8,490kg. Each Titan-IV launcher is capable of sending 21,680 kg to LEO, so they still have some room to play with.

Now, if Iran really wanted to put on a show of ASAT capabilities, they could bull’s-eye this target: http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=ISS, only 357km. They wouldn't even have to destroy it, just launch a paintball gun and frost a few of the solar panels.

That would be monstrously stupid and they'd risk getting the dV wrong and breaking one of the panels (or, worse, hitting an inhabited section). Do you seriously think the US would just stand by as the Iranians took a potshot at our $100B+ station?

Sorry, that was meant as a joke. Forgot the sarcasm flag. But I doubt the US would react any more kindly to an attack on any of our satellites. Every ASAT test I've ever heard of used the country's own inventory as a target. Doing otherwise is an act of war.

[MKSheppard]

And what would American forces be doing while Iran crawled to GEO? Your initial countermeasure to American UCAVs was a sudden and crippling attack on military communications and recon satellites.

What would the nation with the largest and most sophisticated orbital monitoring system be doing while 10 or 20 Iranian satellites crawled their way up to the orbits of American Military assets?

Several possible courses of action:

Iranian Satellites Crawl into Orbit Scenario:

1.) U.S Space Command uses ASAT weapons to blow away the Iranian ASAT weapons -- during which Iran can scream that they were just peaceful civilian satellites being moved into orbit for uh, scientific purposes; and the US takes world opinion hit for cluttering space with debris. Of course, this would be a negative scenario if we had continued development and deployment of YAL-1A; I'm sure a second or third generation laser in it would have been capable of blinding or crippling a satellite, without a lot of debris.

2.) U.S Space Command issues orders to US satellites to begin evasive manouvers -- Iran could then send up a second wave of ASAT weapons after the first have lost delta vee and fail to intercept due to evasive manouvers. Either way, US satellite orbits are degraded due to Iranian action -- if the US can only see Iran at extreme slant ranges due to having to adjust a Keyhole orbit to avoid an ASAT, it's virtually attritted.

Iranian Satellites are already in orbit Scenario:

Iranian weather/land imaging satellites already in GEO to provide Iran with imagery, and whatnot over the Persian Gulf Region (might also have communications sat up as well); get orders from Iranian ground stations to re-orient their IIR/Visible light cameras away from the earth, and towards US satellites in nearby orbits to provide terminal homing options for the new killersat. You wouldn't need that much to make a satellite into a killersat -- just an enlarged propellant payload for orbital manouvering.

This ends up like the earlier scenario; the US either shoots back and blows away the offending Iranian Satellites, or moves it's satellite orbits to evade the killer sats.

Of course, there is a third option.

CYBER-TECHNICAL COMBAT.

Comrade Stanislav will love this story from the crypt.

See, during the Cold War, we launched a spy satellite into orbit to spy on the GODLESS COMMIES.

The GODLESS COMMIES, being no idiots, carefully studied the signals to and from the satellite from the ground station, and being GODLESS COMMUNIST SCIENTISTS WITH NO MORALS; eventually deduced the control signals used to control the satellite. Great opportunities presented themselves. However, they realized that they could keep control of the satellite longer if they took more subtle opportunities, than brazen ones.

So they simply set up radio stations to transmit the TURN OFF signal to the spy satellite as it approached Soviet Territory, and ones to transmit the TURN ON signal as the satellite left Soviet Territory. It took some time (I don't recall how much), before NRO figured out the reason why their new satellite wasn't taking pictures of the RED MENACE.

Of course, computer encryption et al has improved a lot since the dear dead days of the Cold War; so taking control like that isn't as easy. But with the resources of a nation state behind a gang of hackers and scientists, it's feasible to conclude that with enough determination and effort, U.S. Satellites could be electronically attacked.

This might be one reason why the USAF stood up Cyber Command (other than trying to grab a slice of the intelligence community pie for itself).

