Was the T-34 significantly superior?

[Simon_Jester]

Was the Matilda with its two-pounder undergunned to fight its contemporary German tanks, though? How did the 2pdr stack up against the 37mm-armed Panzer III and the short 75mm-armed Panzer IV?

My impression was that the Matilda's real crippling vice, insofar as it had one, was speed, not armament. It was too slow for a really mobile operational role at ~15 mph, wasn't it?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Was the Matilda with its two-pounder undergunned to fight its contemporary German tanks, though? How did the 2pdr stack up against the 37mm-armed Panzer III and the short 75mm-armed Panzer IV?

My impression was that the Matilda's real crippling vice, insofar as it had one, was speed, not armament. It was too slow for a really mobile operational role at ~15 mph, wasn't it?

I think it might have matched somewhat well against the early Panzer III/IV, but by the mid war, it would have been outclassed, and the 75mm gun would simply slice up the Matilda with ease at range. The 2pdr is a 40mm gun, mind you. The Matilda's slow speed definitely made things worse.

[Black Admiral]

Was the Matilda with its two-pounder undergunned to fight its contemporary German tanks, though? How did the 2pdr stack up against the 37mm-armed Panzer III and the short 75mm-armed Panzer IV?

Reasonably, at least as far as I know - and Matilda IIs & Valentines were more than a match for the Italian tanks they faced in the Western Desert.

My impression was that the Matilda's real crippling vice, insofar as it had one, was speed, not armament. It was too slow for a really mobile operational role at ~15 mph, wasn't it?

It was also difficult to maintain, which is why the Valentine (simplified & easier to maintain) was developed.

[Thanas]

^People, next time please cite some sources or make an argument to back your words up. Just saying "reasonably" is not informative at all.

[Stuart]

What do people think of the Matilda in general? I mean, as a midwar tank it was badly outclassed, let alone as a late war tank; that much is obvious (hell, as far as I can tell its vaunted armor wasn't all that much better than that of the Sherman, which won a reputation for being thin-skinned in the late war period). But in the period when it really was one of the Brits' top of the line tanks... how was it?

A bit of background. Pre-WW2, the British divided tanks into three classes; light tanks used for reconnaissance, cruiser tanks used for penetration and operational advances and infantry tanks used to support the infantry. Infantry tanks traded off speed in favor of armor. Most infantry tanks were armed with machine guns but the Matilda II introduced the two pounder. Cruiser tanks traded off armor for speed and had the two pounder. Light tanks traded off armament and protection for speed. The Matilda II was a 1940 infantry tank.

At that time the Matilda II had much the reputation that the Tiger was to acheive four years later. It would shrug off shots from German 37mm guns and it took 88s firing over open sights to stop them. Its basic problem was that in France there weren't enough of them to be consequential.

The two pounder was a pretty good gun. In 1940 its penetration figures against a 30 degree angled plate were 50/42/36 (the figures being at 100 yards/500 yards/1000 yards. (http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php? ... &Itemid=58) With a Littlejohn Adaptor, (a squeezebore device fitted to the barrel) it was still a viable weapon as late as 1944. The last two pounder guns came off the production line in 1944.

The equivalent figures for the German 37mm PAK 35/36 were 35/29/22 (http://www.wwiivehicles.com/germany/guns/37-mm.asp) which puts the two pounder into context. Beware when working with penetration numbers though. Transnational comparisons are always hard to reconcile. Also, ammunitionn type has massive effects. The last 37mm PAK 35/36s came off the line in 1942.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Was the Matilda with its two-pounder undergunned to fight its contemporary German tanks, though? How did the 2pdr stack up against the 37mm-armed Panzer III and the short 75mm-armed Panzer IV?

Reasonably, at least as far as I know - and Matilda IIs & Valentines were more than a match for the Italian tanks they faced in the Western Desert.

My impression was that the Matilda's real crippling vice, insofar as it had one, was speed, not armament. It was too slow for a really mobile operational role at ~15 mph, wasn't it?

It was also difficult to maintain, which is why the Valentine (simplified & easier to maintain) was developed.

Let's not forget that the Matildas, both the original A11 a.k.a. Matilda I and the one in question (A12 a.k.a. Matilda II), were designed as an infantry tanks, which meant that they were supposed to advance at the pace of infantry and defend the attacking infantry against enemy armored counter-attacks.

The 2 pounder gun when designed was one of the best under 75 mm tank guns in the world. It was markedly superior to the German 37 mm gun and pretty much matched the Soviet 45 mm and French 47 mm guns despite smaller caliber. Unfortunately that was not all good, since it had a very high muzzle velocity, which made designing a useful high explosive shell difficult, and in fact the British tanks with a 2 pdr gun in ETO or North Africa were not supplied with HE shells after France, although such a shell did exist (unlike certain legend claims). HE shells were, however, supplied to Far East.

There was also another, even more serious consequence: the German early war tanks had face hardened armor and the high velocity shot of the 2 pdr often shattered completely on impact. The original shot had no penetrator cap to facilitate the penetrating process, but once the problem was discovered a cap was added. Unfortunately it only alleviated the shattering problem but did not completely remove it, and by the time the troops were well supplied with the new shot, the Germans were already receiving new tanks with increased protection. So the history of the 2 pounder gun was a lot less successful than it should have been just by looking at the paper specs. The shattering problem was based on phenomena that were not understood at the time and unfortunately the British did not think to test their AP shots against face hardened armor.

As far as armor goes the Matilda II was one of the better armored tanks (along the French Somua 35 and B1bis) until the T-34 and in particular the KV-1 appeared in 1941. It was frontally inpenetrable by the German 37 mm gun and the 50 mm guns could penetrate it only at short ranges. The 50 mm L/42 required APCR (Panzergranat 40) ammunition to penetrate at all. Unfortunately the good armor rarely translated into significant tactical advantage because of the slow speed and inability to fire effective HE shells, which meant that it had to close within machine gun range to engage German AT guns somewhat effectively. Sometimes the Matildas simply run over the German AT guns. Nevertheless the Matilda II was one of the primary reasons why the Afrika Korps started to increasingly employ the 88 mm AA gun in the anti-tank role, since it was the only German gun which could reliably destroy the Matilda II even at long ranges.

[Simon_Jester]

Thank you, Stuart and Marcus.

Let's not forget that the Matildas, both the original A11 a.k.a. Matilda I and the one in question (A12 a.k.a. Matilda II), were designed as an infantry tanks, which meant that they were supposed to advance at the pace of infantry and defend the attacking infantry against enemy armored counter-attacks.

The real question to my mind is whether this doctrine was valid. Because if it was, then the Matilda was a pretty good infantry tank, being better protected than any of its contemporaries on the field and better armed than most of its contemporaries on the field.

If it wasn't, then the Matilda suffered, as I said, a crippling flaw in its low top speed (and lack of HE shell for long range antipersonnel work).

Unfortunately that was not all good, since it had a very high muzzle velocity, which made designing a useful high explosive shell difficult, and in fact the British tanks with a 2 pdr gun in ETO or North Africa were not supplied with HE shells after France...

Should I take this to mean that they were supplied with HE shells in France, or is that not what you meant?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Up until the end of the War, the Soviets still employed ISU-152s, and ISU-122s and JS-1/2/3 tanks to support infantry, and to attack enemy tanks. The ISU-152 in particular, had a huge 152mm gun for the purpose of hurling a huge HE round to crack open bunkers (or, in some cases, crack open Tiger I and maybe Tiger II tanks.). So the strategy of infantry support tanks was a good idea, but in the case of the Matilda, her armament was lacking by the end of the war, as others have pointed out.

Tank gun selection was more often than not, about achieving some kind of balance between large HE rounds and high muzzle velocity AP rounds. Tank guns optimised for AP rounds often ended up in tank destroyers, or as anti-tank guns. Examples are the Soviet 100mm D-10 and 57mm ZIS-2 guns, and the American 76mm M1 guns.

[Iosef Cross]

Here is one interesting criticism of the T-34 as a superior tank:
http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters2.html

[Iosef Cross]

The big crying shame was that we didn't invade France in 1943 -- at that point, the Germans had not yet fully developed PaK 40 spam, and you would have faced a majority of 50mm guns, both on tanks and attached to the infantry. By 1944, the 50mm had been pretty much superceeded in all frontline roles basically.

I think that invading France around June 1943 was suicide. The allies only had the capacity to deploy ~20 divisions (see: ) while the Germans had around 50 divisions, granted German divisions were smaller, but they needed numerical superiority to fight over prepared defenders with excellent tactical skills. The Luftwaffe wasn't defeated yet, so total air superiority like they in 1944 was out of question.