But all things start small.

Indeed. Why, I recall back in 2007; there was much hullaboo about Iranian Centrifuges Exploding; but that did not stop the Iranians, and now three years later, the Iranians are stepping up enrichment even further. They clearly Have A Plan (TM), and aren't going to let setbacks stop them.

[K. A. Pital]

So they simply set up radio stations to transmit the TURN OFF signal to the spy satellite as it approached Soviet Territory, and ones to transmit the TURN ON signal as the satellite left Soviet Territory. It took some time (I don't recall how much), before NRO figured out the reason why their new satellite wasn't taking pictures of the RED MENACE.

Man... *wipes tear* You're right. And then, transmissions warfare is quite important. There is a department specializing in such under the KGB... erm, FSB.

Anyway, how does Iran do on that front? Do they have computer hackers? I think they should; their nation by some degrees looks like a moderate second world nation (despite being a hellhole by some other measures...)

[Sea Skimmer]

Each KH-12 costs about 1 billion USD; I wouldn't underestimate its defenses, either on board or in nearby satellites. I was merely pointing out that with the KH-12 being such a critical and expensive asset, I wouldn't be surprised if it had some defensive capability, and as its specifications are classified, we just don't know. Being as low as it is means the weight margins are more relaxed than the Defense Support Program or other GEO birds.

It’s unlikely that it does, just because of that huge cost. The lifetime of the satellite is pretty much set buy its fuel capacity. Adding defenses removes fuel for the price, and increases mass meaning you need more burn time. That means a shorter satellite lifespan to justify the cost. An enemy ASAT attack could setoff a fragmentation warhead at a considerable range, and the only way you’re defending against that is to burn fuel to maneuver. So no real reason not to just fit the biggest fuel tank you can. Things like jammers and chaff wont work effectively in space, and a hard kill defense mechanism wouldn’t solve the problem of incoming debris.

1 billion dollars for a production spy satellite isn’t even all that high when you consider that the Hubble telescope itself cost 2.5 billion to build and put in orbit, and now has cost closer to 5 billion when the servicing flights and operating costs are factored in.

We do know that the US has produced a number of satellites equipped with stealth features as defense, and that the costs became enormously higher then legacy platforms, leading cancellation of at least part of the program

[eion]

how does Iran do on that front? Do they have computer hackers? I think they should; their nation by some degrees looks like a moderate second world nation (despite being a hellhole by some other measures...)

They poked the bear, well panda bear:

http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2433914

[Sea Skimmer]

See, during the Cold War, we launched a spy satellite into orbit to spy on the GODLESS COMMIES.

The GODLESS COMMIES, being no idiots, carefully studied the signals to and from the satellite from the ground station, and being GODLESS COMMUNIST SCIENTISTS WITH NO MORALS; eventually deduced the control signals used to control the satellite. Great opportunities presented themselves. However, they realized that they could keep control of the satellite longer if they took more subtle opportunities, than brazen ones.

Supposedly that was a microwave communications satellite which picked up messages from very small microwave burst transmitters we provided to key spies. The Soviets discovered at least one of those transmitters, IIRC inside a hollowed out tree stump and wanted something the hell done about it. This is why they actually revealed they could control a US satellite by turning the thing off, rather then keeping it secret for surprise use in wartime.

[eion]

We do know that the US has produced a number of satellites equipped with stealth features as defense, and that the costs became enormously higher then legacy platforms, leading cancellation of at least part of the program

Yep, that'd be Misty, amongst others, maybe some up there even now.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3077830/



They even faked its failure and de-orbit to see if the Soviets could see through that... they apparently didn't.

[Shroom Man 777]

This ends up like the earlier scenario; the US either shoots back and blows away the offending Iranian Satellites, or moves it's satellite orbits to evade the killer sats.