Also, the importance of tanks is overrated, like in WW1, it was good'ol artillery that caused the vast majority of casualties in WW2.

[Iosef Cross]

While the Germans had probably the deadliest designs on the field, there is a simple proof it wasn't the best. They lost the war.

That is ridiculous: The quality (in terms of cost effectiveness of tanks) of tanks in each side had a minimal impact on the outcome. The fact that the US + USSR + UK had nearly 400 million people while Germany had ~65 million is of some greater significance. The number of men each side could put in the battlefield was the single element of greater importance.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Thank you, Stuart and Marcus.

The real question to my mind is whether this doctrine was valid. Because if it was, then the Matilda was a pretty good infantry tank, being better protected than any of its contemporaries on the field and better armed than most of its contemporaries on the field.

If it wasn't, then the Matilda suffered, as I said, a crippling flaw in its low top speed (and lack of HE shell for long range antipersonnel work).

The doctrine was certainly valid to some degree, although the lack of useful HE shell made the Matildas less well suited to the role than they could have been. The later Churchill tried to mimic the Char B1bis and M3 Medium by putting a 75 mm howitzer in the hull, but unfortunately the field of fire was so limited that it was nearly useless. Often the howitzer was removed and replaced with a machine gun. Later marks of the Churchill deleted the howitzer.

The final evolution of the infantry tank was the Churchill VII, which finally gained a 75 mm gun in the turret and a useful HE capacity. The Churchill was in general well liked by British troops since it could go almost anywhere, albeit very slowly. The Mark VII also had heavy armor, which made it frontally nearly invulnerable to the German 75 mm L/48 guns.

As a side note, there was also a Valentine model with the same 75 mm QF gun, the Mk. XI, but nearly all of them were send to the Soviets, who actually liked the little Valentine tank. After the Sherman it was the best liked Western tank. The Valentine was also probably the most reliable British tank of WW2.

Up until the end of the War, the Soviets still employed ISU-152s, and ISU-122s and JS-1/2/3 tanks to support infantry, and to attack enemy tanks. The ISU-152 in particular, had a huge 152mm gun for the purpose of hurling a huge HE round to crack open bunkers (or, in some cases, crack open Tiger I and maybe Tiger II tanks.). So the strategy of infantry support tanks was a good idea, but in the case of the Matilda, her armament was lacking by the end of the war, as others have pointed out.

The Soviet ideas were similar but not quite the same as the British infantry tank. Well, to be entirely correct the Soviets also envisaged tanks co-operating with infantry closely, but originally they wanted to use light tanks for that. T-26 was such a tank and it was supposed to be replaced by the T-50, but after an initial production run the Soviets realized that a light infantry support tank did not really make sense any more and the T-50 was abandoned in favor of more T-34s. To complicate things even more the Soviets did use a large number of T-60 and T-70 light tanks for infantry support, but these tanks were in fact derived from the T-40, which was originally conceived as a reconnaissance tank. The T-60 and T-70 were manufactured in large numbers, because the factories making them did not have the tooling to make medium tanks. The final evolution of that line was the SU-76 assault gun, which was the most numerous Soviet assault gun made during the war. All of these vehicles are quite poorly represented in general military history books, since they were not glorious in any way, but numerically they were an important part of the Soviet war effort.

Back to doctrine: the Soviet KV series, JS series, (I)SU-152 and (I)SU-122 are best described as breakhrough vehicles. The Tiger I was also, although it ended up doing a lot more defense than intended. They were used to supply heavy firepower at the intended breakthrough point while still being as well armored as possible. They had to be able to duke it out with any enemy tanks attempting a counter-attack and they also needed heavy firepower to take out enemy tanks and strongpoints. It is telling that already in early 1941 the Soviets wanted to put a bigger gun on the KV-1, but such a gun did not exist, so they had to settle for the 76 mm (there was the KV-2 with a 152 mm howitzer, but that was a separate case).

A good indication for the need of such vehicle is that the US Army developed the M4A3E2 "Jumbo" Sherman. It was basically a Sherman with as much armor as the suspension could take. The M6 heavy tank was never quite satisfactory and it was much more difficult to transport than the Sherman Jumbo, so the latter had to play the role of breakthrough vehicle for the US Army.

A minor correction: the JS-3 was not really used in WW2, although there are unconfirmed reports of them being deployed against the Japanese in August 1945.

Should I take this to mean that they were supplied with HE shells in France, or is that not what you meant?

It appears that they really were, but proved to be of very limited utility, which probably lead to the decision to delete them. It was a two-fold problem: the high muzzle velocity necessitated thick walls for the shell and it also made it difficult to design a properly functioning fuse for the shell. The shell buried deep into ground before exploding and the small amount of HE meant that the exlosion was very underwhelming. Later there were attempts to developed a HE shell for the 6 pounder (57 mm) gun, but they met with similar difficulties. Of course it all should not have been impossible, since there were perfectly good HE fragmentation shells for the 40 mm Bofors AA guns, which had a high muzzle velocity as well, but it appears that the British did not really put much effort into it.

[Mr Bean]

The final evolution of the infantry tank was the Churchill VII, which finally gained a 75 mm gun in the turret and a useful HE capacity. The Churchill was in general well liked by British troops since it could go almost anywhere, albeit very slowly. The Mark VII also had heavy armor, which made it frontally nearly invulnerable to the German 75 mm L/48 guns.

This is incorrect, the Churchill MK IV in 1942 already had a British designed 75mm gun. In fact over forty Churchill's received a cut down Sherman turret directly on the chassis for use against the afrika korps defenses towards the end of the year.

I have a rather large number of WWII to Vietnman tank books on hand for some hobbies of mine and I can tell you that most general issue history books very much gloss over tank production, armor and armament's because of how complicated some of the issues are. And the less said about American tankers and the machine shops who supported them and the glee in which they field modified American equipment the better. The British to a lesser extent where the same as I mentioned the hybrid Sherman turret, Churchill chassie.

[Simon_Jester]

While we're on the subject of underappreciated Soviet tanks, what do you think of the BT series, Marcus?

[Marcus Aurelius]

The final evolution of the infantry tank was the Churchill VII, which finally gained a 75 mm gun in the turret and a useful HE capacity. The Churchill was in general well liked by British troops since it could go almost anywhere, albeit very slowly. The Mark VII also had heavy armor, which made it frontally nearly invulnerable to the German 75 mm L/48 guns.

This is incorrect, the Churchill MK IV in 1942 already had a British designed 75mm gun. In fact over forty Churchill's received a cut down Sherman turret directly on the chassis for use against the afrika korps defenses towards the end of the year.

The standard Churchill Mk IV had a 6 pounder gun when it came out of the factory. The Sherman turret on the Mk IV was a field expedient and it did not have a British designed gun, since it retained the original M3 gun of the Sherman. Then again the 75 mm Ordnance QF gun was spesifically designed to fire the same ammunition as the US 75 mm tank guns for logistical reasons and also because the US 75 mm HE shell was very good for its size. The 75 mm OQF was, by the way, based on the 6 pounder design so it could be easily fitted into tank turrets which previously had the 6 pounder, including Churchill and Cromwell. The 6 pounder was still the superior AT weapon and especially so once APDS ammunition was supplied in Autumn 1944.

But you were still sort of correct: I forgot about the Mk VI, which was basically a Mk IV with the 6 pounder replaced with the 75 mm OQF gun. Unlike the Mk IV 75NA, the Mk VI came out like that from the factory. It was an interim model before the Mk VII production was started, so it did not have the heavier armor of the Mk VII.

While we're on the subject of underappreciated Soviet tanks, what do you think of the BT series, Marcus?

The BT series was of course significant as predecessors of the T-34. The Soviets also thought that the BT-7 was their best tank before the T-34 and KV-1. The BT series was more reliable than the T-26 and much faster, but had the same basic weakness of very thin armor, which provided protection against rifle caliber (< 10 mm) weapons only. All anti-tank guns and most anti-tank rifles could penetrate the BT-7 armor easily, guns even at long ranges. That is the reason why the BT-7 did not really distinguish itself from other Soviet light tanks in 1941. It was theoretically well suited for fast exploitation, but there were not many openings for such operations in 1941 and 1942. The closest Western equivalent of the BT-7 were the early British cruiser tanks up to the Cruiser Mk VI Crusader (A15), which were also fast but too lightly armored. (In fact the earliest cruisers had even less armor than the BT-7, but the Crusader had a bit more.)

[Elfdart]

Here is one interesting criticism of the T-34 as a superior tank:
http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters2.html

But how does that compare to other Allied medium tanks? I don't think it's much of an indictment to say the T-34 often got whacked by German AT guns, unless other tanks fared better when they got hit.