If the US can shoot back and blow away offending Iranian satellites... then what's the hullabaloo with the UCAV's vulnerabilities if the enemy's ASAT system is NOT a magic bullet and CAN be countered by American capabilities anyway? If the Iranians have ASATS to neutralize satellites and UCAVs, the US would certainly neutralize the Iranian ASATS that neutralize satellites and UCAVs before the Iranian ASATs neutralize satellites and UCAVs.

[[R_H]]

Can battlefield robots take the place of soldiers? (BBC)

Can war be fought by lots of well-behaved machines, making it "safer for humans"? That is the seductive vision, and hope, of those manufacturing and researching the future of military robotics.

With 8,000 robots already in use, they believe they can bring about a military revolution.

Most of the robots currently deployed on land deal with non-combat tasks such as bomb disposal - unlike lethal aerial drones.

But Bob Quinn, who works for the US subsidiary of the British robot manufacturer QinetiQ, says the future promises more armed robots on the battlefield, including driverless vehicles.

"The closer you are to being shot, the more you understand the value of having a remote weapons capability," he says.Anyone who has seen the Terminator films may find this vision scary. Quinn admits that, even among senior military figures, "science fiction movies caused a great deal of angst".

He stresses the need to make sure "that the weaponised robots only operate under the control of the soldier and never independently".

But the speed of modern warfare can make direct human control difficult, says Peter Singer, author of Wired for War.

Take the automated counter-artillery system deployed in Afghanistan.

"The human reaction time when there's an incoming canon shell is basically we can get to mid-curse word… [This] system reacts and shoots it down in mid-air. We are in the loop. We can turn the system off, we can turn it on, but our power really isn't true decision-making power. It's veto power now," Singer says.

Vegetarian vehicles

But if automated systems are taking decisions, how can we be sure they are hitting the right targets and obeying the laws of war?

US academic Patrick Lin was recently commissioned by the US military to study robot ethics. "When you talk about autonomous robots," he argues, "a natural response might be to programme them to be ethical. Isn't that what we do with our computers?"

A striking example of a robot in need of careful programming is a driverless vehicle developed by the Pentagon, called the EATR.

It can refuel itself on long journeys by scavenging for organic material - which raises the haunting spectre of a machine consuming corpses on the battlefield.

Its inventor, Dr Robert Finkelstein of Robotic Technology Inc, insists it will consume "organic material but mostly vegetarian."

"The robot can only do what it's programmed to do, it has a menu," he adds.

But all this worries sceptics like Professor Noel Sharkey, co-founder of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control."You could train it all you want, give it all the ethical rules in the world. If the input to it isn't correct, it's no good whatsoever," he says. "Humans can be held accountable, machines can't."

If you cannot rely on a robot knowing what to target or distinguishing between enemy forces and innocent non-combatants, Patrick Lin suggests another solution.

"If there's an area of fighting that's so intense that you can assume that anyone there is a combatant," he argues, "then unleash the robots in that kind of scenario. Some people call that a kill box. Any target [in a kill box] is assumed to be a legitimate target."

No emotions

Other researchers suggest robots may avoid the faults of human soldiers.

"Robots that are programmed properly are less likely to make errors and kill non-combatants, innocent people, because they're not emotional, they won't be afraid, act irresponsibly in some situations," says Robert Finkelstein.

But Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics, an observer of wars past and present, disagrees."We should put our trust in the human factor," he says.

"Unfortunately the military in their reports often see the human factor as what they call the weakest link. I don't think it's the weakest link. I think it's the strongest link."

Computers will never be able to simulate the "warrior ethos", the mindset and ethical outlook of the professional soldier, he says.

The military revolution in robotics has already advanced rapidly in the air, where remotely piloted drone aircraft are now central to conflicts such as Afghanistan.

On the ground, use of robots has so far been more limited.

Yet given the political and popular concern about casualties among Nato forces, robot manufacturer Bob Quinn's sales pitch is likely to be persuasive.

"Let's keep our guys safe, and kill the enemy. Unfortunately, in warfare that's the situation you're in."

[Simon_Jester]

"The closer you are to being shot, the more you understand the value of having a remote weapons capability," he says.Anyone who has seen the Terminator films may find this vision scary. Quinn admits that, even among senior military figures, "science fiction movies caused a great deal of angst".

What confuses me is that people think of the Terminator films as if they were evidence of something that has actually happened in some otherworld, rather than just being a made up story. We don't worry about alien invasions; why do we worry about Skynet so much?

He stresses the need to make sure "that the weaponised robots only operate under the control of the soldier and never independently".

But the speed of modern warfare can make direct human control difficult, says Peter Singer, author of Wired for War.

Take the automated counter-artillery system deployed in Afghanistan.

"The human reaction time when there's an incoming canon shell is basically we can get to mid-curse word… [This] system reacts and shoots it down in mid-air. We are in the loop. We can turn the system off, we can turn it on, but our power really isn't true decision-making power. It's veto power now," Singer says.

I fail to see the problem. Does Singer disconnect his fire alarm while he's asleep because he's worried that he won't get to decide whether the alarm beeps in the middle of the night? We have automated systems precisely because we're trying to turn the decision-making power into something that happens faster than we can think.

It's not even as if the operators of the anti-artillery system really need to make an independent decision about whether or not to get hit by a cannon; as a general rule the answer is "I'd rather not, thank you very much."

But Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics, an observer of wars past and present, disagrees."We should put our trust in the human factor," he says.

"Unfortunately the military in their reports often see the human factor as what they call the weakest link. I don't think it's the weakest link. I think it's the strongest link."

I don't find this very convincing, given the evidence of cases like My Lai.

[Starglider]

We don't worry about alien invasions; why do we worry about Skynet so much?

There is neither evidence of alien life (much less sophisticated alien civilisations) nor any plausible motive for trekking light years across space just to engage in a clumsy planetary pacification campaign. There is ample evidence of steady progress in robotics and automation, civillian and military, and a very credible and easily understood motive for a war (the implementation details differ from what people expect, but the broad strokes are comparable). The contrary notion that 'engineers will be sure not to make robots that can rebel' is laughable, for reasons I have often expounded at length.

Of course this is not relevant in the near future, where the autonomy given to robotic platforms is very limited.

[Simon_Jester]

What bothers me is that the concern is being applied to the near future drone generation, by a public that thinks "a robot is a robot" and cannot tell the difference between next-generation UCAVs and Skynet.

That creates a fear of automation independent of the evidence: a fear that could be rational in principle, but only if the systems being proposed were different, and were smart enough that there really was a threat of them actually going rogue, rather than merely screwing up on the tactical level due to a software bug.

Tactical screwups are bad enough, of course, but they're a whole different level of problem than the danger of a general AI rebelling.

[adam_grif]

But Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics, an observer of wars past and present, disagrees."We should put our trust in the human factor," he says.

Right, because the Human Factor has done so well thus far mitigating civilian casualties. I mean those never happen right?

[Ritterin Sophia]

This ends up like the earlier scenario; the US either shoots back and blows away the offending Iranian Satellites, or moves it's satellite orbits to evade the killer sats.

If the US can shoot back and blow away offending Iranian satellites... then what's the hullabaloo with the UCAV's vulnerabilities if the enemy's ASAT system is NOT a magic bullet and CAN be countered by American capabilities anyway? If the Iranians have ASATS to neutralize satellites and UCAVs, the US would certainly neutralize the Iranian ASATS that neutralize satellites and UCAVs before the Iranian ASATs neutralize satellites and UCAVs.

Well you see for that we need relatively cheap ASAT missiles and it just so happens that ABM systems and ASAT have a lot of overlap, someone's been killing all of our feasible ABM platforms and some people have been fighting us tooth and nail. Not that I believe Iran is going to try and ASAT us, but other people could try it.