[Stuart]

Here is one interesting criticism of the T-34 as a superior tank:
http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters2.html

That might just be about the worst piece of statistical analysis I've ever read and believe me, I've read some doozies. Cherry-picked data manipulated to give a pre-determined conclusion. I don't know what is more embarrassing, the fact that somebody wrote it or somebody else quoted it.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Here is one interesting criticism of the T-34 as a superior tank:
http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters2.html

That might just be about the worst piece of statistical analysis I've ever read and believe me, I've read some doozies. Cherry-picked data manipulated to give a pre-determined conclusion. I don't know what is more embarrassing, the fact that somebody wrote it or somebody else quoted it.

The poster in question has shown in the past to cherry pick statistics...

[Marcus Aurelius]

Here is one interesting criticism of the T-34 as a superior tank:
http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters2.html

That might just be about the worst piece of statistical analysis I've ever read and believe me, I've read some doozies. Cherry-picked data manipulated to give a pre-determined conclusion. I don't know what is more embarrassing, the fact that somebody wrote it or somebody else quoted it.

I didn't see him present any methodology but just conclusions. His criticism concerning the two man turret and poor vision devices of the T-34-76 is of course still correct, but the whole essay seems to lack understanding of tactics and training issues. He does mention them but basically just handwaves them away. A tank is just a weapon system and only as good as the men who use them and the leaders who decide the tactics allow them to be.

The sad fact is that for the most of the war and especially before 1944 the Soviet tank crews were not as well trained as their German counterparts and tank tactics lacked sophistication. This improved only slowly and we probably have to go all the way to Autumn 1944 before the Soviets finally started to match the Germans on tactical level.

The author also conveniently forgets that unless the attacker is tactically clearly superior, the attacker is expected to suffer higher losses even if no serious errors are made. In 1941 and 1942 the Germans really were tactically superior and thus were able to inflict higher losses on the Soviets while attacking, but the Soviets, while slowly learning and improving their tactics, relied mostly on numerical superiority and strategic prowess to defeat the Germans. Numerical superiority is of course often the result of better strategy; the Soviets were able to have superior numbers on tactical and operational level because Stavka was very good at strategic deception.

All in all I would not say that the article is complete bullshit, but the conclusions are clearly wrong and based on myopic analysis of the facts.

[K. A. Pital]

The statistics measuring on the T-34s lost to all causes compared to German tanks lost to all causes is just... the worst fucking butchering of statistics I've ever seen. He tries to do a better job later with the analysis of what amount of T-34 losses came from what caliber fire, but he still doesn't explain which amount came from tanks par se, which is critical. To say that Germans used guns better is not the same as to say the T-34 was inferior. So yeah, the guy's methodology is one big huge error. But then, what should one expect from "mythbusters", heh.

[MKSheppard]

Comrade Stas; how much do Soviet tankist memoirs talk about the death rate for T-34s?

Much of the perception of the Sherman as being a deathtrap got built up by postwar memoirs and other stuff about how their rounds bounced off panthers and tigers -- and the Sherman's two guns (75mm and 76mm) are pretty much equivalent give or take a few mm in penetration or what with the T-34's 76mm and 85mm.

[Marcus Aurelius]

The statistics measuring on the T-34s lost to all causes compared to German tanks lost to all causes is just... the worst fucking butchering of statistics I've ever seen. He tries to do a better job later with the analysis of what amount of T-34 losses came from what caliber fire, but he still doesn't explain which amount came from tanks par se, which is critical. To say that Germans used guns better is not the same as to say the T-34 was inferior. So yeah, the guy's methodology is one big huge error. But then, what should one expect from "mythbusters", heh.

The basic assumption would be that most combat losses of tanks in WW2 were caused by towed guns instead of other AFVs. All operational research I have seen supports that conclusion until the end of the war, although the percentage of AFVs destroyed by other AFVs naturally increases towards the end of the war with all sides fielding increasing numbers of assault guns and tank destroyers. German tanks destroyed by the US Army is the notable exception caused by the tank destroyer doctrine and general secondary importance of towed AT guns in the US Army.

The Germans were very skilled in using the towed AT guns and even found out ways to use them offensively in the form of the retreat ruse by tanks, which worked against the British for a remarkably long time and although evidence from the Eastern Front is more sketchy, it also seemed to work against the Soviets at least in 1941 and 1942. It must also be noted that particularly in 1942 the 50 mm L/60 PaK 38 could kill the T-34 frontally, because APCR ammunition was supplied to the AT guns after the debacles of 1941 and with APCR they could kill the T-34 frontally up to 300 meters without too much problems, giving turrets hits even farther away. Shortage of tungsten did not start to seriously limit the use APCR ammunition until 1943.

[Stuart]

The statistics measuring on the T-34s lost to all causes compared to German tanks lost to all causes is just... the worst fucking butchering of statistics I've ever seen.

Grazhdanin Stas, there is no need to be tactful. The butchering of statistics is much worse than you imply.

To make this analysis valid, one would have to take the losses of tanks on each side and split them down by cause. One would also have to find out how many tanks on each side were recovered and put back into service after being "lost". One would also have to dig deeply into the records and find out exactly how each side defined a "lost" tank.

Then one would have to do that for every year. Why that's critical is because the structure of losses changed darmatically in 1944/45. In 1941 the prime causes of tank losses were tanks, anti-tank guns, tank destroyers and mines (don't ask me which order they fall in). In 1944, the prime causes of tank losses suffered by the Russians were the above plus hand-held anti-tank weapons like Panzerfaust and Panzerschrenk. Beevor states (in his book on Berlin) that, by late 1944 these hand-held weapons were inflicting the majority of losses suffered by allied (US, British and Russian) tank crews. This is pretty mcuh confirmed by other sources. That single fact destroys the whole so-called analysis.

However, if the author presented this analysis in support of a job application here, we would, at least, learn one interesting thing about him. Whether he bounced when we kicked his ass through the door.

[Marcus Aurelius]

To make this analysis valid, one would have to take the losses of tanks on each side and split them down by cause. One would also have to find out how many tanks on each side were recovered and put back into service after being "lost". One would also have to dig deeply into the records and find out exactly how each side defined a "lost" tank.

Then one would have to do that for every year. Why that's critical is because the structure of losses changed darmatically in 1944/45. In 1941 the prime causes of tank losses were tanks, anti-tank guns, tank destroyers and mines (don't ask me which order they fall in). In 1944, the prime causes of tank losses suffered by the Russians were the above plus hand-held anti-tank weapons like Panzerfaust and Panzerschrenk. Beevor states (in his book on Berlin) that, by late 1944 these hand-held weapons were inflicting the majority of losses suffered by allied (US, British and Russian) tank crews. This is pretty mcuh confirmed by other sources. That single fact destroys the whole so-called analysis.

There is little doubt that at least before 1944 the most important cause of permanent combat losses were towed guns, which in the case of Soviets included dual purpose guns such as the 76 mm ZiS-3. Heavier field artillery pieces were sometimes used for AT work as well, for example in Kursk. Mines caused a lot of mobility kills, but much less permanent losses. The infantry AT weapons were short ranged1, so their importance increased greatly on terrains like the Normandy bogace and of course urban combat towards the end of 1944 and in 1945. They were also very useful in forests. Still, I would hate to draw any wider conclusions from that and I think their relative importance during the last months of the war was caused in part by Hitler's insistence on "fortress cities" and such, which increased the amount of urban combat beyond what it would have otherwise been.

1 The most numerous infantry AT weapon variants (Faustpatrone and Panzerfaust 30) had an effective range of 30 meters only and even the most long ranged one, the Panzerschreck, had an effective range of only 200 meters.

[Mr Bean]

.

1 The most numerous infantry AT weapon variants (Faustpatrone and Panzerfaust 30) had an effective range of 30 meters only and even the most long ranged one, the Panzerschreck, had an effective range of only 200 meters.

Effective range of 100 meters on Mr Panzerschreck because the rocket was not the most stable thing in the world. Also left off the Panzerfaust 30's bigger brothers the almost as common Panzerfaust 60 and it's rare late war brother the Panzerfaust 100.

However it should be noted because of the design of the rocket's war-heads that a Panzerfaust/Panzershreck hit was nearly always deadly and nearly always a one shot kill compared to the lighter American Bazooka's and Piats and of how the Germans employed their rocket AT weapons, particularly the Panzerfaust. As a one-shot disposable anti-tank tube they were handed out in job lots to pretty much anyone who might run into a tank and any old idiot could use them including the allies. From my own family history every dispatch rider tried to have one or two on hand and the US two man bazooka teams tried to carry one along for use against heavier German armors like the Tiger which a bazooka would have issues with.

There came the downside because reprisals were much more likely if you had a panzerfaust on you if you were captured.